William L. Yost, Appellant,v.Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 3, 1999
01981596 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 3, 1999)

01981596

06-03-1999

William L. Yost, Appellant, v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.


William L. Yost v. Social Security Administration

01981596

June 3, 1999

William L. Yost, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01981596

) Agency No. 97-0377-SSA

Kenneth S. Apfel, )

Commissioner, )

Social Security Administration, )

Agency. )

___________________________________)

DECISION

The Commission finds that the agency's decision dated November 10, 1997

dismissing a portion of appellant's complaint (allegation 1 - alleging a

"systemic discriminatory policy" against males in the personnel practices

of hiring, rating, awards, and promotions) on the grounds that appellant

failed to state a claim and the remainder of the complaint (allegation 2 -

alleging specific nonselections; allegation 3 - alleging lack of honorary

awards) for failing to timely contact an EEO Counselor is proper pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) (failure to state a claim) and �1614.107(b)

(untimely EEO Counselor contact), respectively.

On appeal appellant argues that the agency misdefined the complaint and

that the complaint is "but one allegation" which he defined as:

[D]isparate impact which has resulted from pervasive discrimination

against male employees as a result of an illegal affirmative action

program and a policy of diversity that has been implemented by

discriminating against male employees and documented in its yearly

reports to the EEOC.

Appellant also indicates in appeal that part of his complaint alleged

that the agency has ignored the "systemic continuing violation

theory in an attempt to limit its liability for its illegal conduct

against males maintained by the Agency for the benefit of its female

employees." (emphasis omitted).

The Commission finds that appellant may indeed have been attempting to

allege in his complaint that the agency was improperly processing his

claims of discrimination. The Commission finds that such an allegation

may be a collateral attack on prior agency decisions. The Commission

shall not entertain such a collateral attack. Such concerns about the

improper processing of a complaint should be raised during the processing

of the complaint at issue. Such concerns do not state independent

claims of discrimination. To the extent that appellant's claim about the

agency's failure to recognize the systemic continuing violation theory

applies to the instant complaint, we find that this is simply an argument

in support of appellant's appeal and does not state an independent claim

of discrimination. Therefore, appellant's claims of improper processing

are dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to �1614.107(a).

The Commission finds that the agency properly defined allegations 1,

2, and 3 as encompassing the whole complaint apart from any claims of

improper processing. The Commission finds that allegation 1 is properly

dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to �1614.107(a) because

appellant has not shown any specific, personal harm from any specific

agency action. See Boyer v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Appeal

No. 01971500 (June 19, 1998); Sobchak v. Social Security Admin., EEOC

Appeal No. 01975467 (May 22, 1998); Bowers v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Appeal No. 01975429 (May 5, 1998).

The Commission finds that allegations 2 and 3 are properly dismissed

for untimely EEO Counselor contact because all of the incidents that

appellant has cited in allegations 2 and 3 occurred more than 45 days

prior to appellant's initial contact of an EEO Counselor. Allegations

2 and 3 are not timely under the continuing violation theory because

appellant has not shown that any incident in the complaint was timely

raised and because we find that appellant should have reasonably suspected

discrimination at the time of the discrete incidents in question which

occurred more than 45 days prior to his initial EEO contact. See Sobchak,

EEOC Appeal No. 01975467; Bowers, EEOC Appeal No. 01975429.

The Commission finds that if allegations 1, 2,and 3 are effectively just

one allegation with the incidents in allegations 2 and 3 constituting

examples of the policy at issue in allegation 1, then we find that such

an allegation is properly dismissed pursuant to �1614.107(b) for untimely

EEO Counselor contact because none of these incidents were timely raised

as explained supra.

The agency's decision dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 3, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations