Opinion
No. 05-07-01771-CR
Opinion issued February 10, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-48605-YV.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and LANG.
OPINION
Wes Len Allen appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The indictment alleged two previous misdemeanor convictions, making the charged offense a felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04; 49.09(b)(2) (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2008). Appellant pleaded not guilty, but stipulated he committed the primary offense as alleged in the first paragraph of the indictment, leaving it to the State to prove paragraphs two and three, which alleged two prior DWI convictions. After hearing evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty of felony DWI and assessed appellant's punishment at ten years' confinement. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show appellant had two prior misdemeanor DWI convictions. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgments. We apply well-known standards when reviewing challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light and ask whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 704-05 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Evidence is factually insufficient when the evidence supporting the conviction is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or when the evidence supporting the conviction is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id.; Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 282 (2007). To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. See Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements. Id. While evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove both of these elements in a number of different ways, including (1) the defendant's admission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a person who was present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof (such as a judgment) that contains sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant's identity as the person convicted. Id. In its indictment, the State alleged appellant had been twice previously convicted of driving while intoxicated. The State offered State's Exhibit 3, a certified judgment of conviction in cause number 13774, stating appellant pleaded guilty to DWI, a third offense, on February 25, 1993, in Lamar County, Texas. The State also offered State's Exhibit 4, the indictment for cause number 13744, which alleged appellant committed DWI, third offense, and had been previously convicted of DWI in Lamar County, Texas on April 13, 1989 (cause number 22364) and on November 23, 1987 (cause number 22335). Finally, the State offered State's Exhibit 2, the judgment revoking probation in cause number 13744. Appellant stipulated that he was the person convicted in cause number 13744. In his issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show two prior DWI convictions because the judgment in cause number 13744 did not identify the underlying convictions and there is no proof that the indictment in cause number 13744 identifying the previous convictions was not amended. We disagree. Appellant stipulated that he was the person convicted in cause number 13744. The judgment in that case states appellant pleaded guilty to two prior convictions as alleged in the indictment and there is nothing in the record indicating another indictment had been issued or that the indictment had been amended prior to trial. Although certified judgments are the preferred method of proving prior convictions, no specific document or mode of proof is required for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that prior convictions linked to appellant exist. Viewing the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove appellant was twice convicted of the offense of DWI as alleged in the second and third paragraphs of the indictment in this case. We overrule appellant's issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.