WU, PETER et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 24, 2020

12761281 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/761,281 04/15/2010 PETER WU 20.3266-US-NP 1826
23718 7590 04/24/2020
Schlumberger Technology Center
10001 Richmond Avenue
IP Administration Center of Excellence
HOUSTON, TX 77042
EXAMINER
SCHINDLER, DAVID M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2858
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
SMarckesoni@slb.com
USDOCKETING@slb.com
jalverson@slb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PETER WU and
THOMAS D. BARBER
____________

Appeal 2019-001251
Application 12/761,281
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before DONNA M. PRAISS, MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, and
LILAN REN, Administrative Patent Judges.

PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 8–13. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 In this Decision, we refer to the Specification filed Apr. 15, 2010
(“Spec.”), the Final Office Action dated July. 28, 2017 (“Final Act.”), the
Appeal Brief filed Apr. 30, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer
dated Sept. 27, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed Nov. 27, 2018
(“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Schlumberger Technology
Corporation as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to methods for “determining
geologic structural dip of subsurface rock formations using measurements
from a multiaxial electromagnetic induction well logging instrument.”
Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification describes structural dip as the dip of entire
formation layers as determined by formation boundaries and stratigraphic
dip as those that are internal to a specific layer or layers of rock formation.
Id. ¶ 6. Discerning the two using multiaxial induction measurements is said
to be problematic, thus geological dip is typically determined by inspection
of wellbore wall images and either visual or automatic fitting of sinusoids to
features that cross the images. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. According to the Specification,
multiaxial induction well logging instruments determine electrical resistivity
of rock formations by passing alternating current through transmitters that is
detected by receivers, and characteristics of the induced voltages are related
to the rock formation’s electrical resistivity. Id. ¶ 2.
The Specification describes a method for determining structural dip of
subsurface formation using multiaxial induction measurements. Id. ¶ 9.
Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below from the Claims Appendix of
the Appeal Brief (disputed limitations italicized):
1. A method for determining structural dip of
subsurface formations, comprising:
accepting as input multiaxial induction measurements
made by passing electric current through a multiaxial
transmitter disposed in a wellbore drilled through subsurface
rock formations, and detecting voltages induced in a multiaxial
receiver disposed at a longitudinally spaced apart location along
the wellbore while moving the transmitter and receiver along
the wellbore;
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inverting the multiaxial voltage measurements into
values of formation dip magnitude and formation dip azimuth;
measuring a parameter related to shale content of the
rock formations;
when the parameter related to the shale content of the
rock formations exceeds a threshold indicating that shale is
present, selecting the formation dip magnitude and formation
dip azimuth values as the structural dip of the rock formations;
and
generating a structural map of the rock formations using
the determined structural dip.
Independent claim 6 is similar to claim 1, but instead of measuring a
parameter related to shale content, recites “measuring gamma ray intensity to
produce a gamma ray curve to identify shale content of the rock formations”
and the formation dip magnitude and formation dip azimuth is identified “only
when the shale content of the rock formation is identified by gamma ray curve
as exceeding a selected threshold.” Id. at 16.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 8–13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant presents the same arguments for independent claims 1 and 6, and
does not separately argue the dependent claims. We focus on claims 1 and 6
below. Claims 3, 4, and 8–13 will stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
After review of the cited evidence in the appeal record and the
opposing positions of Appellant and the Examiner, we determine that
Appellant has not identified reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection for reasons set forth below, in the Final
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Action, and in the Examiner’s Answer. See generally Final Act. 6–10;
Ans. 3–28.
Claim 1. Determining whether a claimed invention is directed to
patent eligible subject matter is a two-step process that requires
(1) evaluating whether the claim is “directed to” a patent ineligible concept,
i.e., a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; and, if so,
(2) determining whether the claim’s elements, considered both individually
and as an ordered combination, transform the nature of the claim into a
patent-eligible application. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216–18 (2014).
As to Alice step 1, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to
the abstract ideas of (1) inverting the multiaxial voltage measurements into
values of formation dip magnitude and formation dip azimuth when the
parameter related to shale content of the rock formation exceeds a threshold
indicating that shale is present, (2) selecting dip values as the structural dip
of the rock formations, and (3) generating a structural map of the rock
formations using the determined structural dip. Final Act. 4, 6–7.
According to the Examiner, these steps are abstract because they amount to
collecting data, analyzing the data, and storing if not displaying the data as
in Electric Power Group. LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351–52
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Id. at 4–5.
As to Alice step 2, the Examiner finds the accepting step, the inverting
step, and the measuring a parameter step are conventional features
performed in the prior art and determines:
Therefore, the only structural features of this claim are well-
known and conventional, and the remaining claim features are
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directed towards an abstract idea (processing in the form of
selecting and generating a structural map). Furthermore, the
inverting and decision steps (last two paragraphs of the claim)
as well as the generating a structural map steps are therefore
abstract claim features as they do not include physical structural
claim features and the measuring step is a generic data
gathering feature which is known and therefore does not
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception of an
abstract idea.
Final Act. 4–5.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred by not analyzing the claims as
a whole. Appeal Br. 5. According to Appellant, the claims are not directed
to an abstract idea because they are not similar to the examples identified in
Alice and are not similar to the claims involved in Electric Power Group
based on the recitation of a concrete machine, e.g. multiaxial induction well
logging device. Id. at 7. Appellant also argues “the use of multiaxial
induction instruments is not conventional merely because it appears in prior
art and, hence, the structural elements are nonconventional.” Id. at 5–6.
Appellant contends that the Examiner must demonstrate not only that the
multiaxial induction well logging instrument is widely prevalent, but also
that its combination with other elements, such as claim 6’s gamma ray
intensity detector, are well understand and routine. Id. at 10, 13.
Appellant asserts that, even if the structural features are considered
conventional, the claims are patent eligible because they are “directed to
technical improvements.” Id. at 6. Appellant contends the claimed method
uses a particular instrument (e.g., a multiaxial induction well logging
instrument) to perform a particular function (e.g., induce voltages that
indicate structural dip) that is an improvement over the known “subjective
and laborious process (e.g., visual inspection).” Id. at 7. Appellant asserts
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that using the multiaxial induction well logging instrument to identify and
characterize structural dip by using formation dip magnitude and formation
dip azimuth when a threshold amount of shale is present is an
unconventional approach to solve a problem like the claim in Thales
Visionex Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Id. at 11.
Legal Framework
In determining whether a claim falls within a category excluded from
eligible subject matter, our inquiry focuses on the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework described in Mayo and Alice, set forth above. Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)).
In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. Concepts determined
to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include mental processes
(Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) and mathematical formulas
(Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)). Concepts determined to be
patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding
rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning,
dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
However, not every claim that recites a mathematical formula is
patent ineligible. In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981), the claim
at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a]
claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
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nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450
U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing
more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to
patent a mathematical formula.”). The Supreme Court also indicated that a
claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not
accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment.” Id. (citing Flook and Benson); see also, e.g., id.
at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).3

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
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Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56.
Judicial Exception (Step 2A, Prong One)
Consistent with the Examiner’s analysis, claim 1 recites at least one
judicial exception. Specifically, claim 1’s steps apply a mental process (i.e.,
“selecting dip values”) to collected data (i.e., “accepting as input multiaxial
induction measurements” and “measuring a parameter related to shale

4 We perform this evaluation by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2),
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
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content of the rock formations”) that is processed into values of formation
dip magnitude and formation dip azimuth, and then storing in memory the
selected values (“generating a structural map of the rock formations”). Final
Act. 6; Ans. 4–5. The Specification supports that a person is able to use
collected data to select dip values in his or her mind and then use those
selected values to generate a structural map. For example, the Specification
provides “[g]eologists or other interpreters normally select the structural dips
manually in places that have clear bedding planes visible, normally at the
boundaries of formations known as ‘shales.’” Spec. ¶ 7. The Specification
also provides “there is generally a good match between the triaxial
induction-determined dip measured in shales and an interpreter’s manual
selection of structural dip from imaging instrument measurements.” Id.
¶ 42.
The Examiner also finds that the “inverting” step is a mathematical
concept. Final Act. 6; Ans. 4. Appellant fails to meaningfully contend that
the claim does not recite a mental process or a mathematical concept. See
Appeal Br. 7 (acknowledging that one currently can use “visual inspection”
to perform the claimed method steps); Spec. ¶ 45 (“The dip magnitude and
dip azimuth angles are output from an inversion algorithm.”). Instead,
relevant to step (2) of the Guidance (discussed below), Appellant focuses on
whether the claim as a whole integrates the abstract idea into a practical
application. See Appeal Br. 7–8.
Similar to the incidental use of a computer to translate data into a
another format, Appellant’s claims use a mental process and a mathematical
concept to identify a structural dip of rock formations that “read on an
individual performing the claimed steps mentally or with pencil and paper”
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as in Synopsys, Inc. v. Meteor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1139 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (holding claims to the mental process of “translating a functional
description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the
logic circuit” are directed to an abstract idea.). In accordance with the Step
2A, Prong One, we determine that claim 1 recites a mental process and a
mathematical concept and, thus, recites an abstract idea.
Integration into a Practical Application (Step 2A, Prong 2)
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
determine that claim 1, as a whole, does not integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application. Integration into a practical application requires
an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to
“apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see also id. at 55 (setting forth exemplary
considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of
elements may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical
application).
Appellant’s argument that “the claims as a whole are directed to more
than an abstract idea” is not persuasive. See Appeal Br. 6–8. Contrary to
Appellant’s argument, see id. at 7, claim 1 is directed to a data
collection/mathematical analysis process similar to the claims at issue in
Electric Power Group, which the Federal Circuit held were directed to
ineligible subject matter. The claims in Electric Power required
(1) collecting data (i.e., “receiving a plurality of data streams” including
“measurements . . . collected in real time at geographically distinct points”),
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(2) subjecting the data to a mathematical operation (i.e., “analyzing events in
realtime from the plurality of data streams” and “deriving a composite
indicator of relability that is an indicator of power grid vulnerability”), and
(3) based on the measurements and analysis, “displaying” and
“accumulating” the results. Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1351–52.
Claim 1 similarly requires (1) collecting data (“accepting as input
multiaxial induction measurements” and “measuring a parameter related to
shale content”), (2) subjecting the multiaxial voltage measurement data to a
mathematical operation (“inverting”), and (3) on the basis of the results of
the measurement of a parameter related to shale content, selecting values
from the mathematical operation (“when the parameter related to the shale
content of the rock formations exceeds a threshold indicating that shale is
present, selecting the formation dip magnitude and formation dip azimuth
values as the structural dip of the rock formation”) to generate a structural
map of the rock formation.
The fact that claim 1 uses a tool for collecting measurements, see
Appeal Br. 8 (“the recited methods use a particular instrument (e.g.,
multiaxial induction well logging instrument)”), does not mean that the
claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. As the
October 2019 Update to the 2019 Revised Guidance explains, “[a]n
important consideration to evaluate when determining whether the claim as a
whole integrates a judicial exception into a practical application is whether
the claimed invention improves the functioning of a computer or other
technology.” October 2019 Update, 12. To do so, we consider whether
Appellant’s Specification “provides sufficient details such that one of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing
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an improvement.” Id. If the Specification sets forth an improvement in
technology, we then evaluate claim 1 “to ensure that the claim itself reflects
the disclosed improvement.” Id.
Here, the Specification discloses that multiaxial induction logging
instruments were known in the art. See Spec. ¶ 5 (stating, in the background
of the invention, that “[m]ultiaxial induction logging instruments can also be
used to determine the geodetic inclination (dip magnitude and dip azimuth)
of rock formations.”). Thus, contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, the fact that
data must be collected using generic elements such as a multiaxial induction
well logging instrument before data manipulation and selection can be
performed does not, of itself, indicate a practical application. Appellant
does not identify any “improvement” that claim 1 implicates sufficient to
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
We also are not persuaded that the use of a multiaxial induction
instrument to generate a structural map integrates the judicial exception into
a practical application. See Appeal Br. 8. In In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
962–63 (Fed Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
(2010), the Federal Circuit explained that “the transformation of . . . raw data
into a particular visual depiction of a physical object on a display was
sufficient to render that more narrowly-claimed process patent-eligible.”
Here, in contrast, the Specification at most suggests that the recited method
improves the manipulation of data collected. Spec. ¶ 6 (characterizing the
problem of the existing methods as “separating the two types of dip from
each other from triaxial induction measurements has remained difficult.”).
Appellant also argues that “even if the claim features are regarded as
conventional, the claimed methods use the features in an unconventional
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manner to solve an existing technical problem.” Appeal Br. 12; see Reply
Br. 4. We observe that the Specification identifies a particular technical
problem in “separating the two types of dip from each other from triaxial
induction measurements,” see Spec. ¶ 6, but claim 1 does not appear to
reflect an improvement in solving that problem. We agree with the
Examiner (Ans. 4–5) that claim 1 does not recite generating an image. As
the Examiner explains, “[t]he last step of generating a structural map is the
mere generation of data where the previous data is analyzed, and a structural
map is generated. This map is not recited to be displayed, and it thus
effectively [is] just data sitting in memory.” Id. Thus, even were we to
agree that Appellant describes an improvement to an existing technological
process in the Specification, claim 1 does not clearly reflect that specific
improvement. Rather, claim 1 is broader in scope than any improvement
that Appellant identifies in the Specification. Cf. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While Synopsys
may be correct that the inventions of the Gregory Patents were intended to
be used in conjunction with computer-based design tools, the Asserted
Claims are not confined to that conception. The § 101 inquiry must focus on
the language of the Asserted Claims themselves.”); Accenture Global Servs.,
GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(admonishing that “the important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to
the claim”); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“We focus here on
whether the claims of the asserted patents fall within the excluded category
of abstract ideas.”).
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In sum, we are not persuaded that claim 1 integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application. Thus, claim 1 is directed to the recited
abstract idea.
Inventive Concept (Step 2B)
Turning to Step 2B, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s
determination that the limitations of claim 1 beyond the abstract idea itself
are well understood, routine, and conventional. See Final Act. 6–8.
Appellant argues that “[t]he pending claims recite additional,
nonconventional features that are used to particularly solve the problem of
identifying formation dip.” Appeal Br. 9. The “measuring,” “selecting,”
and “generating” steps, however, are steps that the Examiner identifies as
encompassing abstract mental processes. See Final Act. 7. “It has been
clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC
v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Even were we to not consider the “generating” step as reciting a
mental process, in the Specification, Appellant uses phrases such as
“[g]eological dip is . . . typically determined by inspection of wellbore wall
images,” Spec. ¶ 7, and “[t]hese images are generally electrical resistivity
images in wireline logging, and either resistivity or density images when
made using [logging-while-drilling] tools,” id. Appellant does not argue that
the known, traditional methods fail to identify structural dips. The
Specification indicates that “characterization of dips calculated from
multiaxial induction measurements as structural or stratigraphic is
problematic” and the manual selection of structural dips “is a subjective and
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laborious process.” E.g., Spec. ¶¶ 6–7. On this record, Appellant fails to
persuade us that any step of claim 1, beyond those encompassing the abstract
idea itself, alone or as an ordered combination, recites subject matter that is
not well understood, routine, and conventional.
Appellant argues that Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017), indicates that the “present claims use conventional
components in an unconventional manner.” Appeal Br. 11–12. Appellant’s
argument appears to be that, because the claims in Thales involved
measurements and calculations but were nevertheless determined to be
eligible under § 101, claim 1 in this case likewise is eligible. See id. That
argument is not persuasive. The fact that certain claims (of unrelated
patents) involving measurements and calculations have previously been
determined to recite eligible subject matter, of itself, does not establish that
the specific claims at issue here likewise recite eligible subject matter.
Critical to the eligibility determination in Thales was the recitation in the
claims of an “unconventional configuration of sensors.” Thales, 850 F.3d at
1349. Here, Appellant identifies no “unconventional configuration of
sensors” or similar unconventional subject matter in claim 1 that might
warrant reversal of the Examiner’s rejection based on Thales. On the
contrary, Appellant states that “the recited methods use a particular
instrument (e.g., multiaxial induction well logging instrument) from a
variety of available instruments.” Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added).
In summary, we have carefully considered Appellant’s arguments, but
are not persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Claim 6. Independent claim 6 is similar to claim 1 (our analysis of
which applies equally here) but additionally recites “measuring gamma ray
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intensity to produce a gamma ray curve to identify shale content of the rock
formations” and further limiting the well log generated to values “identified
by the gamma ray curve as exceeding a selected threshold.” Appeal Br. 16
(Claims Appendix). Relevant to the arguments discussed above concerning
whether the claim integrates an exception into a practical application and
whether the claim elements are well understood, routine, and conventional,
the Appellant’s only argument concerning claim 6 is that the Examiner must
“demonstrate that the multiaxial induction well logging instrument is widely
prevalent, but also that its combination with other elements (e.g., gamma ray
intensity measurements) is also well understood and routine.” Appeal Br.
10.
That argument is not persuasive of error. As an initial matter, we
observe that Appellant does not actually dispute the Examiner’s finding that
a multiaxial induction well logging instrument is well understood, routine,
and conventional for geological dip survey methods. Even if dips are more
often selected manually, see Spec. ¶ 7 (“[g]eologists or other interpreters
normally select the structural dips manually”), the record supports the
Examiner’s determination that such instruments are well understood,
routine, and conventional. See Ans. 7–8, 10–11; see also Spec. ¶ 5
(describing the use of multiaxial induction logging elements in the
background of the invention section). In that regard, and as set forth above,
the Specification describes the use of multiaxial induction measurements
being used for calculations that characterize dips. Spec. ¶ 6. Appellant does
not sufficiently explain how measurements could be obtained and
understood without an instrument for measuring properties of rock
formations, including “measuring gamma ray intensity” as recited in claim
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6. Indeed, the Specification states that, rather than measuring characteristics
of rock formations with a multiaxial induction well logging instrument, it is
the “separating the two types of dip from each other from triaxial induction
measurements [that] has remained difficult.” Id.
On the record before us, Appellant fails to persuade us that measuring
gamma ray intensity to produce a gamma ray curve to identify shale content
of rock formations and generating a well log based on a selected threshold
are not well understood, routine, and conventional, or that they otherwise
impart subject matter eligibility to claim 6 alone or as an ordered
combination.
Appellant raises no other arguments specific to claim 6. We affirm
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we uphold the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3,
4, 6, and 8–13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as unpatentable subject matter.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 6, 8–13 101 1, 3, 4, 6, 8–13

AFFIRMED