Opinion
12-30-2014
70 PINEHURST AVENUE LLC, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. RPN MANAGEMENT CO., INC., Defendant–Appellant.
Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP, Hawthorne (Chevon A. Brooks of counsel), for appellant. Troutman Sanders LLP, New York (Deanna DeFrancesco of counsel), fo respondent.
Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP, Hawthorne (Chevon A. Brooks of counsel), for appellant.
Troutman Sanders LLP, New York (Deanna DeFrancesco of counsel), fo respondent.
TOM, J.P., FRIEDMAN, ANDRIAS, FEINMAN, KAPNICK, JJ.
Opinion Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered June 19, 2014, which granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, and denied defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, and to grant defendant's cross motion to the extent of dismissing the third cause of action, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
This action stems from the collapse of a retaining wall located on plaintiff's property, which plaintiff alleges is also partially located on defendant's property. Plaintiff's allegations are based on statements in two land surveys from 2001 and 2011, both describing the presence of a retaining wall located at the “west face of wall on [property] line.” Both surveys also indicate, however, “the offsets (or dimensions) shown hereon from the structures to the property lines ... are not intended to guide the erection of fences, retaining walls, pools, and any other construction.” Their import is therefore unclear. Moreover, a survey alone, without an accompanying affidavit from the surveyor, does not constitute competent evidence of the location of property lines and fences or retaining walls (see Thomson v. Nayyar, 90 A.D.3d 1024, 1026, 935 N.Y.S.2d 654, [2d Dept.2011] ). Plaintiff has therefore failed to tender sufficient evidence to demonstrate entitlement to a declaratory judgment on its claim brought pursuant to Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 28–305.1.1.
Defendant met its prima facie burden as cross movant by submission of the affidavit of a land surveyor who inspected and measured the property subsequent to the collapse of the retaining wall in June 2013, and concluded that no portion of the wall had been upon defendant's property. That plaintiff's two surveys indicate that the wall was “on [the] line” of both properties, is sufficient, however, to raise a question as to the location of the wall relative to the two properties; we have long held that otherwise inadmissible evidence may be considered to defeat an application for summary judgment (see Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 100 A.D.2d 175, 182, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426 [1st Dept.1984], affd. 63 N.Y.2d 379, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457, 472 N.E.2d 307 [1984] ). We do not consider the contents of plaintiff's land surveyor's affidavit submitted in surreply as defendant had no opportunity to respond, nor do we consider plaintiff's arguments addressing that affidavit's contents (see Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Morse Shoe Co., 218 A.D.2d 624, 626, 630 N.Y.S.2d 1003 [1st Dept.1995] ; see also Rhodes v. City of New York, 88 A.D.3d 614, 615, 931 N.Y.S.2d 595 [1st Dept.2011] ). Were we to consider them, our analysis would be unchanged.
In construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff (see Young v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 91 N.Y.2d 291, 296, 670 N.Y.S.2d 169, 693 N.E.2d 196 [1998] ), we find that the claim of negligence is expressed throughout plaintiff's papers, and there is a question of fact as to whether defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff, if the retaining wall is found to rest on both parties' premises. The claim of nuisance, based on allegations that defendant's ongoing refusal to participate in the repairs and maintenance of the retaining wall substantially interferes with plaintiff's ability to use and enjoy its property, arises solely from plaintiff's claim of negligence. Where nuisance and negligence elements are “so intertwined as to be practically inseparable,” a plaintiff may recover only once for the harm suffered (Murphy v. Both, 84 A.D.3d 761, 762, 922 N.Y.S.2d 483 [2d Dept.2011], citing Morello v. Brookfield Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 83, 91, 172 N.Y.S.2d 577, 149 N.E.2d 202 [1958] ; see also Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 569, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 362 N.E.2d 968 [1977] ). Upon a search of the record, we conclude that the third cause of action, nuisance, should be dismissed as duplicative of the negligence cause of action, although this argument was not previously made or considered (CPLR 3212[b] ; see Merritt Hill Vineyards v. Windy Hgts. Vineyard, 61 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 472 N.Y.S.2d 592, 460 N.E.2d 1077 [1984] ).