Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. Nos. 76283, 76284, 76285
Sepulveda, J.
Angel B. (mother) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing as to her three children (six-year-old L., four-year-old A., and two-year-old A.) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother claims that (1) the juvenile court should have ordered that the minors be returned to her, (2) the court failed to make required factual findings to support its determination that returning the minors to her care would be detrimental, and (3) real party in interest San Mateo County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to provide her with reasonable reunification services. We disagree and deny the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 25, 2005, mother’s two older children (her then three-year-old son L. and two-year-old son A.) were found by Burlingame police sitting on a bare mattress on the floor of a hotel room wearing nothing but diapers. The room smelled of urine and feces, bags with garbage and diapers were found in a corner, there was no food in the refrigerator, and no clean clothes were available for the children. Mother and the minors’ presumed father, Lionel B. (father), were arrested for child endangerment and child neglect. Mother was convicted of child endangerment and sentenced on May 8, 2006, to four years’ supervised probation. She was also ordered to attend one year of child abuse counseling. Father, who is not a party to this petition, was ordered to have no contact with L. or A.
The Agency learned about the possible neglect of all three minors (mother’s daughter A. was born in 2006) when it received a referral on June 22, 2006. Mother was arrested again a few days later for being under the influence of a controlled substance. The probation department then ordered mother to submit to random drug tests, and to participate in a drug diversion program and substance abuse counseling.
On September 26, 2006, mother entered into a voluntary contract with the Agency that called for her to comply with the terms of her probation, participate in a substance abuse assessment, follow the recommendations for drug treatment, submit to random drug tests, participate in individual counseling and parenting education classes, and comply with the no-contact order prohibiting father from seeing the minors. Within weeks, however, mother failed to submit to random drug tests, then tested positive for methamphetamine, and allowed father back into her home with the minors. She was arrested on October 30, 2006, for violating the terms of her probation, and the minors were taken into protective custody.
On November 1, 2006, the Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions as to all three minors. Petitions were filed pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) as to all three minors; the petition as to the youngest child, A., was also filed pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling). The petitions alleged that the minors had been subject to child neglect and endangerment because of mother’s substance abuse. The minors were ordered detained.
The minors were first placed with their maternal great-grandmother, but were removed after it was reported that the great-grandmother was allowing father to live at her apartment. The great-grandmother reported that she had been scared to tell anyone, because father had physically abused her on several occasions and had given her two black eyes in 2006. L. reported in December 2006 that he had seen his grandmother and father “ ‘fight, wrestle, and yell’ ” the previous night, and that father had punched L. in the stomach and face at some point. The Agency filed amended petitions (pursuant to the same code sections) as to the minors on December 27, 2006, to add allegations that the children had been exposed to domestic violence, based on father’s physical abuse of mother and the minors’ great-grandmother. Mother’s son A. was eventually placed in a separate home from L. and her daughter A. because of his behavioral issues.
The Agency reported in a jurisdiction/disposition report that father’s history of domestic violence included an arrest in 2005 after he grabbed mother and physically detained her against her will. Police interviewed mother, who reported that father “had a very bad temper and had pushed her in the past.” The juvenile court sustained the amended petitions on February 1, 2007, and ordered that the minors remain detained outside the parents’ home. The court ordered reunification services for both parents, and approved a case plan that called for mother to address her substance abuse and domestic violence issues.
Mother’s probation officer reported that mother was to serve jail time if she did not enroll in a residential substance abuse treatment program by March 11, 2007, which she had been ordered to do after she tested positive for methamphetamine the previous October. She failed to enroll, and she was arrested on March 16. She was sentenced to eight months in jail, with the understanding that she could be released sooner if she entered a residential treatment center.
Mother was released from jail on May 14, 2007, and entered a treatment program through the San Mateo County probation department. She has tested negative for drugs ever since. Mother’s substance abuse counselor reported in August 2007 that mother had “developed an ability to set boundaries, gain confidence, and improve her self-esteem.” Mother secured employment at a retail store in September 2007, and continued to attend group sessions for her treatment program.
Following a contested six-month review hearing over two days in October 2007, the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to father. The court continued the minors as dependent children, and ordered additional reunification services for mother.
The Agency filed a status review report dated December 18, 2007 and an addendum report dated February 25, 2008 in advance of the 12-month hearing that is the subject of the instant writ. The Agency reported that mother resided with her sister. She planned to move in with her mother (the minors’ grandmother) so that she could seek parenting support from her. Mother “sometimes” had contact with father, but she reported that that “she does not really know what he is doing.” Mother commented, however, that she did not understand the reasoning behind limiting father’s visits or terminating his reunification services.
With respect to dealing with her substance abuse, the Agency acknowledged that mother had attended her treatment program, had made substantial progress with treatment services, was reportedly committed to maintaining her sobriety, and was on track to graduate from her treatment program in May 2008. In fact, it is undisputed that her progress has been “excellent and outstanding.”
With respect to obtaining appropriate counseling, the Agency reported on mother’s past failure to follow through with receiving mental health services, but noted that mother reported she met with a new counselor for the first time on November 6, 2007. The counselor reported in February 2008 that she had worked with mother on “ ‘relapse prevention’ ” to reinforce what she had learned in her treatment program, and that mother had been “ ‘attentive, responsible, and ha[d] shown up’ ” for individual counseling.
With respect to parenting classes, the Agency reported that mother started classes in September 2007; her probation officer reported that she had not been able to start until she secured employment and was able to pay for the sessions. The director of the program reported that mother attended seven parenting classes in 2007 and showed some insight into her situation; however, she did not return after a session on December 15, 2007, and was considered terminated from the program.
With respect to domestic violence education, the Agency reported that as of October 24, 2007, mother had not begun her required domestic violence education and counseling. A social worker referred mother to receive domestic violence counseling through the Community Overcoming Relationship Abuse (CORA) or through the Anger Management and Domestic Abuse Treatment Center (Treatment Center), where mother was then taking parenting classes. Mother reported on October 29 that she planned to participate in domestic violence counseling at the Treatment Center, because she learned that there was an “all women’s support group” there. However, in early December the director of the Treatment Center reported that his classes were aimed at treating offenders, as opposed to victims like mother. The new social worker who was assigned to mother’s case in November referred mother to CORA on December 4, 2007. As of February 25, 2008 (the date of the 12-month hearing), mother had not participated in a domestic violence program. She reportedly told a social worker that she did not feel it was necessary, and that she did not feel she had to do it.
Finally, with respect to supervised visitation, the Agency reported that mother brought appropriate activities and snacks for the minors, and that it appeared that family members enjoyed their visits. Mother was consistent in attending the visits, and it was clear that the minors were bonded to her. However, she was visibly overwhelmed and tired at the end of her two-hour visits, and she struggled to manage the three minors independently.
The Agency concluded that “[i]t continues to be a concern whether [mother] has the ability to follow through with the boundaries she sets with [father] to ensure her own safety as well as to protect the children. . . . It would be a detriment to the children to return home to the mother as she has not made progress or shown that she is prepared to provide for her three needy children in a domestic-violence free environment.” The Agency cited the fact that father had called a social worker from mother’s home, and the fact that mother had failed to follow through with domestic violence counseling. A social worker also noted that mother had “not yet demonstrated growth in her ability to follow through with appointments, a task that is essential to parenting three children [with] medical, developmental, and educational needs.”
At the contested 12-month hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from two social workers who had been assigned to mother’s case. They acknowledged that mother had made significant progress in addressing her substance abuse; however, she had failed to follow through on receiving counseling to address the fact that she was a victim of domestic violence and came from a family with a history of such abuse. Mother told one social worker that “she didn’t feel that domestic violence was an issue . . . .” The juvenile court “applaud[ed]” mother’s efforts to deal with her substance abuse issues, but found that mother had not done enough to address the domestic violence in her life. The court terminated reunification services as to mother and ordered a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing as to the minors. Mother filed a timely notice of her intent to seek writ relief.
II.
Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence That Return Of Minors Would Be Detrimental.
Mother first argues that the juvenile court erred by not returning the minors to her custody, and that there was “no evidence” to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that there was a substantial risk of detriment to the minors if they were returned to her care. “ ‘At the dispositional hearing, and at each review hearing prior to permanency planning, there is a statutory presumption that the child will be returned to parental custody. . . . At 6-, 12-, and 18-month review hearings the juvenile court must return the child to the custody of the parent unless it determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.’ ” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789, quoting In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308; see also § 366.21, subd. (f) [12-month hearing].) “The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) We review the juvenile court’s determination of detriment for substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination. Although mother’s progress in addressing her substance abuse is laudable, the fact remains that she failed to follow through with obtaining domestic violence counseling as set forth in her case plan. Perhaps more significantly, she did not appreciate that domestic violence was even an “issue” in her life, despite the fact that father had a history of abusing her and members of her family, including her son L. This was a major obstacle to showing that she could provide a home to her minors in a “domestic-violence free environment.”
This case is readily distinguishable from David B. v. Superior Court, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 768, upon which mother relies. In that case, unlike here, the father had done “virtually everything” requested of the social services agency, “and then some.” (Id. at p. 772.) The David B. court stressed that in dependency proceedings, we are concerned about a parent’s “grasp of the important parenting concepts,” including a child’s need for “freedom from violence,” something that mother apparently has not yet grasped in this case. (Id. at p. 790, italics added.) The juvenile court did not err when it found that there was a substantial risk of harm to the minors if they were returned to mother’s care.
B. No Failure To Make Required Findings.
We also reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court failed to specify the factual basis for its conclusion that returning the minors to mother would be detrimental. (§ 366.21, subd. (f) [juvenile court shall specify at permanency hearing the factual basis for conclusion that return of minor would be detrimental].) Even if the issue was not waived for failure to object at the hearing (as the Agency argues) (In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886), we conclude that there was no error. The juvenile court set forth the reasons it concluded that mother had failed to address the significant domestic violence in her life, stating that “it’s obvious in reading these reports here that domestic violence is a major component of why these children are at risk. [¶] I find that while, arguably—and it’s understandable in these times of budget constraints and personnel deal [sic] that we’ll do certain[ly] what will we call it? Boilerplate statements, but there is enough here that would suggest to me that reasonable services have been provided to you over the period of time and an effort was made to try to improve your circumstances. I don’t have to deal with the father at this point, but I don’t feel that you have made substantial progress here. [¶] You have blown off any of the domestic violence part. You still have obviously some affection for the father of the children, which I understand, but you can’t let him be around. You haven’t developed the skills to deal with the domestic violence at this point. That’s what’s animating the difficulty for your children. [¶] As a result—and I don’t see there is a substantial probability of returning the children in the near future given your failures there.” (Italics added.) This statement sufficiently set forth the finding that because mother had failed to address her domestic violence issues, the minors would continue to be “at risk” if they were returned to her.
C. Agency Provided Reasonable Services To Mother.
Mother also argues that the Agency did not provide adequate reunification services to her. In reviewing mother’s claim that adequate reunification services were not provided, “our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.” (Angela S. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) In so doing, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s findings regarding the adequacy of services and the reasonableness of the agency’s efforts. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
A proper reunification plan must be tailored to the specific needs of a family and designed to eliminate the conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding, and the court must monitor the plan through periodic review. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474; In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1787; In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) “In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
Those requirements were met here. Mother briefly focuses on the delay in referring her to an appropriate domestic violence course. She simply ignores the fact that even after receiving a referral to an appropriate program, she failed to follow through and sign up, and she failed to even appreciate the need for services in the first place. Even assuming that in an ideal world the Agency would have identified an appropriate domestic violence program sooner (which is not a basis for granting relief), the fact remains that there is no evidence that mother would have followed through, given her failure to acknowledge she had to address this issue. In light of the fact that mother did not comply with this aspect of her case plan even after the Agency identified a program for her to attend, we conclude that services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) The juvenile court did not err in terminating services to mother.
The juvenile court stated that it was “a little shocked” at the Agency’s general lack of knowledge about the programs offered to its clients. At one point the court had the following exchange with a testifying social worker: “Q. I am familiar with [the director of the Treatment Center]. Sounds like you don’t know what his course covers. Right? [¶] A. I don’t know specifically what his course covers. [¶] Q. Then why would you refer them for that particular course? [¶] A. Because I have heard that clients use the service there, and that they are successful from the courses that he is teaching them and that they move on and graduate and are—and have learned parenting skills from his course. [¶] Q. You are not helping me here— [¶] A. I’m sorry. [¶] Q. —in this. Nobody is. [¶] I need to know what it was that was covered by this course that might deal with her ability, mom’s ability, to deal with domestic violence that occurs in her presence, affects her directly or her children.”
III.
Disposition
Mother’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(i).) This decision shall be final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(2)(A).) The request for a stay of the section 366.26 hearing to be held on June 11, 2008, is denied as moot.
We concur: Reardon, Acting P.J.. Rivera, J.