Wei Zhang et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 3, 2019

11856109 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 3, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/856,109 09/17/2007 Wei Zhang 2006P20095 US01 8324
28524 7590 10/03/2019
SIEMENS CORPORATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
Orlando, FL 32817
EXAMINER
RIFKIN, BEN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2123
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte WEI ZHANG, ADRIAN BARBU, YEFENG ZHENG, and
DORIN COMANICIU
____________

Appeal 2018-004206
Application 11/856,109
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 10–14, and 24–28.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to object detection in digital images
using a probability mechanism, including identifying and manipulating a
digital representation of the detected object. Spec. ¶ 23. According to one

1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Siemens Medical Solutions
USA, Inc. App. Br. 1.
2 Claims 1–9, 15–23, 29, and 30 were previously canceled.
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aspect, the probability mechanism is trained to detect lymph nodes depicted
in image data. Spec. ¶ 24.

Exemplary Claim
10. A method for detecting objects in CT volume data using
a probabilistic boosting cascade tree (PBCT), comprising:
receiving an input CT volume;
processing said input CT volume using a PBCT having
a plurality of nodes to detect one or more objects in said input
CT volume, wherein said PBCT comprises at least one tree
node, at least one cascade node, and a plurality of leaf nodes,
wherein each of said at least one tree node, said at least one
cascade node, and said plurality of leaf nodes classifies voxels
of the input CT volume as positive or negative, wherein said at
least one cascade node has a single child node for further
classifying voxels classified as positive by said at least one
cascade node, wherein voxels classified as negative by said at
least one cascade node are discarded without being passed to a
leaf node, and wherein said at least one tree node has a first
child node for further classifying voxels classified as positive
by said at least one tree node and a second child node for further
classifying voxels classified as negative by said at least one tree
node.
App. Br. 35 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTIONS
Claims 10–14 and 24–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the enablement requirement. Final Act. 3–6.3
Claims 10–14 and 24–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as

3 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Office Action mailed
Nov. 21, 2016 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed Aug. 9, 2017 (“App.
Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed Jan. 11, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (4) the
Reply Brief filed Mar. 12, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 6–7.
Claims 10–14 and 24–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite. Final Act. 7–8.
Claims 10–14 and 24–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more. Final Act. 2.

REJECTION UNDER § 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH, WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION
Issue: Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, did the
Examiner err in finding that independent claims 10 and 24 fail to comply
with the written description requirement?
The Examiner finds the Specification and drawings of the application
do not sufficiently support the claim limitations (1) “wherein voxels
classified as negative by said at least one cascade node are discarded without
being passed to a leaf node”; and (2) “said plurality of leaf nodes classifies
voxels of the input CT volume as positive or negative” as recited in
independent claims 10 and 24. Final Act. 6–7.
With respect to limitation (1), we agree with Appellants’ arguments
(App. Br. 28–30) that the limitation complies with the written description
requirement. We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection because the
Examiner fails to set forth a prima facie case for the rejection of claims 10
and 24 (Final Act. 6–7) pursuant to the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 132(a). See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). In
particular, the Examiner finds that “[f]urther, the specification at no time
discusses discarding negative data without passing to a leaf node.” Final
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Act. 7. However, the Specification discloses a “leaf node” as the endpoint
specific to a tree structure rather than a cascade structure. Spec.
¶ 6. Accordingly, a cascade node would not pass negative data to a “leaf
node.” As correctly pointed out by Appellants, “data classified as negative
by each cascade node is not passed to any child node and is thus discarded
without being passed to a leaf node.” App. Br. 28. Accordingly, the
Examiner’s identification of the area of discarded negative data in FIG. 2
(Final Act. 7) is inconsistent with the terminology disclosed in the
Specification.
However, with respect to limitation (2), we agree with the Examiner
that the Specification fails to comply with the written description
requirement. Appellants define “nodes 626, 628, 630, 632, 634, 636, and
638” as “leaf nodes” (App. Br. 15) wherein a leaf node has no child nodes
(App. Br. 16). We disagree with Appellants’ assertion that the Specification
supports an interpretation that a leaf node “still performs a classification, but
there are no child nodes trained to perform further classifications on the data
classified as positive or negative by the leaf nodes.” App. Br. 17. Rather,
the Specification clarifies that:
Each node in the PBCT classifies all of the voxels received at
the node as positive or negative. If a node is a cascade node the
positively classified voxels are further classified at a child
node, and the negatively classified voxels are discarded. If a
node is a tree node, one child node further classifies
positively classified voxels and another child node further
classifies negatively classified voxels.
Spec. ¶ 38 (bolding added).
Furthermore, the Specification does not provide any guidance that a
“leaf node” is distinct from a “tree node” such that a “leaf node” that
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performs classification is required to send positive or negative classifications
to a further child node. See also Spec. ¶ 27 (each node is classified as a
cascade or tree node, “each node is trained it determined how many child
nodes must be trained for that node” (emphasis added) wherein a cascade
node has one child and a tree node has two). In addition, for cascade nodes
that perform classification, “[a]ll data classified as positive advances to be
classified by the next classifier” Spec. ¶ 5 (emphasis added). As noted
above, further classification occurs at a child node. Accordingly, node 630,
for example, shown in FIG. 6, under the guidance of the Specification would
necessarily have to be trained as a tree node or a cascade node (¶ 27) and
perform a classification having at least an additional child node (¶ 38).
The Specification guides that if there are not enough training samples
to train a node as a tree node or a cascade node, the node is deemed a
“terminal node” which does not perform further classification since no child
nodes are generated from it. App. Br. 16–17 (citing Spec. ¶ 34). However,
this citation does not resolve the inconsistencies cited by the Examiner
(Final Act. 3–4) that a terminal or leaf node cannot both perform
classification (which requires a child node, e.g., Spec. ¶ 38) and also not
include a further child node.
“[I]t is ‘not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be able
to construct the patentee’s device from the teachings of the disclosure. . . .
Rather, it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that
particular device.’ . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for
which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v.
Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).
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This reasoning is applicable here. In reviewing the record, we agree
with the Examiner that the Specification is insufficient to demonstrate
possession of Appellants’ claimed invention and show each of the claimed
computations.
Because Appellants fail to direct our attention to sufficient disclosure
in the originally-filed Specification that demonstrates possession of the
claim limitation “said plurality of leaf nodes classifies voxels of the input
CT volume as positive or negative” (independent claims 10 and 24), we find
Appellants’ contentions do not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, and based upon a preponderance
of the evidence, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Accordingly,
with respect to limitation (2), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
10–14 and 24–28, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to
comply with the written description requirement.

REJECTION UNDER § 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH, ENABLEMENT
Issue: Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, did the
Examiner err in finding that independent claims 10 and 24 fail to comply
with the enablement requirement?
Appellants present similar arguments asserting the § 112, first
paragraph enablement rejection should be withdrawn (App. Br. 14–19) that
was asserted for § 112, first paragraph written description. Accordingly, we
agree with Appellants with respect to limitation (1) but we disagree with
Appellants with respect to limitation (2) that the § 112 first paragraph
enablement rejection should be withdrawn for the same reasons discussed
supra. Additionally, Appellants assert the Declaration of Dorin Comaniciu
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submitted September 1, 2015 provides evidence one of ordinary skill in the
art would understand that in a PBT structure, leaf nodes are trained
classifiers and that the leaf nodes do not represent the final decisions of the
parent nodes. App. Br. 19. However, assuming arguendo this is true, the
declaration provided still does not address the inconsistencies resulting from
the definitions and guidance of the claim language, drawings and
Specification discussed above, with respect to limitation (2). Accordingly,
with respect to limitation (2), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
10–14 and 24–28, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to
comply with the enablement requirement.

REJECTION UNDER § 112, SECOND PARAGRAPH
Issue: Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, did the
Examiner err in finding that independent claims 10 and 24 fail to comply
with the indefiniteness requirement?
Appellants present similar arguments asserting the § 112, second
paragraph rejection should be withdrawn (App. Br. 31–33) that was asserted
for § 112(a) written description. Accordingly, we agree with Appellants
with respect to limitation (1) and we disagree with Appellants with respect
to limitation (2) that the § 112, second paragraph indefiniteness rejection
should be withdrawn for the same reasons discussed supra. Accordingly,
with respect to limitation (2), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
10–14 and 24–28, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for failing to
comply with the indefiniteness requirement.

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THE INELIGIBILITY REJECTION

ISSUE
Under § 101, has the Examiner erred in rejecting the claimed
invention as directed to ineligible subject matter? This issue turns on
whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea and, if so, whether
additional elements recited—considered individually and as an ordered
combination—transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible
application of that abstract idea.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). That
said, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08. 2017, Jan.
2018)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
THE INELIGIBILITY ANALYSIS
Independent claims 10 and 24 recite analogous limitations.
Appellants present a unitary argument directed towards independent claims
10 and 24 together. App. Br. 13. Accordingly, we select claim 10 for
discussion as representative of the rejected claims. We refer to the rejected
independent claims collectively herein as “claim 10.” See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We must determine whether the claimed invention is directed to a
judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To
this end, we determine (1) whether the claimed invention recites a judicial
exception (Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong 1) and, if so, (2) whether the
identified judicial exception is integrated into a practical application
(Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong 2). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52–55.
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Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong 1
In Revised Step 2A –– Prong 1, we (1) identify the claim’s specific
limitations that recite an abstract idea, and (2) determine whether the
identified limitations fall within certain subject matter groupings, namely (a)
mathematical concepts4; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity5;
or (c) mental processes.6 We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 3) that claim 10
recites a judicial exception. Here, the claimed invention’s recited
limitations, which collectively are directed to receiving image data and
classifying the image data for the purpose of detecting objects in the image
data, fit squarely within at least one of the above categories of the agency’s
guidelines.
First, the claimed invention recites steps directed to a mental process,
as a concept related to organizing or analyzing image data that can be
performed mentally. See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2), III (“an idea of ‘itself’”).
For example, claim 10 recites (1) “receiving an input CT volume”; (2)
“processing said input CT volume using a PBCT having a plurality of

4 Mathematical concepts include mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
5 Certain methods of organizing human activity include fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating
risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships
or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and
following rules or instructions). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
6 Mental processes are concepts performed in the human mind including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
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nodes to detect one or more objects in said input CT volume”; (3)
“wherein said PBCT comprises at least one tree node, at least one cascade
node, and a plurality of leaf nodes”; “wherein each of said at least one tree
node, said at least one cascade node, and said plurality of leaf nodes
classifies voxels of the input CT volume as positive or negative”; “wherein
said at least one cascade node has a single child node for further
classifying voxels classified as positive by said at least one cascade node”;
“and wherein said at least one tree node has a first child node for further
classifying voxels classified as positive by said at least one tree node and
a second child node for further classifying voxels classified as negative by
said at least one tree node.” App. Br. 35 (Claims Appendix) (emphasis
added) which recite a mental process, namely, a process that can
alternatively be performed in the human mind with the aid of pen and paper.
Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that a recited step that constructed a map of credit
card numbers could be performed by merely writing down a list of credit
card transactions made from a particular IP address); see also FairWarning
IP, LLC. v. latric System, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that
the patent was drawn to an ineligible idea, the concept of collects
information, analyzes the information according to one of several rules to
make a determination and provide notification based on that determination);
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1345–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding ineligible claims reciting
(1) receiving output representing diverse types of hard copy documents from
an automated digitizing unit, and (2) storing information from those
documents into memory).
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Specifically, limitation (1) recites data gathering. In Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016), our
reviewing court found claim limitations reciting
identifying characteristics of data files comprising: receiving,
on a processing system, file content identifiers for data files
from a plurality of file content identifier generator agents
(emphasis added) constitute mental process related to retrieving data using
data file identifiers. See id. at 1313; see also Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at
1345–49 (holding ineligible claims reciting (1) receiving output representing
diverse types of hard copy documents from an automated digitizing unit, and
(2) storing information from those documents into memory); CyberSource,
654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that limitations reciting obtaining information
about transactions that have used an Internet address identified with a credit
card transaction can be performed by a human who simply reads records of
Internet credit card transactions from a pre-existing database).
Additionally, steps (2)–(3) recite a classification algorithm for
processing the received data that can also be performed as a mental process
by merely thinking about these identifications and determinations, or writing
them down—both involving mere observation and logical reasoning. Cf.
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map
of credit card numbers to determine the validity of a credit card transaction
could be performed entirely mentally by merely using logical reasoning to
identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous
transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP
address). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when
automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been
done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely
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mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Furthermore, steps (2)–(3) recite a method of recognizing certain data
in digital images. Our reviewing court in Content Extraction has found that
recognizing certain data in digital images can be performed mentally by a
human being, which is a type of abstract idea. Content Extraction, 776 F.3d
1343 at 1358. Furthermore, classification of data from received digital
images, as is recited in step (3), has been found to constitute mental
processes, which is a type of abstract idea. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC v.
AV Auto., L.L.C., 823 F.3d 607 at 613 (“[T]he claims are not directed to a
solution to a ‘technological problem’ . . . [i]nstead, the claims, as noted, are
simply directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images
in an organized manner”); See also MPEP 2106.04(a)(2), III (“we have
treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or
by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category. See, e.g., TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at
613”).
Therefore, the steps (1)–(3) fall squarely within the mental processes
category of the agency’s guidelines. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
(listing exemplary mental processes including observation and evaluation).

Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong 2
Although claim 1 recites a mental process, which is a type of abstract
idea, we nevertheless must still determine whether the abstract idea is
integrated into a practical application, namely whether the claim applies,
relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful
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limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54–55. To this end, we (1) identify whether there are any additional
recited elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements
individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application. See id.
Here, we agree with the Examiner (e.g., Final Act. 3–4) that claim 10
does not include any additional elements outside the abstract idea and that
the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application when reading
the claimed invention as a whole.
Appellants argue “[d]etection of objects in a CT volume by processing
the CT volume using a PBCT that classifies voxels of the CT volume as
positive or negative is not an abstract idea” (App. Br. 4) because “[d]etecting
objects in CT volume data using a probabilistic boosting cascade tree
(PBCT) is functional and palpable application in the field of computer and
medical imaging technology with a concrete and tangible result.” (App. Br.
7). However, claim 10 does not require “detecting objects,” but merely
recites processing image data using a PBCT algorithm for the intended
purpose “to detect one or more objects.” Furthermore, Appellants’ assertion
a concrete and tangible result is recited in claim 10 is unpersuasive since
information, as such, is intangible, and data analysis and algorithms are also
abstract ideas. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
451 n.12 (2007); Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (“Reasoning
that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson
applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be the subject of a
patent.”); and Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72. “[C]ollecting information,
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including when limited to particular content (which does not change its
character as information),” and “analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more,” are
“within the realm of abstract ideas.” Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Internet Patents
Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758
F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370. That is,
“[w]ithout additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical
algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional
information is not patent eligible.” Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350–51 (“Data in
its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information that does not fall under
any of the categories of eligible subject matter under section 101.”).
We find Appellants conclusory argument (App. Br. 8, 10) that claim
10 recites an improvement to the computer related technology of machine
learning based detection of objects in CT Volume data unavailing.
Appellants do not specifically delineate what the improvement is. See
generally App. Br. When a claim directed to an abstract idea contains no
restriction on how an asserted improvement is accomplished and the asserted
improvement is not described in the claim, then the claim typically is not
patent eligible. See Intellectual Ventures, 838 F.3d at 1316. To the extent
Appellant contends the improvement lies in increased speed using a
computer, generally “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental
process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C.
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir.
2012); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286
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(Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[S]imply appending generic computer
functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise
abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of
patent eligibility.”), aff'd, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
Additionally, “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (emphasis omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures, 838 F.3d at 1321
(“A narrow claim directed to an abstract idea, however, is not necessarily
patent-eligible.”). To the extent Appellants also urge that the purportedly
meaningful limitations are not well-understood, routine, and conventional,
we address this issue under Step 2B (Inventive Concept), infra. For the
reasons discussed further below, and on this record, it is our view that
Appellants’ claims do not add meaningful limitations beyond generally
linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment.
Furthermore, we find Appellants’ argument (App. Br. 10–11) that
claim 10 recites a transformation of medical image data to a different state of
thing unpersuasive. Appellants never indicate what the different state or
thing from the asserted transformation actually is. Rather, claim 10 merely
recites processing image data using a PBCT algorithm for the intended
purpose “to detect one or more objects” such that the claim limitations are
devoted to receiving image data and then training a classification algorithm
to be able to recognize objects in the data. See Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351
(“[w]ithout additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical
algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional
information is not patent eligible.”).
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With respect to limitation (1), this image data receiving step is
insignificant pre-solution activity and, therefore, does not integrate the
exception into a practical application for that additional reason. See In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds,
561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant
extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting
that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a
database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-
gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability). Accord Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g). Recitations of extra-solution
activity, as in limitation (1), weighs against a finding that the claim effects a
transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing.
See MPEP 2106.05(c). Therefore, we conclude the method of claim 10 fails
to satisfy the transformation prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation
test. See id.
Additionally, dependent claims 11–14 and 25–28 are not argued
separately with sufficient particularity. See generally App. Br.; see also
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the above-stated reasons, we determine the
additional elements recited in the claimed invention, beyond the judicial
exceptions, whether considered alone or in combination, do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application.

Revised Guidance, Step 2B
Under the Revised Guidance, if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
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beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
On the record before us, we disagree with Appellants that the claims
add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)). We find no reversible error in the Examiner’s determination
that claim 10 does not contain any additional elements outside of the abstract
idea.
Appellants do not argue dependent claims 11–14 and 25–28
separately with particularity. See generally App. Br. In light of the
foregoing, we conclude that each of claims 10–14 and 24–28, considered as
a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated
into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 10–14 and 24–28.7

DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 10–14 and 24–28
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 10–14 and 24–28

7 To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 10–14 and 24–28
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED