From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

American Federation of State, County v. City of Merced

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Apr 13, 2009
No. F055174 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County No. 149334, Ronald W. Hansen, Judge.

Law Offices of Linda L. Daube and Linda L. Daube for Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Bennett & Sharpe, Barry J. Bennett and Thomas M. Sharpe for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

CORNELL, Acting P.J.

The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District 57 Local 2703 (the Union) filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking an order requiring the City of Merced and James Marshall, the city manger of the City of Merced (collectively, the City), to comply with the memorandum of understanding (the MOU) into which the City and the Union had entered. The trial court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandate. The City appeals, raising various procedural arguments, as well as asserting the trial court’s judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The City employed Aarin Garrison and Jeff Bennyhoff, members of the Union, as Network Technicians II. At first, Garrison was supervised by Bill Cross, who was classified as a Network Administrator. Cross resigned his position in 2003 and Garrison, later joined by Bennyhoff, assumed Cross’s duties. In essence, the Union’s position was that since Garrison and Bennyhoff performed the same work as Cross, they should be classified as Network Administrators with commensurate pay.

The City argued that the responsibilities taken over by Garrison and Bennyhoff did not include those required of a Network Administrator, primarily the lack of management tasks and supervision of outside vendors.

The Union initiated a complaint pursuant to the terms of the MOU that governed the relationship between the parties. The matter eventually proceeded to a hearing before the Personnel Board of the City of Merced (the Board). The evidence consisted primarily of the testimony of Garrison, Bennyhoff, and the Director of Information Systems for the City, Jeff Lewis.

Two other employees claimed they also were working outside of their classification and sought additional compensation. The Board determined these employees had not met their burden of proving they were doing so and denied them any relief. This finding was upheld by the city manager. The Union did not seek review of any finding related to that decision. Accordingly, we do not address the evidence related to these claims.

The Board concluded that Garrison and Bennyhoff met their burden of establishing they were working as Network Administrators. The Board reasoned that Garrison took over Network Administrator duties when Cross left and should have been compensated for doing so from the date Cross left the City’s employ. The Board also concluded that since Bennyhoff was sharing job responsibilities with Garrison, he too should be paid as a Network Administrator.

The Board found e-mail messages sent to Garrison from his immediate supervisor, Larry Labendeira, as well as excerpts from Garrison’s performance review, to be persuasive. In one e-mail dated February 12, 2004, Labendeira responded to Garrison’s inquiry about help for the additional responsibilities he had acquired after Cross left the City’s employ. After informing Garrison that the hiring process was continuing, Labendeira added that Lewis wanted to hire a Network Administrator.

In addition, Labendeira told Garrison to not “worry about the projects piling up; your number one priority is to keep the network functioning properly, securely, and safely; everything else is secondary.” In another e-mail dated February 5, 2004 (three months after Cross left), Labendeira stated, “First, I want to commend you on hanging in there thru all the projects and fires that have come up in the past 3 months. You’ve done a good job in taking over the network admin duties, and I hope that we will get you some help (and some proper compensation) in the near future.”

Garrison’s performance reviews indicated an above average level of performance. In the “Comments” section of the review, Labendeira made several relevant references. In the July 18, 2002, review it was noted that Garrison was given responsibility for setting up and maintaining user network accounts and security authorizations, was working directly with the Network Administrator in assisting with many of the network server operations, and that his duties into the network administrative arena were expanding. The summary of this evaluation stated that Garrison’s focus had been shifted to “more network administrative functions, including working on the servers and the network infrastructure.”

The term “network administrative functions” is not synonymous with network administrative duties. A Network Technician, Garrison’s classification, also is required to perform network administrative functions, as is a Network Administrator.

The March 14, 2003, evaluation noted that Garrison “can be counted on to take any and every task presented to him, and see it through [to] its completions with minimal or no supervision.” The evaluation also stated that Garrison “has been working increasingly more with the network administrator on network infrastructure tasks. In doing so, he technically is working above the classification requirements for his position. Doing so has been a needed relief to split some of the duties previously reserved for the network administrator only.” The summary stated that Garrison “is being given more network administrative functions, including working on the servers and the network infrastructure.”

The December 29, 2003, evaluation similarly was complementary. It reiterated the comment about Garrison taking on every task and completing it with minimal supervision. The “Comments” section stated that Garrison “has assumed the responsibilities for all of the network server operations including coordinating net network cabling installs, installing network printers, troubleshooting network problems.…” In addition, it was stated that “in dealings with various issues, both software and hardware related, [Garrison] has had to work with City users and outside agencies (vendors, and other cities), and has represented this department and the [c]ity well in those situations. He has had to handle problems with outside companies … and does so with confidence and professionalism.”

As required by the MOU, the Board’s findings and recommendations were forwarded to the city manager for final decision. The city manager’s decision began with a review of the history of the Information Systems Department in an attempt to explain that some of the job classifications in that department were necessarily “fuzzy.” “Because of this ‘fuzziness,’ job classes are written with significant overlap in duties. Department managers are required to operate their departments within the complement of personnel allocated by the City Council during the budget adoption process. Department managers make every effort to maintain work assignments within the relative class specifications. [¶] However, because an employee may be performing work that is generally referred to in more than one classification does not mean that the employee is working at the higher classification.”

After these general comments, the city manger proceeded to discuss the recommendations made by the Board. As relevant here, the city manger began by discussing the various exhibits referred to by the Board in coming to its conclusions. In the city manager’s opinion, the e-mails and performance reviews discussed above were consistent with Garrison working as a Network Technician and not a Network Administrator. The city manager also reviewed select portions of Garrison’s testimony and concluded that “Based upon the class specifications in evidence and the testimony of [Garrison], it is apparent that [Garrison] is not working under general direction but rather under general supervision and is appropriately serving as a Network Technician II.”

Regarding Bennyhoff, the city manager concluded that since Garrison appropriately was classified as a Network Technician, Bennyhoff also was classified appropriately. He then cited to select portions of the testimony that supported his conclusion, relying primarily on Lewis’s testimony.

The Union filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to vacate the city manager’s decision and reinstate the decision of the Board. After reviewing the record, the trial court issued a statement of decision that concluded that “substantial evidence supports findings that employees Garrison and Bennyhoff were primarily performing duties above their classification and not being compensated appropriately in accordance with the MOU and that the City Manager abused his discretion in making findings regarding Garrison and Bennyhoff that are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Accordingly, the trial court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandate requiring the city manager to set aside his decision and award Garrison and Bennyhoff back pay. In addition, the Union was allowed to seek reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of Government Code section 800.

DISCUSSION

The City contends the trial court erred in numerous respects. We begin with the City’s claim that the Union does not have standing to pursue these claims on behalf of Garrison and Bennyhoff.

I. Standing

The City argues that the Union does not have standing to bring this action. The City recognizes that unions, “as the recognized representative of city employees, may sue in its own name to enforce the memorandum of understanding. [Citations.]” (Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 341 (Glendale City Employees’ Assn.).) Unions have standing because they are beneficially interested in the enforcement of the MOU, i.e., the union has a special interest in insuring the MOU is complied with that is over and above that of the general public. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361-362; Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1515, 1521-1522 (Brotherhood of Teamsters).)

A union’s right to enforce the rights of its members is not absolute, however. In Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n (1977) 432 U.S. 333, 342-343, the Supreme Court held that an association will have standing only if “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Typically, a union member must participate when individual monetary damages are sought. (United Union of Roofers v. Insurance Corp. of Am. (9th Cir. 1990) 919 F.2d 1398, 1400; see also Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1522-1523.)

The City argues that Garrison and Bennyhoff are seeking monetary damages and thus must bring the writ in their own names. In reviewing the petition, it appears that the primary purpose of this action is enforcement of the MOU. The Union seeks to have its members placed in the job classification that is consistent with the tasks they perform. While reclassification necessarily would require calculation of any back pay that may be due, the actual calculation of that amount is not required to resolve this dispute. No one has presented any evidence of a specific amount due. The only issue is the effective date of any reclassification.

Moreover, if we were to find the Union did not have standing to file the petition, we would be endorsing an incredible waste of judicial resources. The Union, naming Garrison and Bennyhoff as petitioners, simply would file a new petition seeking the same relief relying on the same record. Accordingly, we find the Union has standing to pursue this matter.

II. Standard of Review

The City next argues that the trial court utilized an incorrect standard of review, thus leading to an erroneous conclusion. While the parties have cited numerous cases that address the issue, the most relevant decision is Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805 (Fukuda).

Fukuda was a police officer who was terminated from his employment. He pursued his position through the administrative process, where his termination was upheld. A petition for writ of mandate was filed seeking to overturn the administrative decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion to issue the requested writ.

The Supreme Court accepted review to address the appropriate standard for review of administrative proceedings. After a lengthy review of the cases, both preceding and following the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the Supreme Court confirmed that review of administrative boards pursuant to section 1094.5 is subject to the trial court’s exercise of its independent judgment, but “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative finding, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 816-817.) The presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings “‘has the effect of an admonition’” to the trial court, and “provides the trial court with a starting point for review—but it is only a presumption, and may be overcome. Because the trial court ultimately must exercise its own independent judgment, that court is free to substitute its own findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s findings.” (Id. at p. 818.)

The independent judgment rule applies when the final administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right. If the administrative decision does not involve or substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial court reviews the record to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency committed any errors of law. (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 816-817, fn. 8.) Here, the parties appear to agree that the trial court was required to exercise its independent judgment.

The City argues that the trial court improperly applied a substantial evidence standard of review, concluding that the city manager’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court’s reference to the lack of evidence supporting the city manager’s decision does not establish that it reviewed the record only for sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court stated it reviewed the entire record and concluded after that review that the city manager’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. If there was not substantial evidence to support the city manager’s decision, then the Union met its burden of establishing that the city manager’s decision was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court, in exercising its independent judgment, obviously reached this conclusion.

Moreover, whether the presumption of correctness of the administrative findings should be applied in this case is debatable because there were two sets of findings. The Board, which heard the testimony, made findings that Garrison and Bennyhoff were performing the work of Network Administrators and should be classified as such. As the Supreme Court observed 70 years ago in Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, and reiterated in Fukuda, the findings of an agency are presumed correct because they occur after a full formal hearing. “‘Obviously, considerable weight should be given to the findings of experienced administrative bodies made after a full and formal hearing, especially in cases involving technical and scientific evidence.’” (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 812, quoting Drummey, at p. 86.) Here, the findings on which the City bases its argument were not made by the agency body that held the full and formal hearing, but instead were made by the city manager, who referred to the administrative record, but relied in large part on his own understanding of the various job requirements of the Network Administrator and Network Technician positions.

Under the circumstances of this case, it is questionable whether the findings of the city manager should be given a strong presumption of correctness. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the record that suggests the trial court failed to apply the presumption, and then reject it based on the lack of evidence supporting the city manager’s findings. We will not parse words and phrases, as the City asks us to do. Instead, we “‘must conclusively presume that the trial court performed its duty, gave full weight to the presumption of validity of the board’s findings, but nevertheless found against the board on this count.’” (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 812.)

Nor do we find any inconsistency in the trial court’s various rulings. The City asks us to refer to the hearing on the Union’s motion for attorney fees. The Union sought attorney fees pursuant to Government Code section 800. This section permits recovery of up to $7,500 in attorney fees from the public entity if the party prevails at trial and if the party can establish that the “determination of the [administrative] proceeding was the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct by a public entity or an officer thereof.…” (Id., subd. (a).) The trial court denied the request, stating that it could not “find that [the city manager] acted arbitrarily. In order to do that I feel I have to find that he was predisposed with a mind set no matter what the findings of the Personnel Board were that he was going -- didn’t matter what they said, he was going to disregard it.”

The City contends this finding by the trial court precludes a finding of an abuse of discretion by the city manager in the main case. Not so. The trial court’s conclusion that the city manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously does not mean that the trial court concluded that the city manager’s actual conclusion was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. The concepts are entirely different. The city manager could have acted in a diligent and thorough manner in reaching a conclusion but, nonetheless, made a decision that was not supported by substantial evidence, resulting in an abuse of discretion. The City’s attempt to commingle these two distinct concepts fails.

III. The Union Failed to Meet Its Burden of Proof

The City next contends the Union at all times had the burden to prove that the city manager’s decision was contrary to the weight of evidence and failed to carry its burden. This contention correctly sets forth the standard of review before the trial court, but not here. The issue in this court is whether there was substantial evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.)

Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. We “‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could’” find for the prevailing party. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Superior Court (Jones)(1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) We focus on the whole record, not isolated bits of evidence. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1203.) We presume the existence of every fact the trial court reasonably could deduce from the evidence that supports the judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We will not substitute our evaluations of a witness’s credibility for that of the trial court. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078.)

The relevant evidence in this case was provided by Garrison, Bennyhoff, and the job descriptions admitted into evidence by the Board. A Network Administrator is defined as follows:

We recognize that Lewis’s testimony contradicted that of Garrison and Bennyhoff in many respects. Our task, however, is to look for evidence that supports the judgment, not to reweigh the evidence.

“Under general direction, to plan, design, install, maintain, and troubleshoot City computer networks; to work with outside vendors and consultants in the development of computer networks and personal computer resources; to provide training for City staff in the use of personal computers and networks; and to do related work as required.”

“DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS” for the position are stated as follows:

“This is a specialized classification for the positions which have general responsibility for the planning, design, installation, maintenance, and repair of the [c]ity’s computer networks resources. Responsibilities also include providing training for City staff in the capabilities and use of these resources.”

The job description states that this position is not a supervisory classification, but some supervision of staff may be required. The job description includes a long list of “IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL DUTIES.” Examples listed include (1) planning, designing and installing computer networks, (2) development of project timetables, (3) development and maintenance of system records, (4) working with outside vendors in system design, installation, and troubleshooting of the network, and (5) providing lead direction for other technical staff in installation and maintenance of equipment and software.

A Network Technician II position is defined as follows:

“Under general supervision, assists the Network Administrator by installing, maintaining, and troubleshooting computer network software; to configure network software and operating systems; to assist with planning, installing, and maintaining computer networks; to receive and log responses regarding computer problems and respond accordingly; and to do related word as required.”

“DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS” for this position are stated as follows:

“This is the advanced working class of the Network Technician series. Incumbents receive training and perform work of a broader nature, and assignments are more comprehensive, involving trouble-shooting and analysis of network hardware and software problems and determining appropriate solutions. The incumbent is self-motivating and works with little supervision. The incumbent has general responsibility for providing technical support in the installing, configuring, maintaining, and repairing of computer network hardware and software.”

A Network Technician II is not a supervisory classification. Examples of “IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL DUTIES” include (1) providing technical support functions in the installation, maintenance and troubleshooting of computer network hardware and software, (2) installing and configuring upgrades to the computer network hardware and software, (3) handling inquiries at the “Help Desk,” (4) setting up and maintaining user accounts, (5) hardware and software testing, and (6) hardware and software maintenance.

We have the testimony of Garrison and Bennyhoff to compare to these standards, as well as the undisputed fact that when the former Network Administrator, Cross, left his employment with the City, Garrison assumed all of his duties.

Garrison testified that he became a Network Technician II while Cross was still employed by the City. When he was promoted to a Network Technician II, he assumed more responsibility for the network servers -- managing the backup server, the database server, network security permissions, and smaller work group application servers. Cross was responsible for the e-mail servers and made the final decisions regarding the network servers. When Cross left, Labendeira told Garrison he was the acting Network Administrator until a replacement was found. On occasion, Labendeira confirmed that Garrison was the acting Network Administrator. The e-mails from Labendeira to Garrison, discussed above, were introduced into evidence. A Network Administrator has not been appointed to date.

Cross initially supervised Garrison and, after Cross left, Labendeira would follow up on big issues with Garrison. Garrison assumed all of the duties of the Network Administrator and also retained his old duties. New duties that Garrison assumed included managing and administering all of the network servers, network switches, routers, and the wide area connections that connected remote sites to the central office. In addition, Garrison supervised contractors with whom the City worked and made decisions on implementing new hardware and software. Garrison had input on the design of various parts of the network where the contractor did the actual design.

When Lewis started, he wanted more wireless capability and better security. Garrison, Bennyhoff, and outside contractors designed the system. Garrison received assistance from outside vendors only if there was a major problem. Garrison also had input on the City Hall network redesign that was performed by an outside contractor. Garrison was working on project planning and addressed budget issues for that project, although Lewis did the budget work for the department. Garrison also had input in the “I-Net project” and supervised the contractor hired to do the job. Garrison began meeting with vendors, working directly with contractors, and making sure the product met the needs of the department seeking the new product. Garrison also selected contractors for specific projects.

Garrison admitted that he did not give other staff projects on which to work.

In 2004 the City hired Bennyhoff and he and Garrison started sharing job responsibilities, including all of the network administration responsibilities. After Lewis was hired in February 2004, Garrison received more projects instead of day-to-day items. Lewis was involved in all of the projects to some extent, but when his office was moved to a different building, Garrison received less day-to-day supervision. Lewis did not perform the work of a Network Administrator; his job was to manage the department.

Garrison testified that whenever the “PC technicians” had a problem they could not solve, they came to him for assistance. Garrison reviewed the examples of essential duties for a Network Administrator and testified that he performed all of those duties. The Network Administrator’s duties required Garrison to assume more responsibilities, more duties, and work at a higher technical level when compared to a Network Technician II. Garrison identified several training courses he attended to improve his technical expertise.

Bennyhoff joined the department in May 2004. Garrison was managing the network when Bennyhoff arrived. Once Bennyhoff learned the network, he began sharing responsibilities with Garrison. Bennyhoff reviewed the job description for a Network Technician II and stated that many of his job duties were not included in the examples of the “IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL DUTIES” portion of the description. Examples of the type of work he felt was not included in the Network Technician II job description were design and actual implementation, project planning, and some budget planning. Both Garrison and Bennyhoff often worked with vendors when working on a project. They worked with the vendors to solve problems. If strategic planning was involved, however, Lewis or Labendeira would become involved. If strategic planning was not involved, usually Garrison and Bennyhoff completed the project with little or no supervision.

Garrison and Bennyhoff had input on which vendors to use for a particular project, but Lewis and Labendeira had the right to make the final choice. Garrison and Bennyhoff also initiated changes in products or vendors if they found a less expensive alternative. They also were responsible for maintaining all of the network logs.

Garrison and Bennyhoff usually were responsible for designing any new system that came into the city, and, in some cases, working with outside vendors to design the system. Numerous examples were given where Garrison and Bennyhoff worked with outside vendors to make sure that new products or services would work with the network and each other. Usually, once a project was identified, Garrison and Bennyhoff worked with the vendor to ensure the design met the needs of the City and would work with the City’s network.

We recognize that the city manager’s decision concluded that Garrison and Bennyhoff were not performing the tasks of a Network Administrator, and that Lewis testified consistently with the city manager’s decision. But our task is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. There can be no doubt that it does.

Both Garrison and Bennyhoff testified that they worked under what could be described as general direction performing network administration tasks. Lewis would decide what features the network needed and then had Garrison and Bennyhoff implement those plans. Both testified that they worked with vendors in designing and installing portions of the network and designed some portions themselves. Both testified that they trained the PC technicians on how to install some network features. All these tasks are included in the Network Administrator’s job definition. Significantly, both testified that they were the only city employees who were responsible for the network, its maintenance, and ensuring the new projects and features operated correctly. There was no one to perform the Network Administrator’s tasks once Cross left except for Garrison and Bennyhoff. These facts are much more than substantial evidence to support the judgment. The City’s argument to the contrary fails.

IV. Insufficient Evidence for Back Pay Award

The judgment incorporated the statement of decision prepared by the trial court. In the statement of decision, the trial court awarded Garrison Network Administrator compensation beginning November 2003, reduced by a 5 percent merit increase he received on January 5, 2004. Bennyhoff was awarded Network Administrator compensation commencing May 2004. The City argues there was insufficient evidence to support the specific dates on which the increased compensation was to commence.

Garrison’s award of back pay is dated to the month that Cross left the employ of the City. The trial court rationally could have concluded that since Garrison was the only person working on the network at that time, he undertook the responsibility of being the Network Administrator and should be compensated accordingly. The facts supporting this conclusion were undisputed and provided ample support for the award.

Bennyhoff’s award was retroactive to the date he began his employ with the City. The trial court logically could have concluded that he assumed Network Administrator duties when he began his employment because both Bennyhoff and Garrison testified that after a short period (two months) to learn the City’s network, they shared the job equally.

The City argues, however, that the award cannot be upheld because the MOU provides a strict time limitation on monetary awards. Article XII, Section 12.02 of the MOU states, “A grievance shall be barred and not considered if based upon a condition or event which occurred or existed more than fifteen (15) workdays immediately prior to the date on which the grievance is first presented in writing to the immediate supervisor pursuant to Step 2.”

The plain language of this section establishes that it is not intended as a damage limitation provision. The section clearly states that the grievance shall be barred if not filed within 15 days of the occurrence of the event. The City did not assert in the trial court that the grievance should be barred because the event leading to the grievance occurred more than 15 work days before a written claim was submitted to Garrison’s and Bennyhoff’s immediate supervisor. Therefore, to the extent the City claims the grievance should be barred, the claim has been forfeited. To the extent the City claims that compensation awarded to Garrison and Bennyhoff should be limited, the claim is rejected because the section on which the City relies does not limit compensation that may be awarded once a grievance is upheld.

DISPOSITION

The judgment granting the petition of the Union is affirmed. The Union shall recover its costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: DAWSON, J., KANE, J.


Summaries of

American Federation of State, County v. City of Merced

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Apr 13, 2009
No. F055174 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009)
Case details for

American Federation of State, County v. City of Merced

Case Details

Full title:AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT 57…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Apr 13, 2009

Citations

No. F055174 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009)