Wire Products Mfg. Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1998

326 N.L.R.B. 625 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 625
Wire Products Manufacturing Corporation and Dis-
trict No. 200, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO.

R. T. Blankenship & Associates and Rayford T.
Blankenship1 and District No. 200, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL–CIO. Cases 30–CA–12645, 30–CA–
12714, 30–CA–12840, 30–CA–12946, and 30–
CA–12860
August 27, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On February 2, 1996, Administrative Law Judge Rich-
ard A. Scully issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel, Respondent Wire Products Manufacturing Cor-
poration (the Employer), and Respondents R. T. Blank-
enship & Associates and Rayford T. Blankenship
(Blankenship) filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and
they each filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions as
modified below and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.3
Overview
The judge found, and we agree, that the Employer vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating, maintaining, and
enforcing overly broad rules restricting the posting and
distribution of union literature and the conduct of union
business on its premises, and by threatening to arrest
employees on the Union’s bargaining committee if they
did not leave the site of an employee meeting; that it vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) by failing to recall one employee,
by disciplining two others, and by discriminatorily ex-
cluding employees on the Union’s bargaining committee
from an employee meeting; and that it violated Section
8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing wages and other terms
and conditions of employment. We also adopt the
judge’s findings that the Employer and Blankenship vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) by informing employees that a wage
increase would be delayed because the Union had filed
charges against the Respondents, by falsely informing
employees that the Union had lost its majority status and
would no longer represent them, and by coercively inter-
rogating employees; and that they violated Section
8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition from the Union and
by refusing to meet and negotiate. We reverse the judge,
however, and find for the reasons set forth below that the
Employer committed an additional violation of Section
8(a)(1) by sending unit employees a letter encouraging
them to decertify the Union, and that it also violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by announcing that it intended to
implement an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in
place of the existing profit-sharing plan without giving
the Union notice or an opportunity to bargain. We find
further that the Employer’s unfair labor practices tainted
the decertification petition on which the Respondents
relied in withdrawing recognition from the Union. We
also find, contrary to the judge, that a broad order is war-
ranted against Blankenship.

1 The name of this Respondent appears as amended at the hearing.
2 The Respondents and the General Counsel have excepted to some
of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is
not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
We correct the following inadvertent error in sec. III,C,3, LL. 8–9 of
the judge’s decision: “Marilyn Beck” should read “Marilyn Boyd.”
Blankenship and the General Counsel have excepted to, inter alia,
the finding that Blankenship violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (3) by prohibit-
ing union bargaining committee members from attending a meeting on
August 16, 1994, and threatening their arrest if they did not leave the
vicinity of the meeting. Blankenship was alleged as an agent of the
Employer, but not charged as a respondent, in connection with these
violations. We therefore find merit to the exceptions. We note, how-
ever, that the remedy will not be materially affected, as we are not
disturbing the judge’s findings on this issue pertaining to the Respon-
dent Employer.
3 We shall modify the recommended Order in accordance with our
decisions in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996), and
Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997). In addition, we shall
modify the recommended Order to make union bargaining committee
members whole for any loss of wages or other earnings due to their
discriminatory exclusion from the August 16, 1994 employee meeting.
The Employer operates a manufacturing plant in
Merrill, Wisconsin. Following an election conducted by
the Board on August 12, 1993, the Union was certified
on September 20, 1993, as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees. During
the initial election campaign, the Employer retained labor
consultants R. T. Blankenship and Associates. After the
election, Blankenship continued to act as the Employer’s
representative in labor relations matters, including in
negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement.4 On
June 20, 1994, employee Phyllis Duellman began circu-
lating a petition among unit employees to decertify the
Union. She presented the petition to the Employer on
February 20, 1995.5 On February 24, on the basis of the
petition, the Respondents withdrew recognition from the
Union. Thereafter, the Employer instituted new work
rules, unilaterally raised wages, and announced other
changes in terms and conditions of employment.
4 As of the last negotiating session on February 3, 1995, the parties
had yet to reach agreement on an initial contract.
5 Duellman filed the petition with the Board on March 8, 1995. On
March 10, the Acting Regional Director dismissed the petition because
of unfair labor practice charges.
326 NLRB No. 62
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 626
1. The judge dismissed a complaint allegation that the
Employer unlawfully aided and encouraged its employ-
ees to decertify the Union by permitting them to circulate
a decertification petition on company premises during
working time and by sending them a letter dated July 18,
1994, informing them about the decertification process.
We agree that the General Counsel has not shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Employer know-
ingly permitted employees to solicit signatures for the
petition during working time. We do not agree, however,
with the judge’s finding that the Employer’s July 18 let-
ter did not constitute unlawful encouragement to decer-
tify the Union.
The July 18 letter informs employees that a
decertification petition is being circulated and that
employees may sign the petition in nonproduction areas,
during breaks and before and after work. It concludes by
wishing employees “Good Luck.” Accompanying the
letter is an attachment encaptioned: “FED UP? If you
are dissatisfied with union representation the attached list
of questions and answers will help you understand your
legal opportunities to do something about it!” In addi-
tion to providing accurate information about how to de-
certify the Union, the attachment sets forth the purported
disadvantages of union representation and the relative
advantages of decertification over merely quitting or
deauthorizing the Union. It also contains a sample peti-
tion with suggested language for decertifying the Union.

In concluding that the Employer’s distribution of these
materials did not violate Section 8(a)(1), the judge relied
on the absence of a specific request in the letter that em-
ployees start a decertification petition. He also relied on
his assessment that it was unlikely that the letter would
cause employees to feel in peril if they did not circulate
or sign a petition. Contrary to the judge, we find that the
letter and attachment, when considered in the context of
the Employer’s other unfair labor practices, unlawfully
undermines the Union and influences employees to reject
the Union as their bargaining representative.
It is not determinative that the Employer did not ex-
pressly advise employees to get rid of the Union. Ex-
press appeals by management to decertify or manage-
ment involvement in circulating a petition are not essen-
tial to a finding that an employer effectively solicited
decertification and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.6 It suffices that an employer’s communications to
employees regarding a decertification petition, when

6 See generally Condon Transport, Inc., 211 NLRB 297, 302 (1974)
(Board adopted the administrative law judge’s finding that “it is imma-
terial that the Respondent did not expressly advise [employees] to get
rid of the Union, for such a desire was implicit” in the assistance it
provided); and Fabric Warehouse, 294 NLRB 189 (1989), enfd. mem.
902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990) (Board found that an employer’s statements
to employees that they would receive better benefits if they got rid of
the union constituted unlawful solicitation to circulate a decertification
petition, because such statements “would normally tend to encourage”
such action).
viewed in the context of the relevant circumstances, rea-
sonably communicate that employees will fare better
with respect to employment opportunities and security if
they act in accordance with the employer’s desire to get
rid of the union.7
The Employer’s July 18 letter sought to disparage the
Union and to drive a wedge between the Union and unit
employees. Additionally, the letter, by wishing employ-
ees “Good Luck” and advising that they can engage in
activities to decertify the Union on company premises
during nonworking time and in nonproduction areas
(while the Employer was unlawfully restricting pro-
union activity on company premises), and by its refer-
ence to an attached sample decertification petition,8 con-
veyed to employees an appeal for them to engage in de-
certification activities.9
Furthermore, the Employer distributed its July 18 letter
contemporaneously with its commission of other unfair
labor practices aimed at undermining support for the Un-
ion. Thus, in order to discourage support for the Union,
the Employer, since May 1994, discriminatorily failed to
recall an employee on layoff and, on July 20, 1994, gave
discriminatory written warnings to two employees. The
Employer also discriminatorily excluded employees on
the Union’s bargaining committee from an August 16,
1994 employee meeting with Blankenship, while paying
other employees overtime to attend, and threatened to
arrest excluded employees if they failed to leave the vi-
cinity of the meeting. Finally, since February 25, 1994,
and continuing as of the hearing in this matter, the Em-
ployer maintained and enforced a rule restricting the dis-
tribution and posting of union literature and the conduct
of union business on its premises in violation of Section
8(a)(1). By maintaining and enforcing such a rule at the
same time that it was encouraging employees’ efforts to
decertify the Union on company premises through its
July 18 letter, the Employer created a situation in which
antiunion activity was clearly favored over activity in
support of the Union.
Thus, this is not a case in which an employer merely
set forth objective information detailing the manner in
which employees can decertify the union in response to
employee questions.10 Rather, the Employer’s July 18
letter and attachment, considered in the context of its
7 Condon Transport, Inc., supra; Fabric Warehouse, supra.
8 There is no evidence that any employee requested a sample petition
from the Employer.
9 We disagree with our colleague’s assertion that certain aspects of
the letter were lawful and other aspects were unlawful. The relevant
inquiry does not involve a determination of whether aspects of the
Respondents’ letter, viewed in isolation, are lawful. Rather, it is
whether the letter, considered in its entirety and in the context of the
total circumstances, constitutes the unlawful encouragement of em-
ployees to decertify the Union.
10 Compare Amer-Cal Industries, 274 NLRB 1046, 1051 (1985), and
cases there cited (no violation if employer conduct limited to noncoer-
cive truthful responses to information requests).
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 627
contemporaneous unfair labor practices, conveyed to
employees the message that they would fare better if they
refrained from engaging in prounion activity and sup-
ported the Employer’s implicit intention to get rid of the
Union.11 Accordingly, we find in these circumstances
that the Employer’s July 18 letter constitutes unlawful
coercion and encouragement to employees to decertify
the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
2. The judge found that the Respondents violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from the
Union on February 24, 1995, because they failed to show
either that the Union in fact no longer had the support of
a majority of the unit employees on that date, or that they
possessed a good-faith doubt based on objective consid-
erations as to the Union’s continued majority status. The
General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s failure to
find, in addition, that the petition on which the Respon-
dents relied was tainted by unremedied unfair labor prac-
tices. We find merit in the General Counsel’s exception.
It is well established that an employer cannot rely on
any expression of disaffection by its employees which is
attributable to its own unfair labor practices directed at
undermining support for the Union.12 In this case we
have found that while the petition was being circulated,
the Employer failed to recall one employee and disci-
plined two others in order to discourage support for the
Union. It also discriminatorily excluded employees on
the Union’s bargaining committee from an August 16,
1994 meeting with employees, which resulted in a denial
of overtime pay to at least two of the excluded employ-
ees, and it threatened to arrest the excluded employees if
they failed to leave the vicinity of the meeting. Finally,
it unlawfully maintained and enforced a rule restricting
the distribution and posting of union literature and the
conduct of union business on company premises, and, at
the same time, was unlawfully encouraging employees to
engage in activities to decertify the Union on company
premises through its July 18 letter. In view of the nature
of these violations, and their foreseeable tendency to
weaken employee support for the Union, we find that it
is reasonable to infer that they contributed to the em-

11 For these reasons, we disagree with our colleague that certain
statements in the Respondents’ letter expressing antiunion views and
imparting information on how employees could rid themselves of the
Union amounted to “no more than an expression of free speech, pro-
tected by Section 8(c).”
12 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944);
Fabric Warehouse, supra 294 NLRB at 192; Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB
764 (1986), affd. mem. 837 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1988).
In determining whether a causal relationship exists between unfair
labor practices and a union’s loss of support, the Board considers sev-
eral evidentiary factors: (1) the length of time between the unfair labor
practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of the viola-
tion, including the possibility of a detrimental or lasting effect on em-
ployees; (3) the tendency of the violation to cause employee disaffec-
tion; and (4) the effect of the unlawful conduct on employees’ morale,
organizational activities, and membership in the union. Master Slack
Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984).
ployee disaffection expressed in the petition.13 Accord-
ingly, we find that the petition is tainted by the Em-
ployer’s unfair labor practices, and consequently, the
Respondents cannot rely on it to assert a good-faith
doubt of the Union’s majority status. This finding pro-
vides independent support for the judge’s conclusion that
the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
withdrawing recognition from the Union on February 24,
1995.14
3. On March 14, 1995, the Employer posted a notice
stating that it would file an application with the Internal
Revenue Service seeking qualification to convert its ex-
isting profit sharing plan to an ESOP. On March 21,
Company Co-owner Roger Dupke reiterated to employ-
ees that the Employer intended to convert the profit shar-
ing plan to an ESOP. Prior to the posting and the an-
nouncement, the Employer did not provide the Union
with notice or an opportunity to bargain over the change.
The judge found no violation, however, because there
was no evidence that the Employer actually implemented
an ESOP. Even if the Employer never carried through
with its stated intention, however, we find that the Em-
ployer’s announcement violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
because it conveyed to employees the message that it no
longer intended to deal with the Union as their exclusive
representative regarding terms and conditions of em-
ployment. ABC Automotive Products Corp., 307 NLRB
248, 250 (1992), and cases there cited.
4. The judge found that the Respondents, through
Blankenship, interrogated employees about whether they
had given statements to an agent of the Board in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1). We agree. Such questioning is
13 In assessing the tendency of unlawful action to cause employee
disaffection, the Board applies an objective, rather than a subjective,
test. For this reason, actual knowledge by the employees of the unfair
labor practices need not be shown. Fabric Warehouse, supra at 192;
Hearst Corp., supra at 765; Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392,
396 (1995). We note, nevertheless, that the record shows that employ-
ees were well aware of the Employer’s discriminatory exclusion of
bargaining committee members from the August 16 meeting and the
threat of arrest. Further, the unlawful rule restricting union activity was
posted throughout the plant and remained posted as of the hearing.
Finally, it is unlikely that employees failed to notice the Employer’s
refusal to recall William Edwards in light of his prominent role at three
Employer-sponsored meetings during the union organizing campaign,
and Blankenship’s statement to employees at one of the meetings while
pointing to Edwards, “I want you to remember this face and this name
when you decide whether you want these people working for you and
whether you want the Machinists Union in your plant.”
Member Hurtgen finds it unnecessary to pass on the conclusion that
a decertification petition can be tainted even if the employees are un-
aware of any antecedent unfair labor practices. In this regard, he notes
that the evidence in this case shows that the employees did in fact have
such knowledge of most of the unfair labor practices.
14 In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Allentown Mack
Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), we do not pass on the
judge’s analysis concerning the numerical sufficiency of the signatures
on the decertification petition and we rely solely on the petition taint in
finding that the Respondents failed to establish a good-faith reasonable
doubt of the Union’s majority status prior to withdrawing union recog-
nition.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 628
inherently coercive. Nearly three decades ago, in John-
nie’s Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 775–776 (1964), the
Board stated:

[T]he Board has generally found coercive, and outside
the ambit of privilege, interrogation concerning state-
ments or affidavits given to a Board agent. For such
questions have a pronounced inhibitory effect upon the
exercise by employees of their Section 7 rights, which
includes protection in seeking vindication of those
rights free from interference, restraint, and coercion by
their employer. Moreover, interrogation concerning
employee activities directed toward enforcement of
Section 7 rights also interferes with the Board’s proc-
esses in carrying out the statutory mandate to protect
such rights. [Citations omitted.]

The Board further explained in Waggoner Corp., 162
NLRB 1161, 1163 (1967), that interrogation regarding an
employee’s statement to an agent of the Board “can only
exert an inhibiting effect upon the employee’s willingness to
give a statement at all . . . thereby frustrating the policies of
the Act and the vindication of the statutory rights protected
thereby.” Although the Board in these cases was primarily
concerned with interrogation regarding the content of state-
ments or affidavits given to Board agents or requests for
copies, the rationale applies with equal force to questions
pertaining to whether an employee has given an affidavit or
statement. Astro Printing, 300 NLRB 1028, 1029 fn. 6
(1990).
The Respondents contend that the Board, in Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., 146 NLRB 76, 80 (1964), held that
questions pertaining to whether an employee has given
an affidavit or statement to the Board do not exceed the
permissible scope of inquiry because they are clearly
relevant and necessary to a respondent’s pretrial prepara-
tion. We note, however, that to the extent Montgomery
Ward holds that such questions are privileged, that
precedent was implicitly overruled in Astro Printing,
supra.15
5. The General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s
failure to include a broad cease-and-desist provision
against Blankenship in his recommended Order. The
General Counsel contends that such an order is warranted
given the seriousness of the violations and Blankenship’s
demonstrated proclivity to violate the Act. We find merit
in the General Counsel’s contention. Accordingly, we
shall substitute the broad injunctive language requiring
Blankenship to cease and desist from violating the Act,

15 We note that under the safeguards attending an unfair labor prac-
tice hearing, counsel for the respondent is entitled to, on request, the
statements of General Counsel witnesses for use in their cross-
examination. Johnnie’s Poultry, supra. See also Sec. 102.118(b)(1)
and (2) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations.
“in any other manner,” for the provision recommended
by the judge. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).16
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Add the following Conclusion of Law 6(f).
“(f) Distributing to employees letters and materials
which encourage and solicit them to decertify the Un-
ion.”
2. Add the following Conclusion of Law 8(c).
“(c) Announcing to employees an intent to change
from a profit-sharing plan to an ESOP without giving the
union notice and an opportunity to bargain.”
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that
A. Respondent Wire Products Manufacturing Corpora-
tion, Merrill, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Promulgating, maintaining, and enforcing overly
broad rules restricting the posting and distribution of
union literature and the conduct of union business on the
Employer’s premises.
(b) Distributing to employees letters and materials
which encourage and solicit them to decertify the Union.
(c) Informing employees that a wage increase will be
delayed because the Union has filed charges against it.
(d) Falsely informing employees that the Union no
longer represents a majority of unit employees and will
no longer be their collective-bargaining representative.
(e) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their own and others’ protected activities and/or about
whether they have given statements to agents of the
Board.
(f) Discriminatorily prohibiting employees on the Un-
ion’s collective-bargaining committee from attending
employee meetings and threatening to have them arrested
if they do not leave the vicinity of such meetings.
(g) Discriminatorily failing to recall employees from
layoff in order to discourage support for the Union.
(h) Discriminatorily issuing written disciplinary warn-
ings to employees in order to discourage support for the
Union.
(i) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of employees in the
appropriate unit and refusing to meet and bargain in
good-faith with the Union.
(j) Announcing an intent to change unit employees’
wages and other terms and conditions of employment
16 We refrained from issuing a broad order in Blankenship & Associ-
ates, Inc. and Rayford T. Blankenship, 306 NLRB 994 (1992), enfd.
999 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1993), in part because that case involved only
8(a)(1) violations. We believe that the findings in the present case,
especially when viewed in conjunction with a similar pattern of unlaw-
ful conduct in earlier cases, clearly demonstrate that Blankenship has a
proclivity to violate the Act. This evidence of proclivity warrants the
issuance of a broad remedial order.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 629
without giving the Union notice and an opportunity to
bargain.
(k) Unilaterally changing unit employees’ wages and
other terms and conditions of employment without giv-
ing the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain.
(l) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
William Edwards full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make
him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
resulting from the discriminatory failure to recall him
since May 1994, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
(b) Make whole employees on the Union’s collective-
bargaining committee for any loss of earnings or other
benefits resulting from their discriminatory exclusion
from the August 16, 1994 employee meeting, with inter-
est as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987).
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and
other records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful disciplinary
warnings issued to Carol Albright and Lola Wendt and,
within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this
has been done and that the warnings will not be used
against them in any way.
(e) On request of the Union, cancel the unilateral
changes in wages and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment of unit employees.17
(f) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the following appro-
priate unit concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the
understanding in a signed agreement:

All full-time and regular part-time employees em-
ployed by the Employer at its Mathewis and Genesee
Street operations in Merrill, Wisconsin; but excluding
office clerical employees, guards and supervisors, as
defined in the Act.

17 Nothing in this Order shall be construed as requiring the Employer
to cancel any wage increase without a request from the Union. See
Elias Mallouk Realty Corp., 265 NLRB 1225 fn. 3 (1982); Taft Broad-
casting Co., 262 NLRB 185 fn. 6 (1982).
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facilities in Merrill, Wisconsin, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix A.”18 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30,
after being signed by the Employer’s authorized repre-
sentatives, shall be posted by the Employer and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Employer to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. In the event that
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Employer
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Employer shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by it at
any time since February 25, 1994.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Employer has taken to com-
ply.
B. Respondents R. T. Blankenship & Associates and
Rayford T. Blankenship, Greenwood, Indiana, their offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, when acting as an
agent for any employer subject to the jurisdiction of the
Board, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Informing employees that a wage increase will be
delayed because the Union has filed charges against them
and/or the employer.
(b) Falsely informing employees that the Union no
longer represents a majority of unit employees and will
no longer be their collective-bargaining representative.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees about their
own or others’ protected activities and/or about whether
they have given statements to Board agents.
(d) Unlawfully withdrawing recognition from or un-
lawfully refusing to meet and bargain in good-faith with
any union which is the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of employees in an appropriate unit.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the following appro-
priate unit concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the
understanding in a signed agreement:
18 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 630

All full-time and regular part-time employees em-
ployed by the Employer at its Mathewis and Genesee
Street operations in Merrill, Wisconsin; but excluding
office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.

(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
Blankenship’s offices in Greenwood, Indiana, and at the
Employer’s Mathewis and Genesee Street operations in
Merrill, Wisconsin, copies of “Appendix B.”19 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 30, after being signed by Blankenship’s au-
thorized representatives, shall be posted by Blankenship
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Blankenship to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that during the pendency of these proceedings, the Em-
ployer has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, Blankenship shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by
the Employer at any time since February 25, 1994.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that Blankenship has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not specifically found herein.

MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring and dissenting in part.
I do not agree with the majority that the Employer’s
July 18, 1994 letter to its employees was unlawful in its
entirety. I agree that the letter was unlawful in one par-
ticular.
After learning that an employee had started circulating
a petition for decertification in June 1994, the Em-
ployer’s general manager, Dennis Glenn, sent a letter to
employees dated July 18, 1994. In that letter, he in-
formed the employees that a decertification petition was
circulating, advised employees that they could sign the
petition on nonworktime in nonwork areas, and wished
them “Good Luck.” An attachment captioned “FED UP”
informed the employees of their legal rights, and pro-
vided information about how to decertify the Union if
they wished. It also contained a sample decertification
petition.
The Employer did not instigate the circulation of the
petition. That had been done almost a month earlier by
an employee who was dissatisfied with the Union’s rep-
resentation. The Employer also did not promise, or even
imply, that it would furnish greater benefits if the em-

19 See fn. 18, above.
ployees got rid of the Union. Further, as found by the
judge, there was nothing in the letter which would tend
to cause employees to feel that they would be in peril if
they did not circulate or sign the petition.
The Board and the courts have found that statements
by employers, without promises or threats, which only
express a preference that their employees be represented
or not represented by a union, are expressions of free
speech, protected by Section 8(c) of the Act.1 These
principles apply equally to decertification campaigns, at
least where, as here, the campaign is not initiated by the
employer. In the instant case, the Employer informed the
employees of the existence of the petition, expressed its
antiunion views, and imparted information on how the
employees could rid themselves of the Union. In my
view, this amounted to no more than an expression of
free speech, protected by Section 8(c). I would thus find
that these expressions did not cause the letter to be un-
lawful.2
However, there was one aspect of the letter which was
unlawful. The Employer informed the employees that
they could circulate the decertification petition on non-
worktime in nonwork areas. At this same time, the Em-
ployer was maintaining and enforcing a rule (found un-
lawful in this case) which prohibited, among other
things, distribution of “union literature,” and “conducting
union business during working hours and/or on Company
premises.” I would find this portion of the July 18 letter
to be unlawful.3
Also, I agree with my colleagues in finding that there
is a causal nexus between several of the Employer’s un-
fair labor practices and the employees’ disaffection from
the Union. Thus, the decertification petition was tainted
and could not be used to support a good-faith doubt of
majority status. During the period when the decertifica-
tion petition was circulating,4 the Employer engaged in
several unfair labor practices as found here by the Board.
General Manager Glenn’s July 18, 1994 letter to the em-
ployees discriminatorily authorized circulation of the
petition. Further, the Employer continued to maintain an
1 Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 890 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1989);
Williams Enterprises, 301 NLRB 167, 173 (1991); Indiana Cabinet
Co., 275 NLRB 1209, 1210 (1985); Thomas Industries, 255 NLRB 646
(1981), modified 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982).
2 The cases cited by the majority in finding these expressions unlaw-
ful are not applicable. In Condon Transport, Inc., 211 NLRB 297
(1974), the Board found that the idea of decertification was conceived
by the employer who not only suggested it initially to the employees,
but also actively participated in every phase of the decertification peti-
tion process. In Fabric Warehouse, 294 NLRB 189 (1989), enfd. mem.
902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990), the Board found that members of man-
agement had made express promises to employees that they would
receive increased benefits if they decertified the union.
3 I do not agree with my colleagues’ position that one unlawful por-
tion of a letter necessarily taints the entire letter, including 8(c) expres-
sions of opinion contained therein.
4 It started circulating in June 1994. The Respondents withdrew rec-
ognition in February 1995.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 631
unlawful rule against distribution of union literature or
conducting union business on company premises. It un-
lawfully disciplined an employee union bargaining
committee member and another employee on July 20;
and it excluded union bargaining committee members
from an employer meeting and threatened them with ar-
rest while paying other employees overtime for attending
the meeting on August 15. The timing of these viola-
tions, and the nature of the violations—directly inhibiting
union activity, including bargaining—would tend to
cause employee disaffection from the Union. I therefore
find that these activities tainted the decertification peti-
tion, which circulated during this period. However, I
would not find this to be the case with the discriminatory
refusal to recall Edwards from layoff. Edwards’ verbal
confrontations with the Employer’s agent, Blankenship,
at employee meetings occurred prior to the August 1993
election. Edwards was laid off in November 1993 (not
alleged as unlawful), and his failed attempt at being re-
called was in early spring 1994 (found unlawful). There
is nothing in the judge’s decision to show that any other
employees were aware of his attempt at recall, or that it
had anything to do with the circulation of the decertifica-
tion petition. In these circumstances, and in view of the
lack of evidence that the Employer’s treatment of him
was known among employees, and could have caused
disaffection from the Union, I would not find a causal
nexus between this unfair labor practice and the petition.5
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce overly
broad rules restricting the posting and distribution of
union literature and the conduct of union business.
WE WILL NOT distribute to employees letters and mate-
rials which encourage and solicit them to decertify the
Union.
WE WILL NOT inform employees that a wage increase
will be delayed because the Union has filed charges
against us.
WE WILL NOT falsely inform employees that the Union
no longer represents a majority of unit employees and
will no longer be their collective-bargaining representa-
tive.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that we are changing from
a profit sharing plan to an ESOP without giving the Un-
ion notice and an opportunity to bargain.

5 See Matthews Readymix, Inc., 324 NLRB 1005 (1997).
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees con-
cerning their own and others’ protected activities and/or
about whether they have given statements to agents of
the Board.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily prohibit employees on
the Union’s collective-bargaining committee from at-
tending employee meetings or threaten to have them ar-
rested if they do not leave the vicinity of such meetings.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily fail to recall employees
from layoff in order to discourage support for the Union.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily issue written discipli-
nary warnings to employees in order to discourage sup-
port for the Union.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union as
the collective-bargaining representative of employees in
the appropriate unit and refuse to meet and bargain in
good-faith with the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell unit employees that we are changing
their wages and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment without giving the union notice and an opportunity
to bargain.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change unit employees’
wages and other terms and conditions of employment
without giving the union notice and an opportunity to
bargain.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer William Edwards immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from the discrimina-
tory failure to recall him since May 1994, with interest.
WE WILL make whole employees on the Union’s col-
lective-bargaining committee for any loss of earnings or
other benefits resulting from their discriminatory exclu-
sion from the August 16, 1994 employee meeting, with
interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the dis-
criminatory disciplinary warnings issued to Carol Al-
bright and Lola Wendt and WE WILL within 3 days there-
after notify them in writing that this has been done and
that the warnings will not be used against them in any
way.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, cancel the unilateral
changes in wages and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment of unit employees.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 632
the understanding in a signed agreement. The appropri-
ate unit is:

All full-time and regular part-time employees em-
ployed by the Employer at its Mathewis and Genesee
Street operation in Merrill, Wisconsin; but excluding
office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
WIRE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CORP.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT inform employees that a wage increase
will be delayed because the Union has filed charges
against us and/or the Employer.
WE WILL NOT falsely inform employees that the Union
no longer represents a majority of unit employees and
will no longer be their collective-bargaining representa-
tive.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees con-
cerning their own and others’ protected activities and/or
about whether they have given statements to agents of
the Board.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully withdraw recognition from or
unlawfully refuse to meet and bargain in good faith with
any union which is the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of employees in an appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
the understanding in a signed agreement. The appropri-
ate unit is:

All full-time and regular part-time employees em-
ployed by the Employer at its Mathewis and Genesee
Street operation in Merrill, Wisconsin; but excluding
office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
R. T. BLANKENSHIP & ASSOCIATES AND
RAYMOND T. BLANKENSHIP

Joyce Ann Seiser, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Scott Summers, Esq., of Lexington, Kentucky, and
Stephen LePage, Consultant, of Greenwood, Indiana, for the
Respondents.
Rayford Blankenship, Consultant, of Greenwood, Indiana, for
the Employer.
Daniel L. Vande Kolk, of Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD A. SCULLY, Administrative Law Judge. On
charges1 filed by District No. 200, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO (the Union) the
Acting Regional Director for Region 30, National Labor Rela-
tions Board (the Board), issued consolidated complaints2 alleg-
ing that Wire Products Manufacturing Corp. (the Employer)
and R. T. Blankenship and Associates (Blankenship) had com-
mited certain violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondents3
have filed answers denying that they have committed any viola-
tion of the Act.
A hearing was held in Merrill, Wisconsin, on July 17
through 21, 1995, at which all parties were given a full oppor-
tunity to participate, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to present other evidence and argument. Briefs submitted
on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondents have
been given due consideration.4 On the entire record and from
my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS
At all times material, the Employer was a corporation with
an office and place of business in Merrill, Wisconsin, engaged
in the manufacture and nonretail sale of wire forms and metal
strippings. During the calendar year 1994, in the conduct of its
business operations, the Employer purchased and received
goods and materials at its Merrill facility valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Wis-
consin.
At all times material, Blankenship has maintained an office
and place of business in Greenwood, Indiana, where it has en-
gaged in business as labor consultants. During the calendar
year 1994, Blankenship, in the conduct of its business opera-
tions performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for enti-
ties located outside the State of Indiana. The evidence also

1 The charge in Case 30–CA–12645 was filed on August 25, 1994;
that in Case 30–CA–12714 on November 14, 1994; a charge and
amended charge in Case 30–CA–12840 on March 22 and April 14,
1995, respectively; that in Case 30–CA–12860 on April 14, 1995; and
that in Case 30–CA–12946 on June 26, 1995.
2 The original complaint was issued on February 28, 1995. An
amended complaint was issued on April 18 and additional complaints
were issued on April 19, May 17, and July 12, 1995.
3 Throughout this decision the term “Respondents” refers to both the
Employer and Blankenship.
4 Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Respondents filed a
motion and supporting memorandum seeking to strike portions of the
General Counsel’s brief. I find this was a attempt to sumbit a reply
brief which the Board’s rules do not allow. Accordingly, I have disre-
garded these documents and the General Counsel’s response to them.
Blankenship has also moved to amend the portion of the hearing tran-
script relating to the appearance of Stephen LePage to reflect his posi-
tion as that of “Consultant.” Although the General Counsel filed an
opposition to this motion, I find there is no basis to deny it and that the
motion should be granted.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 633
establishes that, at all times material, Blankenship acted as a
labor consultant to and was an agent of the Employer and was
directly involved in the formulation and execution of its labor
relations policies. Consequently, it is subject to the Board’s
jurisdiction. Blankenship & Associates, 306 NLRB 994 fn. 2
(1992).
The Respondents admit, and I find, that at all times material
each was an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondents admit, and I find, that at all times material
the Union was a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
Following an election conducted by the Board on August 12,
1993, the Union was certified on September 20, 1993, as the
collective-bargaining representative of the the Employer’s em-
ployees in a unit consisting of

All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by
the Employer at its Mathewis and Genesee Street operations
in Merrill, Wisconsin; but excluding office clerical employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

Since October 1993, all production operations have been car-
ried on at the Mathewis Street facility and the Genesee Street
facility has been used for offices and storage. The parties
commenced contract negotiations in late November or early
December 1993 and held their last negotiating session on Feb-
ruary 3, 1995. No agreement has been reached.
B. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. The Employer’s “No-Solicitation/No-Distribution” rule
The complaint alleges that in November 1993, the Employer
promulgated and since February 25, 1994, has unlawfully en-
forced a rule which restricts the distribution of union literature
and the conduct of union business on its premises. Dennis
Glenn, who was the Employer’s general manager from October
1992 to January 1995 and has been its office manager since,
testified that on November 9, 1993, he posted a notice on all
company bulletin boards at the Mathewis Street facility where
the Employer’s notices to employees are normally posted,
which states:

Until such time as the Company has an agreement with the
IAM governing such activities, no employee may engage in
the following activities:
(1) Distribution of union literature in working areas
during working time.
(2) Posting of union literature on Company premises.
(3) Conducting union business during working hours
and/or on Company premises.
In accordance with the Company rules and Regula-
tions, each employee must leave the premises at the end of
his or her work shift.

Glenn testified that the notice was still posted as of the date of
the hearing, but that it is not in effect. However, he has never
notified the employees that it is not in effect.
The Employer contends that this complaint allegation is
barred by Section 10(b) and that the rule existed “in theory
only” because it was never enforced. It presented several em-
ployees and supervisors who testifed that they understood that
the Company has long had a policy that prohibited solicitations
during working time but that solicitations such as candy sales,
pools, and the like, are permitted and have been carried on
regularly on company premises during break and lunch periods
as well as before and after work. There was also evidence that
both pro and antiunion literature have been distributed in the
plant since the rule was posted. There was no evidence that any
employee has ever been disciplined for violating the rule.
Analysis and Conclusions
There is no dispute but that the rule in question was posted
more than 6 months prior to the Union’s first charge in this
matter which was filed on August 25, 1994. However, it is not
the promulgation of the rule that is being challenged here but its
maintainance and enforcement. If it was maintained and en-
forced during the 6-month period prior to the filing of the
charge, a finding of a violation is not time-barred. Alamo Ce-
ment Co., 277 NLRB 1031, 1037 (1985); American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126, 1127 fn. 1 (1978). There is uncon-
tradicted evidence that the rule remains posted and that the
employees have never been informed that it has been repealed
or will not be enforced. I do not credit Glenn’s testimony that
the rule has not been enforced because, in an affidavit he swore
to on March 29, 1995, he stated that the Company has enforced
this rule regarding solicitation “at all times.” His attempt to
explain why he signed the affidavit, if it was incorrect, was
unconvincing. The fact that the employees distributed literature
and carried on various types of solicitations unrelated to “un-
ion” activity on the company’s premises during nonworking
hours without interference does not establish that the rule was
not maintained or enforced. By its terms, this rule applies only
to distributing and posting “union literature” and contains a
blanket prohibition against conducting “union business” on the
company’s premises. It does not purport to restrict candy sales,
football pools or other similar activities. Nor does the fact that
Union supporter Cliff Pfingston testified to distributing union
literature during his breaks at the plant establish that the rule
was not being enforced. There is no evidence that he was ever
observed doing so by Glenn or any other supervisor. In any
event, so long as the rule remains posted and unrepealed, its
inhibiting effect and interference with the employees’ protected
rights continues. A rule which is directed solely against union
activity is invalid on its face. Southwest Gas Corp., 283 NLRB
543, 546 (1987); C.O.W. Industries, 276 NLRB 960 (1985). I
find that by maintaining and enforcing this rule, which relates
only to union activity and prohibits the posting of union litera-
ture and conduct of union business on company premises, the
Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Solicitation of signatures for decertification petition
The complaint alleges that beginning in May 1994 the Em-
ployer permitted employees to distribute and solicit support for
a petition to decertify the Union in work areas, during work
hours and on company premises. Phyllis Duellman is an 18-
year, day-shift employee who regularly worked on a butt-
welding machine located in the welding department.She testi-
fied that in May 1994 she was dissatisfied with the lack of pro-
gress in contract negotiations and opposed to the Union con-
tinuing as the employees’ bargaining representative, believing a
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 634
“shop committee” would be more successful in obtaining an
increase in wages and benefits. Duellman began making in-
quiries about how to go about removing the Union. She tele-
phoned the Board’s Regional Office a number of times, got a
book about labor relations from the library and addressed cer-
tain written questions to Glenn which he answered. She drafted
a decertification petition on a yellow legal pad and on June 20,
1994, began soliciting employees to sign the petition at the
plant. She obtained several signatures and left the petition with
a night-shift employee to seek signatures on that shift. After
continuing to get signatures at the plant during July and August,
she mailed to employees’ homes slips of paper on which they
could indicate their desire to decertify the Union, some of
which were returned to her by mail or in person at work. Dur-
ing workdays, she had a red folder by her machine in which she
kept the original petition sheet and additional pages to which
she attached the signed slips of paper she received. She dis-
tributed some of these slips at the plant and let it be known that
there were additional slips in the folder that employees could
take. After work on February 20, 1995, she showed the petition
to Glenn and asked him to help her with the decertification
petition form she had obtained from the Board as she was un-
sure of the Union’s address and the date it had been certified.
Glenn filled in the information called for on the NLRB petition
form and returned it to her. He also made a copy of the four
pages of names she showed him. On March 6, 1995, she ob-
tained several more signatures on her petition because she knew
that some new employees had been hired and she wanted to be
sure that she had a majority. She copied the information from
the form that Glenn had filled out onto another petition form
and sent it to the Board. Duellman testifed that all of her solici-
tations for her petition at the plant were done before or after
work, during lunch, or during break periods, some of which
were taken at her machine. She said that she regularly took
unscheduled smoking breaks in the restroom and that some of
the signed slips were given out or returned to her while she was
on such breaks, but not by prearrangement. She said she re-
ceived no assistance in copying or mailing her petitions to em-
ployees and no financial or other support from the Employer in
connection with it. The General Counsel contends that there is
evidence establishing that Duellman solicited signatures on her
petition with the knowledge and assistance of the Employer.
Analysis and Conclusions
There is no doubt but that the Employer had knowlege of
Duellman’s effort from the start. The first signature on the peti-
tion is that of Jayne Dupke, the wife of Supervisor Tim Dupke,
son of Co-owner Roger Dupke. The petition was signed on
July 18, 1994, by Randy Hill and James Dupke, both of whom
are sons of the co-owners. At a bargaining session on June 22,
1994, 2 days after Duellman began soliciting signatures, Union
Representative Daniel Vande Kolk complained to Blankenship
that she was solicititing for the petition on worktime and de-
manded that the Employer put a stop to it. John Sullivan, who
was plant manager until January 1995, admitted that he had
heard about the petition being circulated.
While the Employer had knowledge of Duellman’s petition, I
find the evidence fails to establish that it permitted her to solicit
for the petition during worktime or that it unlawfully assisted
her efforts.5 The only direct evidence that it did so was the

5 Whether or not the Employer’s letter to employees, dated July
18,1994, constituted interference with their rights is discussed below
testimony of former employee Deborah Taves. Taves said that
she had observed Duellman’s red folder being kept by her ma-
chine and her showing its contents to employees, then, taking it
into the restroom with her. Taves also testified that on August
16, 1994, the date of an employee meeting, she observed Du-
ellman openly soliciting for the petition at her work station for
the first 2 hours of the workday. According to Taves, from 6 to
8 a.m., Duellman did no work but talked with and passed out
slips of paper to employees. They were yellow slips of paper
about 2 inches long. Duellman showed a copy to Welding
Department Supervisor Gordon Marnholtz, who read it and
talked and laughed about it with Duellman and other employ-
ees. Marnholtz, she said, was present at Duellman’s work sta-
tion for at least an hour of the two while this was going on.
Taves testified that Duellman gave one of the slips to employee
Roger Leiviska who showed it to her. It was similar to that
which Duellman later mailed to employees. It indicated that
the employee no longer wanted to be represented by the Union
and had a place to fill in one’s name and the date. She said she
saw Duellman give slips to Jayne Dupke, Randy Hill, and
Sandy Merrimon. At 8 a.m., Duellman ceased this activity and
began to work.
If Taves were to be believed, it could establish that the Em-
ployer unlawfully assisted Duellman’s petition by permitting
her to solicit for it during worktime. I found nothing about her
demeanor while testifying that suggested she was not telling the
truth. However, I do not credit her testimony. Taves was a
union supporter and had served on the bargaining committee
while employed by the Respondent. She was one of the per-
sons excluded from an employee meeting held on August 16,
solely because of her position on that committee which is dis-
cussed below. She admitted that she felt she had been mis-
treated by the Employer and that she was angry about it. She
also indicated having bad feelings toward Marnholtz whom she
said had yelled at her every Thursday for the last month she
was employed there. While I do not find these factors to be
decisive, they must be considered in determining her credibil-
ity. When added to the other factors discussed herein, none of
which supports her version, I have concluded her testimony
about Duellman’s actions on the morning of August 16 cannot
be credited. It is difficult to believe that if the Employer permit-
ted Duellman to engage in such flagrant and open solicitation
for her petition, it only happened this one time and that noone
could be found to corroborate Taves’ account. Employee Bar-
bara Plautz, called as a witness by the General Counsel, testi-
fied that she was working in the welding department near Du-
ellman that morning, that she did not observe anything unusual,
and that Duellman was working by her machine most of the
time between 6 and 8 a.m. Although Taves claimed to have
observed Duellman doing nothing but talking and soliciting
signatures for her petition for nearly 2 hours, she was only able
to name four people other than Marnholtz with whom she had
such contact. Two of those to whom Duellman allegedly gave
slips of paper had already signed her petition long before.6 A
third, Merrimon, did sign one of the slips, but not until Febru-
ary 2, 1995. The evidence also indicates that Duellman was
still using the yellow legal pad sheet at the time, as the last two
signatures on that sheet are dated after August 16. The first two
6 Both had signed the first page, a yellow legal pad sheet, not one of
the slips that Duellman later used and pasted to subsequent pages of her
petition.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 635
of the slips of paper attached to the second page of the petition
are dated September 9, 1994.
What I consider most damaging to Taves’ credibility is the
failure of Leiviska to corroborate her testimony. In his deposi-
tion taken after the hearing, Leiviska testified that he had left
the Employer’s employ in September 1994 and moved to Ten-
nessee. He recalled the employee meeting that was held at the
Super 8 Motel on the same day as the alleged incident de-
scribed by Taves. When asked about that incident he testified
that on some morning, he could not say it was the same day as
the employee meeting, Duellman had offered him a piece of
paper and asked him to sign it. He refused to sign or to take the
paper which he described as a regular sized sheet. He said that
this had not occurred during worktime, that he was aware of
Duellman’s activities to get rid of the Union, but that he had
never seen her engage in such activity during worktime. He
denied that he took the sheet of paper and showed it to Taves,
whom he said he “hardly ever talked to.” When shown a copy
of Duellman’s petition, Leiviska said he believed that was the
paper Duellman had asked him to sign as he recalled that there
were other signatures on it. He said she had never tried to give
him a smaller slip of paper at the plant. I have no reason to
doubt Leiviska’s testimony. I find it likely that Taves was
aware that Leiviska had left the Merrill, Wisconsin area and
assumed that he would not be available to contradict her when
she conjured up her story. I do not credit any of her testimony
about this alleged incident and find that the is no credible evi-
dence that it occurred.7
The evidence that Duellman kept her petition in a folder by
her machine and that she sometimes passed out or received
slips for the petition at her machine or in the restroom is insuf-
ficient to establish that she was soliciting signatures during
worktime and that the Employer knew about and condoned
such activity, thereby, providing her with assistance or permis-
sion to do so. I credit Duellman’s credible testimony to the
contrary.8 Similarly, the testimony that she was sometimes
seen carrying on long conversations with or whispering to su-
pervisor Marnholtz does not establish that they were discussing
the petition or that he had assisted her. I also find that the assis-
tance Glenn gave Duellman in connection with her petition was
limited to providing her with information by answering certain
questions she had posed after independently deciding to pursue
it. This assistance was ministerial in nature, did not constitute
an attempt to induce her to collect signatures or file her peti-
tion, and did not violate Section 8(a)(1). Amer-Cal Industries,
274 NLRB 1046, 1051 (1985). I shall recommend that this
allegation be dismissed.
C. The 8(a)(3) and (1) Allegations
1. Failure to recall William Edwards
William Edwards was hired by the Employer in March 1993
and worked in the shipping department. He also worked in the
painting department 1 or 2 days a week, but doing the same

7 I do not consider the fact the the Respondent did not recall Duell-
man as a witness to testify about this incident significant as she had
previously denied ever doing any soliciting during worktime. Failing
to call her to deny this specific incident does nothing to rehabilitate
Taves’ credibility.
8 I find that the fact Duellman may have been mistaken about the ex-
act place she obtained 1 or 2 of the over 60 signatures on her petition is
insufficient to undermine her otherwise credible testimony.
type of shipping work. He was laid off on November 19, 1993,
and has never been recalled. Edwards testified that he attended
four mandatory meetings called by the Employer and con-
ducted by R.T. Blankenship during the Union’s organizing
campaign. During the first meeting when the floor was opened
for questions, Edwards attempted to ask Blankenship questions
about statements he had made concerning the Union that Ed-
wards considered untrue. After recognizing him once or twice
Blankenship began ignoring Edwards, who then began to inter-
rupt him. At the next meeting, as a part of the presentation
Blankenship showed some slides of what he described as an
example of a union contract. Edwards said that he was in the
back of the room and could not read what was on the screen.
After moving to the front of the room he challenged Blanken-
ship and said that what was being shown on the screen was not
what it was purported to be. Blankenship pointed at him and
said: “I want you to to remember this face and this name when
you decide whether you want these people working for you and
whether you want the Machinists Union in your plant.” Ed-
wards accused Blankenship of telling lies about the contract
and what was in the Union’s bylaws. At the third meeting,
Blankenship would not call on him when he asked for employ-
ees’ questions. When another slide was projected on the screen
Edwards went to the front of the room and said that what was
on the screen was not what Blankenship claimed it was. At that
point, Glenn told him he was being disruptive and ordered him
to leave the meeting. Edwards said that he refused to leave the
meeting, but he sat down and maintained a low profile from
then on. He also attended a fourth meeting held after the Union
won the election, but he did not speak out at that meeting. Ed-
wards testified that after he was laid off, in early spring 1994,
he called the plant and talked with Glenn. Edwards told him
that he was interested in returning to work and asked why he
had not been recalled. Glenn said that they liked his work and
considered him a good worker but that there was nothing avail-
able for him. Edwards said that he knew that the Employer has
been hiring new employees since his layoff. Glenn responded,
“that’s true but I can’t discuss it at this time,” and the conver-
sation ended. The complaint alleges that the Respondent un-
lawfully failed to recall Edwards because of his support for the
Union. His layoff is not alleged to be unlawful. The
Respondents contends that Edwards was not recalled because
the Employer’s policy was that “persons were recalled only to
the department from which they are laid off” and there has been
no need for another full-time employee in the shipping
department.
Analysis and Conclusions
In cases in which the employer’s motivation is in issue, its
actions must be analyzed in accordance with the test outline by
the Board in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982),
approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393 (1983). Under Wright Line, the General Counsel must
make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference
that protected conduct was a motivating factor in the em-
ployer’s decision. Once that has been done, the burden shifts to
the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same
action even in the absence of protected activity on the part of it
employees.
I find that the General Counsel has made such a prima facie
showing here. Direct evidence of unlawful motivation is diffi-
cult to obtain and is not essential. Circumstantial evidence and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 636
the inferences drawn therefrom can be relied on to establish
motivation. Abbey’s Transportation Services, 284 NLRB 701
(1987); NLRB v. Pete’s Pic-Pac Supermarkets, 707 F.2d 236,
240 (6th Cir. 1983). The Respondents’ opposition to the Un-
ion’s organizing efforts and the violations of the Act found
herein establish their union animus. Blankenship’s action at the
employee meeting during the Union’s organizing campaign in
which, after being challenged by Edwards several times for
allegedly making untrue statements about the Union he singled
out Edwards before the group, supports the inference that he
was the victim of retaliation because of his support for the Un-
ion and his actions at these meetings.
I also find that the Employer has failed to establish that Ed-
wards would not have been recalled in the absence of his Union
support. It contends that Edwards was not recalled because of a
company policy under which it can only recall an employee to
the same department from which he was laid off and since
noone has been recalled or hired into the shipping department
on a full-time basis since Edwards’ layoff, it has not discrimi-
nated against him. It also argues that Edwards was not the only
vocal supporter of the Union during the organizing campaign
and the fact that other supporters were not similarly treated
shows that he was not a victim of discrimination. Finally, it
contends that because Edwards promptly secured new and bet-
ter employment following his layoff, he could not have really
wanted to be recalled.
The fact that the Employer has not been shown to have taken
similar retaliatory actions against other prominent union sup-
porters does not establish that Edwards was not the victim of
discriminatory treatment. “It is well established that a dis-
criminatory motive, otherwise established, is not disproved by
an employer’s proof that it did not weed out all union adher-
ents.” Nachman Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir.
1964). This particularly true here where Blankenship foreshad-
owed and highlighted the discriminatory treatment of Edwards
at a mandatory meeting for all employees when he told them to
remember Edwards’ name and his face. The fact that Edwards
found new employment shortly after being laid off by the Em-
ployer has no bearing on whether its failure to recall him was
unlawful. There is no evidence that it was aware of his em-
ployment status or that it was a consideration in its determina-
tion not to recall him. Similarly, there is no evidence to support
the assertion in its brief that Edwards’ new job was more desir-
able than his job with it which it describes as “inferior-
conditioned” and “physically demanding.” Although Edwards
testified that his new job paid more, I find no reason to doubt
his testimony that he liked his old job with the Employer, as
well as the people he worked with, and found it very conven-
ient.
I find that the evidence fails to establish that the Employer
had a policy which precluded Edwards from being recalled to
any position other than one in the shipping department. The
was no evidence that such a policy ever existed in written form.
In its brief, the Employer contends that cited testimony of su-
pervisors Glenn, Tim Dupke and Marnholtz establishes that
there was such a policy. I do not agree. It does not appear that
Marnholtz gave any testimony about this subject. Glenn testi-
fied only that after the layoff in late 1993, there were employ-
ees who were recalled to the same departments from which
they were laid off. Tim Dupke said that the policy on layoffs
was the least qualified were laid off first. When asked about
the policy for recalls, he said: “When there is jobs to be done,
they recall them. I mean—I don’t know.” Although the Em-
ployer offered the testimony of numerous employees, some
with as much as 26 years of service in its employ, not one of
them testified to knowledge of there ever being such a policy in
effect. Their testimony established only that some of them had
been laid off at some time during their employment or that they
knew of someone else who had and that they were usually
called back to their previous jobs. John Sullivan, who had been
the plant manager for 21 years, was called as a witness by the
Respondents. He testified that when a layoff occurred he and
his supervisors determined who would be laid off based on
their “opinions” of the employees. He further testified:

Q. (By Mr. Blankenship) Does the company use any
kind of formal system to layoff and recall employees at
Wire Products?
A. Normally, we recall them on the basis of the latest
layoff coming back first.
Q. Okay.
A. In reverse order of the layoffs.
Q. Does that, regarding layoffs, pertain to department,
or plant-wide?
A. Plant-wide.
Q. When a person from the welding department, is he
called back to the welding department when there is a re-
call?
A. Normally.
Q. Is he recalled to a different department?
A. He could be, if we needed help in another depart-
ment, and we didn’t have it there.

I find that this evidence does not establish that the Employer
had a policy that precluded Edwards from being recalled to any
department but the one from which he had been laid off. On
the contrary, the credited testimony of Sullivan was that an
employee on layoff could be recalled to any department in
which there was an opening. There also was evidence that this
is what the Employer did subsequent to Edwards’ layoff. Rob-
ert Bacon was originally hired by the Employer on April 29,
1993, about a month after Edwards. He began working in the
press department but was transferred to the shipping de-
partment. He had not worked there before and was trained by
Edwards. During the last 2 weeks before he was laid off in late
1993, Bacon worked on the paint line. In June 1994, Bacon
was recalled by Sullivan and put to work in the welding de-
partment. He had never worked there before, had no experi-
ence doing welding and had to be trained to do the work. Sul-
livan’s testimony that he felt Bacon had the strength to handle
some heavy welding jobs may explain why Bacon was recalled
to a different department but it does not explain why Edwards
was not.9 There was evidence that numerous new employees
have been hired since early 1994 into the welding and press
departments and on the second shift, but none that any laid-off

9 Sullivan stated that the reason Bacon was offered this job instead
of Edwards was that, under its reverse order of recall policy, Bacon was
laid off later and entitled to be recalled first. While the record does not
disclose in what order they were laid off, it does not matter. Sullivan’s
testimony shows there was no policy that prevented the Employer from
recalling Edwards to an open position outside the shipping department.
The Employer offered evidence, in connection with another issue, that
former employee Edwin Hermanson who was laid off because his
position as a truckdriver was eliminated was offered a different position
in the factory.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 637
employee other than Edwards has not been recalled. With the
exception of Sullivan’s testimony that Bacon’s strength was a
factor in his being recalled to the welding department, there
was no evidence that any of those recalled or newly hired after
Edwards’ layoff, possessed any special training or skill that he
did not.10 Finally, I find Glenn’s statement to Edwards in early
1994, that he was a good worker but there was nothing avail-
able for him and that he could not discuss with him why new
workers were being hired while Edwards remained on layoff,
creates an inference that Edwards was being treated differently
than other employees because of his openly demonstrated sup-
port for the Union, an inference which has not been rebutted.
I find that the Employer has not borne the burden imposed
by Wright Line, supa, of demonstrating that it would have taken
the same action in not recalling Edwards to an open position of
employment since May 1994, in the absence of his support for
the Union. Accordingly, I find that its failure to recall him was
a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. Issuance of Warnings to Carol Albright and Lola Wendt
On July 20, 1994, second-shift employees Carol Albright
and Lola Wendt were issued written disciplinary warnings.
The complaint alleges that these warnings were issued because
Albright’s support for the Union and to discourage such sup-
port. The Employer contends that the warnings were properly
issued to the employees who were observed talking for an ex-
cessive length of time and that the allegation is barred by Sec-
tion 10(b). The charge in Case 30–CA–12714 specifically
refers to this incident and was filed by the Union on November
14, 1994, within 6 months. This allegation is not time-barred.
Albright was a member of the union bargaining committee
and had attended one negotiating session prior to the date that
these warnings were issued. The credible testimony of Al-
bright, Wendt, and Pat Heckendorf was that on the night of July
20, Albright and Wendt were standing and talking to Hecken-
dorf at the latter’s machine. A material handler brought over
some parts which he threw on a table. The parts fell on the
floor and Albright and Wendt assisted Heckendorf in picking
them up and continued their conversation while doing so. Al-
bright and Wendt estimated that their conversation lasted 5 to
10 minutes. Heckendorf estimated it lasted 10 to 15 minutes.
Some time later, Second-Shift Supervisor Tim Dupke came to
Albright and told her he was going to write her up for talking.
He gave her warning form to sign and told her if she did any-
thing else she would pay the consequences. The warning was
on a printed form in which the reason for its issuance is written
in longhand and states that it is being issued for not working at
her machine, walking, moving around and talking too much.
Wendt was given a similarly worded warning but it was not on
a printed form and was entirely handwritten. She was told if it
happened again, she was done.
Analysis and Conclusions
The evidence establishes that it was not uncommon for em-
ployees to engage in conversations while they were supposed to
be working and that this occurred regularly on the second shift
that Dupke supervised. It also establishes that Dupke rarely, if
ever, disciplined anyone for doing so or even spoke to employ-

10 In addition to Bacon, at least one other welding department em-
ployee, Stacey Chartier, testified that she had no welding experience
when she was hired by the Employer and was trained by it while on the
job.
ees about it. According to the credible testimony of Hecken-
dorf, it was unnecessary, as Dupke had told her when she began
working that if he went by and she was talking, he would not
say anything but if he came by again and she was still talking,
he would say something. She said that his walking by was a
signal to get back to work. Numerous employees testified that
they had carried on conversations while they were supposed to
be working without discipline but almost all agreed that talking
for 10 to 15 minutes would not be allowed. Based on this, I
find that the warnings are not obviously pretextual and that the
Employer’s reasons for issuing them must be analyzed accord-
ing to the standards of Wright Line, supra.
I find that the General Counsel has made out a prima facie
case under Wright Line. As discussed above, the Employer has
demonstrated its animus toward the Union and its supporters.
Albright’s status as member of the bargaining committee iden-
tified her as a union supporter and the committee members
were singled out for other acts of discrimination, as is discussed
below. This places the burden on the Employer to establish
that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of
protected activity on Albright’s part.
The Employer relies on the testimony of Dupke, the supervi-
sor who issued the warnings. Dupke testifed that, on the night
of the warnings, he was told by other employees that they were
mad because Albright and Wendt were standing around talking.
He went over to see if this was true. He saw them talking and
timed them for 15 minutes by his watch. He issued the warn-
ings to tell them that such conduct would not be tolerated. If
believed, Dupke’s testimony would probably carry the Respon-
dent’s burden on this issue. After observing his hesitant de-
meanor and hearing his testimony, I found him to be com-
pletely unworthy of belief.
To begin with, Dupke said that at least two and possibly
more employees compained about Albright and Wendt’s con-
versation, however, he could not identify any of them. Second,
Heckendorf, who is still in the Respondent’s employ and ap-
peared as one of its witnesses, testified that the entire conversa-
tion lasted only 10 to 15 minutes. Given the evidence that con-
versations of up to a few minutes were commonplace, it must
be assumed that this conversation had to have already been one
of excessive length before it would have been brought to
Dupke’s attention and his testimony indicates that is what he
was told. According to Dupke, he then observed and timed it
for at least another 15 minutes. Although he claimed to have
observed a conversation that, at a minimum, must have gone on
for 20 to 30 minutes, he did nothing to interrupt or terminate it,
notwithstanding the fact that he described his duties as includ-
ing, making sure that “people do their work.” When asked
what he did when he observed employees standing around talk-
ing, he first denied ever approaching them, but then acknowl-
edged that he would walk up to them as a signal to get back to
work. In this case, he did nothing. Finally, Dupke testified that
he did not hear any of the conversation in issue, that he did not
see any materials being delivered and that he did not see them
being picked up off the floor. He also did not ask either Al-
bright or Wendt what they were talking about. He offered no
explanation for why only those two were disciplined while
Heckendorf, who was admittedly a part of the entire conversa-
tion, was not. Since he did not hear any of the conversation or
ask what it involved, he had no way of knowing whether
Heckendorf might be even more culpable as the instigator as
well as a participant in the conversation. I am convinced that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 638
Dupke never saw the conversation and that his testimony about
what he did and observed was untrue.11 Where the stated rea-
son for an action is false, another may be inferred from the
surrounding facts. Shattuck Denn Minung Corp. v. NLRB, 362
F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966). It appears that Dupke was told
about a lengthy conversation involving Albright, a known un-
ion supporter, and seized on the opportunity to take disciplinary
action against her. It also appears that he failed to learn all the
details concerning the incident and was unaware of Hecken-
dorf’s involvement.
Several other factors indicate the warning to Albright was
unlawfully motivated. There is no evidence that either Albright
or Wendt had ever been the subject of disciplinary action be-
fore this incident. Glenn, who was Dupke’s superior at the
time, testified that although the Employer did not have a pro-
gressive disciplinary policy in effect that would have required a
verbal warning before a written warning, he encouraged all
foremen and supervisors to speak to their employees first
whenever they felt there was a problem or a deficiency and, if it
continued, to document it in some fashion. Here, Dupke began
with a written warning and indicated if there was another viola-
tion they would be discharged. Dupke admitted that the warn-
ing form that he issued to Albright was filled out by someone
other than himself before the incident even took place and that
he simply filled in Albright’s name and clock number and
signed it and had it copied over for Wendt. He had no explana-
tion as to how or why it happened to be in his desk when he
found it necessary to discipline Albright. I find there is no
credible evidence to overcome the inference that Albright was
given a disciplinary warning because of her support for the
Union and in order to undermine that support in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1). I find that the warning to Wendt was
the result of the Respondent’s attempt retaliate against Albright
and was also unlawful.
3. Exclusion of bargaining committee members from
employee meeting
On August 15, 1994, the Employer posted a notice at the
plant announcing an informational meeting to be held on the
following day at the Super 8 Motel “to discuss what the IAM
has agreed to in negotiations.” The notice stated that employ-
ees who wished to attend “and are not on the bargaining com-
mittee” could leave work at 3:15 p.m. and would be paid for
their time while attending. Employees who chose not to attend
the meeting could remain at work or punch out and leave the
premises. The complaint alleges that the Employer violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to permit mem-
bers of the union bargaining committee to attend this meeting,
by refusing to pay them for their time, and by threatening with
arrest two of them who showed up at the Super 8 Motel and
attempted to attend the meeting. The Employer contends that it
had a right to exclude union committee members from the
meeting and that they had no need to be there since the purpose
of the meeting was to discuss what had been agreed to during
bargaining sessions that they had attended.
Carol Albright testified that when she saw the notice about
the meeting she asked Tim Dupke why she could not attend.
Dupke said he had no idea and told her to speak to Sullivan.

11 Although Dupke claims he stood for 15 minutes in a position
where he could have been seen by them, each of the three women in-
volved in the conversation credibly testified that she did not see him
nearby.
When she asked Sullivan if she and fellow committee member
Marilyn Beck could attend, he said they could not. She also
asked if she and Beck could come in to work early that day and
he said they could not and had to work their regular hours. The
evidence shows that other second-shift employees, who did
attend the meeting, were paid for an additional hour and 15
minutes of work that day at overtime rates.
Employee William Wegner testified that he attended the
meeting at which Blankenship discussed certain provisions of
the contract. He was asked why he would not let “the Union
guys” in. He responded, “I thought it would be disruptive. We
paid for this and it’s our meeting.” Employee Iris Schuelke,
who attended the meeting, testified that she observed Glenn go
to the door of the meeting room and tell some committee mem-
bers that they could not come in but she did not see who they
were.
Clifford Pfingsten testified that he was a member of the Un-
ion’s bargaining committee. When he saw the notice about the
meeting, he asked his supervisor Don Keeser why he could not
attend since he was an employee of the company. Keeser said
only that bargaining committee members could not attend and
that he could either stay at the plant and work or go home. On
the following afternoon, he left the plant and went to the Super
8 Motel where he met committee member Deborah Taves who
told him she was going to try to get in to the meeting. Taves
came out about 5 minutes later and said that they would not let
her in. Pfingsten entered the front door and followed some
other employees to the conference room where the meeting was
to be held. Outside the door, he encountered Glenn who asked
him what he was doing there. Pfingsten said that he wanted to
go into the meeting and Glenn said that he was not allowed.
After going back outside, Pfingsten, Taves, and Union Repre-
sentative James Cveykus, who had arrived at the motel, went
back inside and sat down in a lounge area. He said that
Cveykus jokingly asked Glenn if he could go into the meeting
and was told he could not. Blankenship came out of the con-
ference room and told them they were disrupting the meeting
and if they did not leave he was going to call the police and
have them arrested.12 Blankenship told Cveykus that he could
not be in the lounge area unless he had a room at the motel and
Cveykus responded that he was going to rent one. Blankenship
went to a phone at the front desk and called the police. Five
minutes later the police arrived and were told by Blankenship
that the three of them were disrupting the meeting and were not
wanted there. The policemen came over to them and said that
they had to leave the area where they were sitting or they would
be arrested, but they could sit in a waiting area by the front
door. They moved to the waiting area and later went outside
the building and waited until the meeting ended. As the em-
ployees were leaving, he talked with several about his not being
allowed to attend the meeting. Taves’ testimony generally
coroborrated that of Pfingsten as to what occurred at the motel
although she recalled only Blankenship and not the policemen
using the word “arrest” during the incident.13
12 I find the fact that an affidavit Pfingsten gave to the Board in Feb-
ruary 1995 did not mention this incident does not undermine his credi-
bilty. His testimony was credible, uncontradicted, and corroborated.
13 Although, as indicated above, I do not credit Taves’ testimony
about what occurred in the welding department that morning, I credit
her uncontradicted testimony as to what happened at the motel.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 639
Analysis and Conclusions
The Employer’s reliance on Board decisions it claims
authorized it to exclude employees who were members of the
Union’s bargaining committee from this employee meeting is
misplaced. Northwest Engineering Co., 265 NLRB 190 (1982),
involved an issue of employees’ rights under the Supreme
Court’s decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,14 where their
request for union representation at a meeting to review work
rules had been denied. Here, the Union’s bargaining committee
members were barred from attending an informational meeting
open to all other employees. Daniel Construction Co., 266
NLRB 1090 (1983), is one of a line of cases in which the Board
has held that an employer can lawfully limit attendance at anti-
union meetings held on working time during an organizing
campaign to employees who do not support the union. Here, the
meeting was not held during an election campaign and did not
purport to be one in which the Employer sought to express to
employees its opposition to unionization while excluding those
who had already made up their minds and presumably would
not be swayed by its arguments. The Union had already been
chosen as the collective-bargaining representative of the Re-
spondent’s employee by a majority vote and was engaged in
negotiating for a contract. The ostensible purpose of the meet-
ing was to explain the status of those negotiations. The cited
cases are not controlling here.
None of the reasons cited by the Employer serve to justify its
exclusion of the bargaining committee members from the meet-
ing. Although in its posttrial brief it claims that it feared dis-
ruption based on its experience at the meetings Blankenship
conducted during the election campaign, there was no evidence
that it ever found it necessary to exclude anyone from any of
those meetings. Moreover, there was no evidence that all
members of the bargaining committee were involved in disrup-
tive conduct that would justify their blanket exclusion. Also, in
testifying about why they were excluded, Glenn failed to men-
tion fear of disruption as a reason. He testified that he felt the
committee members already knew what had occurred during
the bargaining sessions and he wanted them to stay at the plant
to “keep some sort of production going.” This is questionable
given the fact that first-shift employees who did not attend were
given the option of leaving work when the meeting began and
second-shift employee Albright’s uncontradicted testmony that
she was told she and another committee member could not
come into work early that day but had to keep to their regular
hours.
An employer violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it treats employees in a disparate manner with respect to
their terms and conditions of employment solely because of
they have publicly committed themselves in favor of or against
union representation and/or when such treatment serves to en-
courage or discourage their engaging in union activities. Wim-
pey Minerals USA, Inc., 316 NLRB 803, 805 (1995). By per-
mitting first-shift employees to attend the meeting during their
normal working hours and second-shift employees to attend
and be paid for additional hours at overtime rates while em-
ployees on the Union’s bargaining committee could not, it con-
ferred benefits on the former two categories which were denied
to the latter. The sole basis for the difference in treatment was
that those in the latter category had engaged in activities in
support of the Union. Such treatment is inherently destructive

14 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
of employees’ rights since it distinguishes among workers on
the basis of their participation in a particular concerted activity.
Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 748 (7th Cir. 1989). I
find that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by discriminatorily prohibiting bargaining committee
members from attending this meeting. Wimpey Minerals USA,
Inc., supra; Delchamps, Inc., 244 NLRB 366, 367 (1979).
I also find that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act when Blankenship threatened employees Pfingsten and
Taves with arrest when they appeared at the motel where the
meeting was being held. As representatives of all employees in
the bargaining unit, they had a right to know what the Em-
ployer told the employees about the negotiations and a right to
communicate with them about what they had been told once the
meeting ended. There is no evidence that, after being denied
admittance to the meeting from which they had been unlawfully
excluded, they did anything disruptive or unlawful. They sim-
ply sat in the lounge area of the motel, away from the confer-
ence room in which the meeting was being held, waiting for the
meeting to end. Having chosen to hold its meeting in a motel, a
facility open to the public, in the absence of any interference or
disruption on their part, the Respondents had no right to order
these employees out or threaten them with arrest if they did not
leave. Their doing so was coercive and unlawful. See Union
Child Day Care Center, 304 NLRB 517, 525 (1991).15
D. The 8(a)(5) and (1) Allegations
1. Alleged misrepresentations concerning the Union’s
bargaining positions
In June 1994, during the contract negotiations between the
parties, the Union proposed an interim wage increase for all
bargaining unit employees based on years of service with the
company. In response, Blankenship informed Union Negotia-
tor Vande Kolk that the Employer would not agree to such an
increase but wanted to grant a merit increase to those employ-
ees it felt should receive one. Vande Kolk told Blankenship to
put the proposal in writing and he would consider it, but no
proposal was forthcoming. However, by letter dated July 6,
1994, to Vande Kolk, Blankenship stated that the Employer
was opposed to a general increase and while it felt some em-
ployees merited a raise it did not want to risk having unfair
labor practice charges filed by the Union or a “disgruntled em-
ployee.” It further stated that the Employer was unwilling to
risk the costs of litigation merit raises to some but not all em-
ployees might engender. On July 8, the union bargaining
committee distributed a flyer to the employees in which it in-
formed them about the discussions concerning a wage increase
and stated that it had not received a written proposal concerning
merit increases that had been requested. The Employer re-
sponded by mailing to employees a notice dated July 14, 1994.
The complaint alleges that this notice was unlawful in that it
misrepresented the Union’s position during negotiations and
falsely represented that the employees’ wages had been frozen
due to the Union’s intransigence.
The complaint also alleges that Blankenship misrepresented
the Union’s bargaining position concerning jury duty pay by
telling employees at the meeting held on August 16, 1994, that
the Employer had proposed payment for jury duty and that the
15 Although the Respondents contend that these allegations are time-
barred, they were the subjects of a charge filed on August 26, 1994,
well within 6 months of the incidents.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 640
Union had rejected its proposal. Employee Iris Schuelke testi-
fied that at the meeting which was held to let employees know
how the negotiations were going, during a discussion concern-
ing various kinds leaves of absence from work, she asked
Blankenship about leave for jury duty. She said that he re-
sponded that “it had been brought up, but it wasn’t really that
important.” When asked what he said about the Union’s posi-
tion regarding jury duty, she said: “He said they had brought it
up but they didn’t feel it was important.” She encountered
Pfingsten outside after the meeting and asked him about the
jury duty proposal. Pfingsten told her that the Union did con-
sider it important and that Blankenship had lied to her.
Analysis and Conclusions
I shall recommend that both of these complaint allegations
be dismissed. Unlike the cases cited by the General Counsel,16
this does not involve an expected wage increase which an em-
ployer has withheld during an election campaign and for which
it has blamed the Union or the employees’ union activity for
not being implemented. The law requires that an employer
“grant or withhold benefits during a period of employee union
activities in the same manner as it would in the absence of
those activities.” Medical Center at Bowling Green, 268
NLRB 985 (1984); Singer Co., 199 NLRB 1195 (1972). Here,
there was no planned or expected increase in the offing, but
only a suggestion by the Union that the Employer should make
a counterproposal concerning such an increase. The July 14
letter to employees was a response to the Union’s July 8 flyer
which sought to put the onus on the Employer for not granting
an across-the-board interim wage increase, as it had proposed,
or submitting a proposal for merit increases. When read in
context, the letter explains the Employer’s position on a wage
increase and the reasoning behind it and does not imply that the
employees’ support for the Union has caused it to forego grant-
ing an increase.
The evidence concerning what Blankenship said at the Au-
gust 16 meeting does not establish the complaint allegation that
he told employees that the Employer had proposed paid leave
for jury duty and the Union had rejected it. Counsel for the
General Counsel contends that he did tell the employees that
the Union felt that jury duty pay was “not important” and that
this unlawfully misrepresented its position on the issue. Even if
the complaint allegation were interpreted to encompass this, I
would find that a violation has not been established.
Schuelke’s testimony about this incident does not appear to be
a verbatim account of what Blankenship said and is ambiguous
in that it implies that he said that both parties felt that it was not
an important issue. I find that the evidence does not establish
that Blankenship said that the issue was not important to the
Union or that his comments amounted to a misrepresentation of
the Union’s bargaining position.
2. Glenn’s letter of July 18, 1994
After learning of Duellman’s attempt to gather signatures to
decertify the Union, the Employer sent a letter signed by Glenn,
dated July 18, 1994, to all unit employees except those on the
Union’s bargaining committee. In the letter, Glenn advised the
employees, inter alia, that he was aware that a decertification
petition effort was underway, that management and supervisors
cannot get involved in that effort, but can answer questions and

16 Wellstream Corp., 313 NLRB 698 (1994), and Centre Engineer-
ing, 253 NLRB 419 (1980).
refer them to authorities who can assist them. He went on to
advise them that they could not engage in such efforts during
working time but could do so in nonproduction areas during
breaks and before and after work. The letter refers employees
to an enclosure that purports to explain their rights and answer
their questions, and provides the address of the Board’s office
in Milwaukee. The letter concludes by wishing the employees
“Good Luck” in their efforts to decertify the Union. The com-
plaint alleges that this letter and the enclosure constituted
unlawful assistance to the decertification effort.
Analysis and Conclusions
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by actively soliciting,
encouraging, promoting, or providing assistance in the initia-
tion, signing, or filing of an employee petition seeking to decer-
tify a bargaining representative. E.g., Central Washington
Hospital, 279 NLRB 60, 64 (1986); Placke Toyota, Inc., 215
NLRB 395 (1974). However, it will not be considered to have
violated the Act where it merely answers questions of employ-
ees who have already decided to pursue a decertification effort
and/or provides assistance that is strictly ministerial in nature.
Amer-Cal Industries, supra. The question to be decided here is
whether the Employer’s sending this letter and enclosed infor-
mation was coercive. Glenn’s letter did not request that the
employees start a decertifcation petition and there is no evi-
dence that after it was sent he attempted to follow up on the
progress of such a petition. Notwithstanding the fact that his
wishing them luck in their efforts might indicate that the Em-
ployer favored such action, I find it unlikely that any employee
who received the letter would tend to feel peril if they did not
circulate or sign such a petition; accordingly, I find that it was
not coercive and shall recommend that this allegation be dis-
missed. Williams Enterprises, 301 NLRB 167, 173 (1991);
Indiana Cabinet Co., 275 NLRB 1209, 1210 (1985).
3. Alleged statement by Gordon Marnholtz
Employee Dennis Zuelke testifed that he has been employed
in the welding department for about 2 years. On February 7,
1995,17 he was given a written warning by his supervisor,
Gordon Marnholtz, which states that it is for missing too much
work and coming in late “all the time.” Zuelke testified that
Marnholtz came to his welding booth and yelled at him for not
getting to work on time. When he responded that he had to
work two jobs to make ends meet, Marnholtz said “something
about ‘get the Union out of here and you wouldn’t have this
problem.’” Marnholtz testified that he had spoken to Zuelke
several times about his attendance problems before issuing him
a written warning on February 7. When he gave Zuelke the
warning slip, he signed it but did not say anything about it.
Zuelke did ask him if he was going to get a birthday check, a
reference to a bonus given to employees who have been em-
ployed for 2 years. Marnholtz said that he did not know and
would have to check with the office to find out. At some point,
Zuelke commented that if he did not have to work two jobs he
could get to work on time. Marnholtz testified that he re-
sponded, “if the Union and the Company were to get together
and settle, they might have a merit increase.” Nothing more
was said and Zuelke went back to work. The complaint alleges
that Marnholtz’ statement to Zuelke was an unlawful promise
of a wage increase if the employees got rid of the Union.
17 Hereinafter, all dates are in 1995.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 641
Analysis and Conclusions
Having viewed their demeanor while testifying, while I did
not find Marnholtz to be a particularly credible witness,18
Zuelke was even less believable. Zuelke appeared extremely
uncomfortable throughout his testimony, hardly speaking above
a whisper both on direct and cross-examination. On cross-
examination, he was often hostile and unresponsive. I find his
unimpressive demeanor offset any enhanced credibility to
which the testimony of a current employee testifying adversely
to his employer might normally be entitled. Beyond that, even
if taken at face value, his testimony does not establish that
Marnholtz stated that the employees would receive a wage
increase if they got rid of the Union. Rather than purporting to
state what Marnholtz actually said, he couched his testimony in
terms of it being “something like” what he said. This suggests
that he did not remember exactly what was said. That this was
a deliberate hedge and not simply a manner of speaking is ap-
parent from the fact that, when he gave an affidavit to a Board
agent in March 1995, he was just as indefinite. In the affidavit
he said that, in response to his saying that he had to work two
jobs because he wasn’t making enough money, “Gordy said
‘well, get the union out of here’ or something like that.’” I find
that his testimony does not establish what Marnholtz actually
said and cannot serve as the basis for finding a violation. I
shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
4. Withdrawal of recognition
By the end of the bargaining sessions held on February 2 and
3, the contract negotiations between the parties had reached a
point where there was tentative agreement on many issues and
their differences on those remaining open had narrowed signifi-
cantly. Representatives of both sides testified that they felt an
agreement could be reached. The next negotiating sessions
were to be held on February 27 and 28. On the afternoon of
February 20, Duellman presented her decertification petition to
Glenn in his office and requested his assistance in filing it with
the Board. Glenn kept a photocopy of the petition and sent a
copy to Blankenship’s office by fax transmission along with a
copy of a payroll list he had run showing the names of all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit as of that date. By letter dated
February 24, Blankenship informed the Union that the Em-
ployer had been served with “a petitition indicating the union
has lost its majority status” as the bargaining representative of
its employees and that it was canceling the negotiating sessions
scheduled for February 27 and 28. On February 28, the Em-
ployer posted a notice to employees on bulletin boards at the
plant stating that it would no longer bargain with the Union
because it no longer represented a majority of its employees.
By letter dated March 7, Blankenship informed the Union that
the Employer had received a decertification petition supported
by a majority of the bargaining unit employees and that “based
on objective considerations and upon a good faith doubt as to
the IAM’s continuing majority status we must respectfully
decline any future collective bargaining negotiations.” There
have been no further negotiations between the parties.
The petition that Duellman showed Glenn on the afternoon
of February 20 contained 57 signatures. The payroll list which

18 I find it very unlikely that after just having delivered a written
warning for tardiness and poor attendance (following at least five ver-
bal reprimands based on the same reasons), Marnholtz would suggest to
Zuelke the possibility of his receiving a merit wage increase.
Glenn had run shows there were 92 employees in the unit on
that date. Glenn testified that he compared the names on the
list with those on Duellman’s petition on February 20 and was
aware that there were signatures on the petition of employees
who were no longer employed in the unit on that date. The
evidence shows that the petition contains the names of 11 indi-
viduals who were no longer employed in the bargaining unit on
February 20.19 In addition, both the petition and the payroll list
contain the names of James Dupke and Randy Hill. Both are
sons of owners of the Company and the Respondent apparently
agrees that they are not members of the bargaining unit.
The Employer contends that three persons on the payroll lists
in evidence, Joyce Doering, Dorothy Williams, and Edwin
Hermanson, should not be considered part of the unit. Office
Supervisor Adele Huber testifed that Doering and Williams
were off work due to job-related injuries and were not expected
to return. She said they remained on the payroll because the
workers’ compensation carrier said that they should. Huber
testified that Hermanson was laid off in December 1993 be-
cause his position as a truckdriver had been eliminated. She
said that he was offered another position in the factory to keep
him on the payroll but he had refused it and that his name re-
mained on the payroll list only because it had never been coded
as “terminated.” Although uncontradicted, I find Huber’s tes-
timony insufficient to establish that Doering and Williams were
no longer employees in the bargaining unit on and after Febru-
ary 20. The payroll lists in evidence show that neither had ever
been terminated or resigned. Huber’s testimony as to the
physical conditions of these employees and likelihood of their
return to work was pure hearsay and totally lacking factual
foundation or specific detail. I do not credit it. In any event, in
the absence of an affirmative showing that either was dis-
charged or had resigned, their status as employees continues.
E.g., Atlanta Dairies Cooperative, 283 NLRB 327 (1987); Red
Arrow Freight Lines, 278 NLRB 965 (1986). As for Herman-
son, Huber’s credible testimony establishes that he had been
laid off over a year prior to February 1995, when his job as a
truckdriver was eliminated, and that he was offered and had
declined other employment in the factory. I find that there is no
evidence that Hermanson had any reasonable expectation of
recall to work as a member of the bargaining unit on or after
February 20 and that he should not be considered a member of
the unit for purposes of determining whether a majority of the
employees in the unit had signed the decertification petition.
See Apex Paper Box Co., 302 NLRB 67 (1991).
Consequently, on February 20 there were 89 members of the
bargaining unit and the petition contained the names of 44 of
them.20 By February 24, the date of Blankenship’s letter can-
19 Vicki Eternicka, Theresa Carstenson, Dale Falcon, David Sche-
mehorn, Michelle Schoone, Greg Loos, Melissa Swader, Nadine We-
ber, Nikki Zahn, and Norma Zortman had been terminated and Betty
Lange was no longer a member of the bargaining unit because of a
change in the nature of her duties.
20 The number of unit employees (89) is reached by subtracting the
names of Hill, James Dupke, and Hermanson from the 92 on the payroll
list. The number of effective signatures on the petition (44) is reached
by subtracting Hill, James Dupke, and the 11 persons no longer em-
ployed in the unit as of February 20 from the 57 signatures on the peti-
tion. The General Counsel does not dispute the inclusion of Jayne
Dupke, wife of Tim Dupke who is a supervisor and son of an owner, on
the petition or in the bargaining unit for purposes of determining what
constitutes a majority, but contends there are 56 signatures on the peti-
tion, not 57. In their brief, the Respondents contend that, as of Febru-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 642
celing the bargaining sessions scheduled for February 27 and
28, three new employees had been hired and Larry Shotz,
whose name was on the petition, had been terminated. On that
date, there were 91 employees in the bargaining unit and 43 had
signed the petition. By February 28, when Glenn informed the
employees that the Employer had withdrawn recognition from
the Union, two more employees had been hired. On that date
there were 93 employees, 43 of whom had signed the petition.
On March 6, Duellman gave Glenn another sheet of her petition
with six additional signatures on it, all of which were obtained
on that date. A payroll list shows that on March 6 there were
97 employees in the unit and that 49 of those employees had
signed the petition. The complaint alleges that the Employer’s
withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain with the Union
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Respondents
contend that, on March 7, the Employer lawfully withdrew
recognition based on objective considerations and a good-faith
doubt as to the Union’s majority status.
Analysis and Conclusions
The law is clear that a certified union enjoys a rebuttable
presumption that its majority status continues after the expira-
tion of the first year following its certification. The employer
remains obligated to bargain with that union unless it can rebut
that presumption by establishing (1) that on the date recognition
was withdrawn the union did not in fact enjoy majority status,
or (2) that its withdrawal of regognition was predicated on an
objectively based good-faith doubt as to the union’s majority
status. E.g., Suzy Curtains, Inc., 309 NLRB 1287, 1288 (1992);
Hollaender Mfg. Co., 299 NLRB 466, 468 (1990); Terrell Ma-
chine Co., 173 NLRB 1480 (1969). The employer bears the
burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has
met the standard, as well as that of establishing the size of the
bargaining unit. Rock-Tenn Co., 315 NLRB 670, 678 (1994);
Laidlaw Waste Systems, 307 NLRB 1211 (1992).
The first issue to be resolved is the date the Employer actu-
ally withdrew recognition from the Union. The General Coun-
sel contends that it was accomplished by Blankenship’s letter of
February 24, while the Respondent contends that it was done by
his letter of March 7. The evidence shows that Blankenship’s
February 24 letter informed the Union that he was canceling the
negotiating sessions scheduled for February 27and 28 because
the company had received “a petition indicating that the union
has lost its majority status” and that it was in the process of
verifying the signatures. Glenn testified that, after he for-
warded the petition he received on February 20 to Blanken-
ship’s office, Blankenship told him that “he was going to advise
the union that we were not going to continue negotiations” and
sent him a copy of the February 24 letter. After consulting with
Blankenship’s office, Glenn drafted and posted the February 28
notice to employees, stating:

The purpose of this notice is to let you know that the
Company has been served with a petition signed by over
half of the employees asking us to not recognize the IAM
as representing the employees of Wire Products.
We have reviewed the signatures on the petition to de-
termine their validity, and we have made the determination
that the petition is in order.

ary 20, 47 of the employees in the bargaining unit had signed the peti-
tion but do not explain how they arrived at that figure.
We have notified the IAM that we have an obligation
to recognize the request of a majority of our employees
and cease negotiations with the IAM. Accordingly, we
will no longer bargain with the IAM since they no longer
represent a majority of our employees.
While the litigation is not over yet, this means the
Company is once again able to communicate directly with
you. It means we as a Company, both management and
what was formerly called the “bargaining unit employees,”
can operate in an environment without the interference of
a disinterested third party.
You are aware of recent changes that the Company has
made to insure its continued existence. We are looking
forward to working with all our employees to bring the
Company into the twenty-first century.
You may direct any questions you may have directly to
me.
Dennis Glenn
I find that this notice removed any ambiguity there may have
been in Blankenship’s February 24 letter and made it clear that
the letter was intended as notice that the Employer was with-
drawing recognition from the Union. If it did not, I find, in the
alternative, that the February 28 posting served as such notice.
I find that the Employer has not rebutted the presumption
that the Union had a continuing majority on either date, since it
has not established that the Union had actually lost its majority
status. The evidence shows that, on February 24, only 43 of 91
bargaining unit members had signed the decertification petition
and that, on February 28, only 43 of 93 had signed.21
The Employer has also failed to establish that it had a good-
faith doubt as to the Union’s majority when it withdrew recog-
nition. It is not clear who actually made the decision to with-
draw recognition although the evidence suggests it was Blank-
enship. Since Blankenship did not testify, there is no way of
knowing on what objective factors he allegedly based his deci-
sion. In their brief, the Respondents refer only to the fact of the
petition being presented to the Employer and its knowledge of
certain documents previously distributed by Duellman as alleg-
edly constituting evidence of “employee attitudes.” A good-
faith doubt cannot be supported by a petition signed by less
than a majority of unit employees or by an employer’s errone-
ous belief that a majority have signed. Hollaender Mfg. Co.,
supra at 469. The documents Duellman distributed do not pur-
port to reflect the attitude of anyone other than herself, an
attitude that was known to the Employer long before she pre-
21 The petition had been signed a numerical majority of unit employ-
ees (49 of 97) as of March 7, the date the Respondent claims it with-
drew recognition. However, even if that were the correct date of with-
drawal, it does the Employer no good. Six of those signatures were
obtained on March 6 and I find that they cannot be counted in deter-
mining the Union’s majority status inasmuch as they were secured after
February 28, the date the Employer informed all employees that the
Union had already lost its majority and that recognition had already
been withdrawn. If it had not already been withdrawn as of that date,
both statements were untrue and tainted any signatures obtained there-
after. I find it likely that even employees who had supported the Union
might seek to be numbered among those who did not, once they had
been told the Union was out as their representative. At least two who
signed the petition on March 6, Jeanette Scheu and Robert Bacon, had
been employed throughout the 8 months Duellman had solicited names
for her petition, but they signed only after the February 28 notice was
posted.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 643
sented her petition to it. Consequently, these documents add
nothing to support a good-faith belief that employees other than
Duellman did not want the Union to represent them.
By withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain
with the Union without having established that it did not enjoy
majority status among unit employees and without having es-
tablished that the withdrawal was predicated on a good-faith
and reasonably grounded doubt as to majority status, the Em-
ployer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The letter
sent by Blankenship to the Union, dated March 16, 1995, in
response to its March 15 letter requesting a resumption of bar-
gaining, in which he reiterated the Employer’s refusal to so,
was additional evidence of its continuing unlawful refusal to
bargain.
5. The meeting on March 21, 1995
There was a meeting for all employees at the Super 8 Motel
on March 21. Carol Albright credibly testified that Blanken-
ship informed them that 52 percent of the employees had
signed Duellman’s petition to get the Union out, that the Em-
ployer was not going back to the bargaining table, that the
matter would go to court and could take 3 to 6 years before it
was resolved. When employees asked when there would be a
raise, he said that he hoped to get things resolved in 6 months.
Company Co-owner Roger Dupke was also at the meeting and
responded to questions concerning a pay raise, but she could
not recall what he said. Employee William Wegner testified
that at the meeting Blankenship said that the Union was not
going to go away, that it looked like there would be a trial and
that there would not be a pay raise for 3 years.
Analysis and Conclusions
The Respondent contends that there was no violation of the
Act, because Blankenship truthfully told the employees that the
Union no longer represented a majority of the employees and
that the Employer would no longer recognize and bargain with
it. As discussed above, Blankenship’s statements concerning
the Union’s loss of majority status were untrue and interfered
with employee rights. His statement that there would not be a
pay raise for a lengthy period because charges had been filed
was an attempt to place the onus on the Union for the delay. I
find that these statements violated Section 8(a)(1).
6. Unilateral changes
The complaint in Case 30–CA–12946 alleges that since it
withdrew recognition from the Union the Employer has unlaw-
fully made certain unilateral changes in the terms and condi-
tions of employment of unit employees. During contract nego-
tiations with the Union, the Employer made a proposal which
would have allowed it to replace the existing profit-sharing plan
with an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). The proposal
had not been agreed to at the time negotiations were terminated
by the Employer. On March 14, the Employer posted a notice
on the bulletin board stating it intended to replace the profit
sharing plan with an ESOP and at the meeting on March 21
Roger Dupke told the employees that he wanted to implement
an ESOP. The Union was not given notice of the Employer’s
intention to implement the ESOP before the notice was posted.
The Employer implemented a general wage increase of 15
cents per hour for “all regular, non-management employees,”
effective with the pay period commencing May 21. On May
22, the Employer posted a notice containing a set of rules and
regulations and a progressive disciplinary policy. Some of the
rules and regulations differ from those previously promul-
gated22 and there had not previously been a progressive disci-
pline policy in effect. The Union was not given notice or an
opportunity to bargain before the wage increase and the rules
and regulations and progressive discipline policy were imple-
mented.
Analysis and Conclusions
The complaint in Case 30–CA–12946 was issued and con-
solidated with the other cases herein on July 12. Under the
Board’s rules, the Respondents were not required to file an
answer to this complaint before the commencement of the hear-
ing on July 19. At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the
Respondents moved to have this case severed from the others
and tried separately, claiming that they would be prejudiced by
having to go forward before having an opportunity to investi-
gate the allegations in the new complaint. Given the nature of
the allegations in the new complaint, which were limited to
three alleged unilateral changes implemented after the Em-
ployer withdrew recognition from the Union, I denied the mo-
tion. However, that denial was on the condition that, once
counsel for the General Counsel rested and the Respondents
had put in their evidence concerning the other cases, I would
consider a request for a continuance if the Respondents still felt
they needed additional time to prepare to defend the allegations
in the new complaint. At the close of the hearing, the Respon-
dents did not request any additional time to respond to these
allegations or to prepare their defense. An answer to the new
complaint, signed by Blankenship, was filed and includes his
certification that it was mailed on July 26, the due date. Coun-
sel for the General Counsel has moved to strike the answer on
the grounds that it is untimely, was not served by registered or
certifed mail, and contains assertions of lack of knowledge
which are groundless and made in bad faith.23 Although the
motion might have merit, it is not supported by an affidavit or
other documentary evidence. Moreover, I find there is nothing
to be gained by striking the answer. The allegations in the
complaint have been fully litigated and I believe a decision
based on the evidence presented is preferable.
I find that the evidence fails to establish that the Employer
has unilaterally replaced its existing profit sharing plan with an
ESOP. There is clear evidence that it has announced its inten-
tion to do so, but none that this has actually been done. The
testimony of employee Iris Schuelke, that she has been unable
since January 1995 to make a withdrawal from the profit shar-
ing plan as she had in the past, does not prove that the profit
sharing plan has been eliminated or replaced by an ESOP. I
shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
The uncontradicted testimony of Glenn establishes that the
Employer unilaterally granted a general pay raise to unit em-
ployees, effective May 21, and that on May 22, it unilaterally
issued and put into effect a new progressive discipline policy
for unit employees and made changes in certain work rules.
The Respondents contend that, at the time these actions were
taken, the Employer was free to do so since the Union had lost
its majority status and no longer represented the unit employ-
ees. I have found that the Union had not lost its majority status
and that the Employer unlawfully withdrew recognition and
refused to bargain with the Union. Accordingly, I also find that

22 Rules 2, 4, and 15.
23 The answer and the motion to strike are admitted into the record as
a part of the formal papers, as G.C. Exhs. 1(ff) and (gg), respectively.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 644
it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by making these changes in
the terms and conditions of employment without first notifying
and affording the Union the opportunity to bargain about them.
Caterair International, 309 NLRB 869, 880 (1992); Frontier
Hotel & Casino, 309 NLRB 761, 766 (1992). Its new rule con-
cerning “solicitations” (#8) differed from that posted on No-
vember 9, 1993, and provides: “Solicitation of any kind will not
be permitted during working hours unless previously author-
ized.” This rule is overly broad and unlawful on its face as it
prohibits union solicitation “during working hours,” and does
not limit the prohibition to the time employees are actually
working or state that it does not apply to nonworking lunch or
breaktimes and because it requires that employees obtain per-
mission of the Employer in order to engage in protected activity
during such times. By promulgating and maintaining this rule,
the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1). Brunswick Corp., 282
NLRB 794 (1987); Schnadig Corp., 265 NLRB 147, 156
(1982).
7. Interviews conducted by Blankenship and LePage
On March 21 and 22 and April 5, Blankenship or his associ-
ate Stephen LePage interviewed many of the unit employees at
the Mathewis Street facility. The employees were directed to
go to the interview over the public address system, by other
employees, or by a supervisor. They were given a form con-
taining a waiver which they were asked to read and sign. If an
employee declined to sign the waiver, no interview was held.
Those who signed the waiver were asked a series of questions
and their answers were recorded on the form by the interviewer.
They were asked to sign the form and certify that the answers
were correct. None of these forms, which purport to be affida-
vits, was actually witnessed by a notary or other official. The
complaint alleges that these interviews were coercive and
unlawful. The Respondents contend that they were lawfully
conducted as a part of the preparation of its defense in this mat-
ter and that the Board’s standards for such interviews as out-
lined in Johnnie’s Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 775–776
(1964), were met.
Analysis and Conclusions
In Johnnie’s Poultry, the Board made it clear that an em-
ployer may lawfully question employees about matters involv-
ing their Section 7 rights in connection with “the investigation
of facts concerning issues raised in a complaint where such
interrogation is necessary in preparing [its] defense for trial of
the case” and stated (p. 775):

In allowing an employer the privilege of ascertaining the nec-
essary facts from employees in these given circumstances, the
Board and courts have established specific safeguards de-
signed to minimize the coercive impact of such employer in-
terrogation. Thus, the employer must communicate to the
employee the purpose of the questioning, assure him that no
reprisal will take place, and obtain his participation on a vol-
untary basis; the questioning must occur in a context free
from employer hostility to union organization and must not be
itself coercive in nature; and the questions must not exceed
the necessities of the legitimate purpose by prying into other
union matters, eliciting information concerning an employee’s
subjective state of mind, or otherwise interfering with the
statutory rights of employees. When an employer trans-
gresses the boundaries of these safeguards, he loses the bene-
fits of the privilege. [Footnotes omitted.]

I find that prior to these interviews the employees were ade-
quately informed of their purpose, that they were given assur-
ances against reprisals, and that under the circumstances their
participation was obtained on a voluntary basis, notwithstand-
ing the fact that they were directed to go to the interview room
before any assurances were given. It appears that if an em-
ployee declined to execute the waiver and voluntarily submit to
questioning, the meeting was promptly terminated. However,
while it appears that some questions were directly related to
matters in the pending unfair labor practice complaint, I find
that certain of the questions were outside the permissible areas
of inquiry, coercively pried into other union matters, and inter-
fered with employees’ rights. Specifically, there were ques-
tions about the activities of employees Gaydos, Pfingsten, and
Taves, members of the union negotiating committee, which had
no direct connection to any allegations in the complaint and
sought to inquire into protected activity on the part of the em-
ployee being questioned as well as the others. I find that asking
employees these questions was coercive and violated Section
8(a)(1). The General Counsel also contends that asking the
employees during these interviews if they had given a statement
or affidavit to the Board was unlawful. The Respondents ar-
gue, based on Montgomery Ward & Co., 146 NLRB 76, 80–81
(1964), that since there were no efforts to inquire into their
contents or to obtain copies of such statements these questions
were not unlawful. In Astro Printing Services, 300 NLRB
1028, 1029 fn. 6 (1990), the Board found that an employer’s
attorney’s questioning “about whether employees had given
statements to the Board violated Sec. 8(a)(1) independently of
his of his unlawful requests that the employees provide the
Respondent’s owners with copies of any such statement.” The
same violation of Section 8(a)(1) occurred here.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Employer, Wire Products Manufacturing
Corporation, is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent, R. T. Blankenship and Associates, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) and an agent of the Employer.
3. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
4. All full-time and regular part-time employees employed
by the Employer at its Mathewis and Genesee Street operations
in Merrill, Wisconsin; but excluding office clerical employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. The Union is the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees in the unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. The Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
(a) Promulgating and enforcing overly broad rules restricting
the posting and distribution of union literature and the conduct
of union business on its premises.
(b) Informing employees that a wage increase would be de-
layed because the Union had filed charges against it.
(c) Falsely informing employees that the Union no longer
represented a majority of unit employees and would no longer
be their collective-bargaining representative.
(d) Threatening to have employees arrested if they did not
leave the vicinity of an employee meeting.
WIRE PRODUCTS MFG. CORP. 645
(e) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their pro-
tected activities or those of other employees and/or about
whether they have given statements to agents of the Board.
7. The Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by
(a) Discriminatorily failing to recall employee William Ed-
wards from layoff since May 1994 in order to retaliate against
him for his support for the Union and to discourage such sup-
port.
(b) Discriminatorily issuing written disciplinary warnings to
employees Carol Albright and Lola Wendt in retaliation for
Albright’s support for the Union and to discourage such sup-
port.
(c) Discriminatorily prohibiting employees on the Union’s
collective-bargaining committee from attending an employee
meeting on August 16, 1994, in order to retaliate against them
for their support for the Union and to discourage such support.
8. The Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by:
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of unit employees on February
24, 1995, and thereafter refusing to meet and bargain in good
faith with the Union.
(b) Changing terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees by granting a general wage increase, by promulgat-
ing and enforcing new work rules and regulations, and by
promulgating and enforcing a progressive discipline policy
without first giving the Union notice and an opportunity to
bargain.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Employer violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) by discriminatorily failing to recall employee William Ed-
wards from layoff since May 1994, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his
former position or if that position no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from the discrimination against him, with interest. Backpay
shall be computed as prescribed in F. W. Wollworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest to be computed in accordance
with New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
Having found that the Employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) by withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain
collectively with the Union and by making unilateral changes in
wages and other terms and conditions of employment, I shall
recommend that it be required to recognize and bargain collec-
tively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of unit employees and that on request
of the Union, it cancel the unilateral changes in wages and
other terms and conditions of employment.
I find that the broad cease-and-desist order sought by the
General Counsel is not appropriate in this case. See Blanken-
ship & Associates, supra, and Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357
(1979).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]