Opinion
22 Civ. 975 (JPC)
02-07-2022
CARMINE P. AMELIO and ALFONSO AMELIO, Plaintiffs, v. GALIA HOURI and EYAL RONEN, Defendants.
ORDER
JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Alfonso Amelio and Carmine Amelio, who allege that they reside “in both New York, NY and New Milford, CT, ” filed this pro se action invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4-5. They sue Galia Houri and Eyal Ronen, who Plaintiffs allege are residents of New York, id. ¶¶ 2-3, and seek unspecified relief, id. at 11. Plaintiffs paid the filing fees to bring this action. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but grants Plaintiffs 30 days' leave to replead their claims in an amended complaint.
I. Legal Standard
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Moreover, the court “has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim, ” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard, ” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam); see also Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n.3. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court's “special solicitude, ” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible-not merely possible-that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
II. Background
Plaintiffs bring this action under the court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, for “breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, property damages, impersonation, tampering with mail, unauthorized access to plaintiffs' internet account, harassment and negligence.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 1. Plaintiffs' claims arise from Defendants' rental of Plaintiffs' home located at 3228 Schley Avenue, Bronx, New York 10465. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants caused damage to Plaintiffs and their property, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 18, 38, 40, 42, and 44, but Plaintiffs fail to detail the total amount of the damages caused by Defendants.
III. Discussion
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court's jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or, when a plaintiff asserts claims under state law under the Court's diversity jurisdiction. As relevant here, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over a matter when the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
“‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”).
To establish the Court's diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first show that he and the defendant are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court's ‘original' diversity ‘jurisdiction' only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he is domiciled, which is defined as the place where he “has his true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An individual “has but one domicile.” Id.
There is a second component to diversity jurisdiction: the amount in controversy must be in excess of the sum or value of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The sum claimed by a plaintiff will control if it is made in good faith. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The Court can dismiss a complaint for failing to plead that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, but only if there is “a legal certainty from the complaint that the plaintiff cannot recover sufficient damages to invoke [diversity] jurisdiction.” Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982); see Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[I]n determining whether a challenged jurisdictional amount has been met, district courts are permitted only to assess the allegations in a complaint and not the validity of any asserted defenses.”).
Plaintiffs allege that they are citizens of both New York and Connecticut, and that Defendants are citizens of New York. In a prior action before this Court, however, Plaintiff Carmine P. Amelio provided only a New York address. See In Re: Carmine P. Amelio, No. 20 Civ. 3080 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020). Thus, the diversity of the parties is unclear. Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to show that their claims satisfy the jurisdictional amount for a diversity action-an amount in excess of the sum or value of $75,000. Plaintiffs allege $800.00 in plumber costs, $1,516.17 in unpaid rent, and an unspecified sum for property damage. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 8, 10, 18. Thus, it appears that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction to consider this action. In light of Plaintiffs' pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to allege facts showing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction to consider this action.
IV. Leave to Replead
Plaintiffs proceed in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Although it appears that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction to consider this action, in an abundance of caution, the Court grants Plaintiffs 30 days' leave to replead their claims. The amended complaint must contain a short and plain statement showing that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. The Court strongly encourages Plaintiffs to bear in mind the legal principles explained above when preparing their amended complaint. Specifically, Plaintiffs should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiffs want the Court to consider in deciding whether the Court has diversity jurisdiction to consider their claims. Because Plaintiffs' amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiffs want to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
V. Conclusion
The Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). But the Court grants Plaintiffs 30 days' leave to file an amended complaint to allege facts showing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction to consider this action. If Plaintiffs fail to comply with this order within the time allowed, the Court will enter judgment dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
Plaintiffs may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (NYLAG) Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order. The clinic is currently available only by telephone.
The Court instructs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiffs and note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.