Will VolnakDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 24, 202012422055 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/422,055 04/10/2009 Will Volnak 091113-0011 5825 31824 7590 07/24/2020 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP The McDermott Building 500 North Capitol Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 EXAMINER ELCHANTI, TAREK ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3621 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/24/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mweipdocket@mwe.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte WILL VOLNAK ____________ Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ERIC S. FRAHM, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–18, 20–34, and 36–37. Claims 19 and 35 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction over the pending rejected claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Copernican Technologies, Inc. as the real party in interest. (Appeal Br. 3.) Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 2 THE INVENTION Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is directed to an online library marketplace. (Abstract.) Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A computer-implemented method for providing an online library marketplace, comprising: receiving a first user input from a first user, the first user input providing for publication of a non-modifiable data object in a publishing library, wherein the publication of the non- modifiable data object makes the non-modifiable data object available to a second user for purchase; receiving a second user input from the first user, the second user input providing a first fee for the second user to pay to access the non-modifiable data object; granting, by a computer or by a processor, access to the non-modifiable data object to the second user upon payment of the first fee; polling the publishing library to determine whether a new entry has been created; synchronizing a second user’s library with the publishing library when the second user accesses the publishing library; importing the new entry as a non-modifiable data object into the second user’s library when it is determined that the new entry has been created and the second user’s library is synchronized with the publishing library; receiving a subscription request from the second user for a data object source, wherein the subscription request provides payment information for access to one or more non-modifiable data objects stored in the data object source; and providing the non-modifiable data object for storing as an entry to a journal within a library belonging to the second user based on the subscription request, wherein the first user establishes an e-mail relationship with the second user for Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 3 sharing nonmodifiable data objects, the e-mail relationship including a library identification for the first user, a library identification for the second user, and a validity identification created by the first user. (Appeal Br. 16 (Claims Appendix).) REJECTION The Examiner rejected claims 1–18, 20–34, and 36–37 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.2 (Final Act. 2–4.) ISSUE ON APPEAL Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal and Reply Briefs presents the following issue:3 Whether the Examiner erred in finding claims 1–18, 20–34, and 36– 37 are directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. (Appeal Br. 10–14.) ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). 2 The rejection also specifies claims 19 and 35 — however, those claims are cancelled. 3 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the positions of the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed June 3, 2019); the Reply Brief (filed Aug. 5, 2019); the Final Office Action (mailed Apr. 9, 2019); and the Examiner’s Answer (mailed July 24, 2019) for the respective details. Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 4 The Examiner concludes the claims are directed to an “online library marketplace,” a method of organizing human activity and commercial interaction, including: receiving a first user input, receiving a second user input, granting access to data object, polling the publishing library to determine whether a new entry has been created, synchronizing a second user’s library, importing the new entry as a data object into the second user library when it is determined that the new entry has been created, receiving a subscription request, and providing the non-modifiable data object for storing as an entry to a journal within a library belonging to the second user. (Final Act. 2–3.) The Examiner further concludes the subject matter of the claims is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. (Id. at 3–4.) Appellant argues “the claimed technical features provide a meaningful improvement to the field of managing, accessing, and distributing publisha- ble online material between users and are not directed to ‘advertising, mar- keting or sales activities.’” (Appeal Br. 11.) Appellant further argues “the claims define an invention which improves computer related technology by allowing computer performance of a function not previously performable by a computer, namely, the function of operating a publishing library supported by a computer network.” (Id. at 11–12.) Appellant asserts: The claims are directed to technically challenging, non- conventional steps requiring the use of processors and circuits such as “synchronizing a second user's library with the publishing library when the second user accesses the publishing library” or “polling the publishing library to determine whether a new entry has been created.” Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 5 (Id. at 12.) Finally, Appellant argues the claims add significantly more than any alleged abstract idea given limitations that provide for “user input for publication of a non-modifiable data object in a publishing library”; “importing [a] new entry as a non-modifiable data object into [a] second user’s library when it is determined that the new entry has been created and the second user’s library is synchronized with the publishing library”; and “[granting] by a computer or by a processor, access to the non-modifiable data object to the second user upon payment of [a] first fee.” (Id. at 12–13.) We are not persuaded the Examiner erred. An invention is patent- eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Here, independent claim 1 and its dependent claims relate to a method, independent claim 36 relates to a system, and independent claim 37 relates to a non-transitory computer readable medium — i.e., a process, machine, and manufacture, respectively. However, the Supreme Court has long held that “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2013)). The “abstract ideas” category embodies the longstanding rule that an idea, by itself, is not patentable. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17. In Alice, the Supreme Court sets forth an analytical “framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Id. at 217. The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” such as an abstract idea. Id. Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 6 such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); mathematical concepts (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second step in the Alice/Mayo analysis is to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.) A claim that recites an abstract idea must include additional features to ensure that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea. 573 U.S. at 221. A transformation into a patent-eligible application requires more than simply stating the abstract idea while adding the words “apply it.” Id. Further to the Alice/Mayo analytical framework, and as acknowledged by Appellant and the Examiner, the USPTO published revised guidance on Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 7 the application of Section 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Revised Guidance. In evaluating the claims at issue, we consider claim 1 as representative, consistent with how Appellant and the Examiner analyze the claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(2016). Omitting the portions of the claim invoking use of generic technology (which are discussed separately below), the remaining limitations of claim 1 elaborate on a method of providing a library marketplace, via the steps of: Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 8 (a) receiving a first user input from a first user, the first user input providing for publication of a non-modifiable data object [e.g. a book or publication] in a publishing library, wherein the publication of the non-modifiable data object makes the non- modifiable data object available to a second user for purchase; (b) receiving a second user input from the first user, the second user input providing a first fee for the second user to pay to access the non-modifiable data object; (c) granting . . . access to the non-modifiable data object to the second user upon payment of the first fee; (d) polling the publishing library to determine whether a new entry has been created; (e) synchronizing a second user’s library with the publishing library when the second user accesses the publishing library; (f) importing the new entry as a non-modifiable data object into the second user’s library when it is determined that the new entry has been created and the second user’s library is synchronized with the publishing library; (g) receiving a subscription request from the second user for a data object source, wherein the subscription request provides payment information for access to one or more non-modifiable data objects stored in the data object source; and (h) providing the non-modifiable data object for storing as an entry to a journal within a library belonging to the second user based on the subscription request, wherein the first user establishes [a] relationship with the second user for sharing nonmodifiable data objects, the . . . relationship including a library identification for the first user, a library identification for the second user, and a validity identification created by the first user. (Appeal Br. 16 (Claims Appendix).) Omitted from the above are the generic references to “computer,” “processor,” and “email,” discussed further below. Although terms such as “online”, “user input”; “non-modifiable data object”; “polling”; “synchronizing”; and “importing” are commonly used in Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 9 the context of describing computerized operations, if, as should be the case here, they are broadly construed, those terms are equally applicable to non- computerized human interactions in the context of providing, paying for, and accessing “non-modifiable data objects” — e.g., books or publications — in a library marketplace. Apart from the use of the aforesaid generic technology and terminology, each of these limitations describes steps taken in the course of the human activity of providing a library marketplace. As stated in the Revised Guidance, “methods of organizing human activity” considered an abstract idea include “commercial or legal interactions” including “agreements in the form of contracts,” and “marketing or sales activities or behaviors.” (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52). The above listed claim 1 limitations relate to commercial activities (purchasing access to library materials), contractual agreements (providing a fee, payment of the fee, receiving a subscription request, establishing a relationship, validity identification), and marketing and sales activities. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 6 (“The subscription based nature sets up an ongoing financial relationship between the user and the provider, allowing for revolving billing and crediting related to viewing/selling/reselling of entries.”) Appellant argues that “the claimed technical features provide a meaningful improvement to the field of managing, accessing, and distributing publishable online material between users and are not directed to ‘advertising, marketing or sales activities.’” (Appeal Br. 11.) However, as discussed, the claims encompass marketing and sales activities, and in any event “managing, accessing, and distributing publishable online material” are themselves part of the abstract idea of providing a library marketplace. Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 10 Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the subject matter of claim 1 recites an abstract idea, as do the remaining claims. Further, pursuant to the Revised Guidance, we consider whether there are additional elements set forth in claim 1 that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Here, the abstract idea of claim 1 is carried out using a computer or processor, and email. We agree with the Examiner “the additional element(s) of the claim(s) such as computer, processor, system, and a non- transitory computer readable storage medium merely use(s) a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea and/or generally link(s) the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment.” (Final Act. 3.) “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Nor does the subject matter of claim 1 contain additional elements that implement the judicial exception with a “particular machine,” because the claims do not specify any details in regard to the system. See MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the method does not transform matter; at best it transforms information. See MPEP § 2106.05(c). Nor does claim 1 have any other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), or any of the other considerations set forth in the Revised Guidance regarding a determination of whether additional elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Accordingly, we conclude that the subject matter of claim 1 (and the remaining claims) is directed to fundamental economic principles or practices, which are examples of the certain methods of organizing human activity, and thus an abstract idea, and the additional elements recited therein do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 11 Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, we consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 66, 79, 78 (2012)). Again, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “the additional element(s) of using a computer, processor, system, and a non-transitory computer readable storage medium to perform the steps amounts to no more than using a computer or processor to automate and/or implement the abstract idea of a library marketplace. (Final Act. 4.) “[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. These additional elements of claim 1, whether individually or in combination, fails to add “significantly more” to the basic abstract idea encompassed by the claim sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. The other features of the claims on which Appellant relies — such as synchronizing libraries, polling the publishing library, and addressing security (see Appeal Br. 12–13) — are elaborations on the basic abstract idea itself, in which a computer or processor, and email, are used to provide an online library marketplace. “It is clear from Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Moreover, “[p]atent law does not protect claims to an ‘asserted advance in the realm of abstract ideas . . . no matter how groundbreaking the advance.’” Aatrix, 890 F.3d at 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Nothing regarding any aspect of the “ordered combination” of the claim elements provide significantly more than the abstract idea that claim 1 is directed to. Appeal 2019-005913 Application 12/422,055 12 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claim 1. Appellant provides no arguments that would differentiate the remaining claims from claim 1. (Appeal Br. 13.) Thus, the foregoing analysis of claim 1 is exemplary of that for dependent claims 2–18, 20–34, 36–37. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2016). Therefore, we also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of those claims. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–18, 20– 34, 36–37 101 Eligibility 1–18, 20– 34, 36–37 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation