Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ, Super.Ct.No. RIJ100392, Kenneth Fernandez, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Gareit Becker for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
Petitioner Randy W. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (formerly rule 38.1(a)), challenging the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services as to his child, Alice F. (the child) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Father argues that: 1) the juvenile court erroneously failed to designate him a presumed father; 2) the court erred in denying him reunification services; and 3) he was not provided with reasonable reunification services pending the dispositional hearing. We deny the writ petition.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2008, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) filed a petition on behalf of the child, who was approximately one week old at the time. The petition alleged the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b)(failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling). Essentially, the petition alleged that the child’s mother (mother) had neglected the health and safety of the child in that she had allegedly abused alcohol throughout the pregnancy and received no prenatal care; that mother and father had a history of abusing controlled substances; and that father had a criminal history, including a conviction for attempted murder.
Mother is not a party to this writ petition.
In the detention report, the social worker reported that she talked to father on the telephone on January 3, 2008, and father said he could not take care of the child at that time but wanted to do so once he was able to financially provide for her. Father said he could barely take care of himself. He worked part time and paid $200 per month in child support for his three other children, who lived with their maternal grandmother. The social worker further reported that father was sentenced to eight years in prison for his conviction of attempted murder. Father is currently on parole.
The detention hearing was held on January 8, 2008. The court detained the child in foster care and ordered reunification services pending further hearing.
Jurisdiction/disposition Report and Hearing
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report recommending that no reunification services be provided to father. The social worker reported that on January 4, 2008, father said he was unsure he was the child’s biological father. The court ordered a paternity test. The results of the paternity test showed that father was 99.95 percent likely to be the biological father.
The social worker also reported that father did not graduate from high school and had no additional educational or vocational training. He was currently employed part time at a drug store. Father said he had been arrested at least five times and had three convictions. Regarding substance abuse, he first used illegal drugs in the third or fourth grade and first used alcohol in junior high school. Father said that he primarily abused marijuana and methamphetamine. Furthermore, the social worker reported that father knew mother was pregnant and did nothing to stop her from consuming alcohol during the pregnancy. Instead, he helped conceal the pregnancy from the paternal grandparents, thereby preventing them from intervening. Father and mother lived in a mobilehome with no running water or cooking facilities. Father continued to allow mother to reside in the mobilehome, despite clear directives from his parole officer not to allow her on the property. After the child was removed, father commented that it would have been better to allow mother to deliver the baby in their mobilehome in order to avoid intervention from the department and the court.
A contested jurisdictional hearing was held on April 14, 2008, and the court found the allegations in the petition true. The court trailed the dispositional hearing to the next day. At the dispositional hearing, the court found that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) and declared her a dependent of the court. The court denied reunification services to father under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) and stated that it could not find reunification services to be in the best interests of the child. The court then set a section 366.26 hearing for August 13, 2008.
ANALYSIS
I. There Was No Evidence That Father Was Entitled to Presumed Father Status
Father argues that the court failed to designate him a presumed father. This claim is meritless.
“Presumed fatherhood, for purposes of dependency proceedings, denotes one who ‘promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his paternal responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise[.]’” (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801-802, fn. omitted (Jerry P.).) One who claims he is entitled to presumed father status has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts supporting that entitlement. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653.) Family Code section 7611 “sets out a number of ways a father can obtain ‘presumed father’ status. He can marry or attempt to marry the child’s mother, he and the mother can execute a declaration of paternity or he can ‘receive[] the child into his home and openly hold[] out the child as his natural child.’” (Jerry P., supra, at p. 802, fn. omitted.)
At the dispositional hearing on April 15, 2008, the department informed the court that the results of the paternity test showed that father was the biological father of the child. The department stated that father was a mere biological father, and father did not object or in any way claim presumed father status. In fact, he impliedly conceded the issue. In requesting reunification services, father’s counsel stated: “He is the loving, caring, biological father of the child, who is willing to participate in any services that the court asks of him to remain the provider for this child.” Accordingly, father presented no evidence to establish presumed father status. Moreover, in his writ, father merely contends that he and mother were cohabitating at the time of the child’s birth, that he has held the child out to be his own, he has provided for the child (car seat, bottles, and diapers), and that he has consistently visited the child since she was removed from his care. None of these contentions shows that father has demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities. Thus, he is not entitled to presumed father status.
II. The Court Properly Denied Father Reunification Services
Father argues that the court erred in denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“‘In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible.’ [Citation.]” (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600 (Francisco G.).)
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient
Subdivision (b) of section 361.5 “sets forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed altogether. These bypass provisions represent the Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances. [Citation.]” (Francisco G., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 597.) Specifically, “(b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (12) That the parent or guardian of the child has been convicted of a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12).) Section 361.5, subdivision (c), provides in part: “The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (12) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
Here, the record shows that father was convicted of attempted murder, which is listed as a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)(12). Therefore, under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12), the court did not need to provide reunification services. Furthermore, the court properly found that reunification was not in the best interest of the child. The record shows that father has a long history of substance abuse; he was only employed part time and he was obligated to pay child support for his three other children; he lived in a mobilehome with no running water or cooking facilities; and he admittedly could barely take care of himself. Moreover, the record demonstrates that father did not protect the child when mother was pregnant, but simply stood by while she consumed alcohol during the pregnancy. After the child was removed, father commented that it would have been better to allow mother to deliver the baby in their mobilehome in order to avoid intervention from the department and court. Father did not have the child’s best interests in mind. The evidence clearly supports the court’s decision to deny reunification services to father.
Finally, father argues that the department failed to timely provide reunification services pending the dispositional hearing. Specifically, he asserts that he was not given referrals until approximately six to eight weeks after the child was detained. Father fails to explain how the department’s delayed provision of services between the period of detention and disposition had any effect on the court’s decision to deny him reunification services under section 361.5. Therefore, we reject his claim.
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied.
We concur: MCKINSTER, J., GAUT, J.