Opinion
L & T 50980/2015
06-06-2016
230 W 140 Inc., Petitioner, v. Sheila Carter, Respondent-Tenant, JAMES KENO, CORNELL JACKSON, "JOHN DOE" AND "JANE DOE".
BACKGROUND
This summary holdover proceeding was commenced by 230 W 140 INC. (Petitioner) against SHEILA CARTER (Respondent), alleged by Petitioner to be the tenant of record of 230 West 140th Street, Apt. 5, New York, New York 10030 (Subject Premises), pursuant to RPAPL § 715 based on the allegation Respondent has allowed the Subject Premises to be used for illegal activity and the sale of narcotics.
THE MOTION
Respondent - Jackson moves for any order striking any references to sealed records in the proceeding and precluding Petitioner from introducing any evidence of the sealed records pursuant to CPL § 160.50 and 160.60.
CPL § 160.50(1)(c) provides that "all official records and papers relating to the arrest or prosecution on file with any court, police agency, or prosecutor's office, shall be sealed and not made available to any person or public or private agency" and therefore precludes the use of any contents of a sealed record for any proceeding.
The purpose in adding these provisions to the Criminal Procedure Law and the Human Rights Law was to ensure that the protections provided to exonerated accused's be consistent with the presumption of innocence, which simply means that no individual should suffer adverse consequences merely on the basis of an accusation, unless the charges were ultimately sustained in a court of law (In re Joseph M., 82 NY2d 128, 131 [1993] (citing Governor's Approval Mem., 1976 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2451).
CPL § 160.50 is meant to balance the interests of law enforcement agencies against the right of a former defendant to restrict access to the official records of criminal proceedings that had been terminated in her favor. This statute requires sealing of records in a broad variety of contexts, and permits disclosure of sealed files only under very narrowly defined circumstances (Harper v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 761, 767 [1997]). Further, "there are several decisions holding that CPL § 160.50(1)(d)(ii) applies only when the criminal justice or government agency is seeking to unseal records for use in a criminal investigation" ( People v Canales, 174 Misc 2d 387, 389) ; Hynes v. Karassik, 47 NY2d 659 ( previously sealed records may be unsealed by judicial order in cases where the court documents must be amended to be truthful, or there is an important public policy matter at issue, such as disbarment).
One case on point is Reed v NY City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. (2013 NY Slip Op 33142[U], [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]). In Reed, eviction proceedings were started against a tenant on the basis of information provided by the Bronx Attorney General's Office regarding a criminal investigation into the activities of said tenant. The criminal proceedings were terminated in favor of the tenant and the records were sealed pursuant to the requirement in CPL §160.50. However, the NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development terminated tenant's Section 8 benefits, and eviction proceedings continued based on evidence obtained from the "sealed records". The tenant initiated an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, and upon review of HPD's conduct, held "...reliance on sealed records contravened the letter and the spirit of the sealing statutes as interpreted by our appellate courts and deprived Ms. Reed of her right to a fair hearing with all the protections of due process of law (Reed v NY City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 2013 NY Slip Op 33142[U], [Sup Ct, NY County 2013).
The court further held:
The clear and compelling language in the sealing statutes and cases discussed here compels a finding that HPD's Hearing Officer committed an egregious error of law by admitting into evidence and relying upon the records from Ms. Reed's criminal proceedings that had undeniably been sealed. In so doing, the Hearing Officer circumvented both the letter and the intent of the law to protect exonerated individuals from the stigma and adverse consequences associated with mere accusations of criminal conduct. Id.
The plain language of the statute firmly prohibits the unsealing of records for any reason but those expressly stated in CPL §160.50 (1)(d), "(1) to a prosecutor in any proceeding in which the accused has moved for an order for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal in a case involving marihuana, (2) to a law enforcement agency if justice requires that such records be made available to it, or (3) to any agency having responsibility for the issuance of gun licenses." Hynes, at 663 [1979]. The statute provides two other exceptions, both involving law enforcement agencies or probation officers.
There are six exceptions prescribed under CPL § 160.50(1)(d), for which sealed records may be unsealed and the contents used. The present case, the circumstances surrounding and resulting from it, and the venue in which it is being heard, satisfy none of the factors to which the exceptions may be applied. Therefore, the Court precludes the admission of sealed evidence from the proceeding to the extent it pertains to Cornell Jackson, including any evidence contained in the sealed record relating to the arrest and subsequent acquittal of subtenant Cornell Jackson.
With regard to the redaction of prejudicial information; it is not possible to separate prejudicial information from non-prejudicial information. The record is either "sealed" or "unsealed". There has been no mention of a "middle-ground" in the case law. Thus, the non-prejudicial information would still fall under the clause in the statute barring "all official records and papers relating to the arrest or prosecution on file with any court, police agency, or prosecutor's office" from being "made available to any person or public or private agency."
Based on the forgoing the motion to preclude is granted. Trial remains scheduled for June 22, 2016, at 9:30 am.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. Dated: New York, New York June 6, 2016 Sabrina B. Kraus, JHC