01A20527_r
06-25-2002
Wyvonia C. Pringle, Complainant, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency.
Wyvonia C. Pringle v. Department of Defense
01A20527
June 25, 2002
.
Wyvonia C. Pringle,
Complainant,
v.
Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary,
Department of Defense,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A20527
Agency No. HON-98-DS-0045-E
Hearing
No.
370-99-X2453
DECISION
Complainant appeals from the agency's final order in the above-entitled
matter. Complainant had been employed by the agency as a teacher at the
Taegu Elementary School in Taegu, South Korea. Complainant filed a formal
EEO complaint in which she claimed that the agency discriminated against
her on the bases of her race (African-American), color (dark brown),
sex (female), and age (DOB 1945) when she was harassed in 1996-1997 and
terminated effective June 12, 1997.
The agency investigated the complaint and thereafter referred the
matter to an Administrative Judge (AJ), who issued a decision finding
no discrimination without holding a hearing. The agency issued a final
order adopting the AJ's decision. It is from this final order that
complainant now appeals.
In response, the agency asserts that complainant was terminated
because she failed the National Teachers Examination. The agency
notes that complainant signed an employment contract wherein she agreed
to pass the National Teachers Examination prior to the completion of
the 1996-97 school year. The agency states that a Caucasian female
also was terminated after she failed the examination. With respect to
complainant's claim of harassment, the agency asserts that complainant
was not subjected to harassment. The agency states that complainant was
removed from a teaching team at mid-year because the Principal needed to
realign the teams due to a personality conflict between complainant and
another teacher. According to the agency, complainant's class missed out
on some field trips and school activities because she failed to coordinate
these events with administration officials. As to a derogatory electronic
mail message about complainant's union involvement that was placed on
the bulletin board in the teacher's lounge, the agency asserts that it
was not proved who placed the message on the bulletin board. The agency
further argues that complainant has not shown that the message was placed
on the bulletin board to harass her due to her race, color, sex, or age.
With regard to complainant's claim that the Principal stated that there
was an over representation of African-American teachers at the school,
the agency asserts that the Principal stated at a faculty meeting that the
ratio of Black, White, and Hispanic faculty members was higher than the
racial/ethnic makeup of the local community. The agency maintains that
the Principal was emphasizing the need to diversify the staff and obtain
qualified Asian teachers because over half of the student population was
Asian, and that he did not discriminate against complainant based on her
race or color. The agency asserts that complainant failed to establish
that these workplace incidents occurred due to her protected status,
or that they were related to her termination.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances
that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The burden then shifts to
the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is
pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), the Commission agrees with the agency that complainant
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's
articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.
Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the
particular case. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 n. 14.
Where employment terms, conditions, privileges, or benefits are at
issue, complainant may establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that she belongs to a statutorily protected class, and that she was
treated differently than employees outside of her protected group with
respect to those terms, conditions, privileges, or benefits. See Orr
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, EEOC Request No. 05930311 (March 11, 1994).
In this case, the record reveals that complainant was terminated after
she failed to pass the National Teachers Examination. We find that
complainant has not established that teachers outside her protected
classes were allowed to retain employment after failing the National
Teachers Examination. Therefore, we find that complainant has not
established a prima facie case of discrimination on the bases of race,
color, sex, or age with regard to the termination of her employment.
Assuming arguendo, that complainant had established a prima facie case
of discrimination, we shall next consider the agency's explanation for
its actions. The agency stated that complainant was terminated from her
teacher position because she failed to meet her contractual obligation
to pass the National Teachers Examination prior to the completion of the
1996-97 school term. We find that the agency articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of complainant.
We find that complainant has not established, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the agency's stated reason for her termination
was pretextual. Complainant claimed that the agency's termination of
her was discriminatory in light of the harassment that she suffered.
Complainant states that she was excluded from the �Writing Across the
Curriculum� team; her school class was excluded from field trips and
other events in which other classes participated; a derogatory, untrue,
an embarrassing electronic mail message about her union representation
was placed on the bulletin board in the teacher's lounge; and the
Principal of the Taegu School stated in March 1997, that there was an over
representation of African-Americans teachers at the school, and that he
intended to balance the African-American teacher/student ethnicity ratio.
We find that the incidents cited by complainant do not negate the fact
that she failed to pass the National Teachers Examination prior to the
completion of the 1996-97 school year. Complainant has not shown that
other teachers who failed to examination were allowed to remain in their
positions. Therefore, we find that complainant has failed to show that
she was discriminated against on the bases of her race, color, sex,
or age when she was terminated from her teaching position.
With regard to complainant's claim of harassment, we note that in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment. The
Court explained that an �objectively hostile or abusive work environment
[is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive�
and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, supra
at 21-22.
Insofar as complainant contends that the incidents of which she complained
constituted harassment based upon her membership in protected classes,
we find that she failed to refute the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons proffered by the agency for its actions. The agency explained
that complainant was excluded from a �Writing Across the Curriculum� team
because of a personality conflict between complainant and another teacher.
The agency explained that complainant's class was excluded from certain
field trips and school activities because complainant failed to coordinate
these events with administration officials. With regard to the message
placed on the bulletin board in the teacher's lounge, the agency stated
that it was not shown who placed the message. As for the Principal's
alleged statement about an over representation of African-American
teachers at the school, the agency explained that at a faculty meeting,
the Principal stated that the ratio of Black, White, and Hispanic
teachers was higher than the racial/ethnic makeup of the local community.
According to the agency, the Principal sought to encourage a balance in
racial/ethnic composition by emphasizing that qualified Asian teachers
were needed in light of the student population being more than half Asian.
We find that complainant has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the agency's explanation for these actions was pretext
intended to mask discriminatory motivation. Therefore, we find that
the alleged incidents do not constitute discriminatory harassment.
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration
of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final order,
because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a
hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does
not establish that discrimination occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 25, 2002
__________________
Date