Zhenqiang Ma et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 21, 2019

13724051 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/724,051 12/21/2012 Zhenqiang Ma 00300-0006-02 5999
96854 7590 08/21/2019
Bell & Manning, LLC
Michelle Manning
2801 West Beltline Highway
Ste. 210
Madison, WI 53713
EXAMINER
GONZALEZ, HIRAM E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2848
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/21/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cbell@bellmanning.com
docketing@bellmanning.com
mmanning@bellmanning.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ZHENQIANG MA,
GUOXUAN QIN, and NAMKI CHO
____________

Appeal 2018-009133
Application 13/724,051
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, Acting Vice Chief Administrative
Patent Judge, DONNA M. PRAISS, and JEFFREY R. SNAY,
Administrative Patent Judges.

PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 2, 5–10, and 18–22 as obvious over cited prior art
references. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed Dec. 21, 2012; the
Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final”), dated Sept. 13, 2017; Appellant’s
Appeal Brief (“Br.”) filed Feb. 6, 2018; and the Examiner’s Answer
(“Ans.”), dated June 11, 2018.
2 Appellant is the Applicant, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,
which, according to the Appeal Brief, is the real party in interest. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to flexible devices comprising a multilevel
electronic device structure, and an elastomeric dielectric material disposed
around an interconnect structure of the multilevel electronic device structure
and within spaces between levels of the interconnect structure. Spec. ¶ 5.
According to the Specification, organic and some inorganic semiconductor-
based electronics can provide extreme bendability for flexible, lightweight,
electronics, but such electronics cannot be operated at high speeds (i.e., high
frequencies) due to these materials’ low carrier mobility. Id. ¶ 3. The
Specification describes Appellant’s devices as desirably free of rigid
inorganic dielectric material between interconnect levels, which makes the
devices flexible without sacrificing performance. Id. ¶ 6.
Claim 5, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal
Brief, is illustrative (emphasis added).
5. A flexible integrated circuit comprising:
(a) a multilevel electronic device structure comprising
multiple device levels, each device level comprising at least one
electronic component, wherein the electronic components in
different device levels are electrically connected by an electrical
interconnect structure having at least three interconnect levels
comprising a plurality of intra-integrated circuit interconnects;
and
(b) an organic elastomeric dielectric material disposed
around the intra-integrated circuit interconnects of the electrical
interconnect structure, including within spaces between the
intra-integrated circuit interconnects, and also encasing the
electronic components;
wherein the electronic components within each of the
device levels are not disposed on an inorganic dielectric
substrate.
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ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
Appellant identify and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)
(cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”)). After considering the
argued claims in light of the case law presented in this Appeal and each of
Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded of reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejections.

Rejection 1: Obviousness of Claims 2, 5–7, and 18–22
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 5–7, and 18–22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Leedy3 and Chen4 for the reasons
provided on pages 2–6 of the Final Office Action.
Appellant argues the claims together. Br. 4–16. Therefore, we
confine our discussion to claim 5, which we select as representative. Claims
2, 6, 7, and 18–22 stand or fall with claim 5. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds Leedy’s Figures 32a and 32b (described in
Leedy’s paragraph 300) depict a flexible integrated circuit comprising,
among other things, a multilevel electronic device structure and a dielectric
material disposed around intra-integrated circuit interconnects of an
electrical interconnect structure, including within spaces between the intra-

3 Leedy, US 2008/0302559 A1, published December 11, 2008 (“Leedy”).
4 Chen et al., US 2008/0257586 A1, published October 23, 2008 (“Chen”).
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integrated circuit interconnects, and encasing electronic components. Final
Act. 2–3. The Examiner also finds Leedy discloses that a dielectric material
can be an organic dielectric material, citing Leedy’s claim 92. Id. at 3.
The Examiner finds Leedy does not teach that the organic dielectric
material is an elastomeric material, but finds Chen discloses a flexible circuit
structure having a dielectric substrate comprising an organic elastomeric
dielectric. Id. The Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to
modify Leedy to use an organic elastomeric dielectric material, as Chen
discloses, because that material has good flexibility and because it would
have been obvious to use a known material based on its suitability for that
use. Id. at 3–4.
Appellant contends that intra-integrated circuit interconnects connect
electronic components making up an integrated circuit, whereas inter-
integrated circuit interconnects connect one integrated circuit to another
integrated circuit. Br. 4–5. Appellant argues that Leedy’s embodiment
depicted in Figures 32a and 32b has non-organic dielectric material in intra-
integrated circuit interconnects, whereas Leedy’s claim 92 is directed to
organic dielectric material in inter-integrated circuit interconnects. Id. at 5–
6. Specifically, Appellant asserts that claim 92 depends from claim 77 and
these claims “do not recite any structure that suggests the interconnect
conductors are intra-integrated circuit interconnects.” Id. at 7–8. Appellant
contends that claim 88 demonstrates the interconnects are external to an
integrated circuit and are for connecting integrated circuits to one another,
not to connect device elements within a single integrated circuit. Id. at 8.
Appellant also argues there are no electronic components in Leedy’s claim
92 and that claim 92’s circuit interconnect corresponds to the membrane
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described in Leedy’s paragraph 215, not to the embodiment described in
paragraph 300. Id. at 8–9. Appellant further argues that the Examiner is
combining the embodiment depicted in Figures 32a and 32b with Leedy’s
teachings in claim 92 without a rationale for combining these teachings. Id.
at 9–11.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Examiner finds Leedy’s
Figure 32b depicts intra-integrated circuit interconnects as indicated in
annotated Figure 32b (Ans. 3), reproduced below:

Leedy’s Figure 32b, as the Examiner has annotated it

As indicated in annotated Figure 32b, the Examiner finds that Leedy’s
interconnect metallizations 736-1, 736-2, 736-3 function as intra-integrated
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circuit interconnects and that Leedy’s semiconductor devices 730-1, 730-2,
730-3 function as electronic components. Leedy’s disclosure supports these
findings. See Leedy ¶ 300.
The Examiner further finds that Appellant’s Specification does not
define an intra-integrated circuit interconnect, but Appellant admits that
Leedy discloses intra-integrated circuit interconnects. Ans. 3. The record in
this appeal supports the Examiner’s position. Appellant does not direct us to
any support regarding the difference between an intra-integrated circuit
interconnect and an inter-integrated circuit interconnect. Nevertheless,
Leedy’s interconnect metallizations 736-1, 736-2, 736-3 meet Appellant’s
definition for an intra-integrated circuit interconnect. First, Appellant states
the membrane dielectric isolation (MDI) circuit membrane depicted in
Leedy’s Figures 32a and 32b “includes a dielectric membrane disposed
around the circuit interconnects of an integrated circuit and, thus, can be
considered to meet the limitation a ‘dielectric material disposed around the
intra-integrated circuit interconnects of an electrical interconnect structure’
in claim 5.”5 Br. 5. Second, Leedy’s interconnect metallizations 736-1,
736-2, 736-3 connect electrical components 730-1, 730-2, 730-3. Leedy
Figs. 32a and 32b. Leedy discloses that electrical components 730-1, 730-2,
730-3 are embedded in membrane 732. Leedy ¶ 300. Thus, interconnect
metallizations 736-1, 736-2, and 736-3 connect electronic components

5 We understand Appellant’s position is that Leedy’s membrane 732 in
Figures 32a and 32b is disposed around the interconnect metallizations 736-
1, 736-2, 736-3 and within spaces between the interconnect metallizations
736-1, 736-2, 736-3, but that the membrane 732 is not organic in that
embodiment.
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making up an integrated circuit, wherein a dielectric material encases6 the
electronic components.
Appellant’s argument that claims 77 and 92 are directed to inter-
integrated circuit interconnects is also not persuasive. The lack of a
particular interconnect structure in claim 77 does not foreclose claim 77’s
interconnect conductors from being intra-integrated circuit interconnects. In
addition, claim 88, which depends from claim 77, further comprises an
interconnect that connects one or more integrated circuits and claim 77’s at
least one of the plurality of interconnect conductors. In other words, claim
88’s interconnect meets Appellant’s definition of an inter-integrated circuit
interconnect because it connects claim 77’s structure to an integrated circuit.
Thus, claim 77 is broader than the inter-integrated circuit interconnect
required by claim 88. Therefore, Appellant has not shown persuasively that
claims 77 and 92’s interconnect conductors are limited to inter-integrated
circuit interconnects.
As noted above, the Examiner finds Leedy’s claim 92 discloses an
organic dielectric material. Appellant contends there would have been no
reason to combine the embodiment depicted in Figures 32a and 32b and
Leedy’s claim 92. Br. 11. Specifically, Appellant asserts that Leedy teaches
its MDI process requires dielectric membranes to be able to withstand
integrated circuit processing at temperatures exceeding 400°C without

6 Appellant’s Specification defines an encased structure as permitting one or
more portions of a device component to be exposed. Spec. ¶ 18. Thus,
Leedy’s membrane 732, which surrounds electrical components 730-1, 730-
2, 730-3 within the plane of the page of Figures 32a and 32b, but not on the
side along the direction extending out of the page, meets Appellant’s
definition for encasing the electrical components 730-1, 730-2, 730-3.
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noticeable deficiency in performance. Id. at 12. Appellant argues that
Leedy teaches silicon dioxide and silicon nitride as the only dielectric
materials that meet this requirement. Id. at 12–13. Appellant further asserts
that Leedy characterizes the embodiment described in paragraph 300 (i.e.,
the embodiment depicted in Figures 32a and 32b) as a low stress dielectric,
which must meet the above requirement for integrated circuit processing. Id.
at 13–14. Appellant also argues that Chen does not overcome Leedy’s
deficiencies. Id. at 15.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. In an obviousness
determination, a reference may be relied upon for all that it would have
reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art. In re Young,
927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Patents are part of the literature of the
art and are relevant for all they contain”) (citation omitted); Merck & Co. v.
Biocraft Labs., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“That the [prior art]
patent discloses a multitude of effective combinations does not render any
particular formulation less obvious.”). Moreover, “a reference is not limited
to the disclosure of specific working examples.” In re Mills, 470 F.2d 649,
651 (CCPA 1972) (citation omitted).
Here, as Appellant notes, Leedy discloses a membrane being able to
withstand integrated circuit processing conditions, such as a temperature of
at least 400°C. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of Leedy indicate that Leedy’s
fabrication method has the ability to form a dielectric membrane able to
withstand processing temperatures of 400°C or more. However, Leedy’s
disclosure, as a whole, would not have suggested to one of ordinary skill in
the art that its membranes are limited to only those that can withstand such
conditions. Specifically, Leedy states that “[t]he MDI process is not limited
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to starting with a silicon substrate and the process definition of MDI is not
dependent on use of silicon.” Leedy ¶ 21. Leedy further discloses that
membranes can withstand processing temperatures of 400°C or more. Id.
¶¶ 101, 228, 300. Moreover, Leedy’s claim 94, which depends from claim
77, recites that the dielectric layer is formed via a process at a temperature of
about 400°C. Thus, the context of Leedy’s disclosure indicates that claim
77’s dielectric layer is not limited to materials that can withstand such a
temperature. When considering Leedy’s disclosures as a whole, one of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Leedy’s membranes are
not limited to those that are able to withstand processing temperatures of
400°C or more.
We further consider whether Leedy suggests that the membrane in the
embodiment shown in Figures 32a and 32b can be an organic dielectric.
Leedy’s claim 92 recites that “the at least one of the stress-controlled
dielectric layer, the low stress dielectric layer, the flexible dielectric layer,
and the elastic dielectric layer” of claim 77 can be “an organic dielectric
material.” Thus, claim 92 discloses that a low stress dielectric layer can be
an organic dielectric material.
As Appellant notes (Br. 13), Leedy refers to low stress dielectrics
when discussing the embodiment depicted in Figures 32a and 32b. Leedy
¶ 300. Thus, claim 92 indicates that a low stress dielectric, such as that
shown in Leedy’s Figures 32a and 32b, can be an organic material. Leedy’s
paragraph 212 also demonstrates that organic dielectrics were known,
although Leedy considered their passivity and coefficients of thermal
expansion to be inferior to that of silicon nitride and silicon dioxide.
However, something that is known or obvious does not become patentable
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simply because it has been described as somewhat improved over another
product for the same use. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Moreover, Chen demonstrates it was known to use organic materials as
substrates in electronic devices. Chen ¶¶ 39–41.
As a result, the preponderance of the evidence in this appeal record
supports the Examiner’s position that it would have been obvious to modify
the embodiment of Leedy’s Figures 32a and 32b to use an organic dielectric
material, as disclosed in Leedy’s claim 92. This modification to use an
organic dielectric for membranes 732, 746 depicted in Figures 32a and 32b
appears to be the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions (i.e., using an organic dielectric material known for use
in a low stress dielectric). KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007).
In addition, Appellant argues claim 92’s disclosure of “an organic
dielectric material surrounding inter-integrated circuit interconnects is
subject matter that was newly added to Leedy years after the parent
application was filed,” “those of ordinary skill in the art would not expect
organic dielectrics to meet the required properties of Leedy’s low stress
dielectric membranes,” and claim 92 “is not described, supported, or enabled
by any other disclosure in Leedy.” Br. 14–15.
These arguments are unpersuasive. As discussed above, Leedy’s
disclosure is not limited to membranes able to withstand processing
temperatures of 400°C or more, and claim 92 indicates that a low stress
dielectric, such as the membrane in the embodiment of Figures 32a and 32b
and paragraph 300, can be an organic dielectric material. Appellant’s
argument that Leedy’s disclosure does not enable claim 92 is conclusory and
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does not include analysis, evidence, or persuasive technical reasoning as
support. As a result, Appellant’s arguments do not identify a reversible error
in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5.
For these reasons, and those the Examiner provides, we uphold the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 5–7, and 18–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Leedy and Chen.

Rejection 2: Obviousness of Claims 8–10
The Examiner rejects claims 8–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Leedy and Chen and further in view of Six7 for the
reasons provided on pages 6–7 of the Final Office Action.
Appellant contends Six does not remedy the deficiencies of Leedy and
Chen. Id. at 15. For the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded of
deficiencies in the rejection of claim 5 that require curing by Six. Therefore,
for the reasons discussed above with regard to the rejection of claim 5 and
those the Examiner provides, we uphold the Examiner’s rejection of claims
8–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Leedy, Chen, and Six.

DECISION
Upon consideration of the record, and for the reasons given above, in
the Final Office Action, and in the Examiner’s Answer, the decision of the
Examiner rejecting claims 2, 5–10, and 18–22 under § 103 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

7 Six, US 7,893,781 B2, issued February 22, 2011 (“Six”).
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AFFIRMED