Summary
holding that teachers “stand in loco parentis toward a pupil” in matters of discipline and security
Summary of this case from Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch.Opinion
A teacher stands in loco parentis toward a pupil. He must maintain discipline, and he may use reasonable means to compel compliance if a pupil disobeys his orders. This rule of reasonableness also applies to measures employed to counteract the effect of a violent outburst on the part of a pupil where the teacher would otherwise be humiliated in the eyes of his pupils and the order and discipline of the school would be seriously affected. Whether the means employed by a teacher to enforce discipline are reasonable presents a question of fact. After the plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old boy, had become unruly in class, the teacher, the defendant, escorted him from the room. The plaintiff then became loud and profane and, upon reaching a point away from the other pupils, assumed a threatening attitude and uttered a vulgar remark. The defendant, believing that he was about to be struck, slapped the plaintiff across the face with the back of his hand. Held that it could not be said that the defendant's action was unreasonable or improper as a matter of law. Since the slapping was not by way of punishment, a rule of the local board of education against corporal punishment by a teacher was unimportant to the decision of the case. On the issue whether the conduct of the defendant was justifiable, the temper, character and past conduct of the plaintiff in school, if known to the defendant, were relevant.
Argued April 2, 1958
Decided April 29, 1958
Action to recover damages for an assault and battery, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Healey, J.; judgment for the defendant and appeal by the plaintiff. No error.
The appellant filed a motion for reargument which was denied.
Anthony E. Grillo, for the appellant (plaintiff).
John N. Reynolds, with whom were Frank J. Kinney, Jr., and, on the brief, Edward M. Reynolds, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff, a pupil in the Fair Haven Junior High School in New Haven, brought this action by his father as next friend to recover damages for personal injuries which he alleged he had suffered from an assault and battery by the defendant, a teacher in the school.
The plaintiff seeks to correct the finding by striking out seven of the thirteen paragraphs of subordinate facts and substituting substantially all of his draft finding. We cannot retry the case. The finding of subordinate facts lacks clarity, however, and we can resort to the memorandum of decision and to the evidence printed in the appendices to gain a clearer understanding of the scope of the inquiry at the trial and the basis of the decision. Kriedel v. Krampitz, 137 Conn. 532, 535, 79 A.2d 181; State v. Luria, 100 Conn. 207, 212, 123 A. 378; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., 131, 152. On December 22, 1953, the defendant was in charge of the so-called detention room in the school. The plaintiff, a boy fifteen years of age, was, with other pupils, committed to his charge. The plaintiff was an unruly pupil and created a disturbance. The defendant took him by the arm, intending to lead him from the room, but the plaintiff pulled his arm away and became loud and profane. The defendant escorted him from the room in order to talk to him privately. When they had reached a place away from other pupils, the plaintiff clenched his fists, assumed a belligerent attitude, and uttered a vulgar remark to the defendant. The defendant, believing that the plaintiff intended to strike him, slapped the plaintiff across the face with the back of his hand. As the teacher in charge of the detention room, the defendant was under a duty to maintain order. The trial court concluded, in effect, that the defendant did no more than was reasonably necessary to restrain the plaintiff's threatened violence and to maintain discipline.
A teacher stands in loco parentis toward a pupil. He must maintain discipline, and if a pupil disobeys his orders it is his duty to use reasonable means to compel compliance. Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 483, 2 A. 841; Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497, 123 A.2d 747. Whether the means taken by a teacher to enforce discipline are reasonable presents a question of fact under all the circumstances. Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 580, 36 A.2d 377; Sheehan v. Sturges, supra, 482. The plaintiff claims that the defendant in punishing him violated a rule of the New Haven board of education that corporal punishment can be inflicted only by the principal of a school in the presence of a teacher. The plaintiff assigns error because the fact that there was such a rule was not included in the finding. This was apparently an admitted and undisputed fact, but the refusal of the trial court to include it in the finding cannot affect the result. The defendant acted, not for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but to restore order and discipline. It is manifest from all the facts and circumstances that unless the defendant had taken prompt and effective action in the face of the plaintiff's sudden and violent outburst, he would have been humiliated in the eyes of his pupils and the order and discipline of the school would have been seriously affected. In such a situation, the same rule of reasonableness governing the conduct of a teacher applies. Calway v. Williamson, supra. It cannot be said that the action taken by the defendant was unreasonable or improper as a matter of law.
The plaintiff claims error in rulings on evidence. In discussing these, we must first dispose of the plaintiff's assignment of error directed to the failure of the court to incorporate in the finding any information relating to these rulings. The plaintiff had included requested findings relating thereto in his draft finding. It was the obvious duty of the court to make a finding presenting the rulings. Practice Book 405. Accordingly, the paragraphs in the plaintiff's draft finding concerning the rulings on evidence, corrected to conform to the evidence properly before us, are made a part of the finding. There was testimony pertaining to the plaintiff's poor grades as a student, his difficulties with another teacher, and occasions when he had been reprimanded. The plaintiff objected to it as being irrelevant. This testimony was elicited from the plaintiff on cross-examination. It was one of his main contentions that the conduct of the defendant was unjustifiable. On this issue the temper, character and past conduct of the plaintiff in school, if known to the defendant, were clearly relevant. Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 484, 2 A. 841. The guidance director of the school offered a written record which she had made of the plaintiff's school activity and of incidents pertaining to his misbehavior in the past. The plaintiff objected to the offer on the ground that the record was incompetent and irrelevant. It was clearly relevant. The objection that the evidence was incompetent, without stating why, was, on the situation confronting the court, altogether too general to warrant consideration on appeal. See McCarthy v. Maxon, 134 Conn. 170, 173, 55 A.2d 912; Practice Book 155. The defendant was asked if he had had conversations with other teachers about the plaintiff's temper, manners and demeanor. The court allowed the question, but the answer was not responsive, the defendant stating that the plaintiff had no respect for teachers generally. An exception was taken, but no motion to strike the answer was made. The ruling was correct because the question called simply for an answer, yes or no. If the plaintiff desired to have the answer stricken, he should have made a motion to that effect on the ground that it was not responsive. No error can be based upon the court's ruling.