Opinion
11-P-577
03-27-2012
15 MEDWAY STREET, LLC v. OAKTREE SLR, LLC.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, 15 Medway Street, LLC (15 Medway), filed the present action seeking to have an easement benefitting the abutting lot of the defendant, Oaktree SLR, LLC (Oaktree), declared unenforceable. The easement concerns Oaktree's right to park up to forty vehicles on 15 Medway's lot. After trial, a judge of the Land Court ruled in favor of Oaktree. On appeal, 15 Medway claims that judgment was improper because the language of the grant insufficiently defines the location of the parking area within its lot. 15 Medway further argues that the judge erred in failing to consider whether the easement violates local zoning requirements. We affirm.
Background. In 2004, 15 Medway purchased property located at 15-21 Medway Street in the Dorchester section of the city of Boston. Oaktree, a company which operates an assisted living residence, owns the property at 1190 Adams Street, a lot abutting the lot owned by 15 Medway. The parcels were once a unified lot. In 1991, the original owner of the unified lot subdivided it into the Adams Street property (lot 1), and the Medway Street property (lot 2). Two years later, the owner conveyed lot 1 to Oaktree's predecessor. The deed was recorded, and established a parking easement benefitting Lot 1. In relevant part, the deed provides as follows:
'An easement to park up to forty (40) motor vehicles, together with the right of ingress and egress, on said Lot 2. Said easement to park motor vehicles shall be used only for the benefit of Lot 1 herein conveyed to the Grantee. The Grantee agrees that the actual parking spaces shall be relocated and/or moved as may be reasonably requested by any entity or person holding a mortgage on purchase therefrom on said Lot 2, provided said easement continues to comply with applicable parking zoning requirements of the City of Boston as affecting Lot 1 and provided further such relocation is located only within the portion of said Lot 2 assessed by the city of Boston as 17-19 Medway Street.'
The deed does not specify any exact location of the easement within Lot 2.
The plaintiff's aim in purchasing lot 2 was to develop the property by building forty-two condominium units. Toward that end, it performed extensive work on the site, including the removal of several thousand yards of ledge at the rear of the property and the construction of a large concrete slab which was to serve as the foundation for a six story residential building. The cost of construction was approximately $400,000 - $500,000. In the summer of 2006, well after the work had been undertaken, Oaktree contacted the plaintiff, requesting that it recognize the parking easement. The plaintiff replied that it knew nothing about the easement. Historically, Oaktree has used two paved areas on lot 2 for overflow parking, one adjacent to an existing building on lot 2, and the other where the concrete slab is located.
On December 24, 2007, 15 Medway filed the present action in the Land Court seeking a declaration that the easement is invalid and, in the alternative, a determination of the precise location of the easement on lot 2. After a jury-waived trial, the judge held that the easement 'remains in force and effect, burdening generally all of plaintiff's lot 2, and benefitting and appurtenant to [Oaktree's] lot 1.' In reaching his decision, the judge rejected 15 Medway's arguments that the easement was insufficiently defined and imprecisely located, as 'the intent of the parties clearly was to create an easement.' At trial, the judge determined that the easement was located in those areas historically used by Oaktree for overflow parking. This appeal followed.
This ruling was pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment. After trial, the judge ruled that '[t]here has been no occasion for the court to revise or alter [these] rulings . . . [a]nd there is nothing in the evidence at trial which has caused me . . . to doubt [these] rulings.'
Discussion. 1. Localization of easement. The plaintiff first claims that the easement is 'too vague to be valid or enforceable' because its language does not set forth the precise location or area on lot 2 to be used for the parking easement. 'While no particular words are necessary for the grant of an easement, the instrument must identify with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient tenements.' Parkinson v. Assessors of Medfield, 395 Mass. 643, 645 (1985), S.C., 398 Mass. 112 (1986), quoting from Dunlap Investors, Ltd. v. Hogan, 133 Ariz. 130, 132 (1982). The extent of an easement is then 'derived from the presumed intent of the grantor, [and] is to be ascertained from the words used in the written instrument, construed when necessary in the light of the attendant circumstances.' Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 665 (2007), quoting from Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 (1998).
Here, the language of the easement is unambiguous; it sets forth a dominant estate to be benefitted and a servient estate to be burdened. To wit: 'An easement to park up to forty (40) motor vehicles, together with the right of ingress and egress, on said [l]ot 2. Said easement to park motor vehicles shall be used only for the benefit of [l]ot 1 herein conveyed to the [g]rantee.' Contrast Parkinson v. Assessors of Medfield, supra at 646 (holding an easement invalid because it failed to identify both the size and location of the entire servient estate.) In short, the easement need not further clarify the location of those forty parking spaces within the servient estate to be valid and enforceable. That area may be defined by looking to the terms of the easement and 'the then existing conditions so far as they are illuminating.' Mugar v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 443, 444 (1990). At trial, the judge properly made that determination based upon the evidence presented including evidence of parking usage at the time the easement was established.
2. Zoning requirements. The plaintiff also argues that the easement violates article 23 of the Boston Zoning Code, which requires that '[e]xcept in the case of a lot serviced by a common parking facility, the off-street parking facilities required by this [a]rticle shall be provided on the same lot as the main use to which they are accessory.' The plaintiff asserts that because the deed specifies that the easement can be relocated only if it 'continues to comply with applicable parking zoning requirements of the [c]ity of Boston as affecting [l]ot 1,' the easement must fail because use of Oaktree's easement is illegal under Boston's parking regulations.
The arguments are without merit. Compliance with any local zoning requirements are irrelevant to the validity of the easement itself, which we have already determined is effective and remains in force. As the judge aptly noted in his decision, the 'the purpose of the easement is not frustrated by the fact that lot 1 may be unable to count parking on lot 2 for its own zoning compliance. The record does not permit an inference that parking required by zoning was the only, or even principal, purpose for creating the easement.'
The judge's language clearly undercuts 15 Medway's claim that he failed to address the issue in his memorandum and order.
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Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Katzmann, Smith & Grainger, JJ.),