Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. DV025675, David B. Oberholtzer, Judge. Affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
Defendant and appellant Edward King appeals a restraining order for protection issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) We affirm the order.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
King and plaintiff and respondent Ashley Abraitis dated and then lived together. Abraitis had a son who also lived with them.
On August 20, 2007, Abraitis filed an application for a restraining order against King under the DVPA. In that application, Abraitis alleged King threatened her that same day after he demanded she move out. Abraitis also stated King then showed up at her place of employment, demanded her house keys, and when she stated they needed to talk, he grabbed her by the hair and pushed her head down, towards the ground, which caused her to fall. Abraitis left work and went home, where she encountered King. Abraitis called the police.
Abraitis stated King also abused her on August 16, 2007. On that day, King grabbed her and pushed her up against the refrigerator in their kitchen, after she refused to leave. Abraitis freed herself and locked herself in the bedroom. King banged on the door for about five minutes, until he finally left the house. Abraitis suffered bruises on her forearm and upper arm.
Abraitis also described an incident on July 4, 2007. She stated they were in the car on the way home from a party when they began arguing. They continued to argue after they got home. King pushed Abraitis in the face and shoved her against the wall. Abraitis went to their neighbor's house and called the police. The neighbor told police he also heard Abraitis hitting the wall. The police told King to leave for the night.
At the hearing in September 2007, Abraitis and King were sworn as witnesses. The following exchange took place between the trial court and King:
"The Court: Have you read the declarations, the affidavits here?
"[King]: Yes, uh-huh.
"The Court: What do you think?
"[King]: I agree with most of it.
"The Court: You're having a little, maybe, impulse control problem?
"[King]: No, I don't think so.
"The Court: What do you think I ought to do?
"[King]: Ask her.
"The Court: Well, she's already told me what she wants. It's all in here.
"[King]: Okay.
"The Court: Let me tell you where I'm coming from.
"[King]: Okay.
"The Court: You went to her work, showed up without being invited. Walked in, demanded the keys, walked in around her desk and grabbed her by the hair, held her down. This is all in front of the co-workers. That's enough for a restraining order right there, so that's what I'm going to do."
The court issued a restraining order against King for five years.
DISCUSSION
King contends the restraining order against him must be reversed because there was no evidence Abraitis was "physically injured" in any of the incidents, and thus there was no "abuse" as that term is defined in section 6203. He further contends there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the restraining order. We reject both contentions.
A. Standard of Review
"A reviewing court applies the substantial evidence standard of review to a trial court's factual findings, 'regardless of the burden of proof at trial.' " (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822.) "Our sole inquiry is 'whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' supporting the court's finding. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 822-823, quoting Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.) " 'We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings . . ., resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.' [Citation.]" (Sabbah, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 823, quoting Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) If the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment, we must affirm even if there is substantial contrary evidence. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874 (Bowers).)
B. Applicable Law
Section 6203 states that for purposes of the DVPA, "abuse" means "any of the following:
"(a) Intentionally or recklessly to cause or attempt to cause bodily injury.
"(b) Sexual assault.
"(c) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another.
"(d) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320."
Section 6320 provides, in part:
"The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning . . ., destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members."
C. Analysis
With respect to King's first contention, we look to the statutes' words as those " 'generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.' " (Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 804; see also Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1047 (Diamond).) If the words are "clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends. There is no need for judicial construction and a court may not indulge in it." (Diamond, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1047.) " 'If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.; see also Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268.)
We conclude from the plain language of the statute that physical injury is not required for there to be "abuse" within the meaning of section 6203. Indeed, subdivision (a) of section 6203 defines "abuse" to include an "attempt to cause bodily injury," and subdivision (c) of that statute speaks in terms of placing a person in "reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury." (Italics added.)
Moreover, subdivision (d) of section 6203 references section 6320. The latter statute includes a list of behaviors that do not involve physical injury, including, by way of example only, "stalking," "threatening," "harassing," "telephoning," "destroying personal property" and "disturbing the peace of the other party" (§ 6320), but which nonetheless qualify as "abuse" under certain circumstances. (§ 6203, subd. (d).) The plain language of the statute shows physical injury is not required for there to be "abuse" within the meaning of section 6203.
In any event, the record shows Abraitis suffered physical injury (e.g., bruises to her forearm and upper arm) from the altercation on August 16, 2007, when King grabbed her and pushed her against the refrigerator.
We also reject King's contention there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the court's restraining order. In fact, when the court asked King what he thought of Abraitis's declarations regarding the incidents of abuse, he stated, "I agree with most of it." Independent of his concession, there is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's finding of abuse here. (See Bowers, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's restraining order for protection is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., IRION, J.