Yiotis Katsambas

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 20, 2019

13769176 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/769,176 02/15/2013 Yiotis Katsambas 113748-113UT1 6738
103865 7590 12/20/2019
Procopio - SPE
525 B Street
Suite 2200
San Diego, CA 92101
EXAMINER
HEFFERN, JAMES E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2158
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/20/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@procopio.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YIOTIS KATSAMBAS
Appeal 2018-000317
Application 13/769,176
Technology Center 2100
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, THU A. DANG, and NORMAN BEAMER,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s Final Decision to reject claims 1–20, which are all of the
pending claims. See Appeal Br. 5. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sony Corporation.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, the invention “relates to asset management,
and more specifically, to connecting a storyboard system to an editorial
system in content production.” Spec. 1:12–14.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method of managing assets in a movie during
production, comprising:
storing new material in a first file with a first name in a
first folder of a data storage system;
sending the new material to an editorial system at some
predetermined intervals;
storing the new material in a second file in a second folder
of the data storage system after the new material is sent to the
editorial system;
creating an empty third file with the first name in a third
folder of the data storage system after the new material is sent to
the editorial system;
comparing names of first files in the first folder with
names of third files in the third folder;
identifying the names of the first files that are not in the
names of the third files as new materials that have not yet been
sent to the editorial system; and
enabling at least one of: (1) renaming the new materials in
second files of the second folder; and (2) moving the new
materials in the second files of the second folder to new locations
so that the new materials sent to the editorial system can be
processed in parallel with said comparing and said identifying.

Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.)
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Lusen et al.
Rodriguez
Prahlad
US 2003/0050937 A1
US 2012/0042251 A1
US 2012/0059797 A1
Mar. 13, 2003
Feb. 16, 2012
Mar. 08, 2012

REJECTIONS
Claims 11 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b)
Final Act. 6.
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea); and not directed to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself. Ans. 2–6 (New Ground of Rejection).
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Rodriguez, Prahlad, and Lusen. Final Act. 7.
ANALYSIS
Except where indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the
Answer and Final Office Action and we add the following primarily for
emphasis. We note that if Appellant failed to present arguments on a
particular rejection, we decline to review unilaterally those uncontested
aspects of the rejection. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI
2010) (precedential); Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (the Board may treat arguments Appellant failed to make for a given
ground of rejection as waived).

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Rejection of claims 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 112
The Examiner concludes that, regarding claims 11 and 12, “element ‘a
first folder configured’ is using non-structural terms coupled with
functional language,” but “the written description fails to disclose the
corresponding structure, material, or acts of the claimed function.” Final
Act. 5. Thus, the Examiner also concludes that the claims are “indefinite
for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.” Id.
In order to satisfy the written description requirement, “the
specification must describe an invention understandable to [a] skilled artisan
and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc). “[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application
relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor
had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id.
(citation omitted). To have “possession,” “the specification must describe an
invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor
actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. The drawings in an application
can be relied upon to show that an inventor was in possession of the claimed
invention as of the filing date. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[D]rawings alone may be sufficient to provide
the ‘written description of the invention’ required by § 112, first
paragraph.”).
Here, Appellant contends that “[p]aragraph [0018] of U.S. Publication
No. 2013/0232178 of the present application specifically recites that ‘the
new system may use three folders, for example, A, B, and C.’” Reply Br.
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10. In particular, as shown in Figure 2A of the Specification, Appellant’s
application discloses “first folder 210,” “second folder 220,” and “third
folder 230.” Spec. 10:17–22. Thus, although the Examiner finds that “the
written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or
acts of the claimed function” for a “first folder” (Final Act. 5), we agree with
Appellant and conclude that Appellant’s Specification describes the folders
sufficiently to demonstrate that Appellant had possession of a “first folder”
as claimed.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11
and 12 as failing to comply with the written description requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
To the extent the Examiner is relying on the rejections under 35
U.S.C. § 112(a) for failing to comply with the written description to reject
the claims under § 112(b) as “being indefinite for failing to particularly point
out and distinctly claim the subject matter” (Final Act. 5), as discussed
above, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections under § 112(a) for the
reasons set forth above.
For these reasons, the Examiner has not persuasively established that
the claims are not an accurate description of the disclosed device.
Therefore, we also do not sustain the rejection of claims 11 and 12 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b).

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Rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
“directed to a judicial exception of an abstract idea without significantly
more.” Ans. 2 (New Ground of Rejection).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216–218 (2014)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what
concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their
face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated
settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent
ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as
fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S.
at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
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ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Memorandum”). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP §
2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.

Revised Guidance Step 1
Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject
matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.
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Independent claim 1 recites a “method of managing assets in a
movie,” independent claim 11 recites an “asset management system,” and
independent claim 13 recites a “non-transitory storage medium.” Appellant
does not argue that the Examiner erred in concluding claims 1, 11, and 13,
and the claims depending therefrom, fall within the four statutory categories
of patentable subject matter. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion
because claim 1 falls within the process category and claims 11 and 13 fall
within the machine category.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine
whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). See Revised Guidance.
According to the Examiner, the claims are directed to an idea “similar
to the basic concept of data recognition and storage that courts have found to
be an abstract idea.” Ans. 3. In particular, the Examiner concludes that the
claims “simply describe[] the concept of . . . ‘classifying and storing
digital images in an organized matter’ [in TLI Communications v. AV
Automotive LLC] and ‘receiving, screening, and distributing e-mail’ [in
Intellectual Ventures v Symantec].”
Independent claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “storing” new material;
“sending” the new material; “creating” a file; “comparing” names of files;
“identifying” the names; and “enabling” at least one of “renaming” and
“moving” the new materials. Independent claim 11 recites an “asset
management system” comprising a “first folder” and “processor” configured
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to perform steps similar to those in claim 1, and independent claim 13 recites
a “non-transitory storing medium” storing a “computer program comprising
executable instructions” that cause the computer to perform the steps similar
to those in claim 1. That is, claims 1, 11 and 13 merely recite the steps (or a
system/executable instructions for performing the steps) of storing, sending,
creating, comparing, identifying, and renaming and/or moving various data.
Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim
limitations that recites a method of managing assets in a movie during
production, emphasized in italics:
1. A method of managing assets in a movie during production,
comprising:
storing new material in a first file with a first name in a
first folder of a data storage system;
sending the new material to an editorial system at some
predetermined intervals;
storing the new material in a second file in a second folder
of the data storage system after the new material is sent to the
editorial system;
creating an empty third file with the first name in a third
folder of the data storage system after the new material is sent to
the editorial system;
comparing names of first files in the first folder with names
of third files in the third folder;
identifying the names of the first files that are not in the
names of the third files as new materials that have not yet been
sent to the editorial system; and
enabling at least one of: (1) renaming the new materials
in second files of the second folder; and (2) moving the new
materials in the second files of the second folder to new locations
so that the new materials sent to the editorial system can be
processed in parallel with said comparing and said identifying.

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We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, under their
broadest reasonable interpretation, recite “data recognition and storage.”
That is, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claims 1, 11 and 13
recite steps of (and a system/executable instructions for performing the
steps) storing, sending, creating, comparing, identifying, and, for example,
renaming various data, which are identified as example mental processes in
the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In
particular, these steps of storing and recognizing data constitute mental steps
because they involve merely making a mental observation of data and
evaluating/judging the data, which can be carried out either in the human
mind (e.g., in the form of noting an observation) or with the aid of pencil
and paper. See 2019 Guidance 52 n.14; see also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have treated
collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which
does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract
ideas.”). Acts that can be performed in the human mind fall within the
abstract idea exception subgrouping of mental processes.
We, therefore, conclude claims 1, 11, and 13, and the claims
depending respectively therefrom, recite an evaluation or judgment, which
falls within the mental processes category of abstract ideas identified in the
Revised Guidance.

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Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine
whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Appellant provides quotations from the Guidance regarding two
ineligible claim examples and two eligible claim examples. Reply Br. 3–6.
C. Appellant emphasizes in the quotations that the patent-eligible subject
matter inventions addresses a problem. Appellant emphasizes that “the
claimed method relates to addressing a problem with overlapping windows
within a graphical user interface.” Reply Br. 5. In particular, according to
Appellant, the claims in the eligible example recite “dynamically relocating
textual information within a window displayed in a graphical user interface
based upon a detected overlap condition” and “the claimed method is
necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem
specifically arising in graphical user interfaces.” Id. We are not persuaded
by Appellant’s arguments.
Contrary to Appellant’s contention (id.), claim 1 does not recite
overcoming a problem necessarily rooted in computer technology. See
claim 1. Thus, Appellant does persuasively explain how the claimed method
recited in claim 1, claim 11, and/or claim 13 is “necessarily rooted in
computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in graphical
user interfaces.” Id. Instead, the claims merely recite storing, sending,
creating, comparing, identifying, and, for example, renaming various data.
See claim 1.
Claim 1’s steps of storing, sending and creating data involve merely
making a mental observation of data, which can be carried out either in the
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human mind or with the aid of pencil and paper. See 2019 Guidance 52 n.14.
Further, claim 1’s steps of “comparing” and “identifying” data (“names of
first files”), as well as “enabling . . . renaming” data (“new materials”) also
constitute making a mental observation of data and evaluating/judging the
data, which can be carried out either in the human mind or with the aid of
pencil and paper. See 2019 Guidance 52 n.14. That is, these steps in claim 1
comprises comparing the names of the first files with the names of the third
files, and then identifying the names in the first files that are not in the third
files, but no further step is performed in response to the identification. See
claim 1. Similarly, stored data/materials in the “second files” are then
possibly renamed, but nothing is done to the renamed data/materials. Id.
Because these claimed steps of claim 1 set forth an abstract idea, we
do not identify any other additional element(s) sufficient to integrate the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible practical application. Hence, other than
the limitations directed to the abstract idea, discussed above, the invention is
claimed at a very high level of generality and is only limited in the data
being stored, sent, created, compared, identified and enabled to be renamed.
Accordingly, we conclude independent claims 1, 11, and 13, and
claims depending respectively therefrom do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application, and that the subject matter of the
claims is directed to the abstract idea of making a mental observation of data
and evaluating/judging the data.

Revised Guidance Step 2B
Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether
the elements in the claims both individually and “as an ordered
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combination” recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more
than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” BASCOM Global
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2016). There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the
industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
Here, although Appellant contends “the claimed method is necessarily
rooted in computer technology” (Reply Br. 5), storing and sending data in a
“data storage system,” or “sending,” “creating,” “comparing,” “identifying,”
and “renaming” data to/in an “editorial system” are not additional elements
beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed to the abstract idea itself.
See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether
the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept
to which it was directed were well understood, routine and conventional”).
We briefly look to whether any additional limitations in claims 1, 11,
and 13 include an inventive concept. Here, the steps of “storing,” “sending,”
“creating,” “comparing,” “identifying,” and “renaming” data to/in an
“editorial system” in claims 1, 11, and 13 do not individually or as an
ordered combination define ways of storing or processing data that is
different than any of the myriad conventional ways in which a computer
stores or processes data, and thus do not provide an inventive concept. See,
e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with
no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). The focus of the
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claims is not on an improvement in computer processors as tools, but on
certain independently abstract ideas that use conventional computing
components such as a “data storage system” and an “editorial system” as
tools. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. IA, 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). As with the ineligible claimed
invention in BSG, the claimed invention does not improve a computer’s
functionality or that of its associated components, but rather the benefits
flow from performing the abstract idea in conjunction with those
conventional computer components. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1288 (“While the
presentation of summary comparison usage information to users improves
the quality of the information added to the database, an improvement [in] . . .
the information stored by a database is not equivalent to an improvement in
the database’s functionality.”).
Although the Examiner does not expressly cite to Appellant’s
Specification or provide extrinsic evidence, we note that Appellant describes
the invention with respect to only well-understood, routine, and conventional
computers and processors (See Fig. 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B and their
corresponding disclosure in the Specification at pages 10–16 identifying
only generic “system,” “processor,” “medium,” computer, and network
elements.) Additionally, Appellant provided no argument in the Reply Brief
that the claimed invention has additional elements which provide
“significantly more” than the abstract idea. Outside of the abstract idea, the
additional elements of the claims, individually or as a whole, only recite
generic computer components with functions that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. Accordingly, we agree
with the Examiner that the claims are patent-ineligible.
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Therefore, claims 1, 11, and 13 do not recite an inventive concept.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that independent claims 1, 11, and
13, and claims depending respectively therefrom and not specifically argued
separately, are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Claims 1–20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Rodriguez, Prahlad, and
Lusen.
With respect to claims 1, 5, and 6, Appellant repeats the cited
paragraphs to Prahlad (“Paragraph [0030]”, “Paragraph [0048]”, “Paragraph
[0036]”), Lusen (“Paragraph [0021]”), and Rodriguez (“Paragraph [0074]”,
“Paragraph [0081]”), and then merely contends that “this paragraph of
[Prahlad, Lusen or Rodriguez] fails to teach, suggest or disclose” what the
claim recites. Appeal Br. 6–11.
A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(vii). Moreover, Appellant’s contentions that Prahlad, Lusen and
Rodriguez fail to “teach, suggest or disclose” the recited claim language are
mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by
factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d
1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7-8
(BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd09004693.pdf.
Nevertheless, as to claim 1, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Prahlad discloses “electronic data that is periodically stored
(predetermined intervals).” See Ans. 7 (citing Prahlad ⁋ 30). Thus,
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although Appellant contends that Prahlad fails to teach, suggest or disclose
the contested limitation (Appeal Br. 7 (citing Prahlad ⁋ 30)), we find no
error with the Examiner’s reliance on Prahlad to teach and suggest “sending”
new material “to an editorial system at some predetermined intervals,” as
recited in claim 1.
We further agree with the Examiner’s finding that Prahlad discloses a
“data migrator” that “may store a stub file (empty file with the same name)
at the original file location.” See Ans. 8 (citing Prahlad ⁋ 48). Thus,
although Appellant contends that Prahlad fails to teach, suggest or disclose
the contested limitation (Appeal Br. 7–8 (citing Prahlad ⁋ 48)), we find no
error with the Examiner’s reliance on Prahlad to teach and suggest “creating
an empty third file,” as recited in claim 1.
We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Lusen discloses “a
decision processor (203) programmed for comparing at least a portion of a
filename of an identified new stored data object with stored
predetermined filename data.” Ans. 9 (citing Lusen ⁋ 21). Thus, although
Appellant contends that Lusen fails to teach, suggest or disclose the
contested limitation (Appeal Br. 8–9 (citing Lusen ⁋ 21)),we find no error
with the Examiner’s reliance on Lusen to teach and suggest “comparing
names of first files in the first folder with names of third files in the third
folder,” as recited in claim 1.
Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Prahlad
discloses “data migrator (moving) 95” which “may ‘discover’ certain
information regarding that data and then migrate it . . . to secondary storage
devices.” See Ans. 10–11 (citing Prahlad ⁋ 36). Thus, although Appellant
contends that Prahlad fails to teach, suggest or disclose the contested
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limitation (Appeal Br. 9–10 (citing Prahlad ⁋ 36)), we find no error with the
Examiner’s reliance on Prahlad to teach and suggest “enabling” (i.e., make
possible or not preventing) “at least one of” (i.e., either of) “renaming” the
new materials or “moving” the new materials, as recited in claim 1.
With respect to dependent claims 5 and 6, we find no error with the
Examiner’s reliance on Rodriguez to teach and suggest the contested
limitations. Final Act. 24–25.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, and 6
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Rodriguez, Prahlad and
Lusen. Appellant does not provide substantive arguments for independent
claims 11 and 13, and claims 2–4, 7–10, 12, and 14–20 depending
respectively from claims 1, 11, and 13, separate from those of claim 1. See
Appeal Br. 11. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 2–4 and 7–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of
Rodriguez, Prahlad and Lusen.
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are
affirmed.
However, the Examiner’s rejections of claims 11 and 12 under 35
U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b) are reversed.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, the Examiner's decision is affirmed.

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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Patent-Eligibility 1–20
1–20 103 Rodriguez, Prahlad,
Lusen
1–20
11, 12 112(a),
112(b)
Written Description,
Indefiniteness
11, 12
Overall Outcome: 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED