Xilinx, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 17, 2020

2019005786 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/285,786 10/05/2016 Jun Liu X-4951 US 4527
164051 7590 08/17/2020
PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, LLP - - XILINX
24 GREENWAY PLAZA
SUITE 1600
HOUSTON, TX 77046
EXAMINER
GARBOWSKI, LEIGH M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2851
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Pair_Eofficeaction@pattersonsheridan.com
psdocketing@pattersonsheridan.com
xilinxipl@xilinx.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parteJUN LIU, HAO YU, RAYMOND KONG, and
DAVID P. SCHULTZ
Appeal 2019-005786
Application 15/285,786
Technology Center 2800
Before LARRY J. HUME, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–11, 13, 16, 17, and 20–27. Final
Act. 1. Claims 2, 3, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 have been cancelled. Appeal Br.
19–22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Xilinx, Inc. Appeal
Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-005786
Application 15/285,786

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed “to electronic circuit design systems and,
more particularly, to a design tool for providing dynamic partial
reconfiguration of a circuit design.” Spec ¶ 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method comprising:
using a processor-based system:
reading a netlist for a design of a circuit comprising
a reconfigurable module, the design of the circuit to be
implemented on a programmable logic device;
setting the reconfigurable module to a first region
corresponding to a first physical region of the programmable
logic device, static logic being outside of the first region;
generating a second region corresponding to a
second physical region of the programmable logic device,
generating the second region comprising modifying the first
region, said second region including at least some of said static
logic;
placing logic units of the reconfigurable module
within the first region;
routing connections of the reconfigurable module
within the second region; and
generating an electronic partial bitstream based on
the placed logic units and routed connections of the
reconfigurable module, the electronic partial bitstream being
capable of being loaded onto the programmable logic device to
implement the reconfigurable module of the design of the circuit
on the programmable logic device.
Appeal 2019-005786
Application 15/285,786

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REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Goldman US 8,671,377 B2 Mar. 11, 2014
REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4–11, 13, 16, 17, and 20–27 under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and (a)(2) as being anticipated by Goldman. Final
Act. 4–5.2
OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching our decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellant. We
are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the pending claims that
the Examiner erred.
The Examiner finds Goldman teaches “placing logic units of the
reconfigurable module within the first region,” as recited in claim 1. Final
Act. 5 (citing Goldman 5:16–20); see also Ans. 5 (citing Goldman 5:16–32,
7:50–54), 6–7. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Goldman discloses
placing a PR (partial reconfiguration module) in sections B and D, either of
which is a first region. See Ans. 5, 6–7.
Appellant argues:
Goldman discloses, as an example, expanding, in FIG. 7, floor
plan region 311 assigned to PR module B in FIG. 3 to include

2 The Examiner also rejected the pending claims as directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 2–4. In light of the 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, the Examiner withdrew the
rejection in the Answer. Ans. 3.
Appeal 2019-005786
Application 15/285,786

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floor plan regions previously assigned to static logic modules
Top and E. For clarity, the floor plan region 311 of FIG. 3 is
referred to as such herein, and the expanded floor plan region
illustrated in FIG. 7 is referred to as “expanded floor plan region
**311 **”. Goldman discloses that both the placing and routing
of the PR module B occurs within the expanded floor plan region
**311 **.
Appeal Br. 17 (citation omitted); see also Reply Br. 3, 5. However,
according to Appellant, “Goldman does not inherently (i.e., necessarily)
disclose that logic units of the PR module B are placed within the floor plan
region 311.” Reply Br. 5; see also Appeal Br. 17 (“Goldman does not
disclose placing logic units of a reconfigurable module within a first region
and routing connections of the reconfigurable module within a second region
modified from the first region.”).
We are persuade by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred.
Goldman includes two embodiments, a first illustrated in Figure 2 and a
second illustrated in Figure 5. See Goldman 2:28–31, 2:37–40. In the first
embodiment, a floor plan is generated and the equipment placed. See
Goldman Fig. 2. The Figure 2 embodiment does not involve modifying the
floor plan. See id.
In the second embodiment, an initial floor plan is generated and then,
following the allocation of resources and other steps, a modified floor plan is
generated. Goldman Fig. 5. Following the generation of the modified floor
plan, the resources are reallocated and the PR module is placed. Id., Fig. 5,
5:8–24, 5:38–63.
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Application 15/285,786

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Goldman Figure 3 is reproduced below.

Figure 3 “illustrates an exemplary floor plan of a design used for static
resource allocation according to an embodiment of the present invention.”
Goldman 2:32–34. Goldman Figure 3 represents the original floor plan
shows a first region B that includes a PR module. Goldman 3:8–26. Region
B is mapped to the first region. See Ans. 4.
Goldman Figure 7 is reproduced below.

Goldman Figure 7 “illustrates an exemplary modified floor plan of a design
used for static resource allocation.” Goldman 2:43–44. Goldman Figure 7
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shows the modified floor plan with additional space allocated for region B—
which is mapped to the second region.
In the Final Action, the Examiner relies on Goldman 5:16–20 for the
placement of the PR module. See Final Act. 5. Although that section
describes a PR module being placed in Module B, that section describes
placement of the modules according to the Figure 2 embodiment, which
does not involve generating a second region. See Goldman Fig. 2, 5:16–20
(describing Figure 2).
The Examiner also relies on Goldman 7:50–54. Although that section
discloses that the PR modules are placed after the floor plan is modified, it is
silent as to the location of the PR modules. That is, the section does not
specify whether the PR module is placed in the original module B (the first
region) or the portions of the floor plan that were originally part of Section E
or TOP but which have been reallocated to module B (which along with the
original module B make up the second region). Because Goldman is silent
on whether the PR module is placed in what has been mapped as the first
region or the additional space allocated as part of the second region, based
on the current record, we agree with Appellant that, based on the current
record, the Examiner’s finding that Goldman discloses the disputed
limitation is in error because it is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Examiner’s burden of proving non-patentability is by a preponderance of
the evidence); see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967)
(“The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its
rejection. It may not, because it may doubt that the invention is patentable,
Appeal 2019-005786
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resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to
supply deficiencies in its factual basis.”).3
Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, along with the rejections of claims 13
and 17, which recite limitations commensurate in scope to the disputed
limitation discussed above, and dependent claims 4–11, 16, and 20–27.4
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4–11, 13, 16, 17,
and 20–27 as being anticipated.

3 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced
by Appellants, we need not reach the merits of Appellants’ other arguments.
See Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that an administrative agency may render a decision based on “a
single dispositive issue”).
4 In an anticipation rejection, “it is not enough that the prior art reference
. . . includes multiple, distinct teachings that [an] artisan might somehow
combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign,
Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Rather, the reference must
“clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those
skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing,
and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the
teachings of the cited reference.” Id. (quoting In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586,
587 (CCPA 1972)). Thus, while “[s]uch picking and choosing may be
entirely proper in the making of a 103, obviousness rejection . . . it has no
place in the making of a 102, anticipation rejection.” Arkley, 455 F.2d
at 587–88.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–11, 13,
16, 17, 20–27
102 Goldman 1, 4–11, 13,
16, 17, 20–27
REVERSED