Opinion
24A-CR-1063
10-15-2024
Benjamin Howard Adams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Marietto V. Massillamany Danielle R. Merlo Massillamany Jeter & Carson LLP Fishers, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Angela Dow Davis, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D27-2205-F5-13258
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Marietto V. Massillamany
Danielle R. Merlo
Massillamany Jeter & Carson LLP
Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] Benjamin Howard Adams appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery and his ensuing aggregate sentence of five years with one year executed, one year in home detention, and three years suspended to probation. Adams raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
Adams does not appeal his convictions for Level 6 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony confinement, Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime, or Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief.
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In May 2022, Adams was engaged to and lived with A.F. in Indianapolis. After dinner at their home on May 11, Adams attacked A.F. A.F. initially "felt something hit [her] from behind . . . in the back of [her] head." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 20. A.F. saw a tumbler land on the floor next to her. Before she could turn around, Adams struck her over the head with a potted plant. A.F. then ran toward the home security panel to press the panic button, but Adams chased her and punched her in the face. After a struggle, Adams shoved A.F. face first through two layers of drywall. At some point, A.F. "went on the ground," and Adams "put his hands around [her] throat." Id. at 26. A.F. "felt warm[th] coming over [her] and . . . started seeing black." Id. at 28. She then lost consciousness.
[¶4] When A.F. regained consciousness, she heard Adams lamenting his actions and saying that he was "going to go out and drown [him]self in the lake." Id. at 29. He then left the house. A.F. went outside, found a police officer, and reported what had happened. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Evan Meyer observed that A.F. was "hysterical" and "crying." Id. at 9. He further observed that she had "a very noticeable lump on her forehead"; she was "active[ly] bleeding out of one of her arms"; and she had "several bruises" along her arms, neck, and head. Id. Officers were unable to locate Adams that evening, but the next day he contacted police, and he was arrested.
[¶5] The State charged Adams with seven counts, including Level 5 felony domestic battery, which was premised on A.F.'s loss of consciousness. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 25. After a bench trial at which A.F. testified, the court found Adams guilty of and entered judgment of conviction against him for Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony confinement, Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime, and Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief.
[¶6] Thereafter, the court held a sentencing hearing and found the following aggravating circumstances: the degree of A.F.'s injuries; Adams's lack of accepting responsibility or lack of remorse; and Adams's position of "care" with A.F. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 171. The court found as mitigating circumstances Adams's lack of a criminal history; that the offenses are unlikely to recur; that Adams would likely respond well to probation or short-term imprisonment; and that imprisonment would result in an undue hardship on his dependents. The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and ordered Adams to serve an aggregate sentence of five years, with one year executed, one year in home detention, and three years suspended to probation.
[¶7] This appeal ensued.
1. The State presented sufficient evidence to show that Adams rendered A.F. unconscious.
[¶8] On appeal, Adams first challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence of A.F.'s alleged harm underlying his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[¶9] To support Adams's conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery as charged, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams's attack on A.F. rendered her unconscious. Ind. Code §§ 35-31.5-2-292(2), 35-42-2-1.3(c)(1) (2021). Adams's argument on appeal turns entirely on whether the trial court, as the finder of fact, could have reasonably concluded from the following testimony by A.F. that she had been rendered unconscious during Adams's attack:
Q[ by the State:] Okay, so at some point [Adams] moves from gripping your neck with both of his hands to putting you into a choke hold?
A. Uhmm and that's when I really, that's when I really felt warm[th] coming over me and I started seeing black. When I started really feeling [an] odd sensation and that's when I started feeling . . . lightheaded.
* * *
Q. Did you see blackness?
A. Yea.
Q. At some point, do you remember your eyes closing?
A. I don't remember.
Q. That's okay. What's the next thing you remember after that moment of feeling lightheaded?
A. The next thing I remember was seeing [Adams] . . . I remembered at some point not feeling my feet kick[ing] anymore and then I remembered . . . hearing [Adams] and then I remembered him saying, "I can't believe I did this to you. I am going to go out and drown myself in the lake[."] And then I
remembered this kind of being like[, "]where am I? What just happened[?"] . . .Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 28-29.
[¶10] We conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could have found from that testimony that A.F. lost consciousness during the attack. While Adams was choking her, she felt lightheaded and saw blackness. The next thing she remembered was sometime later, when Adams was no longer engaged in choking her. A.F.'s testimony thus supports the trial court's finding, and Adams's argument to the contrary is simply a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Adams.
[¶11] Adams also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its identification of aggravating circumstances when sentencing him. We review a trial court's consideration of aggravating factors in imposing the defendant's sentence for an abuse of discretion. See Crouse v. State, 158 N.E.3d 388, 393 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). "An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).
[¶12] A trial court abuses its discretion during sentencing by:
(1) "failing to enter a sentencing statement at all"; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are "improper as a matter of law."Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91) (Ind.), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).
[¶13] Adams asserts that the trial court improperly relied on A.F.'s testimony as well as statements made during sentencing against Adams by a former wife. The trial court's reliance on that testimony is not error as a matter of law and was well within the court's discretion. There is no error in this regard.
[¶14] Adams also asserts that the trial court failed to "properly weigh" the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Appellant's Br. at 11. But our Supreme Court has long made clear that we will not consider whether a trial court might have "abused its discretion in failing to 'properly weigh'" aggravating and mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Accordingly, we do not consider this argument, and we affirm Adams's sentence.
Conclusion
[¶15] For all of these reasons, we affirm Adams's conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery and his sentence.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.