Yvonne M. Keahi, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 30, 2004
01A34018 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 30, 2004)

01A34018

06-30-2004

Yvonne M. Keahi, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Yvonne M. Keahi v. United States Postal Service

01A34018

June 30, 2004

.

Yvonne M. Keahi,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A34018

Agency No. 4F-967-0023-01

Hearing No.

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's

final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Customer Services Supervisor

at the agency's Main Office Station, in Honolulu, Hawaii, filed a

formal EEO complaint on August 7, 2001, alleging that the agency had

discriminated against her on the combined bases of sex, race/national

origin (Hawaiian), and age (D.O.B.3/14/46) when she was not selected for

the position of Station Manager, EAS-21, at Waialae Kahala Post Office

on or about February 27, 2001.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no

discrimination. The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The record reflects

that the review panel, after considering all the application files,

was to recommend 3 names to the selecting official. (IE Affidavit E).

The record also reflects that complainant had 22 years of post office

experience and 13 years of managerial experience whereas the selectee had

15 years of experience in the postal service and one year of managerial

experience. (IE 5;6A). According to the panel members, there was

a tie in scores between complainant and the selectee. (HT 72; 117).

Although one panel member testified that she rated complainant highly

in her choices, another panel member did not. (Hearing Transcript 85,

105). Two panel members testified that the reason the selectee was

recommended over complainant was because the selectee had more recent

safety details than complainant (IE 6A). In reference to the disparity

in years of service, a panel member testified that outstanding service,

not necessarily years of service was significant for this position,

and the selectee was considered a �go-getter.� (HT 21).

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely than

not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful

discrimination/retaliation. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found

that evidence of the selecting official's possible animus against the

complainant on the basis of her age was irrelevant because the panel

chose to eliminate her from the selection process, not the selecting

official. The record establishes that the selecting official did not

discuss the selection process with the panel members prior to or during

selection. (HT 24-25; 67-68; 90). The AJ determined this testimony was

credible and we do not disturb that decision.

Complainant contends on appeal that she produced sufficient evidence to

prove pretext, that the AJ erred in failing to apply an adverse inference

because the panel board members destroyed their notes pertaining to

the promotion and failed to remember details about complainant's and

the selectee's qualifications. Complainant also contends that the AJ

erred in refusing to allow testimony of certain witnesses, because their

testimony is relevant to the pattern of unfairness and discrimination

in Post Office hiring practices. In response, the agency contends that

complainant failed to prove pretext by a preponderance of the evidence,

which is the position it took in its FAD, and requests that we affirm

its final order.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the

record and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant

facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.

The record reflects that the AJ admonished the agency to reconsider

its practice of not retaining notes from the panel's deliberations,

as it is predictable that panel members will not be able to recall the

details of their deliberation months or years later. This commission

not only agrees, but reminds the agency that such action could result

in an adverse inference when there is insufficient evidence from which a

fair determination on discrimination can be made. Huey v. Department of

Health and Human Services, EEOC Case No. 01831403 (February 28, 1986).

Since the AJ concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record

to make a decision on the merits, and this commission agrees with that

decision, we do not make a negative inference in this case.

We note that complainant failed to present evidence that the panel's

failure to recommend her for hire was motivated by their discriminatory

animus toward complainant's sex, national origin/race, and age. Although

complainant presented evidence about possible discriminatory animus on

the part of the selecting official, the AJ was correct in concluding

that this evidence was not liked to the panel's decision, which is

the basis for complainant's claim. We discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we AFFIRM the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 30, 2004

__________________

Date