Yvette S. Simmons, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 16, 2003
01A30590 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 16, 2003)

01A30590

07-16-2003

Yvette S. Simmons, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Yvette S. Simmons v. United States Postal Service

01A30590

07-16-03

.

Yvette S. Simmons,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A30590

Agency No. 1J461114895

Hearing No. 240-97-5142x

DECISION

BACKGROUND

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms

the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Distribution Clerk at the

agency's Indianapolis, Indiana facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on

September 5, 1995, alleging that she was subject to disparate treatment

and harassment in a hostile work environment on the bases of race

(African-American), sex (female), disability (chronic pelvic pain,

contusion to sacrum), and reprisal for prior EEO activity.

Complainant was assigned to work in the Flats Pay Location 152 operational

area from May 18, 1995 to May 23, 1995. On May 22, 1995, complainant

was given a direct order to go to the medical unit and was charged AWOL

when she opted to go home instead. Because of her insubordination /

failure to follow a direct order, she was issued a notice of removal

on June 1, 1995. Complainant filed a formal complaint on September

5, 1995. At the conclusion of her investigation, complainant requested

a hearing with an Administrative Judge (AJ). Prior to the hearing, the

Administrative Judge remanded the case for supplemental investigation due

to amendments made by complainant. After the supplemental investigation,

and after the complainant failed to request a hearing or receive a final

agency decision, the agency issued a final decision of no discrimination.

Complainant appealed the decision. The Commission vacated and remanded

the case to the AJ because the AJ should have presided over any necessary

supplementation of the record in the hearing process without remanding

it to the agency for additional investigations. Simmons v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A21416 (April 10, 2002).

The hearing was held on August 14 and 15, 2002. In the AJ's decision,

dated September 24, 2002, she concluded that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of unlawful harassment based

upon complainant's race, gender, alleged physical disability,

and reprisal. Regarding the claim of disparate treatment, the AJ

determined that complainant failed to demonstrate that the agency's

actions were a pretext for discrimination. The AJ also concluded that

complainant's disabilities did not meet the statutory definitions of

the Rehabilitation Act. The agency's final action implemented the AJ's

decision. On appeal, complainant restates arguments previously made at

the hearing. In response, the agency restates the position it took in

its final action, and requests that we dismiss the appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

Disparate Treatment

Although the initial inquiry in a Title VII discrimination case usually

focuses on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case,

following this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

See Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May

31, 1990). In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant

has established a prima facie case to whether she has demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717

(1983). In this case, the Commission finds that the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action.

Complainant's Acting Supervisor (AS) stated that on May 22, 1995, she

asked complainant to go to the medical office after she and a co-worker

smelled alcohol on complainant's breath. When complainant asked for

a medical slip to see the nurse, the AS said she could not find one,

but that the nurse was expecting her and a slip was unnecessary.

When complainant still refused to go, AS, and another supervisor (OS)

ordered complainant to go to the nurse. An affidavit of a witness

to the incident noted that AS was to escort complainant to the nurse.

AS testified that complainant left the building. The record shows that

proper procedure in a case where the employee does not agree with his

or her supervisor's instructions, is to follow the instructions and then

file a grievance. AS issued AWOL status to complainant for May 22, 1995

because of complainant's actions. Complainant testified that OS gave her

the option to go home. OS, who was not complainant's direct supervisor,

denied this. Although he could not remember this specific incident,

he testified that in such a situation the employee would be removed

from the building for failure to follow a direct order. AS requested

removal of complainant for insubordination and failure to follow a direct

order, as was the agency's policy. This request was concurred to by

her supervisor. Additionally, specifically regarding complainant's

physical disability, complainant stated that her transfer to Flats Pay

Location 152 violated her light duty restrictions.<1> The record shows

that employees on light or limited duty are required to have a letter

stating their restrictions. AS testified that complainant's duties at

Location 152 did not violate complainant's restrictions. Complainant

stated that there were more recent documents limiting her restrictions

further, however complainant also testified that she never showed these

documents to AS or OS. Furthermore, concerning complainant's reprisal

claim, AS and OS testified that they had no knowledge of complainant's

prior EEO activity. Complainant stated that EEO postings regarding

her first action were posted around the entire facility. The record

shows that there was no way for AS or OS to have made the connection

between complainant and the postings. The supervisor who concurred to

complainant's removal did know of complainant's prior activity. However,

as already noted, complainant's removal for insubordination and failure

to follow a direct order is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Complainant failed to meet her burden to show that they agency's actions

were motivated by a discriminatory reason. We therefore affirm the

AJ's findings regarding complainant's claim of disparate treatment on

the basis of race, sex, disability and reprisal.

Harassment and Hostile Work Environment

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is

unlawful. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded

as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker

v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the

harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII

must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

Complainant alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

and harassment based on the incidents previously discussed. To establish

a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment, petitioner must

show the existence of four elements: (1) she is a member of a statutorily

protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of

unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class;

(3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected

class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment

and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the

work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. �1604.11.

The Commission affirms the AJ's findings regarding complainant's

claims of harassment. The complainant cannot show by a preponderance

of evidence that the harassment she alleged was based on her race, sex,

disability or reprisal.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record

and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We discern no

basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of

the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we AFFIRM the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__07-16-03________________

Date

1For the purposes of analysis, the Commission assumes without finding

that complainant is an individual with a disability within the meaning

of the Rehabilitation Act.