Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Sonoma County COUNTY, Super. Ct. No. 2540
Jones, P.J.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, petitioner A.M. (mother) moves to vacate the order issued by the juvenile court following a contested 18-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst., § 366.22) which terminated reunification services as to her daughter, C.R., and set a section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing).
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.R. was born in December 2003. Mother admitted using methamphetamine for approximately four and a half months while she was pregnant with C.R. C.R. suffered from serious mental and physical developmental delays and began receiving services from the North Bay Regional Center (NBRC) in July 2005. A November 2006 Investigation Narrative described C.R. as “very hyperactive” and noted that she “has limited response to verbal communication and directions, has an exceptionally brief attention span, and has poor coordination. According to [NBRC] reports, she . . . is very clumsy. Her use of language appears to be impaired for her age . . . . Her parents report she has seizures, although this has not been medically verified.” C.R. was also diagnosed with a seizure disorder.
On January 3, 2007, C.R. was found wandering by herself near a health club. On January 8, 2007, the Sonoma County Department of Human Services (department) filed a petition alleging that C.R. came within section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), (g), and (j). Specifically, the petition alleged that: (1) mother and S.R. (father) failed to provide adequate medical treatment, adequate supervision, and a safe living environment; (2) mother and father had a history of domestic violence; (3) father had a history of substance abuse; (4) mother exposed C.R. to “illicit” substances; (5) mother had twice been arrested for inflicting corporal injury upon a child (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)); (6) father was incarcerated and unable to care for C.R.; and (7) mother’s parental rights as to C.M., the half-brother of C.R., had been terminated in 2002.
Father is not a party to this action and is mentioned only where relevant to the issues raised in mother’s writ petition. (In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 966, fn. 2.)
At a detention hearing on January 12, 2007, the court found that the department had established a prima facie case and ordered C.R. detained. On February 28, 2007, the department amended the petition. That same day, the parents submitted to jurisdiction and the court adjudged C.R. a dependent of the court. The court concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that C.R. came within section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), (g), and (j).
In a report prepared for the disposition hearing, the department recommended that the court not order family reunification services for either parent. The social worker stated that mother was not offered family reunification services before her parental rights as to C.M. were terminated and that “[t]wo psychological evaluations indicated grave concerns for [mother’s] mental stability.” Following a settlement conference, however, the department agreed to offer reunification services to both parents. On May 14, 2007, the court ordered reunification services. As to mother, the court noted, “[a]lthough mother’s parental rights over [C.M.], a half-sibling of [C.R.], have been terminated, the Court finds that mother has made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to [C.M.’s] removal from mother.”
In a report prepared for the six-month review hearing, the department recommended that family reunification services be continued for both parents. The social worker explained that both mother and father “have demonstrated a true desire to successfully reunify with their daughter,” and that “the desire and effort has been the foundation on [ ] which they have begun building their new clean and sober life together.” The social worker, however, opined that both parents had “a substantial amount of work to complete.” The social worker also noted that C.R. was eligible for, and would be attending, special education preschool due to language and motor skill deficiencies and because of “behavioral concerns . . . .” At the six-month review hearing on August 30, 2007, the court continued family reunification services for both parents.
Before the 12-month review hearing, the department filed a report recommending that family reunification be continued only for mother. The social worker noted that mother “is quite active in her case plan, [but] she has more to achieve.” The social worker explained that mother “has made adequate progress towards alleviating the issues that led this family to the attention of the Dependency Court. [Mother] has begun living a healthier clean and sober life. She has made some positive life changes that are significant in the reunification process. However, . . . [mother] is in need of continued support and services.” The social worker, however, noted C.R.’s developmental delays and explained that “C.R.’s behavior [had] declined since the weekend visits began with [ ] mother” in December 2007. The social worker also noted that C.R.’s teacher was “very concerned about [C.R.’s] behavior.” Following the 12-month review hearing on February 14, 2008, the court continued reunification services as to mother and continued the matter for an 18-month review hearing.
In its report for the 18-month review hearing, the department recommended terminating family reunification services. The social worker explained that mother had been asked to leave the shelter where she had been residing because she had broken the rules several times and ignored staff warnings. According to the report, mother “has experienced a great deal of . . . challenges that seriously affect[ ] her parenting, which ultimately [a]ffects her reunifying with her daughter.” The report chronicled mother’s difficulty complying with the case plan, specifically with following the recommendations of the dependency drug court, cooperating with the social worker, and providing a stable environment for C.R. The report also noted that mother did not take advantage of referrals to a community resource worker and to the Ananda Institute for individual counseling.
The social worker explained that mother had tried to “do everything right to the best of her ability and she loves [C.R.]. Unfortunately, [C.R.]’s needs exceed the ability of [mother] at this point. . . . [C]onsideration of placing [C.R.] with [mother] is not in the best interests of the child.” As the social worker noted, “[a]lthough [mother] desires to have [C.R.] placed home with her, she has honestly admitted with no prompting that she feels less than prepared to provide the necessary care for [C.R] full time.”
The court held a contested 18-month review hearing on July 21, 2008, and on August 1, 2008, and admitted the department’s report into evidence. Barbara Holmes, a special education teacher at C.R.’s school, testified for the department. She stated that C.R. became a student in her special education class in May 2007. When C.R. arrived, she suffered from speech and cognitive delays and was not potty trained. Holmes and her staff worked diligently with C.R. and had made “much progress with her” by December 2007. After Holmes implemented a behavior plan, C.R. no longer ran away from Holmes and had stopped eating off the ground.
But in January 2008, when C.R. returned from Christmas vacation, Holmes immediately noticed that C.R. had started “regressing,” i.e., “exhibiting a lot of really old behaviors; things that [ ] had already [been] addressed and extinguished [in] the months prior.” According to Holmes, C.R. was wetting her pants and eating off the floor. She was “having tantrums, [was] unable to sit still for even two minutes. And she would run away from us; not return. She would bite us, hit us, spit on us, [and have] just screaming tantrums completely out of control.” Holmes described C.R. as not “able to focus.”
Holmes spoke to C.R.’s foster mother, Patricia M., who explained that C.R. had been going on overnight visits with mother and returning “completely out of whack.” Holmes agreed with this assessment and explained that it often took several days — until the middle of the week — for C.R. to get back “on track” and to regain the skills that she had lost over the weekend. In May 2008, Holmes asked to have C.R. attend an additional day of instruction because C.R. had “intense needs” and because her behavior had regressed. Mother initially opposed the request, but eventually agreed to permit C.R. to attend school five days a week.
Holmes testified that she spoke to Patricia M. regularly on the telephone. Mother, however, never called, despite the fact that Holmes told her to “call any time.”
According to Holmes, C.R. needed stability and structure. Holmes testified that those needs were not being met by mother because C.R. was “going [on] visits with her mom, and . . . going to one shelter for two weeks, and then the next week she’s at another shelter for a few weeks, and then the next set of monthly visits are at a different shelter. Those have a horrible impact on [C.R.] in the classroom . . . and they must impact her at home as well.” Holmes testified that she “would recommend fewer visits with [mother]” because she did not think that a homeless shelter would provide C.R. with the stability that she needed. Holmes also testified that C.R. had a lack of muscle control and a tendency to fall easily. Holmes noted that it was important for someone to be near C.R. to prevent her from injuring herself. C.R. returned from visits with mother with “very serious bruises” and “[h]uge scrapes” on her arms. To Holmes, this suggested that mother was not in close proximity to C.R.
Patricia M. testified next. She explained that when she first began to care for C.R. in May 2007, C.R. was rambunctious and destructive, and had “no structuring at all.” But when C.R. began to attend Holmes’s special education class, her behavior improved drastically. C.R. had been potty trained, was eating with a fork and a spoon, and was learning how to give and receive physical affection. C.R. began having overnight visits with mother in December 2007. Shortly before Christmas, C.R. visited mother for the weekend; during Christmas, mother had C.R. for a four or five day visit.
After the overnight visits began, Patricia M. noticed that C.R. “started changing”: she began wetting her pants again and had stopped using a fork and a spoon to eat. Patricia M. also noticed that when C.R. returned from visiting her mother, she had “circles under her eyes” and appeared to be very hungry. Patricia M. testified that overnight visits with mother were detrimental to C.R. because C.R. was not getting the structure she needed.
Yvonne Coleman, C.R.’s social worker, testified that she was asking the court to terminate reunification services and award guardianship to C.R.’s foster mother. Coleman explained that mother was unable to adequately care for C.R. because mother’s home environment was not stable and because mother was still involved in her own recovery. Coleman also opined that it would be detrimental for C.R. to return to mother’s care because mother did not put C.R.’s needs first. Instead, mother addressed C.R.’s needs only when she “g[ot] around to it which could be life or death for C.R.” As Coleman explained, C.R. has “such high needs” that a “second thought about what is safe and what’s not safe for her could be her running in the street and not coming back . . . could be her bumping into a wall and having a head injury. . . . And a second thought is not sufficient for this little girl.”
Calla Burton, a parenting coach, also testified for the department. Burton met with mother and C.R. over a three-and-a-half-month period to teach mother safe parenting techniques. Burton testified that mother’s parenting techniques improved initially but the improvements were not lasting. Burton opined that mother was not able to parent C.R. safely; Burton also testified that she would be concerned for C.R.’s safety if C.R. returned to mother’s care. She stated that mother was “very, very loving to [C.R.]” but that her “level of maturity and lack of stability in her life [were] a really big concern for her ability to separate her own needs from her daughter’s as well as provide structure that [C.R.] needs.”
A friend of mother’s, James Fitzgerald, testified on mother’s behalf. Fitzgerald stated that in the months preceding the hearing, he had seen mother and C.R. together between seven to ten times. According to Fitzgerald, mother appeared to be a patient and loving parent. Fitzgerald testified that he did not believe that C.R. would be in any danger if she were placed in mother’s care. Mother also testified. She testified that she was living at a shelter, that she had a job, and that she was attending Narcotics Anonymous and meeting with a therapist. Mother testified in great detail about how her parenting skills had improved and how she would arrange occupational and speech therapy for C.R. if she were returned to her care. Mother conceded, however, that she had lived in several different places — including shelters, friends’ houses, the YWCA Safe House, and residential substance abuse programs — from January 2007 to June 2008.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the “return of [C.R.] would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable services had been provided or offered to mother. The court terminated family reunification services as to mother and set the .26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that C.R. could not be returned to her without substantial risk of detriment and that reasonable reunification services were offered.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that C.R.’s Return to Mother Would Create a Substantial Risk of Detriment to C.R.
Mother’s first contention is that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that there would be a substantial risk of detriment to C.R. if she were returned to mother’s custody. At the 18-month dependency review hearing, “[t]he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her . . . parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her . . . parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.) We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment under the substantial evidence standard, which means that we “do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228; see also Robert L. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 619, 625 (Robert L.).)
The record contains ample evidence that there would be a substantial risk of detriment to C.R.’s “safety, protection, [and] physical . . . well-being” if she were placed in mother’s care. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) There was abundant evidence that, despite her best efforts, mother was simply unable to provide a safe environment for C.R. At the 18-month review hearing, Holmes and Coleman testified that mother was unable to adequately protect C.R. For example, Holmes testified that C.R. returned from visits with mother with “very serious bruises” and “large scrapes” and Coleman testified that returning C.R. to mother’s care would be detrimental because mother did not put C.R.’s needs first, “which could be life or death for C.R.” As Coleman explained, C.R. has “such high needs” that a “second thought about what is safe and what’s not safe for her could be her running in the street and not coming back . . . could be her bumping into a wall and having a head injury. . . . And a second thought is not sufficient for this little girl.” Coleman also noted that C.R.’s “needs at this time exceed [mother’s] ability to keep her safe. . . .” Coleman explained that C.R. came to school after a visit with mother with a black eye and had other “bruises and marks on her body from falling or not being watched closely.” And Burton testified that mother could not parent C.R. safely. Finally, Patricia M. testified that when C.R. returned from overnight visits with mother, she had “circles under her eyes” and appeared to be very hungry. Together this evidence is more than sufficient to demonstrate a substantial risk to C.R.’s safety, protection, and physical well-being.
There was also a significant evidence demonstrating that returning C.R. to mother’s care would “create a substantial risk of detriment to [C.R.’s] . . . emotional well-being.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) Holmes and Patricia M. testified that C.R.’s behavior regressed severely and significantly after she began to have overnight visits with mother. C.R.’s behavior after the visits was “completely out of whack”: she wet her pants, had tantrums, and ate food off the floor. And Holmes testified that visits with mother were having a “horrible impact” on C.R.
Relying on David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 772 (David B.), mother suggests that the court erroneously based the finding of detriment on her “difficulty in obtaining housing.” In David B., the father lived with his sister and her family and had made an effort — at the direction of his social worker — to prepare his residence for his child. (Id. at p. 793.) The father did “virtually everything” asked of him by the social services agency “and then some.” (Id. at p. 772.) At the 18-month hearing, however, the agency pointed to evidence that the sister’s husband had once committed an act of domestic violence against his own daughter and faulted the father for failing to move out of his sister’s residence. After father conceded that he had no other housing, the juvenile court concluded, among other things, that there was a risk of detriment in placing the child with the father while he remained at his sister’s residence. (Id. at p. 773.)
The David B. court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court erroneously based the detriment finding on the unsuitability of the father’s current residence. The court noted that the record showed that the agency never informed father that it would be necessary for him to obtain another residence to gain custody, and that it had not provided him with any assistance to make such a change. (David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 773-774.) But David B. has no application here because the finding of detriment was not based solely on mother’s unstable living situation. Coleman testified that there was a high risk of detriment to C.R. if she returned to her mother’s care due to several factors, including mother’s lack of maturity and her inability to parent C.R. in a selfless manner. Coleman also testified that mother “ha[d] a difficult time socially,” which would impact C.R.’s ability to develop normal social skills. And, perhaps most importantly, mother admitted that she “[felt] less than prepared to provide the necessary care for [C.R.] full time.”
Another case upon which mother relies, In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1214-1215 (G.S.R.), is also distinguishable. There, the juvenile court terminated a father’s parental rights after a .26 hearing. The appellate court reversed, holding that the juvenile court “improperly terminated parental rights based on [ ] father’s poverty,” (id. at p. 1205) specifically, his “lack of housing.” (Id. at p. 1214.) G.S.R. held that the father’s inability to find housing was insufficient to terminate parental rights because “the record [was] devoid of evidence that, but for his inability to obtain housing, [father was] incapable of adequately parenting his sons. This would seem to indicate he is a fit parent.” (Ibid.) In contrast to G.S.R., there is significant evidence in the present case that mother is unable to parent C.R. adequately.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that returning C.R. to mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to C.R.’s safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)
Mother’s Argument Regarding the Inadequacy of the Reunification Services Has No Merit.
Next, mother contends that there was insufficient evidence that she received reasonable reunification services. When the juvenile court sets a .26 hearing, there must be clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents. (Robert L., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.) The court must order a reunification plan that is tailored to fit the specific circumstances of each family and that is designed to eliminate the problems that led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) We determine whether substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, “reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling.” (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598 (Katie V.); In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)
Mother argues that she was faulted for not communicating with Coleman, Holmes, and Patricia M., but that “nothing in the service plan or status review reports . . . indicated that a crucial element for [ ] reunification was that she consistently communicate with [them], or that she incorporate their lessons in her parenting.” We disagree. Mother was aware that communication was an important part of the reunification process. Holmes told mother to call her, but mother did not. Coleman directed mother to keep a journal and to share it with Patricia M., but mother often failed to write in it and often did not give it to Patricia M. Problems mother had communicating with Patricia M. and Coleman were not due to the lack of services provided, but rather to mother’s difficulty communicating or her unwillingness to do so.
Mother also complains that the department did not make an adequate effort to help her establish permanent housing. The record is silent as to whether permanent housing was available, whether mother asked for assistance with her housing, and whether mother would have qualified for such housing. The record does indicate that mother was referred to a community resource worker, but that she failed to take advantage of that referral. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the department unreasonably failed to help mother obtain more permanent housing. Whether the department could have done more to help mother with housing is not the appropriate inquiry. “‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’” (Katie V., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 598-599, quoting In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable reunification services were offered to mother.
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied on the merits. The request for a stay is also denied.
We concur: Needham, J., Dondero, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.