Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10816 Trial Court No. 3DI-09-295 CR No. 5855
06-13-2012
CHARLES F. AKELKOK, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Heather L. Gardner, Shortell Gardner LLC, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Jonas M. Walker, Assistant District Attorney, Adrienne P. Bachman, District Attorney, Anchorage, and Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Dillingham, Fred Torrisi, Judge.
Appearances: Heather L. Gardner, Shortell Gardner LLC, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Jonas M. Walker, Assistant District Attorney, Adrienne P. Bachman, District Attorney, Anchorage, and Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
BOLGER, Judge.
Charles F. Akelkok was intoxicated when he came over to his neighbor's house in Ekwok, carrying a half gallon of Rich and Rare whiskey. A dispute arose, Akelkok became angry, and the neighbor asked Akelkok to leave. Just after Akelkok walked out the door, he yelled that he was going to kill everyone in the house.
In the meantime, Akelkok's father had come out of his house to see what was going on. He saw Akelkok walk into a nearby shipping container, and come out with a rifle. Akelkok then pointed the rifle at his father and told his father to go back in the house.
While the rifle was pointed at his father, Akelkok pulled the trigger, and the gun made an audible click. When the rifle did not fire, Akelkok cocked it and pulled the trigger again. Akelkok's father was afraid that he could be shot, but he was more concerned about protecting the other people in the village. So Akelkok's father walked up to his son and took the rifle away from him.
The foregoing summary is based on the trial testimony viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Based on this testimony, the jury found that Akelkok was guilty of assault in the third degree.
See generally Simpson v. State, 877 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Alaska App. 1994) ("To establish whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and inquire whether reasonable jurors could conclude that the accused's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.").
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).
In this appeal, Akelkok argues that this testimony was insufficient to support the guilty verdict. To decide this question, we must determine whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the State proved that Akelkok was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Simpson, 877 P.2d at 1320.
To prove that Akelkok was guilty of assault in the third degree, the State was required to show that he recklessly placed his father in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument. A person is "placed in fear," within the meaning of this statute, if the person "reasonably perceives or understands a threat of imminent injury." In other words, the victim's subjective reaction to the situation is irrelevant: "It does not matter whether the victim of the assault calmly confronts the danger or quivers in terror."
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A).
Hughes v. State, 56 P.3d 1088, 1090 (Alaska App. 2002).
Id.
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In this case, the testimony established that Akelkok pointed a gun at his father and pulled the trigger. This evidence could convince a reasonable juror that Akelkok placed his father in apprehension of the danger that he could be seriously wounded. A reasonable juror could also infer that, even if Akelkok's father did not fully apprehend the initial threat, he certainly came to a sharper understanding when Akelkok cocked the rifle and pulled the trigger a second time. A reasonable juror could conclude that Akelkok's father was aware of the danger he was in, although he was also determined to take the rifle away from his son.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Akelkok placed his father in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument. We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's judgment of conviction.