William L. Shaw, Complainant,v.Donald L. Evans, Secretary, Department of Commerce, (Bureau of Census), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 17, 2002
01A14466 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 17, 2002)

01A14466

10-17-2002

William L. Shaw, Complainant, v. Donald L. Evans, Secretary, Department of Commerce, (Bureau of Census), Agency.


William L. Shaw v. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Census)

01A14466

October 17, 2002

.

William L. Shaw,

Complainant,

v.

Donald L. Evans,

Secretary,

Department of Commerce,

(Bureau of Census),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A14466

Agency No. 00-63-02817D

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission

affirms the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as an Assistant Manager for Recruiting at the agency's Gastonia

Local Census Office, Gastonia, North Carolina. Complainant sought EEO

counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on August 11, 2000,

alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex (male)

when he was terminated, effective June 1, 2000.<1>

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that assuming arguendo, complainant

established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, it nonetheless

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Specifically, the FAD found that complainant was terminated because he

had failed to meet his recruiting goals, had been counseled about his poor

performance, yet refused to accept the assistance offered to him in order

to help bring his performance up to the required level. The FAD found

that complainant failed to show that these legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons were mere pretext to mask unlawful sex discrimination.

On appeal, complainant reiterates his contention that he was terminated

due to sex discrimination, and calls into questions the veracity of

many of the statements of management officials regarding the reasons

for his termination. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

Complainant has alleged a claim of disparate treatment which is examined

under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the

adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco

Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567(1978). The burden then shifts

to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 ,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 , 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990).

Here, the Commission finds that assuming, arguendo, complainant

established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

The record reflects that complainant's supervisor (S1: male) stated in his

affidavit that complainant had not been meeting his goals, despite being

counseled and provided with additional assistance, and that he recommended

complainant for termination after learning that complainant had refused

to cooperate with the individual brought in to assist him with meeting

his performance goals. (Report of Investigation, Exhibit 32, page 1-2).

While complainant has presented several challenges to the agency's stated

reasons for his termination, he has presented insufficient evidence to

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was terminated

as a result of discriminatory animus toward his sex. Therefore, after

a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions on

appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 17, 2002

__________________

Date

1 In his formal complaint complainant also alleged discrimination

on the basis of age, however that basis was dismissed by the agency.

As complainant did not challenge this dismissal on appeal, it will not

be addressed in this decision.