01A20783
10-20-2003
Wayne Palmer, Complainant, v. Gale A. Norton, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.
Wayne Palmer v. Department of the Interior
01A20783
October 20, 2003
.
Wayne Palmer,
Complainant,
v.
Gale A. Norton,
Secretary,
Department of the Interior,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A20783
Agency Nos. LMS93046; LMS93064; LMS94007
Hearing Nos. 320-95-8281X; 320-95-8282X; 320-95-8283X
DECISION
Complainant filed formal complaints of discrimination in or about 1993,
which were subsequently consolidated, in which he alleged unlawful
employment discrimination on the bases of disability, age, and in
reprisal for prior protected activity in violation of Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq., respectively. On September 10,
1996, complainant's complaint was resolved by the parties pursuant to
a settlement agreement. In or about May 2001, complainant informed the
agency that he was requesting that the settlement agreement be voided, and
that his case be re-opened. By letter dated July 3, 2001, the agency's
Acting Director implicitly refused to void the settlement agreement,
noting that complainant agreed to settle his claims, and that the agency
has fulfilled the terms of the settlement agreement. Complainant, through
his attorney, subsequently filed documentation entitled �Motion to Set
Aside Settlement Agreement� with this Commission, claiming that he had
been incompetent to enter into a settlement agreement on September 10,
1996, because he had major depression and anxiety disorder, and was unable
to demand what he felt was a fair settlement agreement. The Commission
considers this documentation to be an appeal and accepts it in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of
contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See O v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that
if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its
meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
The Commission will find the contract void if coercion, misrepresentation,
misinterpretation, or mistake occur during the formation of the contract,
making assent to the agreement impossible. See Shuman v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05900744 (July 20, 1990). Here, complainant
submits a letter from his psychiatrist, dated November 20, 2000, stating
the following:
[Complainant's] symptoms at the time included difficulty concentrating,
difficulty thinking clearly, difficulty making decisions, anxiety,
insomnia, and low self-esteem. These symptoms resulted in a
predisposition for [complainant] to feel intimidated and overwhelmed by
the court proceedings. Therefore, though he had previously spoken of his
desire to fight for what he believed he was owed for the extreme mental
and emotional stress on-the-job, he was unable to do so at the time of
the hearing. He was not able to marshal his resources to demand what
he believed was a fair hearing . . . [Complainant] felt a great deal
of pressure from [his attorney] and from the [Administrative Judge],
to settle the case . . .
First addressing the contention that complainant was pressured or coerced
into entering the settlement agreement, we note that the Commission
examines coercion claims with much scrutiny. The party raising the defense
of coercion must show that there was an improper threat of sufficient
gravity to induce assent to the agreement and that the assent was in
fact induced by the threat. Such a threat may be expressed, implied
or inferred from words or conduct, and must convey an intention to
cause harm or loss. A complainant's bare assertions will not justify
a finding of coercion. See Lenihan v. Department of the Navy, EEOC
Request No. 05960605 (December 5, 1995).
In the instant case, complainant has submitted no persuasive evidence
of coercion. Nor has he demonstrated that his assent to the agreement
was induced by any improper threat. We, therefore, cannot find
that complainant was coerced into signing the settlement agreement,
particularly since the agreement specifically states that it was entered
into �freely and without coercion.�
After a review of complainant's appeal, we cannot find that coercion, or
any other condition, existed to such an extent as to make complainant's
assent to the agreement impossible. Accordingly, the agency's decision
not to void the settlement agreement is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
October 20, 2003
__________________
Date