Opinion
Case No. 3:03CV7023
June 17, 2003
ORDER
This is a suit by an employer, American Standard, Inc., against the union representing its employees, Local 7A, GMP of the of the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics Allied Workers International Union. Pending is the union's motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion shall be granted.
According to the complaint, the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and union was to expire on May 1, 2002, at 12:00 a.m. Three of four prior collective bargaining agreements had been ratified without a vote of membership. Those ratification had been based on the agreement of the union's bargaining committee, which the employer understood to be effective, provided a the bargaining committee includes a representative of the International Union.
Negotiations that had commenced on April 3, 2002, had led to tentative agreement on several issues. On April 30, 2002, the employer presented its final offer. The union's bargaining committee accepted that offer, subject to several additional items that the union wanted in the agreement. After midnight on April 30th, the employer accepted those items. The bargaining committee ratified the agreement.
The following morning, the union repudiated the agreement, which it refers to as the "Company Contract" and demanded that the prior agreement be extended three years. For purposes of its motion to dismiss, the union agrees that the parties have, despite the union's May 1st renunciation of the Company Contract, operated under its terms and conditions.
The employer brings this suit under § 185(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which provides in pertinent part that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court. . . ." The company contends that a contract was formed when it accepted the additional items which the union demanded be accepted when its bargaining committee ratified the employer's final proposal. The company contends, further, that the union' notice of repudiation breached the contract.
The union claims that no contract was formed, though it agrees, for purposes of this motion that the parties are working under the terms and agreement of the contract.
This dispute, along with other issues, is also the subject of an NLRB complaint filed by the union. That complaint is scheduled for a hearing on June 16, 2003, though a motion to postpone that hearing until July 21, 2003, is pending before the Board.
The union's motion claims that this court does not have jurisdiction under § 185, because that provision only extends to suits for "violations of contracts." This suit, the union argues, is not based on a violation of a contract because the terms of the Company Contract are being implemented without regard to the union's repudiation of that contract.
In response, the employer claims that the union's renunciation of the contract constitutes a breach that is actionable under § 185(a). According to the employer, the union is in violation of the contract by virtue, without more, of its morning-after repudiation.
In Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Intern. Union, 523 U.S. 653, 656 (1998), the Supreme Court held that "`Suits for violation of contracts' under § 301(a) are not suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim a contract has been violated." The Court also noted however, that "if, in the course of deciding whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief for the defendant's alleged violation of a contract, the defendant interposes the affirmative defense that the contract was invalid, the court may, consistent with § 301(a), adjudicate that defense." Id. at 658.
Here, however, the employer is not claiming a specific breach one or more terms of the Company Contract, which both parties are implementing and by which they are abiding. The claim of violation arises from the union's repudiation of the contract in toto. Thus, the employer is, in essence, seeking a determination of the contract's validity: i.e., whether the union's repudiation is well-founded.
I agree with the union that the gravamen of its motion to dismiss is a "factual," rather than a "facial" challenge to the complaint. On its face, the jurisdictional allegation of the complaint is adequate. The union challenges, however, the adequacy of the underlying factual allegations. See generally U.S. v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994).
Determination of whether the union properly repudiated the contract depends on whether the course of the negotiations resulted in a binding collective bargaining agreement. The NLRB, as the Court noted in Textron Lycoming, has primary jurisdiction to resolve disputes "arising from the collective bargaining process." 523 U.S. at 662. Moreover, as the Court also pointed out in that case,
The fact that the Board undoubtedly has more expertise in the collective bargaining area than federal judges provides an additional reason for concluding that Congress meant what it said in § 301(a) and for rejecting the . . . broad reading of the `suits for violations of contracts' language.
Id.
In light of the foregoing, the union's alternative request that this proceeding be stayed is moot. Likewise moot, for purposes of this proceeding, is the issue of whether to strike allegations in the complaint relating to a communication from the mediator employed by the parties to facilitate their negotiations.
It light of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED THAT the motion of the defendant to dismiss be, and the same hereby is granted.
So ordered.