Yehuda Binder

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 10, 2021

2020004273 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 10, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/358,596 01/23/2009 Yehuda Binder BINDER-004-US2 2832
131926 7590 09/10/2021
May Patents Ltd. c/o Dorit Shem-Tov
P.O.B 7230
Ramat-Gan, 5217102
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
WOO, STELLA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2652
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/10/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YEHUDA BINDER

Appeal 2020-004273
Application 12/358,596
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–200. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as May Patents
Ltd. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention generally relates to a “method, device[,] and
system for obtaining information from a remote location to an information
device.” Spec. 1. Claims 1, 84, 141, and 167, reproduced below, are
independent and representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A device for obtaining, storing and displaying information from
a first remote information server via the Internet over a Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN), the device comprising:

an antenna for transmitting and receiving digital data over the
air;

a WLAN transceiver coupled to said antenna for bidirectional
packet-based digital data communication over the air, via said
antenna;

a first memory coupled to said WLAN transceiver for storing
digital data received by said WLAN transceiver;

a display for visually presenting an information, said display
being coupled to said first memory for displaying information stored
in the first memory; and

a single enclosure housing said antenna, said WLAN
transceiver, said first memory and said display, wherein said device is
addressable in the WLAN, and said device is operative for
communicating over the WLAN with the first remote information
server via the Internet for receiving information therefrom, and for
storing and displaying the received information.

Appeal Br. 155.

84. A device for obtaining, storing and displaying information
requested by a user from a single remote information server via the
Internet using a digital data cellular network, the device comprising:

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a cellular antenna for transmitting and receiving digital data
over the air via the digital data cellular network;

a cellular modem coupled to said cellular antenna for bi-
directional packet-based digital data communication over the digital
data cellular network;

a first memory coupled to said cellular modem for storing the
digital data received from the Internet via said digital data cellular
network;

a display for visually presenting information, said display being
coupled to said first memory for displaying information stored in the
digital data in said first memory;

a second memory for storing a first digital address uniquely
identifying the user;

a third memory for storing data identifying the information
requested by the user;

a fourth memory storing a second digital address uniquely
identifying said device in the Internet; and

a single enclosure housing said cellular antenna, said cellular
modem, said first, second, third and fourth memories and said display,
wherein said device is operative to obtain from the user, and store in
said second memory, the first digital address uniquely identifying the
user, and to obtain and store in said third memory the information
requested by the user, and wherein said device is further operative for
communicating over the cellular network and via the Internet with the
single remote information server, for transmitting to the server the
first digital address uniquely identifying the user, the data identifying
the information requested by the user and said second digital address
uniquely identifying said device in the Internet, and for receiving
requested information from the server, and for storing the received
information in said first memory and displaying on said display the
received information.
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Appeal Br. 169–170.

141. A weather forecaster device for obtaining, storing and
displaying a weather forecast information associated with a
geographical location, for use with a weather-forecast information
server identified in the Internet using a digital address and storing
updated weather forecasts associated with a plurality of geographical
locations, the device comprising:

a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) antenna for over the
air digital data wireless communication;

a WLAN transceiver coupled to said WLAN antenna for
bidirectional packet-based digital data communication over the air, via
said WLAN antenna;

a first memory coupled to said WLAN transceiver for storing
weather forecast information received by said WLAN transceiver
from the weather-forecast information server;

a display for visually presenting information, said display being
coupled to said first memory for displaying the weather-forecast
information stored in said first memory;

a firmware and a processor for executing said firmware, said
processor being coupled to control at least said WLAN transceiver
and said display; and

a single enclosure housing said WLAN transceiver, said first
memory, said processor, said first memory and said display;

wherein the device is operative for automatically and
periodically communicating with said weather-forecast information
server at all times when said device is in operation, for obtaining,
storing and displaying the weather forecast associated with a first
geographical location.

Appeal Br. 179.
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167. A television set for receiving and displaying an analog video
carried over a coaxial cable, the television set being further operative
for obtaining, storing and displaying information from a first remote
information server via the Internet over a Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN), said television set comprising:

a television apparatus operative for receiving and displaying the
analog video carried over the coaxial cable;

an antenna for transmitting and receiving digital data over the
air;

a WLAN transceiver coupled to said antenna for bidirectional
packet-based digital data communication over the air, via said
antenna, with another WLAN transceiver of the same type;

a first memory coupled to said WLAN transceiver for storing
information represented as digital data received by said WLAN
transceiver; and

a display for visually presenting information, said display being
coupled to said first memory for displaying information stored in said
first memory;

wherein said television set is addressable in the WLAN, and
said television set is operative for communicating over the WLAN
with the first remote information server via the Internet for receiving
information from the first remote information server, and for storing
and displaying the received information.

Appeal Br. 183.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–200 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 as
failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 4–10.
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Claims 1, 2, 7, 14, 15, 20–46, 54, 64–67, 82, 83, 141, 149–152, 154–
162, 167–169, 175, 177–186, and 192–195 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Bell et al. (US 2004/0044785 A1;
published Mar. 4, 2004) (“Bell ’785”). Final Act. 11–20.
Claims 3, 4, 6, 55, 56, 146, 147, 170, 171, 173, 189, and 190 stand
rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell
’785 and Ishidoshiro (US 2004/0076120 A1; published Apr. 22, 2004).
Final Act. 20–21.
Claims 5, 8–10, 12, 77, 145, 148, 153, 172, and 174 stand rejected
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and
Fong (US 2003/0095152 A1; published May 22, 2003). Final Act. 21–22.
Claims 11–13, 16, 17, 50–53, 68, 78–80, 142–144, 176, 187, 188,
196, and 197 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Bell et al. (US 2004/0044723 A1; published
Mar. 4, 2004) (“Bell ’723”). Final Act. 22.
Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Ulrich (US 4,803,719; issued Feb. 7,
1989). Final Act. 22.
Claims 47 and 48 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Williams et al. (US 7,441,041 B2;
issued Oct. 21, 2008) (“Williams”). Final Act. 22–24.
Claim 49 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Christodoulou et al. (US 2004/0225708 A1;
Nov. 11, 2004) (“Christodoulou”). Final Act. 24.
Claims 57–63, 84, 85, 87, 94, 95, 99–116, 124–129, and 191 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and
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Masterson et al. (US 2003/0018755 A1; published Jan. 23, 2003)
(“Masterson”). Final Act. 24–30.
Claims 69–73 and 198–200 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Bell ’723, and Curtiss et al.
(US 7,110,789 B1; issued Sept. 19, 2006) (“Curtiss”). Final Act. 30–31.
Claims 74–76 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Yamada et al. (US 2004/0100460 A1;
published May 27, 2004) (“Yamada”). Final Act. 31.
Claim 81 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Langseth et al. (US 6,694,316 B1; issued
Feb. 17, 2004) (“Langseth”). Final Act. 31–32.
Claims 86, 88–90, 92, and 137 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Masterson, and Fong.
Final Act. 32.
Claims 902–93, 96, 97, 119–123, 130, 131, and 138–140 stand
rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell
’785, Masterson, and Bell ’723. Final Act. 32.
Claim 98 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Masterson, and Ulrich. Final Act. 32.
Claims 117 and 118 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Masterson, and Williams. Final Act.
32.

2 We note that claim 90 is rejected under two different combinations:
(1) Bell ’785, Masterson, and Fong and (2) Bell ’785, Masterson, and Bell
’723. See Final Act. 32.
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Claims 132 and 133 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Masterson, and Curtiss. Final Act. 32.
Claims 134–136 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Masterson, and Yamada. Final Act. 32.
Claims 163–166 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Luneau et al. (US 2005/0047572 A1;
published Mar. 3, 2005) (“Luneau”). Final Act. 33.
ANALYSIS
Related Appeals
The current application is related to and has the same Specification as
a number of applications previously appealed to the Board: (1) application
12/358,551, which was the subject of Appeal No. 2016-000622 (Decision
mailed on February 2, 2017); (2) application 15/253,915, which was the
subject of Appeal No. 2019-002199 (Decision mailed on August 11, 2020);
(3) application 12/890,888, which was the subject of Appeal No. 2019-
003193 (Decision mailed on November 18, 2020); (4) application
12/889,998, which was the subject of Appeal No. 2019-003425 (Decision
mailed on December 28, 2020); and (5) application 12/693,881, which was
the subject of Appeal No. 2019-004033 (Decision mailed on March 23,
2021) (collectively, “Related Appeals”).
There is substantial overlap in the claim language, the Examiner’s
rejections, and the corresponding arguments made by Appellant in the
current appeal and in the Related Appeals. Accordingly, we incorporate by
reference the analysis in those Related Appeals, and, where appropriate, we
rely on our analysis in those Decisions rather than repeating the analysis
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again here. We have endeavored to provide pin citations to the appropriate
analysis in those Related Appeals where possible.
General Arguments
At the outset, we note that Appellant’s arguments are, in various
instances, repetitive,3 unclear, and/or do not directly address the Examiner’s
rejection. In addition, Appellant provides quotations purportedly from the
Specification and/or the Examiner’s Final Rejection without any pin citation.
Appellant also repeatedly cites to and quotes case law, but does not provide
specific and/or persuasive analysis as to how that law applies to Appellant’s
arguments.4 In other instances, Appellant simply provides a general
argument without more specific arguments directed toward the rejection.
We decline to dig through the record to find support for Appellant’s
arguments, to attempt to discern what arguments and analysis Appellant is
attempting to make, or to provide analysis for Appellant. Moreover,
arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Cf. In re
Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the
function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by
an appellant, looking for nonobvious distinctions over the prior art.”)
In such instances, Appellant has not sufficiently challenged the substance of
the Examiner’s findings.
Appellant provides several general arguments. First, Appellant
contends that the Examiner “improperly and too broadly combines the

3 Appellant has submitted over 200 pages of briefing.
4 As one example, throughout the Appeal Brief, Appellant refers to and cites
the law on inherency, but provides no accompanying analysis in support of
its arguments. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 75, 78–79.
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various references, and . . . it seems any reference can be combined with any
other.” Appeal Br. 11. However, Appellant’s arguments in this regard
address previous rejections by the Examiner, not the Final Rejection from
which the appeal is taken. Id. Accordingly, the propriety of these
combinations of references are not properly before us.
In addition, Appellant repeats various arguments throughout the
Appeal Brief and Reply Brief. For example, Appellant contends that the
prosecution is a “moving target,” and “is a non-ordinary and special case of
improper prosecution, and the PTAB should not contribute to such improper
handling of applications.” Appeal Br. 12–13. Appellant also argues that
certain claim terms were not rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 in previous
rejections or in co-pending applications, which implies that the claimed
terms complied with § 112, ¶ 1, and were improperly rejected. See, e.g., id.
at 15–16 (citing MPEP § 2103), 23, 25–27, 29–30, 36, 37, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50,
52–54, 56, 60–61, 63.
The Board’s role is to hear appeals reviewing the rejections on the
record. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (“The Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall—
(1) on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners
upon applications for patents pursuant to section 134(a)”). Appellant’s
argument relates to petitionable matters, not appealable matters, and we do
not address them in our opinion. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) (“Petition may be
taken to the Director: (1) From any action or requirement of any examiner
in the ex parte prosecution of an application . . . which is not subject to
appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board or to the court”) (boldface
omitted); MPEP § 1201 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020) (“The line of
demarcation between appealable matters for the Board and petitionable
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matters for the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Director)
should be carefully observed.”).
Appellant also argues, and repeats throughout the Appeal Brief, that
the Examiner applies a “double standard” relating to the § 112 and
§ 102/103 rejections, including in rejections in related applications, in that
the applied references provide less written description support than
Appellant’s Specification. E.g., Appeal Br. 17–19, 21, 23–27, 29–31, 36,
38, 43, 44, 45, 50, 53, 55–57, 61, 63, 70, 75, 79, 90, 92, 93, 100, 102, 103,
132. Appellant has previously made this argument in the Related Appeals.
See, e.g., Decision 2019-002199, pp. 4–5; Decision 2019-003193, pp. 9–12;
Decision 2019-003425, pp. 6–8; Decision 2019-004033, pp. 6–8. As
discussed therein, this argument is not persuasive because the disclosure in
the references cited in the prior art rejections has no bearing on the test for
written description in the present case. We further emphasize that the tests
for written description and obviousness are different, and “a description that
merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the [written
description] requirement.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Thus, the prior art might render a
claim obvious even though identical wording in an application’s
specification fails to provide sufficient written description.
Finally, Appellant generally argues that because the Specification
states that “[t]he invention embraces any combination of the above
embodiments,” there is “no need to repeat the various possibilities and
functionalities detailed at various locations in the specification, and such
functionalities are to be considered as combinable, even if disclosed in
different parts of the specification.” Appeal Br. 19–20 (emphasis omitted).
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We do not find that this argument is specific enough to understand which
rejections Appellant is addressing and arguing. To the extent that Appellant
provides more specific arguments with respect to the §§ 112, 102, and 103
rejections, we address those below.
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 Rejections
“Adequate written description means that, in the specification, the
applicant must ‘convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that,
as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the [claimed]
invention.”’ Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
“When no such description can be found in the specification, the only thing
the PTO can reasonably be expected to do is to point out its nonexistence.”
Id. (citing In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “In the context
of the written description requirement, an adequate prima facie case must
therefore sufficiently explain to the applicant what, in the examiner’s view,
is missing from the written description.” Id. The burden then shifts to the
applicant to demonstrate where adequate written description can be found.
Id. at 1371.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as
to the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 rejections, unless otherwise specified. See Final
Act. 4–10; Ans. 3–15. We address the following arguments below for
emphasis.
Claims 1, 141, 167
Appellant’s arguments as to claim 1 quote a portion of the Examiner’s
analysis that appears to be from claim 84. See Appeal Br. 21. Appellant
further argues that the Examiner “admits support for LAN . . . ” in a co-
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pending application, so “WLAN is equally supported.” Id. (emphasis
omitted). On this record, Appellant’s argument, which does not provide any
support or citation from the Specification, is not sufficient to apprise us of
Examiner error. Because the Examiner rejected claims 141 and 167 for the
same reasons (Final Act. 5), we, likewise, are not apprised of Examiner error
in the Examiner’s rejections of these claims on this basis.
Claim 84
Appellant makes two arguments for the written description of
independent claim 84. First, claim 84 recites a “digital data cellular
network,” a “cellular antenna,” a “cellular modem,” and data “received from
the Internet via said digital data cellular network.” See also claim 84
preamble (“A device for obtaining . . . information requested . . . via the
Internet using a digital data cellular network”). The Examiner finds the
“cellular” limitations of claim 84 lack written description support because
“[c]ellular communication is described as a direct point-to-point connection
in which either the information server or the information device is called
directly (page 10, lines 18-24; page 26, lines 8-14).” Final Act. 5 (emphasis
added).
Appellant captions this first argument as “Claim: 84 (Cellular)” and
states “Claim 84 is supported.” Appeal Br. 24 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant argues that “page 22 lines 16–26 and figure 15b clearly show that
the device may communicate with two external devices (e.g., items 132 and
151 in figure 15b), and that the device is not limited to a single
communication port.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellant further argues that
“[t]he specification does not limit the information device to a single interface
or connection.” Id. (citing Spec. 2:15–16, 22:24–26, 31:7, 23:22–24:28).
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Appellant’s arguments are unclear and do not directly address the
Examiner’s rejection, and are, therefore, not sufficient to apprise us of
Examiner error.
Second, Appellant captions the next argument as “Claim: 84
(Memories)” and states “Claim 84 is supported.” Appeal Br. 26 (emphasis
omitted). Appellant further states “[t]he disclosure clearly describes storing
in various memories.” Id. On this record, Appellant’s argument does not
provide any citation or support to the Specification and is, therefore, not
sufficient to apprise us of Examiner error.
Claims 141 and 149–151
The Examiner finds, “Independent claim 141 recites a ‘weather
forecaster device,’ and dependent claims 149–151 recite ‘wherein said
device is a mobile handheld unit.’ However, the disclosure describes a
mobile handheld unit separately connected to the information device (see
Figs. 13, 14, 15, 15a, 15b) and does not sufficiently describe the information
device as being a mobile handheld unit.” Final Act. 6.
Under the heading of “Claim: 141,” Appellant argues “[a]s explained
herein, various embodiments in the disclosure relates to the SAME device,
and thus can be combined.” Appeal Br. 27. Appellant’s argument does not
provide any citation or support to the Specification and is, therefore, not
sufficient to apprise us of Examiner error.
Claim 167
The Examiner finds that “there is no descriptive support for a
television set which obtains information via the Internet over a WLAN”
because in the Specification, “the information device connects to the first
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information server via a direct PSTN or cellular network connection, not
directly via the Internet.” Ans. 8.
Appellant argues “Claim 167 defines a WLAN transceiver and an
antenna for wireless digital communication with a remote server, as part of,
or integrated with, a television set.” Appeal Br. 28. Appellant contends that
the Specification’s disclosure of the IEEE 802.11 protocol discloses the
“WLAN communication interface standard,” and that the Specification
“explicitly disclose[s] that the device may be integrated in a television set
(independent of any interface used for communication).” Id. (citing Spec.
24:21–25:6; 3:8–15; 18:13–29). Appellant further argues that the
Specification discloses that “[t]he invention embraces any combination of
the above embodiments.” Id. (citing Spec. 31:17) (emphasis omitted). In
addition, Appellant argues that “[t]he integration of an information device
(which may be any described embodiment of such device, independent of
any interfaces used for communication)[] in a television set is further
disclosed” in the Specification. Id. (citing Spec. 3:10–15; 17:13–18:12;
24:17–20; Fig. 17).
Appellant’s arguments establish that the Specification discloses that
the information device may be integrated within a television set. See, e.g.,
Spec. 3:12–15. However, Appellant’s arguments do not sufficiently address
the Examiner’s findings, nor do they sufficiently address the limitations in
claim 167 which the Examiner found to be problematic. See Ans. 8; Final
Act. 5–6. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of Examiner error on this
record.
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Claims 3, 4, 55–57, 160, 170, 189, and 191
Appellant argues “[t]he disclosure clearly describes storing
personalized information and geographic information.” Appeal Br. 29.
None of these claims recite a “geographic location,” and only claim 191
recites “storing personalized information.” But Appellant does not provide
any citation to the Specification in support of its argument. Moreover,
Appellant’s argument does not sufficiently address the Examiner’s rejection,
which states that “the disclosure does not describe a second memory which
separately stores a digital address, personalized information or geographical
location.” Final Act. 6 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of Examiner error on this record.
Claims 6 and 173
Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said WLAN
transceiver is operative to communicate with another WLAN transceiver of
the same type, and the WLAN communication is substantially according to
IEEE802.11 standard.” Appeal Br. 156. Claim 173, which depends from
claim 167, recites a similar limitation. The Examiner found that “[t]he
specification does not describe a WLAN transceiver or communication with
another WLAN transceiver.” Final Act. 6.
Appellant argues “[t]he disclosure clearly describes that two similar or
identical devices may communicate with each other.” Appeal Br. 30.
Appellant argues that “IEEE 802.11x” is explicitly mentioned in the
Specification, “which is intended to standardize communication between
devices of the same type.” Id. (citing Spec. 25:5).
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Specification
describes adapting information device 10 to support a home network by
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substituting the dial-up modem 15 with a modem appropriate for the home
network media, such as an IEEE802.11x wireless transceiver. Spec. 24:2–5.
In this way, multiple appliances or devices may communicate over a home
network. Id. at 2:25–29. We find this disclosure sufficiently teaches the
foregoing limitations. However, claims 6 and 173 depend from claims 1 and
167. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of those claims, we
likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 6 and 173.
Claims 11 and 91
Claim 11 depends from claim 10 and recites that the “display is
coupled to said first memory via a composite video interface, and the
composite video interface is one of a PAL and an NTSC interface.” Appeal
Br. 156–157. The Examiner finds that “within the information device, the
internal display 13 is coupled to memory 11 via control unit 14, not a
composite video interface (for example, see Figure 1)” and “[a] composite
video interface (adapter) is used when connecting to an external display
device (page 6, lines 22–25).” Final Act. 7.
Appellant argues that “the display of video content is clearly
indicated.” Appeal Br. 31–32 (citing Spec. 6:17–25). Appellant further
cites to the Specification at page 24, lines 13–14 (“the video signal from the
information device 170”) and page 32, lines 7–8 (“the information
transported as part of the present invention may be of any type”). Appellant
also argues that “television sets at the time of the present invention only
provided video interfaces (e.g., composite video (PAL, NTSC) or S-Video
or HDTV signals . . . ) for displaying video content.” Id. (citing Spec. 6:24–
25). Appellant also argues that “the information clearly includes an ‘image’
or ‘images.’” Id. (citing Spec. 2:4, 31:7, 32:3).
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Appellant’s arguments do not address the Examiner’s findings and, as
such, have not shown that the limitation of the “display is coupled to said
first memory via a composite video interface” is adequately supported by the
written description. Rather, Appellant’s arguments merely attempt to
establish that the Specification discloses the display of video content. As
such, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. See also
Decision 2016-000622, pp. 10–11; Decision 2019-002199, pp. 8–9.
Claims 13, 93, and 176
Claim 13 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said display is an
HDTV display.” Appeal Br. 157. Claims 93 and 176 recite a similar
limitation. Id. at 171, 184. The Examiner finds that “the specification does
not describe the integrated display as being an HDTV display, but rather an
analog display . . . and specifically describes the requirement of an adapter
when connecting to an HDTV display in order to provide conversion to
HDTV signals.” Final Act. 7. Appellant makes various arguments in
response (Appeal Br. 32–36), which we find unpersuasive for the same
reasons as set forth previously in Decision 2016-000622, pp. 8–10; Decision
2019-002199, pp. 9–10; and Decision 2019-003193, pp. 17–19. As such, on
this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Claims 17 and 97
Claim 17 depends from claim 1 and recites “further comprising a
battery, wherein said device is operative to be at least in part powered from
said battery, and wherein said battery is a primary or rechargeable battery.”
Appeal Br. 157. Claim 97 depends from claim 84 and recites a similar
limitation. Id. at 171. The Examiner finds that “the embodiment which uses
a rechargeable battery involves connection with a dial-up telephone line, not
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over the air via an antenna [as recited in claim 1].” Final Act. 7. The
Examiner further finds that “[p]ower is extracted from the telephone line
during an off-hook condition in order to charge the rechargeable battery.”
Id. (citing Spec. 16:5–29).
Appellant argues that “page 22 lines 16-26 and figure 15b clearly
show that the device may communicate with two external devices (e.g.,
items 132 and 151 in figure 15b), and that the device is not limited to a
SINGLE communication port.” Appeal Br. 37. Appellant argues that “[t]he
specification does not limit the information device to a single interface or
connection.” Id. (citing Spec. 2:15–16, 31:7, 23:22–24:28).
Appellant’s argument does not sufficiently address the Examiner’s
rejection, nor does it even address the limitations in claims 17 and 97.
Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. See
also Decision 2016-000622, pp. 11; Decision 2019-002199, pp. 11–12.
Claims 18 and 19
Appellant argues that the Specification discloses the connection and
powering scheme recited in claims 18 and 19. Appeal Br. 38 (citing Spec.
3:6–7, 16:4–17:12, 25:6). Appellant further argues that these features are
applicable for any type of information device and the device is not limited to
a single communication port, interface, or connection. Id. at 38–41 (citing
Spec. 2:14–16, 3:8, 17:5–12, 20:13–16, 20:22–23, 21:1–10, 22:25–28, 24:7–
9, 31:17). We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive for the same
reasons as set forth in Decision 2019-004033, pp. 9–12 and Decision 2019-
003193, pp. 15–17. In particular, Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us
that the Specification describes “wiring connected for concurrently carrying
a power signal and an information signal over the same wires.”
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Claim 27
Appellant argues “[t]he specification, and as known in the art,
discloses that communication with a ‘server’, in particular when such server
is ‘remote’, inherently means communication over the Internet.” Appeal Br.
44. Appellant’s argument does not provide any citation or support to the
Specification, or provide sufficient argument that the argued disclosure is
“inherent.” Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded of Examiner
error.
Claims 64, 126, and 192
Claim 64 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said device is
further operative to store and play digital audio data.” Appeal Br. 164.
Claims 126 and 192 recite similar limitations. Id. at 176, 186. Appellant
presents various arguments (Appeal Br. 46–47), which we do not find
persuasive for the same reasons as discussed in Decision 2016-000622, pp.
12–13 and Decision 2019-002199, pp. 13–15. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred.
Claims 78–80 and 138–140
Claim 78 depends from claim 1 and recites “further comprising a
digital to analog converter coupled to said first memory for converting
digital data stored in said first memory to an analog signal.” Appeal Br. 167.
Claim 138 recites a similar limitation. Id. at 178. Claims 79 and 80 depend
from claim 78, and claims 139 and 140 depend from claim 138. Id. at 167,
178. Appellant presents various arguments (Appeal Br. 50–54), which we
do not find persuasive for the same reasons as discussed in Decision 2016-
000622 pp. 15–16. See also Decision 2019-002199, pp. 8–9. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
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Claim 82
Claim 82 depends from claim 1 and recites “said device is further
operative to periodically retrieve and display information from said first
memory.” Appeal Br. 168. The Examiner finds the Specification discloses
“the device periodically communicating with the remote server, not
periodically retrieving information from the first memory which is the
device’s local memory.” Final Act. 10.
Appellant contends “[t]he information to be displayed is described
clearly (e.g., in Figure 6) to be retrieved from the memory 11.” Appeal Br.
55. Appellant further relies on page 11, lines 10–11 of the Specification. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive for the reasons discussed in
Decision 2016-000622, p. 14, namely, that the referenced portion of the
Specification indicates that the periodic operation to obtain and display
information is from the remote server, not from said first memory, as
claimed. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Claim 98
Appellant’s arguments as to claim 98 (Appeal Br. 57–61) are not
persuasive for the same reasons as set forth above for claims 18 and 19.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Claims 131–133
Appellant’s arguments as to claims 131–133 (Appeal Br. 61–63) are
not persuasive for the same reasons as set forth in Decision 2016-000622,
pp. 13–14. In addition, Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively address
the Examiner’s rejection, which finds that the described embodiment does
not included an integrated cellular antenna and cellular modem.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
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Summary of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 Rejections

For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 1 rejections of claims 1–200.
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejections Over Bell ’785
Appellant’s arguments are repetitive of those made in the Related
Appeals and, at times, difficult to follow. Accordingly, we incorporate
herein our discussion of Bell ’785’s disclosure in the Related Appeals.
Unless otherwise stated below, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 11–20; Ans. 15–22.
Claim 1
Appellant raises a number of arguments relating to the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions as to Bell ’785 with respect to independent claim 1.
See Appeal Br. 64–76; Reply Br. 4–10. We have previously addressed these
arguments in Decision 2019-002199, pp. 18–25, Decision 2019-003193, pp.
36–41, 2019-003425, pp. 33–36; and Decision 2019-004033, pp. 16–20.
Accordingly, for the same reasons stated therein, we do not find
Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 11–15; Ans. 15–18. We, therefore,
are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by
Bell ’785.
Claim 141

Appellant repeats arguments as presented for claim 1, which we do
not find persuasive for the same reasons as discussed above. See Appeal Br.
76–82. In addition, Appellant provides arguments focused on Bell ’785’s
disclosure of a “geographical location” that is “[associated with] weather
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forecast information,” as it pertains to the limitations in claim 141. Id.; see
also Reply Br. 10–12 (emphasis omitted). We do not find Appellant’s
argument persuasive for the reasons set forth by the Examiner. See Final
Act. 12–13; Ans. 18–19. For example, Bell ’785 discloses displaying
weather reports at various intervals, which we find sufficiently discloses this
limitation. See Bell ’785 ¶ 88. We agree with the Examiner that “weather
reports are directed to particular geographical locations,” and Appellant has
not persuasively argued otherwise.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 141 as anticipated by Bell ’785.
Claim 167
Appellant repeats arguments as presented for claim 1, which we do
not find persuasive for the same reasons as discussed above. See Appeal Br.
82–86. In addition, Appellant’s arguments that Bell ’785 does not teach “[a]
television set for receiving and displaying an analog video carried over a
coaxial cable . . . ” and “a television apparatus operative for receiving and
displaying the analog video carried over the coaxial cable,” (Appeal Br. 82–
84; Reply Br. 12–13) (emphasis omitted) are not persuasive for the same
reasons discussed in Decision 2019-004033, pp. 20–21, 27–28.
Appellant further contends that Bell ’785 does not teach “the
television set being further operative for obtaining, storing and displaying
information from a first remote information server via the Internet over a
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN),” and “said television set is
operative for communicating over the WLAN with the first remote
information server via the Internet for receiving information from the first
remote information server, and for storing and displaying the received
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information.” Appeal Br. 84 (emphasis omitted). In support of its
arguments, Appellant repeats its arguments that the Examiner is relying on
“two different and distinct connections,” which we do not find persuasive
for the same reasons as discussed in Decision 2019-002199, pp. 18–20. See
also Decision 2019-004033, pp. 20–21 (discussing Bell ’785’s disclosure of
processor-based devices including a “digital television”). In addition,
Appellant contends that Bell ’785 “is silent, and actually teaches away from,
communication ‘via Internet 65 over a LAN 64.’” Appeal Br. 85. These
arguments are not persuasive. Bell ’785 discloses that “[p]rocessor-based
device 40 can operate in a networked environment using physical and/or
logical connections to local network 64 and/or wide area network (WAN)
65. The connections to these networks can be wired and/or wireless.” Bell
’785 ¶ 56. Bell ’785 also states “embodiments of the invention can work
with information residing on any type of remote resource on any type of
network, including a LAN, or a WAN such as the Internet.” Id. ¶ 72.
Finally, Appellant argues “[i]t is further noted at the time of the invention,
television sets were not ‘computerized’ or included any ‘processor-based’
functionality, as taught by the Bell ’785 reference.” Appeal Br. 86. This
argument is not persuasive, as it appears to admit that Bell ’785 teaches a
“computerized” or “processor-based” television set.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final
Act. 14–15; Ans. 19–20. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 167 as anticipated by Bell ’785.
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Dependent Claims

Regarding the dependent claims, unless otherwise noted below, we
agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final
Act. 15–20; Ans. 20–22. In addition, we address certain claims below for
emphasis.
Regarding claim 169, Appellant does not persuasively argue why Bell
’785 teaches away from the claimed invention. See Appeal Br. 86; In re
Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (A reference teaches away
from a claimed invention if it “criticize[s], discredit[s], or otherwise
discourage[s]” modifying the reference to arrive at the claimed invention.).
Regarding claim 152, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
that Bell ’785 does not disclose a “video display” (Appeal Br. 86–87; Reply
Br. 15) for the reasons set forth in Decision 2019-004033, pp. 21.
Regarding claims 65–67 and 193–195, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments that Bell ’785 does not disclose the recited
limitations (Appeal Br. 87–90; Reply Br. 16) for the reasons set forth in
Decision 2019-002199, pp. 32–33.
Regarding claims 14 and 177, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that Bell ’785 does not disclose “wherein said first memory is
non-volatile” (Appeal Br. 90–92) for the same reasons as set forth in
Decision 2019-003193, pp. 49–50.
Regarding claim 15, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
that Bell ’785 does not disclose “said first memory is based on one out [of] a
Flash memory, a DRAM memory and a RAM memory,” (Appeal Br. 92–93;
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Reply Br. 16–17) for the same reasons as set forth in Decision 2019-003193,
pp. 49–50.
Regarding claim 27, Appellant contends that Bell ’785 does not
disclose that “said device is operative for communicating with a second
remote information server via the Internet for receiving information
therefrom, and for storing and displaying the received information from the
second remote information server” because Bell ’785 does not necessarily
indicate that different objects or location pieces are received from “different
servers.” Appeal Br. 94 (emphasis omitted); see also Reply Br. 17–18. We
are not persuaded. First, we note that Appellant contradicts this argument
elsewhere in the Appeal Brief. For example, Appellant states “throughout
the disclosure the Bell [’785] reference communication with multiple servers
is taught.” See Appeal Br. 95. Nonetheless, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings that “multiple HTML page objects can be selected for automated
retrieval and storage, each can be located at a different location source
(URI/URL) and have different retrieval schedules.” Final Act. 17 (citing
Bell ’785 ¶¶ 83–92); see also Ans. 21 (citing Bell ’785 ¶¶ 31–35, 43, 47, and
95). For example, Bell ’785 states that “the device user’s search request 31
can comprise a URI, such as a URL or other type of object retrieval string,”
the “URL typically comprises . . . a host name or server name,” and “[t]he
Object Retrieval String (ORS) specifies the Web server that sources the
selected object.” Bell ’785 ¶¶ 43, 95 (emphasis added).
Regarding claims 30 and 54, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that Bell ’785 does not disclose “operative for communicating
with only a single remote information server” and “said device is dedicated
only for obtaining, storing and displaying information from the first remote
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information server” (Appeal Br. 95–96; Reply Br. 18–19) for the reasons set
forth by the Examiner. See Ans. 21.
Regarding claims 31, 32, 157, 158, 183, and 184, for the same reasons
as discussed in Decision 2019-004033, pp. 23–24, we are persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 96–97; Reply Br. 19) that the Examiner
has not sufficiently shown that Bell ’785 discloses “communication with the
first remote information server is based on Internet protocol suite” and
“communication with the first remote information server is based on
TCP/IP,” at least for purposes of an anticipation rejection. “Although Bell
’785 may render obvious the use of TCP/IP, the rejection here is solely for
anticipation.” Decision 2019-004033, p. 24. We, therefore do not sustain
the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of claims 31, 32, 157, 158, 183,
and 184.
Regarding claims 33 and 34, for the same reasons as discussed in
Decision 2019-004033, p. 24, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
(Appeal Br. 97–99; Reply Br. 20) that the Examiner has not sufficiently
shown that Bell ’785 discloses “said device is operative to initiate a
communication with the first remote information server after a set period
following a prior communication session,” and “the set period is at least one
of: set by the user; set previously in said device; and is set by the first
remote information server in a previous communication session.” We,
therefore do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of
claims 33 and 34.
Regarding claim 37, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
that Bell ’785 does not disclose “the first remote information server is a
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dedicated remote information server” (Appeal Br. 99; Reply Br. 20–21) for
the reasons set forth by the Examiner. See Ans. 21.
Regarding claims 64 and 192, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that Bell ’785 does not disclose “said device is further operative
to store and play digital audio data” (Appeal Br. 99–100; Reply Br. 21) for
the same reasons as set forth in Decision 2019-002199, pp. 31–32.
Regarding claim 82, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
that Bell ’785 does not disclose “wherein said device is further operative to
periodically retrieve and display information from said first memory”
(Appeal Br. 100–101; Reply Br. 21–22) for the reasons set forth by the
Examiner. See Ans. 22.
Regarding claim 162, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
(Appeal Br. 102–103; Reply Br. 22–23) that the Examiner has not
sufficiently shown that Bell ’785 discloses “further comprising a second
memory for storing said first geographical location, and wherein the device
is operative for sending the first geographical location to the information
server.” In particular, although the Examiner finds that “Bell ’785 discloses
retrieving and displaying information for a particular city (city traffic, para.
0062–0063),” the Examiner has not shown that “first geographical
information” is “stored” in a “second memory.” Ans. 22. We, therefore do
not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of claim 162.
Regarding claim 168, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
(Appeal Br. 103–105; Reply Br. 23) that Bell ’785 does not disclose a
“single enclosure” for the same reasons as set forth in Decision 2019-
004033, pp. 20–21.
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Regarding claim 175, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
(Appeal Br. 105–106; Reply Br. 23–24) that Bell ’785 does not disclose
“said display is a digital display” for the reasons set forth by the Examiner.
See Ans. 22.
Summary of 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejections over Bell ’785
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) rejections of claims 1, 2, 7, 14, 15, 20–46, 54, 64–67, 82, 83, 141,
149–152, 154–162, 167–169, 175, 177–186, and 192–195. We do not
sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejections of claims 31–34, 157,
158, 162, 183, and 184.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Ishidoshiro
Appellant presents several arguments relating to the Examiner’s
proposed combination of Bell ’785 and Ishidoshiro. See Appeal Br. 107–
110. First, Appellant argues that Bell ’785 and Ishidoshiro are non-
analogous art because they “are in different fields, directed towards
respectively different purposes, and are based on respectively different
structures, and thus are not analogous and cannot logically be combined.”
Id. at 107. These conclusory arguments are not persuasive because
Appellant does not provide any supportive evidence or argument.5 Attorney
arguments in a brief cannot take the place of evidence. See In re Pearson,
494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). For example, Appellant does not

5 Appellant presents near identical arguments for a number of the references
asserted by the Examiner, which are not persuasive for the same reason.
See, e.g., Appeal Br. 116 (Ulrich), 120 (Williams), 123 (Christodoulou), 126
(Masterson), 141 (Curtiss), 145 (Langseth), 149 (Luneau). To the extent that
Appellant provides a more specific argument, it will be addressed herein.
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provide substantive argument as to what the fields, purposes, and structures
of the claimed invention, Bell ’785, and Ishidoshiro are, and, therefore, how
they differ so as to support its argument that they are not analogous art.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds that “Bell ’785 and Ishidoshiro are
both directed to processor-based devices which communicate data over a
wireless local area network.” Ans. 22. Appellant argues that the Examiner
has provided field definitions for other references that differ from this, and
Ishidoshiro is not analogous art based on these other field definitions. Reply
Br. 24–25.6 Although the Examiner does not use identical wording, we do
not find that the field definitions outlined by Appellant differ substantially
than that provided by the Examiner. We have previously addressed the field
of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Decision 2019-002199, pp. 41–42
(“Appellant’s claimed invention . . . [is] directed to retrieving, storing, and
displaying information on a device connected to a network.”). Based on the
record before us, we find the Examiner has sufficiently established that Bell
’785 and Ishidoshiro are in the same field as the claimed invention. See
Ans. 22.
Appellant also argues that the proposed modification “renders the
device described by the Bell [’785] reference improper for its intended use
of being simple and ‘low/reduced resources.’” Appeal Br. 108. We are not
persuaded by this argument. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Bell
’785 inherently discloses a device that is “addressable in the WLAN,” (e.g.,
claim 1) but relies on Ishidoshiro to explicitly teach a terminal device having

6 Similarly, Appellant repeats this argument with respect to other references.
Reply Br. 24–25. For the same reason, we do not find this argument
persuasive as to any of Appellant’s arguments.
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a wireless LAN card storing a unique MAC address used to identify the
terminal device in a wireless LAN. See Final Act. 12, 20 (citing Ishidoshiro
¶¶ 46–47); Ans. 18; see also Decision 2019-002199, pp. 22–25. We are not
persuaded that the modification to Bell ’785 (i.e., explicit disclosure of a
unique MAC address) renders Bell ’785 improper for its intended use.
Although Bell ’785 acknowledges that some types of processor-based
devices have “relatively limited capabilities” and “relatively limited
processing and/or memory capabilities,” we do not agree with Appellant that
this represents the full scope of Bell ’785’s intended use, rather than one
disclosed embodiment. Bell ’785 ¶¶ 9, 11, 114 (“in an embodiment . . . for
display on a processor-based device with minimal or reduced resources”).
Rather, Bell ’785 is more broadly directed to selecting and accessing
information over a network. See, e.g., id. at Abstract, ¶¶ 6, 12, 24. In fact,
Bell ’785 explicitly states that its processor-based devices may include
devices that do not generally have relatively limited processing or resource
capabilities, such as a “computer (e.g., desktop, laptop, handheld, etc.).”
Bell ’785 ¶ 30; see also id. ¶ 29 (“Computing device 20 may be or include a
personal computer 24 or any other processor-based device”).
Appellant also contends the Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell
’785 and Ishidoshiro is not sufficient. Appeal Br. 108–110; Reply Br. 27–
28.7 The Examiner finds that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of

7 In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that “[n]othing in the Bell ’785
reference, serving as the primary reference, offers an indication for the
suggested modifications.” Reply Br. 27. This, too, is an argument that is
repeated in the context of other prior art combinations asserted by the
Examiner. E.g., Reply Br. 29, 31, 34, 37, 43. However, contrary to
Appellant’s contentions, the Examiner’s reasoning need not appear in, or be
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ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to incorporate the above
feature of Ishidoshiro within the disclosure of Bell ’785 so that the
processor-based device can transmit and receive communications over the
wireless LAN.” Final Act. 20. Appellant argues that “having an address has
no relevance to the capability to ‘transmit and receive communications,’” the
“address may be part of a unit that is external and separate to the device,”
and “even if . . . an address is required, it does not need to be stored in
memory.” Appeal Br. 108 (emphasis omitted). Appellant also argues that
the device in Bell ’785 can already transmit and receive communications
over the LAN, so the combination is not necessary and redundant. Id. at
109. As such, Appellant contends that the Examiner’s reasoning is based on
impermissible hindsight. Id.
We do not find these arguments persuasive for the reasons stated by
the Examiner. See Ans. 23. In particular, the Examiner’s relies on
Ishidoshiro to explicitly teach a device with a WLAN card storing a unique
MAC address used to identify the device in the WLAN, where Bell ’785
merely discloses connection and communication over the wireless network,
and such addressability is inherent. Id. (citing Ishidoshiro ¶¶ 46–47). As the
Examiner finds, the combination yields nothing more than predictable

suggested by, one or more of the references on which the Examiner relies.
Instead, a reason to combine teachings from the prior art “may be found in
explicit or implicit teachings within the references themselves, from the
ordinary knowledge of those skilled in the art, or from the nature of the
problem to be solved.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d
1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)). For these reasons, we do not find Appellant’s arguments
persuasive.
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results to one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. We, therefore, find the
Examiner has provided sufficient rationale to combine the references
pursuant to the guidelines in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007).
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we sustain the Examiner’s
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 3, 4, 6, 55, 56, 146, 147, 170, 171,
173, 189, and 190 over Bell ’785 and Ishidoshiro.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Fong
Appellant argues that (1) Fong is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Fong is improper. See
Appeal Br. 110–113; Reply Br. 29–32. Appellant’s arguments are not
persuasive for the same reasons discussed in Decision 2019-002199, pp. 34–
35, Decision 2019-003193, pp. 72–73, and Decision 2019-004033, pp. 29–
30. We also agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
See Ans. 23–25. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 5, 8–10, 12, 77, 145,
148, 153, 172, and 174 over Bell ’785 and Fong.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Bell ’723
Claim 11 ultimately depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said
display is coupled to said first memory via a composite video interface, and
the composite video interface is one of a PAL and an NTSC interface.”
Appeal Br., Claims App’x, 156–157. Claim 1, from which claim 11 depends
recites a “device comprising . . . a display . . . and a single enclosure housing
said antenna, said WLAN transceiver, said first memory and said display.”
Id. at 155.
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The Examiner finds that “the television set would inherently ‘provide
for’ a PAL or NTSC interface in order to be able to display conventional
television broadcasts. Bell ’723 teaches coupling the information device to a
television set as an auxiliary display. It would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to couple the available
television set by means of a composite video interface in accordance with
the type of television set.” Ans. 25–26.
Appellant argues that “[t]he rejection seems to be based on that PAL
or NTSC interface are inherent in a television set.” Appeal Br. 114.
Appellant argues that “PAL and NTSC are general video interface standards
. . . and are not inherent in television sets.” Id.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not sufficiently shown
that the combination of Bell ’785 and Bell ’723 teaches or suggests the
limitations in claim 11. In particular, claim 1, from which claim 11 depends,
requires the display is housed in the claimed “single enclosure.” However,
the Examiner’s rejection is premised upon “coupling the information device
to a television set as an auxiliary display.” Ans. 25 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 11.
Appellant’s arguments as to claims 50–53, 142–144, and 187–188
(Appeal Br. 115) are not persuasive for the reasons discussed in Decision
2019-004033, pp. 31–32.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner provides no rationale for
combining Bell ’785 with Bell ’723 for claims 16, 17, 50–53, 68, 142–144,
187, 188, 196, and 197. Appeal Br. 114–115. In the Answer, the Examiner
provides reasoning to combine the references for these claims, to which
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Appellant does not respond. See Ans. 26–27. We, therefore, find the
Examiner has provided sufficient rationale to combine the references
pursuant to the guidelines in KSR, and are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 12, 13, 16, 17, 50–53, 68, 78–80, 142–144, 176, 187, 188, 196,
and 197 over Bell ’785 and Bell ’723. We do not sustain the Examiner’s 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claim 11.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Ulrich
Appellant argues that (1) Ulrich is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Ulrich is improper. See
Appeal Br. 115–120; Reply Br. 32–33.
With respect to the analogous art argument, Patent Owner contends
that Bell ’785 is classified in Class/Subclass 709/238, and Ulrich is
classified in Class/Subclass 379/399, which indicates that they are in
separate fields. Appeal Br. 116–117. However, “[s]uch classification
evidence, even when properly of record, is of limited value” and “inherently
weak also, because considerations in forming a classification system differ
from those relating to a person of ordinary skill seeking solution for a
particular problem.” In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 671 n.5 (CCPA
1982). Instead, “we consider the similarities and differences in structure and
function of the inventions disclosed in the references to carry far greater
weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 1372 (CCPA 1973).
A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the
reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention (even
if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably
pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same
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field of endeavor as the claimed invention.) In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Appellant has not provided sufficient argument that
Ulrich is not analogous art to the claimed invention; rather, Appellant
compares Ulrich to Bell ’785. We also note that Appellant’s application is
classified in Class 379, the same as Ulrich. Moreover, we agree with the
Examiner’s findings, which Appellant has not persuasively rebutted, that
Bell ’785 and Ulrich are “both directed to communication over a wired
network, including a telephone line.” Ans. 26.
The Examiner relies on Ulrich to teach the “device being further
operative to be at least in part powered from the power signal,” as recited in
claim 18, and finds that the combination of Bell ’785 with Ulrich would
have been obvious “so that the device can operate in the event of a power
outage, as taught by Ulrich.” See Final Act. 23 (citing Ulrich 1:8–4:9).
Appellant’s arguments as to the combination are not persuasive for the same
reasons discussed in Decision 2019-003193, pp. 54–58 and Decision 2019-
003425, pp. 46–48. Moreover, Appellant does not persuasively argue that
the Examiner’s reasoning is deficient, or explain why the Examiner’s
reasoning—which is based directly on the disclosure in Ulrich—is deficient.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Ans.
23–25.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 18 and 19 over Bell ’785 and Ulrich.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Williams
Appellant argues that (1) Williams is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Williams is improper.
See Appeal Br. 120–122; Reply Br. 33.
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Appellant’s arguments as to whether Williams is analogous art are not
persuasive for the reasons stated above in footnotes 5 and 6. We agree with
the Examiner that Bell ’785 and Williams are “both directed to
communication between a client device and a remote server.” See Ans. 27.
The Examiner relies on Williams to teach “wherein said device is
operative to delay a communication with the first remote information server
for a set period, in the case that such communication cannot be properly
executed at a given time,” as recited in claim 47. Final Act. 23 (citing
Williams 12:65–13:5). The Examiner finds the combination would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art “in order to respond to errors
resulting from network congestion or heavy server load.” Id. at 23–24.
Williams generally provides “a system and method by which clients’
computer systems are directed by information from a content provider as to
when to download content and for how long, such that the clients can
regulate themselves with respect to downloading content from the network.”
Williams 2:21–25. In particular, Williams states “if there is a transient error
during the download window, the client system can automatically wait for
some predetermined amount of time before retry.” Id. at 12:66–13:1.
Appellant contends that Williams “is directed to network congestion
or network spikes, which are the result of downloading (a) software updates
(b) initiated by a server to (c) millions of clients,” where such “network
spikes (or congestions) are to be expected.” Appeal Br. 121 (emphasis
omitted). In contrast, Appellant contends that in Bell ’785, “any network
spikes or congestions are NOT expected to happen, rendering the rationale
moot.” Id. at 122. Appellant also argues that Williams’ downloads happen
once, while Bell ’785’s objects are continuously updated. Id. Finally,
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Appellant argues that Bell ’785 “provides no reasoning to change the
loading mechanism timing.” Id.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive for the reasons
stated by the Examiner. See Ans. 27. In particular, neither Williams nor
Bell ’785 are limited in the manner described by Appellant.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 47 and 48 over Bell ’785 and Williams.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Christodoulou
Appellant argues that (1) Christodoulou is not analogous art; and
(2) the Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Christodoulou is
improper. See Appeal Br. 123–125; Reply Br. 34–35.
Appellant’s arguments as to whether Christodoulou is analogous art
are not persuasive for the reasons stated above in footnotes 5 and 6. We
agree with the Examiner that Bell ’785 and Christodoulou are “both directed
to communication between a client device and a remote server.” See Ans.
28. Appellant’s arguments as to the combination of Bell ’785 and
Christodoulou are not persuasive for the same reasons discussed in Decision
2019-004033, pp. 35–37. We also agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions. See Ans. 28.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claim 49 over Bell ’785 and Christodoulou.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Masterson
Appellant argues that (1) Masterson is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Masterson is improper.
See Appeal Br. 125–131; Reply Br. 36–37. Appellant’s arguments are not
persuasive for the same reasons discussed in Decision 2019-003193, pp. 74–
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78. We also agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
See Ans. 28–29.
In addition, Appellant argues that the combination of Bell ’785 and
Masterson does not teach the limitations in claims 57, 61, and 191. Appeal
Br. 131–133; Reply Br. 38–39. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments for the reasons stated by the Examiner. See Ans. 29–30. In
particular, Masterson teaches transmission of “a device identifier and serial
number, and may also include security information, a proposed user
password, and various configuration values and state indications of the
device.” See Masterson ¶ 40.
Appellant further argues Bell ’785 does not disclose “the limitations
involving cellular networking and functionalities” of claim 84. Appeal Br.
133–139; Reply Br. 39–42. In particular, Appellant contends that Bell ’785
“is silent regarding using any cellular communication for communication
with a remote server.” Appeal Br. 134 (emphasis omitted). We note that
Bell ’785 explicitly states that its processor-based device may be a cellular
phone. See Bell ’785 ¶ 30. We also note that Appellant has previously
argued that Bell ’785 “is based on a ‘cellular phone.’” See Decision 2019-
003193, pp. 55. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive for the reasons
stated by the Examiner. See Ans. 30–31; see also Decision 2019-004033,
pp. 24–25; Decision 2019-002199, pp. 21, 27.
Appellant further argues that Bell ’785 and Masterson do not teach
“the second digital address uniquely identifying said device in the Internet is
based on a MAC address or an IP address,” as recited in claim 124. Appeal
Br. 139–140; Reply Br. 41–42. The Examiner finds that Bell ’785 teaches
this limitation, stating that “an HTTP request message inherently includes a
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source IP address.” Final Act. 30 (emphasis added). The Examiner relies on
Squire8 in support of these findings. Ans. 31–32. As explained in Decision
2019-002199, pp. 28–29, Decision 2019-003193, pp. 45–46, Decision 2019-
003425, pp. 37–38, and Decision 2019-004033, pp. 26, we are persuaded
that the Examiner has not sufficiently shown that Bell ’785 inherently
discloses an IP address. We, therefore, are constrained to reverse the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 124 over Bell ’785 and
Masterson.
Appellant further argues that Bell ’785 and Masterson do not teach
“the first digital address uniquely identifying the user is a user name or a
password,” as recited in claim 125. The Examiner relies on Masterson’s
providing an initial user password to the server. Ans. 32 (citing Masterson
¶ 36). Masterson states “[p]referably, some form of security is provided via
challenge/response encryption technology that allow the server 302 to verify
the identity of the device 202. The device 202 may also provide an initial
user password to the server.” Masterson ¶ 36. Similarly, the Specification
discloses its “address” as a user name or password as follows:
the information 10 device transmits its identification as part of
the communication session, during the start session step 64. The
identification may consist of . . . [a] unique identification code
(‘address’), associated with a single information device 10. Such
mechanism may be based on the popular and standard
IP/Ethernet MAC / IP address structure, or may be of a
proprietary nature. Similarly, a user name, password and other
personalization techniques known in the art may be used.
Spec. 20:1–8.

8 US 7,080,158 B1 (issued July 18, 2006).
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Given the Specification’s explanation of an “address,” Appellant does
not persuasively argue why Masterson’s disclosure does not teach the
foregoing limitation. See Reply Br. 42.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 57–63, 84, 85, 87, 94, 95, 99–116, 125–129, and 191 over Bell
’785 and Masterson. We do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejections of claim 124 over Bell ’785 and Masterson.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785, Bell ’723, and Curtiss
Appellant argues that (1) Curtiss is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Curtiss is improper. See
Appeal Br. 141–144; Reply Br. 43–45. Appellant’s arguments as to whether
Curtiss is analogous art are not persuasive for the reasons stated above in
footnotes 5 and 6. We agree with the Examiner that Bell ’785 and Curtiss
are both “devices which provide Internet connectivity.” See Ans. 32.
Appellant’s arguments as to the combination are not persuasive for the same
reasons discussed in Decision 2019-002199, pp. 38–39. We also agree with
and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Ans. 32–33.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 69–73 and 198–200 over Bell ’785, Bell ’723, and Curtiss.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Langseth
Claim 81 depends from claim 1 and recites “an information pushing
from the remote server, wherein said device is further operative to respond
and communicate with the remote information server, when the remote
information server initiates a communication session and said device
receives information from the remote server and displays the received
information.” Appeal Br. 167, Claims App’x. The Examiner relies on
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Langseth to teach these limitations. Final Act. 31–32 (citing Langseth 3:59–
4:10). The Examiner finds the combination would have been obvious “in
order to provide the user with any urgent notifications.” Id. at 32.
Appellant argues that (1) Langseth is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Langseth is improper.
See Appeal Br. 144–149; Reply Br. 45–46.
Appellant’s arguments as to whether Langseth is analogous art are not
persuasive for the reasons stated above in footnotes 5 and 6. We agree with
the Examiner that Bell ’785 and Langseth are “directed to processor-based
device[s] which receive personalized information from a remote server.”
See Ans. 33.
With regard to the combination of references, Appellant argues that
Bell ’785 is directed to operation under user control, and, therefore,
modification to support “push” notifications would “change the principle of
operation of the DMF to make it a PC-like device.” Appeal Br. 146; see
also id. at 147–149. We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive for
the reasons stated by the Examiner. See Ans. 33.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claim 81 over Bell ’785 and Langseth.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Luneau
Claims 163–166 recite limitations relating to the “geographical
location” of the user and/or device. Appeal Br. 182, Claims App’x. The
Examiner relies on Luneau to teach these limitations and finds that the
combination would have been obvious “in order to automatically receive
personalized weather information.” Final Act. 33 (citing Luneau ¶¶ 10, 18,
23–27).
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Appellant argues that (1) Luneau is not analogous art; and (2) the
Examiner’s rationale for combining Bell ’785 with Luneau is improper. See
Appeal Br. 149–152; Reply Br. 46–47.
Appellant contends that Luneau is not analogous art because it “is
silent regarding receiving any information from a remote location, and is
directed ONLY to verify the receiving device location using the connection
to the remote server.” Appeal Br. 150. Appellant’s assessment of Luneau is
not supported by the record. See, e.g., Luneau ¶ 18 (“Apparatus 12 is
connected through connection 24 to network 20 . . . to contact server 14
using connection 26,” “[o]nce server 14 has the geographic location data for
apparatus 12 . . . [it] sends the converted data to apparatus 12”); Fig. 1. We
agree with the Examiner that Bell ’785 and Luneau are “directed to
communication devices which receive [personalized] information from a
remote server.” See Ans. 32.
With regard to the combination of references, Appellant argues that
the combination renders Bell ’785 “improper for its intended use of being
simple and ‘low/reduced resources.’” Appeal Br. 150. We do not find
Appellant’s arguments persuasive. We have previously discussed above and
in Related Appeals that Appellant too narrowly defines Bell ’785’s intended
use. E.g., Decision 2019-003193, pp. 52–54. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments that the modifications proposed by the Examiner
render Bell ’785 improper for its intended use. Rather, we find the
Examiner has provided sufficient rationale to combine the references
pursuant to the guidelines in KSR. See Ans. 34.
Appellant further argues that Luneau does not teach “wherein the first
geographical location is received from a user,” as recited in claim 163.
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Appeal Br. 151–152. Specifically, Appellant contends that in Luneau, the
focus “is to AVOID any user manually inputting the location.” Id. (citing
Luneau ¶¶ 5–6) (emphasis omitted).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner relies
in part on paragraph 26 of Luneau (see Final Act. 33), which states:
[A]pparatus 12 sends data to server 14. This data can include
information as a substitute for [Automatic Number
Identification] (if the ANI was not received properly), as well
as other data, such as serial number, data pertaining to the
functionality of apparatus 12, or data pertaining to user
identification, preferences or selection of functions for
apparatus 12. Where apparatus 12 is a [NOAA Weather
Radio], this data can also include the user’s preference for all-
hazard and weather alerts for a specific geographic location as
well as adjacent and/or regional locales. Apparatus 12
provides an interface for the user to make such preference
selections using a keypad in response to prompts . . . .

Luneau ¶ 26 (emphasis added). Appellant does not persuasively argue why
this disclosure does not teach the limitations in claim 163.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 163–166 over Bell ’785 and Langseth.
Remaining Rejections
Appellant does not separately argue the Examiner’s rejections over
(1) Bell ’785 and Yamada (claims 74–76); (2) Bell ’785, Masterson, and
Fong (claims 86, 88–90, 92, and 137); (3) Bell ’785, Masterson, and Bell
’723 (claims 90–93, 96, 97, 119–123, 130, 131, and 138–140); (4) Bell ’785,
Masterson, and Ulrich (claim 98); (5) Bell ’785, Masterson, and Williams
(claims 117 and 118); (6) Bell ’785, Masterson, and Curtiss (claims 132 and
133); and (7) Bell ’785, Masterson, and Yamada (claims 134–136).
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of claims
74–76, 86, 88–93, 96–98, 117–123, and 130–140.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–200 112, ¶ 1 Written
Description
1–200
1, 2, 7, 14, 15,
20–46, 54,
64–67, 82, 83,
141, 149–152,
154–162,
167–169, 175,
177–186,
192–195
102(e) Bell ’785 1, 2, 7, 14,
15, 20–30,
35–46, 54,
64–67, 82,
83, 141,
149–152,
154–156,
159–161,
167–169,
175, 177–
182, 185,
186, 192–
195
31–34,
157, 158,
162, 183,
184
3, 4, 6, 55, 56,
146, 147, 170,
171, 173, 189,
190
103(a) Bell ’785,
Ishidoshiro
3, 4, 6, 55,
56, 146,
147, 170,
171, 173,
189, 190

5, 8–10, 12,
77, 145, 148,
153, 172, 174
103(a) Bell ’785, Fong 5, 8–10, 12,
77, 145,
148, 153,
172, 174

11–13, 16, 17,
50–53, 68,
78–80, 142–
144, 176, 187,
188, 196, 197
103(a) Bell ’785, Bell
’723
12, 13, 16,
17, 50–53,
68, 78–80,
142–144,
176, 187,
11
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Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
188, 196,
197
18, 19 103(a) Bell ’785, Ulrich 18, 19
47, 48 103(a) Bell ’785,
Williams
47, 48
49 103(a) Bell ’785,
Christodoulou
49
57–63, 84, 85,
87, 94, 95,
99–116, 124–
129, 191
103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson
57–63, 84,
85, 87, 94,
95, 99–116,
125–129,
191
124
69–73, 198–
200
103(a) Bell ’785, Bell
’723, Curtiss
69–73, 198–
200

74–76 103(a) Bell ’785, Yamada 74–76
81 103(a) Bell ’785,
Langseth
81
86, 88–90, 92,
137
103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson, Fong
86, 88–90,
92, 137

90–93, 96, 97,
119–123, 130,
131, 138–140
103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson, Bell
’723
90–93, 96,
97, 119–
123, 130,
131, 138–
140

98 103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson, Ulrich
98
117, 118 103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson,
Williams
117, 118
132, 133 103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson, Curtiss
132, 133
134–136 103(a) Bell ’785,
Masterson,
Yamada
134–136
163–166 103(a) Bell ’785, Luneau 163–166
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Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
Overall
Outcome
1–200

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED