Opinion
April 9, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Walter M. Schackman, J.).
Viewing the complaint liberally and in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find it sufficiently particularized to sustain the first cause of action for piercing the corporate veil and assigning personal liability to defendant. Defendant, as sole shareholder, is alleged to have exercised complete dominion and control over the corporation and to have fraudulently conveyed corporate assets to avoid the corporation's obligations under the lease (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; 29/35 Realty Assocs. v. 35th St. N Y Yarn Ctr., 181 A.D.2d 540; see generally, Walkovszky v Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414). The second cause of action was properly dismissed however, as a separate cause of action to pierce the corporate veil does not exist independent from the claims asserted against the corporation (Morris v. New York State Dept. of Taxation Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135). Dismissal of the third cause of action alleging prima facie tort was also warranted by plaintiff's failure to set forth that the breach of contract was motivated by disinterested malevolence, or that it caused plaintiff to suffer special damages, two required elements of this claim (WFB Telecommunications v. NYNEX Corp., 188 A.D.2d 257, 258, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 709).
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Ellerin, Rubin, Kupferman and Tom, JJ.