Warring, Jessica A. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 13, 2020

2019001558 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 13, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/866,738 09/25/2015 Jessica A. Warring 101672.0230P5 5689
158673 7590 07/13/2020
BD/Rutan & Tucker, LLP
611 ANTON BLVD
SUITE 1400
COSTA MESA, CA 92626
EXAMINER
BOSWORTH, KAMI A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3783
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/13/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip.docket@bd.com
patents@rutan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JESSICA A. WARRING, AMIR BELSON, and
WINFIELD S. FISHER
Appeal 2019-001558
Application 14/866,738
Technology Center 3700
Before BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, JILL D. HILL, and
MICHAEL L. WOODS, Administrative Patent Judges.
WOOD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s November 6, 2017 Non-Final Action rejecting claims 1–12. See
Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part and enter a new ground of rejection.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the applicant as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Vascular
Pathways, Inc. Appeal Br. 4.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an intravenous catheter insertion device.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1 (Original) A catheter insertion device, comprising:
a housing;
a needle having a proximal end in the housing and a distal
end extending from a distal end of the housing in an insertion
position;
a guide wire having a distal portion disposed in a lumen of
the needle in a withdrawn position, the guide wire including a
safety tip having a non-coiled configuration in the withdrawn
position and a coiled configuration in an advanced position;
a sliding member attached to the guide wire, wherein
movement of the sliding member translates the guide wire from
the withdrawn position to the advanced position; and
a catheter disposed coaxially over the needle.
REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Chuttani US 5,054,501 Oct. 8, 1991
Stocking US 5,704,914 Jan. 6, 1998
Lederman US 2003/0032936 A1 Feb. 13, 2003
Whiting US 8,029,470 B2 Oct. 4, 2011
REJECTIONS
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with
the enablement requirement.
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 10–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Stocking and Chuttani.
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Stocking, Chuttani, and Lederman.
Claims 1, 2, and 9–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Stocking and Lederman.
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Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Stocking, Lederman, and Chuttani.
Claims 5, 7, and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Stocking, Lederman, and Whiting.
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Stocking and Whiting.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Stocking, Whiting, and Chuttani.
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Stocking, Whiting, and Lederman.
OPINION
Claim 4—Rejected as Failing the Enablement Requirement
Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and additionally recites “wherein the
safety tip includes a first coil in a first coil plane and a second coil in a
second coil plane different from the first coil plane.” App. Br. 41 (Claims
App.). The Examiner determines that
It is unclear how each of the coils of the multiple coils can be in
their own plane. No drawings are provided showing how such a
configuration is possible and the specification is silent as to each
of this limitation. During previous review, the Examiner
interpreted this limitation as describing the configuration of a
typical spring or Slinky® wherein the coiling member
continuously spirals forming coils that lie on top of one another;
however, Applicant’s remarks in the Appeal Brief filed
7/24/2017 contradict that interpretation and explicitly state that
Applicant does not believe such a configuration reads upon the
limitation of claim 4 (see the top of page 15 and the bottom of
page 23). If this configuration is not what is intended by the

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limitation of claim 4, then it is unclear how one could make
and/or use the invention.
Final Act. 3–4.
Appellant responds that “any three points of a coil can define a plane,
or ‘coil plane.’” Appeal Br. 9. Referring to an annotated version of Figure
25B of the Specification, Appellant asserts that “the first coil plane can be
defined by three adjacent points of the first coil,” and “the second coil plane
can be defined by three similarly adjacent points of the second coil.” Id.
Section 112 requires a written description to enable “those skilled in
the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
‘undue experimentation.”’ Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381
F.3d 1142, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Whether undue
experimentation is needed is not a single, simple factual determination, but
is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations. In re
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Wands factors include: (a)
the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples,
(4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art,
and (8) the breadth of the claims. Id. “[T]he PTO bears an initial burden of
setting forth a reasonable explanation as to why it believes that the scope of
protection provided by that claim is not adequately enabled by the
description of the invention provided in the specification of the
application.” In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The Examiner has not made any findings regarding whether undue
experimentation is required for one of ordinary skill in the art to make and
use the invention of claim 10, much less considered any of the Wands
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factors. Therefore, the Examiner has not established a prima facie case of
lack of enablement, and we do not sustain this rejection.
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
Claim 4—Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
Failing the Written Description Requirement
To satisfy the written description requirement, a disclosure must
reasonably convey to one skilled in the art that the applicant had possession
of the subject matter in question when the application was filed. Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc). Determining possession requires an objective inquiry into the “four
corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill
in the art.” Id. at 1351.
Although we agree with the Examiner that claim 4 should be rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), the proper basis to do so is under the written-
description requirement. We are unable to discern any disclosure in the
Specification for a coil configuration that includes a first coil in a first coil
plane and a second coil in a second coil plane that is parallel to the first coil
plane. For example, Figure 4B depicts a first and second coil in the same
plane rather than each in separate, parallel planes. Spec. ¶ 52, Fig. 4B.
Figures 25A and 25B depict two coils that are three dimensional, and thus
cannot be said to be “in” a two-dimensional plane, as claim 4 requires.
Appellant contends that a “coil plane” can be defined by any three
points on each of the coils depicted in Figure 25B. Appeal Br. 12. But the
Specification does not support this contention—the Specification does not
appear to use the term “coil plane,” much less define it as any three
randomly selected points on a coil. Such a definition would mean little, as
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there would be an infinite number of possible planes that could be defined
by the selection of any three of an infinite number of points on each coil.
For the above reasons, we determine that claim 4 is not adequately
described by the Specification.
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 10–12—Rejected as
Unpatentable over Stocking and Chuttani
The Examiner relies on Stocking to teach independent claim 1
substantially as claimed, but acknowledges that Stocking does not teach that
the guidewire has a safety tip having a non-coiled configuration in the
withdrawn position and a coiled configuration in an advanced position.
Non-Final Act. 4 (citing Stocking, 5:1–5, Figs.1–4). The Examiner further
finds that Chuttani teaches a guide wire having a safety tip having a non-
coiled configuration in a withdrawn position and a could configuration in an
advanced position, “for the purpose of cannulating tubular or vascular
organs to allow the passage of devices into these organs for diagnosis and
treatment.” Id. at 5 (citing Chuttani, 2:24–26, 5:23–26, Figs. 1–6). The
Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art “to modify Stocking to include the guide wire with a safety
tip, as taught by Chuttani, for the purpose of cannulating tubular or vascular
organs to allow the passage of devices into these organs for diagnosis and
treatment.” Id. at 5 (citing Chuttani, 2:24–26, 5:23–26).
In response, Appellant argues that the helix formed at the end of
Chuttani’s guide wire is for a different purpose than Stocking’s guide wire.
Appeal Br. 15. That is, according to Appellant, Stocking’s guide wire is
“used to guide the catheter a short distance within a blood vessel,” whereas
the helix at the end of Chuttani’s guide wire is used to navigate the spiral
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folds of the cystic duct that lead to the ball bladder. Id. at 15–16 (citing
Stocking, 6:1–49, 8:26–33, Chuttani, 2:24–26, 5:23–46, 4:36–46).
The Examiner responds that:
Appellant’s arguments focus on Chuttani’s disclosed use within
the cystic duct, but Chuttani does not disclose only use in the
cystic duct but also explicitly discloses use in “tubular and
vascular organs” (see Col 2, Lines 24–26); one of ordinary skill
understands that blood vessels are both “tubular organs” and
“vascular organs”. Therefore, Chuttani discloses use in blood
vessels, like those of Stocking.
Ans. 8.
We do not sustain this rejection. Although the Examiner is correct
that the invention “generally” relates to use in “tubular or vascular organs,”
Chuttani teaches using the coils on its guidewire (the specific structure that
the Examiner proposes combining with Stocking) for a more specialized
purpose: to help maneuver Chuttani’s guidewire through spiraled channels,
particularly the “valves of Heister” in the cystic duct. Chuttani 5:10–19.
We are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to include Chuttani’s coiled structure in a device not intended for
use in an organ with spiral channels.
Claim 9—Rejected as Unpatentable over Stocking, Chuttani, and Lederman
Claim 9 depends on claim 1. Appeal Br. 42. This rejection relies on
the Examiner’s unpersuasive determination that one of ordinary skill in the
art would have combined Chuttani’s helical guide-wire structure with
Stocking’s guide wire. Lederman is not relied upon to cure this deficiency.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 as
unpatentable over Stocking, Chuttani, and Lederman.
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Claims 1, 2, and 9–12—Rejected as
Unpatentable over Stocking and Lederman
Appellant argues claims 1, 2, and 9–12 as a group. Appeal Br. 24–31.
We select claim 1 as representative of the group, and decide the appeal of
these claims on the basis of claim 1 alone. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner relies on Stocking to teach the structure of claim 1,
except for the claimed safety tip having a non-coiled configuration in the
withdrawn position and a coiled configuration in an advanced position.
Non-Final Act. 7–8 (citing Stocking, 5:1–5, Figs. 1–4). For the missing
limitation, the Examiner relies on Lederman’s guide wire 24 and its distal
end pigtail 42. Id. at 8 (citing Lederman ¶¶ 26, 38, Figs. 1, 2). The
Examiner finds that Lederman teaches that distal end pigtail 42 has “a non-
coiled configuration in a withdrawn position (inherently based on the
diameter of the guide wire and the diameter of the lumen it resides within)
and a coiled configuration in an advanced position” for the purpose of
“providing a capture for the catheter it resides within and for the purpose of
reducing the risk of the guide wire puncturing or damaging tissue.” Id.
(citing Lederman ¶¶ 26, 38, Figs. 1, 2). The Examiner determines that it
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify
Stocking’s guide wire to include Lederman’s guide-wire pigtail “for the
purpose of providing a capture for the catheter it resides within and for the
purpose of reducing the risk of the guide wire puncturing or damaging
tissue.” Id. (citing Lederman ¶ 38).
We have reviewed each of Appellant’s arguments for patentability of
claim 1, but find them unpersuasive of Examiner error. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable over Stocking
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and Lederman for essentially those reasons expressed in the Non-Final
Action and Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellant argues that “there is no evidence to support the Examiner’s
assertion that the Lederman guide wire inherently has a non-coiled
configuration in a withdrawn position.” Appeal Br. 26. In response, the
Examiner points to Lederman Paragraphs 26 and 35 and Figures 2–5 as
teaching this limitation. Ans. 19. According to the Examiner:
Para 26 states that “guide wire 24 has been inserted into guide
wire lumen 12 via guide collar 22”, . . . and that this is done so
“snugly” and Fig 2–5 clearly show that guide wire lumen 12 is
of a diameter significantly smaller than the radius of curvature of
the distal end 42 when it is in its pigtail shape and that the
difference between the outer diameter of the guide wire 24 and
the inner diameter of the lumen 12 is so small that the coil
configuration of the distal end 42 could not be maintained when
drawn into the lumen 12. Therefore, one of ordinary skill would
understand that the distal end 42 of Lederman’s guide wire 24
must be uncoiled when it is within the lumen 12, i.e. when it is
in “a withdrawn position.”
Id. Appellant responds that “the non-coiled configuration of the pigtail is an
Examiner-asserted inherent feature of the pigtail,” which therefore “must be
necessarily present in Lederman,” but Lederman “simply does not show the
alleged non-coiled configuration of the pigtail is necessarily present.” Reply
Br. 15.
This argument is not persuasive. First, we disagree with Appellant
that the Examiner is relying on the doctrine of inherency with respect to the
non-coiled configuration. Instead, the Examiner relies on record evidence:
Paragraphs 26 and 35, and Figures 2–5, of Lederman. Ans. 19. In stating
that Lederman’s guide wire 24 and safety tip 42 have “a non-coiled
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configuration in a withdrawn position (inherently based on the diameter of
the guide wire and the diameter of the lumen it resides within),” the
Examiner simply means that guide wire lumen 12 is too small for
Lederman’s pigtail to fit inside of unless the guide wire is in a non-coiled
configuration. See id. at 18–19.
Second, we agree with the Examiner that one can reasonably infer
from paragraph 26 of Lederman that distal pigtail end 42 of guide wire 24 is
inserted through guide collar 22, then through into the proximal end of guide
wire lumen 12, finally “emerging from the distal end 20 of catheter 10.”
Lederman ¶ 26. Because guide wire 24 fits “snugly” into guide wire lumen
12 (Lederman ¶ 35), it is reasonable to infer that the pigtail must be
“maintained in a straightened configuration” while it is still in guide wire
lumen 12 and before it emerges from the distal end of catheter 10. Ans. 19.
Appellant notes that after describing the insertion of the guide wire
into the guide wire lumen, paragraph 26 of Lederman teaches that “the distal
end 42 of guide wire 24 optionally may be coiled to form a ‘pigtail.’”
Appeal Br. 28 (quoting Lederman ¶ 26). Appellant reads this as a process
step, i.e., that “in a first step, the guide wire can be inserted into the guide
wire lumen and, in a second step, the guide wire can be coiled to form a
pigtail.” Id. We disagree with this reading of Lederman. We do not read
paragraph 26 of Lederman as describing the manufacturing steps for the
embodiment depicted in Figures 1–5, but rather as describing the
embodiment itself. Thus, Lederman uses “coiled” as an adjective to describe
an optional version of the distal end 42, rather than a verb describing how it
is made.
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Appellant also takes issue with the Examiner’s reason to combine
Lederman’s pigtail with Stocking’s guide wire, i.e., to “reduc[e] the risk of
the guide wire puncturing or damaging tissue.” Non-Final Act. 8. Appellant
notes that “the tissue at reduced risk of being punctured is expressly heart
tissue,” and therefore “a person of ordinary skill in the art would not
predictably arrive at the claimed catheter insertion device with a reasonable
expectation of success.” Reply Br. 15 (emphasis added by Appellant). This
argument is unpersuasive. First, Lederman teaches that pigtail 42 at the
distal end of guide wire 24 reduces the risk of guide wire 24 puncturing or
damaging “tissue within the body of a subject,” not just heart tissue.
Lederman ¶ 38. Second, even if Lederman’s teaching was limited to
protecting heart tissue, Appellant does not explain why it would have been
beyond ordinary skill to realize that other kinds of tissue need protection
from accidental puncture, and would be protected therefrom by a pigtail at
the distal end of the guide wire. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person
of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Claim 3—Rejected as Unpatentable over Stocking, Lederman, and Chuttani
Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and additionally recites “wherein the
guide wire has a first portion having a first diameter and a second portion
having a second diameter less than the first diameter, and wherein the safety
tip is formed in the second portion.” Appeal Br. 41 (Claims App.). The
Examiner relies on “the proximal end of section 15” as corresponding to the
“first portion having a first diameter,” and on “the distal end of section 15”
as corresponding to the “second portion having a second diameter” less than
the first diameter. Non-Final Act. 9, 10 (citing Chuttani, 3: 46–65, Figs. 1,
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2). The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art “to modify Stocking/Lederman to include the
guidewire as one with two diameters, the smaller of the diameters being
where a safety tip is formed, as taught by Chuttani, for the purpose of
imparting the distal end of the guide wire with increased flexibility.” Id. at
10 (citing Chuttani, 3:58–60).
We have reviewed each of Appellant’s arguments for patentability of
claim 1, but find them unpersuasive of Examiner error. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable over Stocking
and Lederman for essentially those reasons expressed in the Non-Final
Action and Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellant argues, inter alia, that Lederman’s guide wire needs
“sufficient rigidity to transmit torque applied thereto ‘to assist manipulation
of the catheter into apposition with the target structure, such as the wall of a
heart.’” Appeal Br. 32–33 (quoting Lederman ¶ 38). According to
Appellant, “[i]t is contradictory for the Examiner to assert a first
modification of Stocking’s catheter assembly with the sufficiently rigid,
torquable guide wire of Lederman and subsequently assert a second
modification thereto to impart increased flexibility to the torquable guide
wire.” Id. at 33. The Examiner responds that Lederman teaches to use
materials of sufficient flexibility for its guide wire, and thus “Lederman
discloses that the guide wire is already flexible . . . even before modification
by Chuttani.” Ans. 24 (citing Lederman ¶ 32).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. First, as
the Examiner notes, Lederman encourages the use of flexible materials
(Lederman ¶ 32), so the Examiner’s proposed modification to enhance the
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guide wire’s flexibility is fully compatible with Lederman. Second, the
Examiner is not proposing combining Lederman’s teaching that its pigtail be
able to transmit torque, but rather that it be able to protect tissue from
accidental puncture. Appellant does not point to any teaching in Stocking
suggesting the need for its guide wire to transmit torque.
Claims 5, 7, and 8—Rejected as
Unpatentable over Stocking, Lederman, and Whiting
Claims 5, 7, and 8 ultimately depend from claim 1. Appeal Brief 41–
42 (Claims App.). Appellant does not address with any specificity the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 5, 7, and 8 as unpatentable over Stocking,
Lederman, and Whiting. Id. at 33–34. Accordingly, for the reasons stated
above with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable
over Stocking and Lederman, we sustain this rejection.
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10–12—Rejected as
Unpatentable over Stocking and Whiting
The Examiner finds that Stocking discloses all of the limitations of
claim 1 except that it does not disclose that the guidewire has a safety tip
having a non-coiled configuration in the withdrawn position and a coiled
configuration in an advanced position. Non-Final Act. 13–14 (citing
Stocking, 5:1–5, Figs. 1–4). The Examiner relies on Whiting for this
limitation. Id. at 14 (citing Whiting, 18:19–37, Fig. 2). The Examiner finds
that Whiting teaches a guide wire 18 including safety tip 19 having a non-
coiled configuration in a withdrawn position and a coiled configuration in an
advanced position. Id. According to the Examiner, it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Stocking to include
Whiting’s safety tip “for the purpose of forming an anchoring structure
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allowing the guidewire to stay in place when the conduits received thereover
are removed.” Id. (citing Whiting, 18:19–37).
Appellant responds, inter alia, that “the anchoring structure of
Whiting configured for anchoring in the left atrium of the heart would not be
suitable for disposition inside of a blood vessel lumen, as taught by
Stocking.” Appeal Br. 36. We agree. In Stocking, guide wire 32 is
designed to retract when introducer needle 27 is retracted. Stocking, 5:1–5,
6:37–39. We are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would be
motivated to form an anchoring structure to impede this retraction.
Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection.
Remaining Rejections
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 as unpatentable over Stocking,
Whiting, and Chuttani; and of claim 9 as unpatentable over Stocking,
Whiting, and Lederman; rely on the Examiner’s erroneous determination
that claim 1, from which claims 3 and 9 depend, is unpatentable over
Stocking and Whiting. Non-Final Act. 16–17. Neither Chuttani nor
Lederman are relied on to cure this deficiency. Therefore, for the reasons
stated above, we do not sustain these rejections.
DECISION
The following table summarizes our disposition of the rejections at
issue in this appeal:
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
4 112(a) Enablement 4
4 112(a) Written
Description
4
1–3, 5, 6,
10–12
103 Stocking,
Chuttani
1–3, 5, 6,
10–12

9 103 Stocking,
Chuttani,
Lederman
9
1, 2, 9–12 103 Stocking,
Lederman
1, 2, 9–12
3 103 Stocking,
Lederman,
Chuttani
3
5, 7, 8 103 Stocking,
Lederman,
Whiting
5, 7, 8
1, 2, 5, 7, 8,
10–12
103 Stocking,
Whiting
1, 2, 5, 7,
8, 10–12

3 103 Stocking,
Whiting,
Chuttani
3
9 103 Stocking,
Whiting,
Lederman
9
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 3, 5,
7–12
6 4

FINALITY OF DECISION
This decision contains a new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, “must exercise one of
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the following two options with respect to the new grounds of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the
claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or
both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the
prosecution will be remanded to the examiner . . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under
§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record.”
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)