Waycross Sportswear, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 28, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 101 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

WAYCROSS SPORTSWEAR, INC. 101
Waycross Sportswear', Inc. and Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Cases
10-CA-6571 and 10-CA-6708
June 28,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On April 19, 1967, Trial Examiner William J.
Brown issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and the Charging Party
filed an answering brief to Respondent's exceptions
and cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the
cross-exceptions. the briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations 1 of the Trial Ex-
aminer.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
WILLIAM J. BROWN, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Act, came on
to be heard on January 16 to 20, 1967, at Waycross,
Georgia. The original charge of unfair labor practices in
Case 10-CA-6571 had been filed June 3, 1966,' by the
above-indicated Charging Party, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as the Union; it charged unfair labor practices
on the part of the above-indicated Respondent,
hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Company, within
the scope of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. An
amended charge filed June 28, alleged unfair labor prac-
tices solely within the scope of Section 8(a)(1).2 On Au-
gust 3, the complaint in Case 10-CA-6571 was issued by
the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations
Board for Region 10. It alleged, and the Company's duly
filed an answer denied, the commission of unfair labor
practices defined under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in the
nature of interrogation of employees concerning their ac-
tivities on behalf of the Union, threats of refusal to bar-
gain, and promises of benefits as inducements to abandon
support of the Union. The Company's duly filed answer
denied the allegations of unfair labor practices.
The charge in Case 10-CA-6708 was filed by the
Union on September 30, alleging refusal to bargain within
the scope of Section 8(a)(5) and complaint thereon issued
by the Regional Director on November 16, on which
latter date the two cases were consolidated for hearing.
The Company's answer denies the commission of the un-
fair labor practices alleged.
At the hearing the parties appeared and participated as
noted above with full opportunity to present evidence and
argument on the issues. Subsequent to the close of the
hearing, briefs were received on March 13, 1967, from all
parties, and they have been fully considered. On the en-
tire record herein and on the basis of my observation of
the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Waycross Sportswear.
Inc., Waycross, Georgia, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.2
I The Charging Party urges that, in view of Respondent's unlawful
refusal to bargain, the period during which its certification is immune from
attack should be extended for a period of one year. In view of our finding
that Respondent did not bargain in good faith from the inception of
negotiations, we shall grant the Charging Party's request, and extend the
normal certification year to the period of one year from the date when
Respondent begins to bargain in good faith with the Charging Party as the
recognized representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. See
Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc, 136 NLRB 785, Burnett Construction
Company, 149 NLRB 1419.
2 The address and telephone number for Region 10, appearing at the
bottom of the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, is
amended to read 730 Peachtree Street, N E., Room 701, Atlanta,
Georgia 30308, Telephone 526-5741.
166 NLRB No. 14
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY
The pleadings and evidence indicate and I find that the
Company is a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia with its
principal office and place of business at Waycross, Geor-
gia, where it is engaged in the manufacture of men's
wear.3 During the calendar year preceding issuance of
the complaint in Case 10-CA-6571 , admittedly a
representative period , the Company shipped finished
products valued in excess of $50,000 under orders from
firms and corporations located outside the State of Geor-
gia. In Case IO-CA-6571 the Company has admitted that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act ; in Case
10-CA-6708, it has denied this allegation of the com-
plaint. On the basis of the admissions in Case
10-CA-6771, the Decisions of the Board dated October
I Dates hereinafter relate to the year 1966 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The text of the charge, however, includes an allegation of unilateral
wage increases and changes in working conditions.
3 The Company has been at all material times a subsidiary of United
Pioneer Corp., of New York, New York, which latter concern became
controlled in August 1966 by Salant & Salant through stock ownership.
308-926 0-70-8
102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
25, 1965, in Case 10-RC-6471 and 10-CA-6370 (160
NLRB 11) dated July 1, 1966, and a stipulation in the in-
stant case, I find that the Company is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the purview of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act and that the volume of such commerce
warrants exercise of the Board's jurisdiction.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The pleadings and evidence indicate and I find that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Summary of Events
The Company has been engaged since some 7 years
prior to the hearing herein at its Waycross, Georgia, plant
in the manufacture of men's and boys' outerwear. For the
first 5 years of its operations it was located in an old
warehouse building on the edge of downtown Waycross.
For the last 2 years it had operated in a new plant in an in-
dustrial park development. From an initial employee
complement of some 30 to 40 employees it had grown by
the time of the hearing to about 125 production and main-
tenance employees. The plant usually works 51 weeks
per year with seasonal overtime in December and May or
June of each year. As is fairly common in the garment in-
dustry, some 80 to 90 percent of production employees
are employed on a piece-rate basis. The Company's prin-
cipal operating executive is Plant Manager John Al-
derman. His superiors, President Rudy Kiesler and Vice
President Milton Besen, reside in New York and occa-
sionally visit the plant. The pleadings and evidence
establish the supervisory status of Wanell Fales,4 sewing
department supervisor, and Louis Black, cutting depart-
ment supervisor, as of material dates.
Commencing sometime in July 1965, the Union con-
ducted an organizational campaign among company em-
ployees and a representation petition was filed on Sep-
tember 20, 1965. After a hearing an election was directed
on October 25, 1965, by the Regional Director.5 In the
election, conducted on November 19, 1965, the tally of
ballots showed 65 valid votes for the Union, 56 valid
votes against the Union, and 1 challenged ballot. Em-
ployer objections to the election, filed November 29,
1965, were overruled on December 14, 1965, and the
Union was certified on that date as representative of em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, viz: all production and
maintenance employees of the Company at its Waycross,
Georgia, plant, including floor help, but excluding office
clerical employees, professional employees, guards, su-
pervisors of the cutting, sewing, shipping, and main-
tenance departments and all other supervisors as defined
in the Act.
In the interim, by letter dated December 7, 1965, the
Union had requested a meeting on December 28 and 29,
1965, for the purpose of collective bargaining and the
Company had by letter of its attorney, E. Kontz Bennett,
dated December 14, refused the Union's request for
December bargaining meetings on the ground that objec-
4 Wanell Fales appears to have been in a nonsupervisory status at the
time of a representation election held on November 19, 1965, but had
become a supervisor by June 1966.
5 An amended direction issued November 2, 1965.
tions were still pending and certification of the Union had
not issued. On December 21, 1965, the Union renewed
its request for a meeting, proposed for January 12; by
letter of December 29, Bennett agreed to a meeting on
that date.
The parties met in collective-bargaining sessions on
January 12 and on 20 days thereafter in the period Janu-
ary 25 through September 29. As noted above the Union
filed a charge of unfair labor practices, including refusal
to bargain, on June 3 and withdrew the refusal-to-bargain
allegations on June 28, only to renew it on September 30,
the day following the last collective-bargaining session.
On November 7, Union Attorney Robert J. Rabin
telephoned Bennett and requested renewal of the bargain-
ing sessions but was informed that Bennett was engaged
in preparation for hearing on unfair labor practices
charges; Rabin repeated his request for bargaining
meetings by telegram to Bennett on November 7 and
again by letters on November 28 and December 13.6 By
telegram of January 6, 1967, Bennett offered to resume
bargaining, suggesting that the resumption be set for the
date following conclusion of the hearing in the instant
case. By telegram of January 9, 1967, Rabin accepted
this offer. On January 13, 1967, Bennett wired Rabin
stating that the Company proposed a 15-cent wage ad-
justment on January 23, 1967, and asserting a desire to
discuss the matter while Rabin was in Waycross on the
present case; Rabin's telegraphic reply of January 13,
1967, protested the date of January 16 as unsuitable and
asserting that the Company's refusal to permit the Union
to observe operations and piece rates precluded the
Union's formulating an intelligent position on the matter
of the proposed adjustment.
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The complaint alleges and the answer denies that on or
about December 16, 1965, President Kiesler interrogated
employees in the plant concerning their union activities
and threatened them with the statement that the Com-
pany would not negotiate with the recently certified
Union, and that on the same occasion Vice President
Besen threatened employees by stating that the Company
would sell the plant rather than sign a collective-bargain-
ing contract with the Union.
The evidence indicates that the Company has spon-
sored annual Christmas parties since 1960 at which work
is stopped shortly before noon and employees and the su-
pervisory staff partake of a lunch, complete with spiked
punch, and participate in an exchange of gifts program.
The party held on December 16, 1965, was the first one
attended by President Kiesler. At the 1965 party Kiesler
and Besen joined in the imbibing but were apparently still
depressed over the Union's victory in the election and its
certification only recently announced to the parties.
Barbara Ann Hall, a machine operator with 7 years'
service with the Company and an active union supporter,
testified that after the lunch served at the 1965 Christmas
party, Kiesler motioned her into Alderman's office and
after some preliminary remarks said to her that he would
never negotiate with the Union. She also testified that
Vice President Besen, who had entered the office shortly
' Rabin's December 13 letter included a reminder concerning applica-
bility of Federal mimmum wage changes in February 1967, and an ad-
monition that any wage adjustments would have to be discussed with the
Union
WAYCROSS SPORTSWEAR, INC. 103
after the start of her talk with Kiesler, said to her, in con-
nection with a remark by Kiesler that the Union had told
him that he could not close or sell the plant, that if he
were given 2 weeks he could have six plants in operation
or he could sell the Waycross plant or turn it into a
warehouse with only two employees.
Neither Kiesler nor Besen testified and Alderman did
not contradict the account given of the utterances at the
1965 Christmas party by Hall. I found her a convincing
and credible witness and find that on the occasion in
question Kiesler and Besen threatened her with refusal to
negotiate with the Union and with the prospect of selling
the plant rather than negotiating with the Union. These
direct threats of reprisal as a consequence of employee
selection of the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative were clearly instances of interference with
and restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act and unfair labor
practices within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
With respect to the question as to whether or not
Kiesler's remarks on the occasion of the party constituted
interrogation of Hall concerning employees' union mem-
bership, activities, and desires, the question is whether or
not, the preliminary remarks above mentioned amounted
to such interrogation. In those preliminary remarks
Kiesler stated to Hall by way of opening the conversation
"I hear that you said that you're going to make me
negotiate with the Union?" and when Hall denied having
said that, Kiesler continued with "Well, how are you
going to make me? Are you going to put a gun on me and
force me?"
While General Counsel cites no authority regarding
this type of question as an unfair labor practice in the na-
ture of interrogation concerning union membership,
desires, and activities, I am convinced that on principle
it must be regarded as interference within the scope of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act inasmuch as the nature of the
question put to Hall could only have the purpose and ef-
fect of intimidating her in the full exercise of her rights to
representation by the Union.
With respect to the allegations of Section 9 of the com-
plaint to the effect that Cutting Room Supervisor Louise
Black, whose supervisory status is conceded, threatened
employees on or about January 13 and February 15 that
the Company would not sign a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union, Shirley Ann Bishop, an em-
ployee working under the supervision of Louise Black in
the cutting department, testified that on January 13, the
day after the first negotiating session, Louise Black ap-
proached her at work and said that she could be brought
out of the negotiations any time she was needed in the
plant. Black then added, according to Bishop, that she
could not see why they were negotiating and that it was
a waste of time inasmuch as Kiesler had told her that he
would never sign a contract. Bishop testified that about
the middle of February, Louise Black repeated the state-
ments to the effect that the negotiations were a waste of
time since Kiesler had said he would never sign a con-
tract.
Supervisor Black did not testify and I credit the
testimony of Bishop. In accordance with her testimony I
find that the Company, through Supervisor Black,
threatened employee Bishop by statements that negotia-
tions were a waste of time and that the Company would
never sign a collective-bargaining contract, thereby en-
gaging in unfair labor practices defined within Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint.
Wilma Copeland, an odd job employee of the cutting
department under the supervision of Wanell Fates,
testified that on June 9 Fates approached her for a
heart-to-heart talk and asked her how she would like to
set collars (a higher rated job); when Copeland indicated
her interest, Fates, after reminding her that she had previ-
ously questioned Copeland concerning her reason for
supporting the Union, then told her that if she came over
to "our way" it would be to her advantage. I find that this
amounted to a promise of benefit in return for abandon-
ment of support of the Union and an unfair labor practice
within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In making
this finding I am convinced that the statements of Fates
plainly contrasted union support with "our way," i.e., the
Company's way, and promised benefits for a switch in
Copeland's allegiance from the Union to the Company.
C. The Refusal to Bargain
As noted above the Union was certified as the statuto-
ry representative of company employees on December
14, 1965, and the parties met thereafter in a series of col-
lective-bargaining meetings between January 12 and Sep-
tember 29 without reaching agreement on the terms of a
contract. The General Counsel contends that a refusal to
bargain within the meaning of the obligation imposed by
the Act is shown by (1) company imposed limitations on
the duration and frequency of bargaining sessions, (2)
company refusal to permit a qualified union representa-
tive to enter the plant to study operations and appraise
rates, and (3) the totality of the Company's conduct, al-
leged to amount to mere "surface bargaining" designed to
frustrate genuine agreement particularly when viewed in
the light of the other unfair labor practices of the Com-
pany, discussed herein and found by the Board in Case
10-CA-6370, 160 NLRB 11, to have been committed.
The Charging Union's brief parallels the contentions of
the General Counsel and further asserts that the Com-
pany's refusal to bargain is shown by (1) its refusal to
meet after the September 29 session, and (2) its in-
sistence on deferring discussion of economic issues until
agreement had been reached on noneconomic matters.
The Company contends that it has at all times bar-
gained in good faith and under extreme difficulty in view
of the fact that this was its first collective-bargaining ex-
perience and in view of insistence on the part of the
Union in retaining in any agreement many of the clauses
incorporated in the Standard Garment Industry Agree-
ment which formed the basis of negotiations.7
Following the exchange of letters, above referred to, in
which the Union requested bargaining following the elec-
tion but while company objections thereto were pending
and the Company refused this request, the Union, on
December 21, 1965, wrote Bennett referring to the cer-
tification and requesting a bargaining meeting at
Waycross on January 12. On December 29, 1965,
Bennett agreed to meet on January 12, suggested the
Ware Hotel as a meeting place, and advised that the com-
pany representatives would be Bennett, as chief negotia-
7 It does not appear that Company objected to use of the Union's Cot-
ton Garment Model Agreement (G.C Exh 12(a)) as the basis for discus-
sion.
104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tor, and Plant Manager Alderman.
The January 12 meeting was held as scheduled at the
Ware Hotel. Representing the Union were Charles Eng-
lish, the Union 's vice president for the southern area,
Joel Field , assistant general counsel , Edward Blair, the
Union's southern organizing director , Mrs. Oma Barton,
a union vice president and its Georgia director, Tama
Vanooyen, a union organizer , and a four-man employee
negotiating team. The Company was represented by At-
torney Pedrick , Bennett being absent due to illness of his
wife, and Plant Manager Alderman , Pedrick stated, and
the Union apparently did not disagree , that the purpose
of the first meeting would be to receive the Union's initial
proposals and to receive explanations from the Union
with respect to matters on which the Company had
questions . The Union furnished a copy of its Cotton Gar-
ment Model Agreement (G.C. Exh. 12(a)) a 17-page col-
lective-bargaining outline agreement containing nu-
merous provisions customarily incorporated in such
agreements . The Union also furnished a printed Supple-
mental Agreement relating to retirement and insurance
benefits . (G.C. Exh. 13.)8
The first meeting lasted about 2 hours and in the course
of exploring the provisions of the Union ' s model agree-
ment. Pedrick, according to the testimony of Field which
is undenied and credited , stated that there would be no ar-
bitration clause in any agreement signed by the Compa
ny 9 It does appear , however, that in subsequent
meetings Bennett indicated that the Company had no flat
opposition to arbitration in general . At the conclusion of
the January 12 meeting , the Company acceded to the
Union's request that subsequent meetings would be of at
least 2 days' duration. In the course of the January 12
meeting the Union had asked that Barton , a recognized
expert on piece rates in the garment industry , be per-
mitted entry into the plant for the purpose of studying
operations and rates. At that time and subsequently, the
Company, while acknowledging the accomplishments
and character of Barton, refused her entry to the plant.
The first full-fledged bargaining sessions were held at
the Ware Hotel on January 25 and 26. At this time the
Company accepted the Union 's proposal that meetings be
held on 2 consecutive days but the Union, apparently
with considerable reluctance, accepted the time limita-
tions imposed by Bennett which restricted working ses-
sions to the hours of 9 : 30 to 11 a.m., luncheon , then after-
noon sessions from 2 to 5 p.m. On several occasions on
the second bargaining day the Union 's negotiators asked
to be excused a half hour or so prior to 5 p.m. so that they
could make plane connections to their home offices,
generally, however , indicating their willingness to work
if substantial periods beyond 5 p.m. would be granted by
the Company 's representatives for the purpose of con-
tinued bargaining . Union representatives testified and
their testimony is uncontradicted and credited by me, that
they continuously sought additional hours and days for
collective-bargaining meetings.
8 Field testified, and his testimony is not contradicted , that the Union
never presented a demand for retirement benefits ; it did, however, make
proposals for an insurance program to be handled through the Amalga-
mated Life Insurance Company, Inc of New York, New York, anoint
union-employer managed program.
9 This statement of Pedrick , in the light of Kiesler 's refusal to accept a
certified letter from the Union on December 21, 1965, and Field's mfor-
At the outset of the January sessions Bennett explained
that while he would be the chief negotiator for the Com-
pany any agreement would be subject to the approval of
the Company's (or its parent's) board of directors and
that noneconomic matters would have to be discussed
first before proceeding to discussion of economic sub-
jects. In the later January meetings the Union repeated its
proposal that Barton be permitted to enter the plant to
study piece-rate operations but the Company then and
thereafter persisted in its refusal to allow a union
representative in the plant during working hours.
Agreement was reached during the January meetings
on certain items. Thus the coverage and recognition
clauses were accepted (without, however, the bulletin
board or visitation subsidiaries) as was the substance of
the probationary clause. The Company accepted the
clauses requiring the payment of overtime after 40 hours
in any week (as required by Federal law) and the payment
of premium rates for Sunday work (prohibited by Georgia
law); it refused however, premium rates for overtime
after 8 hours in any one day, but agreed to payment of a
second-shift premium (although the Company never
worked a second shift).
Commencing in the January meetings and continuing
thereafter the parties lost considerable valuable time that
might otherwise have been devoted to bargaining by
somewhat extended discussion of extraneous items, in-
troduced in virtually all instances by Bennett.1° Field
conceded that the Union did not protest the intrusion of
these nonbargaining discussions although it resented the
time taken away from discussions. The subjects included
in these extracurricular talks embraced such matters as
the organization of Catholic priests, the then recent New
York subway strike, certain problems of pregnancy, and
Waycross customs. General Counsel's witnesses placed
the time spent on these matters as substantial in relation
to the limited hours made available by the Company for
bargaining and, while Alderman minimized the time spent
and testified that union bargainers were equally guilty, I
credit the General Counsel's witnesses in this regard and
find that the Company introduced these extraneous mat-
ters into a considerably curtailed bargaining period with
the inevitable effect of increasing the difficulty of attain-
ing agreement.
The February sessions were held on the 24th and 25th
of the month. Again economic issues were postponed in
view of the Company's position on concluding discussion
of noneconomic matters first; there was, however, an in-
trusion of an economic matter by the Company's an-
nouncement toward the end of the morning session of
February 24 that it proposed to give a 10-cent increase to
five named hourly rated employees. English considered
this proposal and after lunch asserted the Union's posi-
tion that the Union had no objection to the increase in
case of four of the employees but that if the fifth were in-
creased, a like increase should be granted to others in his
department. Nothing more was heard of the subject until
matron concerning Bennett's prior collective-bargaining experiences ap-
parently predisposed Field to apprehend that bargaining would be difficult
and the evidence indicates that he may well have approached the bargain-
ing table with a chip on his shoulder.
10 I credit General Counsel witnesses with respect to this matter, par-
ticularly in view of Alderman's concession that he did not know who
initiated these diversions
WAYCROSS SPORTSWEAR , INC. 105
the Company announced in the March meetings that the
increase had been given to the five as originally proposed
by the Company."
During the course of the February meetings, according
to Field. whose testimony I credit, the Company sub-
mitted counterproposals on a grievance procedure and on
company rules. Among the Company's proposals with
respect to grievances was its insistence that employees
have the right to submit unresolved grievances to arbitra-
tion as to which Field took the position that Bennett was
merely seeking to increase the volume of his own prac-
tice. The Union, during the February meetings, again de-
manded information as to the piece rates in effect in order
to appraise them against the statements of employee
earnings previously submitted but the rates were not
furnished at that time. During the February meetings the
parties completed their reading through the Union's
model agreement and the Union made proposals of a
10-cent hourly increase, an increase in paid holidays to
three for the first year. and an additional holiday each
year on a 3-year agreement. Bennett insisted during the
February meetings, according to Field, that grievance
discussions be held after working hours, but the Union
pointed out that the bulk of grievances would most
probably concern piece rates which would necessarily
have to be observed during the hours of plant operation.
During the February meetings there was extended
discussion of the Union's proposal for a checkoff and a
question arose as to the irrevocability feature thereof in
the light of Georgia statutes on the subject; at one point
the Union proposed that the union representative enter
the plant to collect dues 12 and at another stage offered to
reimburse the Company for the bookkeeping cost of
checking off. During the February meetings. Fields
testified and I credit him, that English offered to stay for
a third day of each bargaining session or alternatively to
continue meetings into the nighttime; Bennett rejected
these proposals.
The March meetings were held on March 10 and 11.
The union group was enlarged by the addition of Union
Representatives Ed Blair and Mrs. McGill, and a Mr.
Dameron.13 Field conceded that he might have in-
troduced either Blair or McGill as the person who would
handle the picket line in the event of a strike and I find
that there was some discussion of the possibility of a
strike at these sessions with Bennett requesting a state-
ment of items in dispute in the event he were requested by
the Conciliation Service for such material. In any event
it is clear from the testimony that the union representa-
tives assured the Company that they were not planning a
strike.
The March meetings opened with an offer from
Bennett to increase the number of proposed paid
holidays; this was, however, coupled with a company
proposal to compute vacation pay on the basis of 2 per-
cent of earnings which would amount to a reduction from
the existing practice of paying 2 weeks' pay. The Union
renewed its request for piece rates of jobs and the infor-
mation was supplied during the March sessions although
the Company again refused the union request that its
specialist be permitted to enter the plant to study opera-
tions and rates therefor. The union insurance proposal
came in for extended discussion during the March ses-
sions and the Union sought to allay company apprehen-
sion that the Union controlled its proposed insurer by
pointing out that the union-proposed plan qualified under
Federal and Georgia law. There was also discussion
respecting the matter of inclusion of dependents under
any plan with the Union pointing out that they were
generally covered under the union plan in other plants.
The Company again asserted the position with respect to
the grievance subject that individual employees have the
right to initiate arbitration. Some items were agreed on
during the March meetings; namely, notice in advance of
overtime work and the standard workweek. In this meet-
ing and others there was considerable discussion of the
Union's proposal that an employee permanently laid off
in discontinuance of a job could "bump" the least senior
employee in the plant, with Bennett according to Field,
continuously protesting that this could lead to chain
bumping and the Union pointing out that the proposal ob-
viously involved a single bump. 14
During the March meetings the Company agreed to
supply the Union a list of new hires which had previously
been denied it. These meetings also included extended
discussion of the subject of setting piece rates for a new
or changed operation with the Union initially proposing
that the rate be set to yield the previous average hourly
earnings of the section involved and the Company re-
peatedly asserting that such an adjustment would have
the inherent vice of perpetuating any error preexisting in
the old rates and the Union replying that any inequity in
the old rate would itself be up for adjustment in connec-
tion with the change.
In the April and subsequent meetings Barton, who had
attended all previous bargaining sessions, replaced Eng-
lish as the Union's chief negotiator. One of the April ses-
sions also involved the absence of Bennett who was
replaced either for the morning or afternoon session by
either Attorney Pedrick or Attorney Bennett. Junior. The
Union, which had been by this time supplied with
piece-rate information, requested an increase and was in-
formed by the Company that its competitive position
precluded any increase. When the Union asked the names
of its competitors Bennett, according to Field whom I
credit in this regard, replied that he did not know. In the
April sessions the Union requested the annual payrolls in
connection with the company proposal to compute vaca-
11 Alderman testified that the Company proceeded to grant the in-
creases to the five employees after the union representatives stated that
although they did not approve of the increase to employee Frank Taylor
unless other employees received a like increase, the Company could go
ahead and grant it. Shirley Ann Bishop, a member of the negotiating team,
testified concerning other matters in the case but not concerning discus-
sion of this February wage increase. I credit Alderman's testimony that
the Company proceeded to grant this increase on the basis of its recollec-
tion that the Union reluctantly acceded to it.
12 To this proposal the Company's response was that the union
representative could stand outside the plant on the public street, not on
the Company's parking lot, to collect dues.
1 3 Dameron apparently attended merely as an onlooker while waiting to
drive English to another appointment The Company apparently appre-
hended that the union group had been enlarged as a sort of show of
strength but this does not appear to have materially affected the course of
the bargaining . The March meetings were hampered to some extent by the
fact that Bennett appeared about an hour late for one of the sessions and
at another meeting English appeared an hour late.
14 Field testified that this subject was unduly protracted during the
March, April , and May sessions due to Bennett's insistence that he
wanted to avoid a series of bumps as occasionally occurs in the railroad in-
dustry. I credit this testimony which was not contradicted by Alderman.
106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion earnings as a percentage of annual earnings but these
were never supplied. The employee's right to bring
grievances to arbitration came up again and at this point
Field called Bennett an opprobrious name and Bennett
threatened to break off negotiations. Another element
serving to affect adversely the April meetings arose when
Bennett called Field and Barton out into the hall during
a session and Served them with legal process in connec-
tion with a company lawsuit against the Union arising out
of what the Company called a secondary boycott and the
Union called a consumer education campaign. Whatever
name be applied, the service of process during the course
of negotiations clearly appears to me to be an unwar-
ranted and prejudicial interference with the course of col-
lective bargaining. Notwithstanding these disharmonies
the April meetings produced agreement on the grievance
machinery, without however resolving the question of ar-
bitration as a terminal point.
The meetings of May 5 and 6, included a written de-
mand from the Company to the Union (G.C. Exh. 19)
that the Union furnish the Company with a list of persons
solicited by the Union to cancel orders from United
Pioneer or Dun Cannon Sportswear, Inc. (the latter ap-
parently an affiliate of United Pioneer).15 The May
meetings also involved a private request by Field to Al-
derman that those two meet separately inasmuch as the
negotiations were getting nowhere. Alderman stated that
he did not have authority to meet apart from Bennett and
soon thereafter Bennett stated that there would be no
private meetings. These meetings included added discus-
sion of the insurance proposal. waiting and reporting
time, and the bulletin board clause on which agreement
was reached.
In June Attorney Rabin joined the Union's legal staff
and accompanied Field to the June 16 and 17 bargaining
session.16 In the first day of the June sessions the Com-
pany, according to Rabin's testimony, presented written
counterproposals on wages and agreement was reached
on some articles of the model agreement but a lengthy
discussion occurred concerning article VI, B. relating to
rates for new or changed operation, with a renewal of the
discussion concerning perpetuation of inequities. With
respect to article VI. F and G, relating to pay for report-
ing and waiting time the Company, which had previously
offered average earnings on reporting and the federal
minimum on waiting time. reversed these positions.
Discussions followed concerning daily overtime after 8
hours. The first June session also included renewed
discussion of bumping with Field again stating that the
Union's proposal permitted only one bump. Rabin's
testimony concerning the general tenor of the June
meetings and those thereafter is to the effect that they
were marked by courtesy and pleasantries and that there
was some give and take on the subject of rates for new or
changed operations although no agreement was reached.
The subject of inclusion of the Company's rules in any
agreement reached came in for extended discussion and
according to Rabin took most of the time on June 17, the
Union being apprehensive of a position of appearing to be
a cosponsor of disciplinary rules which might prove unac-
ceptable to employees as an agreed-upon matter. During
the course of the June meetings Bennett accused the
Union of bad faith in coercing customers and threatened
to break off the bargaining or file unfair labor practice
charges.
In the July 12 and 13 meetings Rabin commenced
reading a list of items already agreed upon but Bennett in-
terrupted to engage in rediscussion of these items with
particular emphasis on item II, B, of the Union's model
agreement relating to the union agent's visiting plant at
any time during working hours, a proposal which Rabin
offered to modify by establishing a regular schedule for
such visitation. During the course of this discussion
Rabin and Barton were summoned out into the hall where
Bennett's son served them with process in a lawsuit.
When they returned to the meeting they were presented
with a written demand (G.C. Exh. 20) for $50,000
damages estimated to have been incurred by the Com-
pany due to cancellation of orders by a list of 12 named
retailers. After the lunch break Rabin asked Bennett if the
demand were serious and Bennett replied that the Union
could either accept or reject it. At that time Barton re-
peated her request to be permitted entry into the plant to
inspect operations and Bennett stated that Alderman's or-
ders were to run the plant without outside disturbances.
The next meetings took place on August 10 and 1 I and
24 and 25.17 Between the July and August meetings
Rabin prepared a Summary of Contract Negotiations as
of August 3 (G.C. Exh. 21) which was accepted by
Bennett as an accurate statement thereof. This summary
was reviewed in the first August meetings but Bennett
desired renewed discussion of items indicated in the sum-
mary as already agreed upon. Bennett also presented
proposals concerning plant visitation by union represen-
tatives and the furnishing of payroll and production
records but they amounted to no more than restatements
of the Company's original proposals. Nevertheless the
Union accepted the Company's proposals on plant visita-
tion (G.C. Exh. 25) and on management rights (G.C. Exh.
27). The entire afternoon of August 11 was spent on
discussion of the vacation issue and the major part of Au-
gust 10 had been occupied with discussion of the leaves
of absence clause.
In the August 24 and 25 meetings Barton again asked
permission to enter the plant but the Company refused
her request.18 The Company stood fast on its vacation
15 The Union conducted a consumer education campaign and certain
labor councils visited retail outlets in New England to advise them of the
situation in Waycross. The Union also at some time picketed the
headquarters of United Pioneer in New York City.
11 As noted above the original charge of unfair labor practices herein
filed June 3, included a charge of refusal to bargain under Section 8(a)(5);
following the June sessions Rabin filed an amended charge , excluding
reference to Section 8(a)(5), on which complaint issued August 3. Attor-
ney Bennett claims this is an admission in judicio to the effect that as of
August 3 there had occurred no refusal to bargain. This claim is rejected
by me since it is clear that estoppel does not work against the Board and
the union action in question appears to have been taken in expectation of
its facilitating agreement but without prejudice to the right to file amended
charges subsequently within the limitation period of Section 10(b) of the
Act.
17 During the July sessions Rabin had proposed a 3-day meeting in Au-
gust after Bennett indicated that he was free on August 3, 4, and 5, but
Bennett vetoed the 3-day proposal and they later agreed on the two 2-day
sessions. At the outset of the August sessions Barton proposed that the
meetings commence at 8:30 a in . and continue into the evening if necessa-
ry but Bennett rejected this proposal
11 General Counsel's Exh. 28 is a written demand of August 24 for per-
mission for an authorized union representative to enter the plant to study
operations and piece rates and thereby formulate a wage proposal in
negotiations and evaluate the Company's position on maintenance of
earnings and perpetuation of inequities in case of new or changed opera-
tions. This apparently merely reduced to writing demands that had previ-
ously been orally submitted.
WAYCROSS SPORTSWEAR, INC.
proposal and Bennett stated that there would be three or
four paid holidays at most. The grievance clause was
reviewed with Bennett remaining fast in his position that
employees should have the right to refer matters to ar-
bitration. The union negotiators asked Bennett for the
earliest date for the September meeting and he set it as
September 28 and 29.
Prior to the resumption of sessions, Rabin sent Bennett
under date of September 19, a draft of a proposed provi-
sion relating to leaves of absence with the caveat that he
had not consulted Barton or the negotiating committee
and hence the transmittal could not be considered as a
firm union proposal. At the September 28 session how-
ever, it became the basis of discussion on leaves of
absence. The parties also discussed the grievance and
no-strike clauses and Barton repeated her request for
leave to enter the plant which request was refused. Rabin
raised the matter of Salant & Salant's acquisition of con-
trol of the plant and inquired as to Bennett's bargaining
authority. Bennett's reply was that he had authority to
bargain and conclude discussion as to noneconomic mat-
ters but that the parent company would have to become
involved on economic issues. On the second day of the
September sessions, Bennett was absent due to illness of
his wife and the Company was represented by Bennett,
Junior, and Alderman. 19 During the morning the meetings
were terminated and Alderman asked Rabin to prepare a
summary of all matters agreed upon. Rabin, on October
19, forwarded the summary. (G.C. Exh. 30.) Having
received no reply by November 7 Rabin telephoned
Bennett requesting a meeting; Bennett refused to meet on
the ground that he was preparing for the hearing in the in-
stant case, and Rabin sent a telegraphic request (G.C.
Exh. 31) for resumption of bargaining at the earliest
possible time.
Again on November 28 Rabin wrote Bennett (G.C.
Exh. 32) referring to the postponement of the hearing
until January 16, 1967, and requesting dates for resump-
tion of bargaining. Receiving no reply by December 13,
Rabin wrote Bennett again (G.C. Exh. 33) requesting bar-
gaining before the January 16, 1967, hearing. Bennett
replied by telegram of January 6, 1967, proposing a 2-day
resumption of bargaining on the conclusion of the hearing
in the present case. By telegram of January 9, 1967, while
protesting delay, Rabin accepted the offer to bargain after
the hearing. On January 13, 1967, Bennett wired Rabin
stating that the Company proposed a 15-cent wage in-
crease, as adjusted, on January 23, 1967, and requesting
discussion on the matter on January 16. By telegram of
January 13, 1967, Rabin protested the last-minute
proposal on wages and, referring to the often stated com-
pany position that Bennett's principals would have to at-
tend wage adjustment discussions, refused to negotiate
unless such principals were present. The telegram also as-
serted that in the absence of a union study of existing
piece rates it could not intelligently evaluate the proposal.
19 At one point Bennett appeared at the meetings but was soon called
out of the session.
20 The Union's brief breaks its position down into 10 categories but
they are all essentially encompassed within the 3 topics above set forth.
21 In the hearing and in its brief the Company seems to place considera-
ble reliance on the fact that the Union's charges relating to Section 8(a)(5)
were at one stage withdrawn and that the original complaint had no
reference to Section 8(a)(5). The evidence indicates to me, however, and
I credit Rabin on this, that the Union after early meetings felt that the
Company was not negotiating in good faith but that there was some possi-
bility of the parent company entering the negotiations and that Rabin
107
In their briefs General Counsel and the Union assert
that the Company engaged in an unlawful refusal to bar-
gain within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
(1) unreasonable limitations upon the time available for
bargaining, (2) adamant refusal to permit the Union entry
into the plant to study piece-rate operations, and (3) the
totality of its conduct at and away from the bargaining
table which indicates a determination to avoid agree-
ment .20 The Company denies refusing to bargain and
asserts that the pattern of the bargaining discussions
indicates that the Union's objective was to insist upon
company acceptance of its particular positions without
fair consideration being given to the particular problems
of the Company.21
With respect to the Company's persistence in its
refusal to allow a union representative to enter the plant
during working hours to appraise piece-rate operations it
must be remembered that the Union approached bargain-
ing with the knowledge that the bulk of garment industry
employees are compensated on a piece-rate basis and, as
Alderman conceded 80 to 90 percent of company em-
ployees in the bargaining unit are paid on that basis. Eng-
lish testified, and I credit him, that the Union asked
piece-rate information at the first bargaining session but
the rates themselves were not furnished until sometime
in March and, when furnished, indicated that they
averaged out to an hourly rate of $1.19, necessitating
some substantial adjustment to comply with the Federal
minimum wage. When this was pointed out to Bennett his
response was that the rates previously furnished by the
Company were not representative of the entire group of
piece-rate employees.
From the outset of negotiations the union representa-
tives requested permission for Barton to enter the plant
to study piece operations and rates therefor and while ac-
knowledging the character and qualifications of Barton 22
the Company, from the first and throughout the nego-
tiations, refused her entry into the plant. The neces-
sary effect of the Company's refusal to permit a qualified
union representative into the plant to study piece rates
and operations was to preclude the Union from access to
information absolutely necessary to the formulation of an
intelligent proposal on the wage issue and amounted to a
refusal to bargain in good faith. The Fafnir Bearing Com-
pany, 146 NLRB 1582, enfd. 362 F.2d 712 (C.A. 2).
With respect to the General Counsel's and Union's
positions 23 that the limitations imposed by Attorney
Bennett on the length and frequency of bargaining ses-
sions constituted per se a refusal to bargain, I credit the
testimony to the effect that Bennett , the Company's chief
negotiator, insisted on time limitations which, as the
Union's brief points out, allowed only 9 hours per month
on an average, save for August when double sessions
were held, although the Union often protested the time
limitations imposed by Bennett and several times asked
for evening and Saturday meetings . The time limitations
preferred not to commence his bargaining with a refusal-to-bargain charge
pending.
22 The Company similarly never questioned the qualifications of Union
Representative Hinton to discuss any grievances in piece rates that might
arise after the execution of any agreement.
23 The General Counsel also asserts that the Company's refusal to bar-
gain until after the certification issued was an unfair labor practice. I be-
lieve that the Company, whose objections to conduct affecting the elec-
tion were pending, was within its rights in declining to meet until the is-
suance of the certification
108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
imposed by the Company must be adjudged not only per
se but in the light of the substantial body of evidence in-
dicating the volume of time dissipated, in most instances
by Bennett, in discussion of extraneous matters unrelated
to collective bargaining or the issues between the parties,
and the frequent requests by Bennett for a recapitulation
of prior discussions and information as to the status of is-
sues.
The statutory obligation to bargain with bona fide effort
to reach agreement is not satisfied by the allowance of
meetings restricted to an infinitesimal portion of the
working month. The Lock Nut Corporation of America,
77 NLRB 600; nor can an employer be heard to insist
that he bargained in good faith when he unreasonably
restricted the time available for bargaining. Insulating
Fabricators, Inc. 144 NLRB 1325, enfd. 338 F.2d 1002
(C.A. 4).
Under the circumstances of this case I find and con-
clude that the Company engaged in a refusal to bargain by
its imposition of limitations on the hours and frequency
of meetings. These time limitations appear particularly
significant in this case where the parties were negotiating
a first agreement and where they apparently faced the
prospect of parent company approval of any agreement
as to economic matters a factor tending, in my appraisal,
to indicate even more strongly than normally the necessi-
ty for all deliberate speed in their own discussions.
I also find and conclude that the totality of the Com-
pany's conduct throughout the bargaining indicated that
the purpose and intent of the Company at all times was to
engage in fruitless discussion with no sincere attempt to
arrive at a collective-bargaining agreement and was in
short what has come to be known as "surface bargain-
ing"; i.e., meaningless mechanics of discussion with in-
tent to avoid substantial agreement and the execution of
a signed agreement. In this regard it is worthy of note that
with respect to economic matters the Company insisted
both on their postponement pending agreement on
noneconomic matters and the approval of the Company's
principals in New York as to economic issues. When the
Union requested that Kiesler attend the meetings or that
English be permitted to discuss economic issues with
Kiesler in New York, these requests were rejected.24 It
is also of significance that a large bulk of concessions
made by the Company were either as to matters required
by law or were of little or no significance to the parties.
Thus Sunday overtime was allowed, but the plant under
Georgia law does not operate on Sundays. Weekly over-
time was accepted, but that is an element demanded by
Federal law. Night-shift differentials were approved; but
the Company seldom or never operates a night shift. The
vacation proposal of the Company actually amounted to
a reduction of existing benefits. All the foregoing must be
considered in the light of Kiesler's remarks on the occa-
sion of the 1965 Christmas party that he would never
negotiate and the Kiesler-Besen threat to sell the plant on
that occasion rather than negotiate.
Furthermore the conduct of the Company in the bar-
gaining sessions must be evaluated against its earlier un-
fair labor practices (160 NLRB 11) in the nature of dis-
criminatory discharge of union supporters, interrogation
of employees as to their union activities, and the sponsor-
ship of an unaffiliated employee committee as a substitute
for a genuine collective-bargaining agent. On the basis of
all the foregoing, I find and conclude that the 1966 bar-
gaining sessions were entered into by the Company with
the purpose of avoiding any collective-bargaining agree-
ment and the conduct of the company representatives
throughout the bargaining was motivated throughout by
a fixed opposition to the principle of genuine collective
bargaining. The evidence viewed in its totality established
that the Company has engaged in a refusal to bargain in
good faith and in a sincere attempt to arrive at an agree-
ment.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent Company set forth in
section III, above, and there found to constitute unfair
labor practices occurring in connection with the opera-
tions of the Company set forth in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing such com-
merce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
In view of the findings outlined above to the effect that
the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices
defined in Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it will be
recommended that the Company be required to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practices and take such affir-
mative action as appears necessary and appropriate to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act. In the circumstances of
this case there appears merit in the Union's suggestion
that such affirmative relief include the requirement that
further delay of discussion of economic matters be
prohibited and that the Company be required to be
represented at the bargaining table with a negotiator em-
powered to reach final agreement on economic issues.25
In view of the importance of union understanding of the
wage structure as a key to intelligent discussion the Com-
pany should be required to permit immediate access to
the plant on the part of Barton or some other qualified
piece-rate expert for the purpose of study and evaluation
of the Company's rate structure.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
1' With respect to discussions concerning piece rates, Plant Manager
Alderman, whose testimony indicates his expertise in this area, appears to
have been restricted to a virtually completely passive role in the bargain-
ing sessions.
25 The Union has also suggested that any bargaining order include
minimum requirements as to frequency and duration of sessions This
would appear to be an intrusion into mechanics of bargaining and could
well be productive of further disagreement The cease-and-desist relief
recommended is designed to preclude arbitrary and unreasonable com-
pany limitations on the time available for bargaining. The Union has also
urged that the bargaining period be extended for a period of I year during
which the Union's certification should be immune from attack; this ap-
pears to be a matter better left to the Board's discretion under Section
9(c)(1) of the Act. With respect to the Union's request that a union or
Board representative should be allowed entry to the plant during working
hours to explain to employees the nature of the Company's unfair labor
practices and the remedial relief relating thereto, I believe that the posting
of the notices as herein provided, coupled with prompt resumption of the
bargaining, will adequately inform employees in this regard
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WAYCROSS SPORTSWEAR, INC. 109
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the pur-
view of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening employees that it would not
negotiate for or sign a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union, the Company has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the scope of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
4. By interrogating employees as to their activities on
behalf of the Union, the Company has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
5. By threatening employees that it would sell the
plant rather than sign a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union, the Company has engaged in unfair labor
practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By promising an employee benefits in return for her
abandonment of support of the Union, the Company has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the scope of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
7. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
the Union, the Company has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices defined within the scope of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
8. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and upon the entire record in this case, it
is recommended that the Respondent , Waycross Sport-
swear, Inc., Waycross , Georgia, its officers, agents, suc
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing or failing to meet with reasonable prompt-
ness and at reasonable frequency and for reasonably
lengthy sessions and to bargain collectively with the
Union as exclusive bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees of the
Company at its Waycross, Georgia, plant, including
Doris Fowler, Nell Beauregard , Wilma Carter, and floor
help, but excluding office clerical employees , professional
employees , guards, supervisors of the cutting , sewing,
shipping , and maintenance departments and all other su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Refusing or failing to permit a qual ified union
representative to enter the plant for the purpose of study-
ing piece rates and operations at reasonable times during
working hours and for reasonable periods.
(c) Refusing or failing to have present at bargaining
sessions representatives empowered to enter into
reasonably substantial commitments respecting economic
matters.
(d) Refusing or failing timely to furnish the Union
upon request information necessary or relevant to bar-
gaining issues.
(e) Otherwise refusing to bargain collectively in good
faith with the Union as exclusive representative of em-
ployees in the above unit.
(f) Threatening employees with refusal to negotiate
with the Union , or with the sale of the Waycross plant in
reprisal for their selection of the Union as bargaining
representative.
(g) Interrogating employees in a coercive manner with
respect to their activities on behalf of the Union or
promising them benefits in return for their abandonment
of support of the Union.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which appears
necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request , meet with reasonable promptness
and with reasonable frequency and bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of em-
ployees in the above unit with respect to wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment , and other terms and condi-
tions of employment , and, if understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its Waycross, Georgia, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix ." 26 Copies of said
notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 10 , after being duly signed by the Company's
authorized representative , shall be posted by the Com-
pany immediately upon receipt thereof , and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not
altered , defaced , or covered by other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 27 days from receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply with the terms
hereof.
26 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
27 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL meet , upon request , with reasonable
promptness and for reasonable duration and at
reasonable frequency and bargain collectively with
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of ^ America,
AFL-CIO ,, as exclusive representative of em-
ployees in the unit described below, with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and all
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached , embody such understand-
ing in a signed agreement.
110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The appropriate bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees of
the Company at its Waycross, Georgia, plant,
including Doris Fowler, Nell Beauregard,
Wilma Carter, and floor help, but excluding of-
fice clerical employees, professional employees,
guards, supervisors of the cutting, sewing,
shipping, and maintenance departments and all
other supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL permit a qualified representative of the
aforesaid Union to enter our Waycross plant during
working hours at reasonable intervals and for
reasonable periods as necessary and appropriate to
allow such representative to fully analyze and study
piece rates and operations.
WE WILL furnish the Union, upon request, such in-
formation as is necessary and appropriate to enable
it to bargain on issues arising in the course of collec-
tive bargaining.
WE WILL arrange to have present at collective-bar-
gaining meetings with the Union company represen-
tatives authorized to make substantial commitments
with respect to matters arising in the course of bar-
gaining.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in
good faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of employees in the appropriate unit
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
their activities on behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees by statements
that we will not negotiate with the Union nor by
statements that we will sell the Waycross plant rather
than negotiate with the Union.
WE WILL NOT promise employees benefits in
return for their refraining from support of the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
WAYCROSS SPORTSWEAR,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528
Peachtree-Seventh Building, 50 7th Street N.E., Atlanta,
Georgia 30323, Telephone 526-5760.