VMware, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 16, 2020

2019004067 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/660,461 03/17/2015 Darren Brown C265 7681
152606 7590 11/16/2020
Olympic Patent Works PLLC
4979 Admiral Street
Gig Harbor, WA 98332
EXAMINER
TODD, GREGORY G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2457
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/16/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DARREN BROWN, NICHOLAS KUSHMERICK,
JUNYUAN LIN, MATT ROY McLAUGHLIN, and JON HERLOCKER
___________

Appeal 2019-004067
Application 14/660,461
Technology Center 2400
_________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge ARPIN.

Opinion Concurring filed by Administrative Patent Judge BAUMEISTER.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–20, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 2.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party-in-interest as VMWare, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
October 23, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed April 23, 2019); the
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s claimed systems, subsystems, methods, and computer-
readable devices relate “to event logging and log files and, in particular, to
systems, and methods incorporated within the systems, that carry out
probability-distribution based analysis of log-file entries.” Spec. ¶ 1.
As noted above, claims 1–20 are pending. Claims 1, 4, 12, and 20 are
independent. Appeal Br. 28 (claim 1), 28–29 (claim 4), 31 (claim 12),
33 (claim 20) (Claims App.). Claims 2 and 3 depend directly or indirectly
from claim 1; claims 5–11 depend directly from claim 4; and claims 13–19
depend directly or indirectly from claim 12. Id. at 28–32.
Claims 1 and 4, reproduced below with disputed limitations
emphasized, are illustrative.
1. A log-file analysis system comprising:
one or more processors;
one or more memories; and
computer instructions, stored in one or more of the one or
more memories that, when executed by one or more of the one
or more processors, control the log-file analysis system to
generate, for a first set of log-file entries, each of which is
associated with an event type, a first probability distribution of
all or a subset of the event types in the first set of log-file entries,
generate, for a [second]3 set of log-file entries, each of which
is associated with an event type, a second probability

Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed June 13, 2017) and the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed February 19, 2019); and the Specification (“Spec.,”
filed March 17, 2015). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and
Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents.
3 As discussed below, claims 1 and 20 contain a typographical error.
Appellant did not correct the typographical error prior to the appeal.
Because there is no dispute regarding the typographical error or its
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distribution of all or a subset of the event types in the second set
of log- file entries,
generate a numeric divergence metric from the first and
second probability distributions, and
when the numeric divergence metric is greater than a
threshold value, generate one of a displayed indication, alarm,
event, or other physical-state transformation to indicate that the
first and second sets of log-file entries exhibit more than a
threshold level of difference.
Id. at 28 (emphases added).
4. A log-file analysis subsystem within a computer system
having one or more processors,
one or more memories, and computer instructions, stored
in one or more of the one or more memories that, when executed
by one or more of the one or more processors, control the log-
file analysis system to monitor a state of the computer system by
repeatedly:
generating, for one or more log files, each having multiple
entries that are each associated with an event type, a probability
distribution of all or a subset of the event types in the one or more
log files for a time interval to represent the state of a monitored
computer system for the time interval, and
storing the generated probability distribution in
association with an indication of the time interval.
Id. at 28–29 (emphasis added). Claim 20 recites limitations corresponding
to those recited in claim 1, and claim 12 recites limitations corresponding to
those recited in claim 4. Id. at 31, 33.

correction, in our review of the Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 and 103, we interpret claims 1 and 20 as if corrected.
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REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS4
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name5 Number Publication Filed
Carmel US 2008/0033971 A1 Feb. 7, 2008 Aug. 1, 2006
Tonouchi US 2013/0080367 A1 Mar. 28, 2013 Dec. 4, 2012
The Examiner rejects claims 1–3 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) as
indefinite. Final Act. 2. The Examiner also rejects claims 4, 5, 7, 9, 11–13,
15, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent ineligible subject
matter without significantly more. Ans. 3–4; see Final Act. 3–5. In
addition, the Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12–14, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Tonouchi (Final Act. 5–9) and
claims 3, 7–11, and 15–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Tonouchi and Carmel (id. at 9–11).6
Appellant and the Examiner focus on the eligibility and anticipation
rejections of independent claim 1. No other claims are argued separately.
See Reply Br. 4–7. We conduct a limited de novo review of the appealed
eligibility rejection, and we review the appealed rejections for error based

4 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent ineligible subject matter without
significantly more. Final Act. 3–5. The Examiner withdrew the patent
eligibility rejection of claims 1–3, 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 18, and 20. Ans. 3.
5 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
6 The Examiner notes that claims 7, 9, and 11 are identical and would be
subject to a statutory double patenting rejection if found allowable. Final
Act. 3. Because we do not find claims 7, 9, and 11 patentable, we do not
reach this potential rejection. If prosecution resumes, Appellant may wish to
address the dependency of these claims. Cf. Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.)
(claims 15, 17, and 19).
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upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the contentions and
evidence produced thereon. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075
(BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the
Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our own
and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. For the reasons given
below, we affirm-in-part the Examiner’s rejections.
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
As appealed, claim 1 recites, “computer instructions . . . control the
log-file analysis system to generate, for a first set of log-file entries, each of
which is associated with an event type, a second probability distribution of
all or a subset of the event types in the second set of log-file entries.”
Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.) (emphases added). Claim 20 recites
corresponding limitations. Id. at 33.
The Examiner finds that “the second set of log-file entries” lacks
antecedent basis in claim 1 and 20, and, thus, claims 1 and 20, as well as
claims 2 and 3 that depend from claim 1, are indefinite. Final Act. 2.
Appellant tried unsuccessfully to amend claims 1 and 20 to provide
antecedent basis for this term (see supra note 3) and does not contest this
rejection in its appeal briefing (Ans. 9–10). Therefore, we summarily affirm
this rejection.
Patent Ineligible Claims
The Examiner rejects claims 4, 5, 7, 9, 11–13, 15, 17, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent ineligible subject matter without
significantly more. Ans. 3–4. For the reasons given below, we sustain this
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rejection only with respect to claims 4, 5, 7, 9, and 11–13; and we reverse
the rejection with respect to claims 15, 17, and 19.
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept(s) the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”). According to the Court, concepts determined to be abstract
ideas and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing
human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at
219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
In Diamond v. Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical
formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
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statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook). Nevertheless, the
Court noted, “[i]t is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature
or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.” Id. at 187; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Even if the individual components were known, “an inventive concept can
be found in the ordered combination of claim limitations that transform the
abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of
that abstract idea” (emphasis added).).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we next “must examine
the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (some quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. Office Patent Eligibility Guidance
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the Office
applies the Court’s two-part framework, the Office published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).7 Pursuant to the
Office’s guidance, in Step One of our analysis, we look to see whether the
claims fall within one of the four statutory categories identified in § 101. Id.
at 53 (“Examiners should determine whether a claim satisfies the criteria for
subject matter eligibility by evaluating the claim in accordance with the
criteria discussed in MPEP8 2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a statutory
category (Step 1) and the Alice/Mayo test for judicial exceptions (Steps 2A
and 2B).”).
Under the guidance, we then look to whether the claim recites:
(1) Step 2A – Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Step 2A – Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).

7 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility, 2 (October 17, 2019) (“Note, the feedback
received was primarily directed to examination procedures and, accordingly,
this update focuses on clarifying practice for patent examiners. However, all
USPTO personnel are expected to follow the guidance.”).
8 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP, 9th Ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020.
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See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).
C. Step One – Claims Directed to Statutory Categories
Each of independent claim 4 and its associated dependent claims is
directed to a subsystem, i.e., a “machine”; and each of independent claim 12
and its associated dependent claims is directed to a method, i.e., a “process”;
Appeal Br. 28–32 (Claims App.). Thus, the rejected claims are directed to
recognized statutory categories. See Appeal Br. 5–6.
D. Two-Part Alice/Mayo Framework
1. Step 2A, Prong One – Claims Recite an Abstract Ideas
Applying the first part of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step 2A), the
Examiner finds, “[c]laim(s) 1, 4, 12, 20 is/are directed to an abstract idea of
calculating a difference and indicating if the difference exceeds a threshold.”
Final Act. 3. In particular, the Examiner finds:
Claims 1, 4, 12, 20 recite in part a system for generating a
first and second probability distribution for some event types,
generating a divergence of the distributions, and indicating if the
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divergence is greater than a threshold. These steps describe the
concept of calculating a difference and indicating if the
difference exceeds a threshold, which correspond to concepts
identified as abstract ideas by the courts, such as a formula for
computing an alarm limit as in Parker v. Flook[, 437 U.S. 584,
594–95 (1978)], or organizing information through mathematical
correlations as in Digitech[ Image Tech., LLC v. Electronics for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)]. The concept
described in claims 1, 4, 12, 20 [is] not meaningfully different
than the concept found to be abstract by the courts and thus
claims 1, 4, 12, 20 are drawn to an abstract idea.
Id. at 4.
In the Final Office Action and in the Appeal Brief, the Examiner and
Appellant treat independent claim 1 as representative for purposes of the
eligibility rejection. See Appeal Br. 10–11; Reply Br. 5. Although claims 1
and 4 have somewhat overlapping limitations, the Examiner has withdrawn
the patent eligibility rejection with respect to independent claim 1, so we
consider the limitations of independent claim 4 in our analysis below. See
Reply Br. 5
The subsystem of claim 4 recites the functions of (1) generating a
probability distribution of some or all of the event types in the one or more
log files for a time interval (“generating, for one or more log files, each
having multiple entries that are each associated with an event type, a
probability distribution of all or a subset of the event types in the one or
more log files for a time interval to represent the state of a monitored
computer system for the time interval”) and (2) storing the generated
probability distribution and its associated time interval (“storing the
generated probability distribution in association with an indication of the
time interval”). See Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.); see also Spec. ¶ 66
(describing generation of probability distributions from event types in log-
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files for particular time intervals). Thus, considered as a whole, claim 4
recites evaluating data in a file and storing the results of that evaluation.
Ans. 4 (“In fact, there is no analysis being done in the claims, rather the
claims are merely generating a probability distribution of log entries of a
certain type and storing it.”).
The Office defines “Mental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as
an abstract idea grouping. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The Office explains, “[c]laims do not recite a
mental process when they do not contain limitations that can practically be
performed in the human mind, for instance when the human mind is not
equipped to perform the claim limitations.” October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility at 7. Appellant contends that because of the volume of
data contained in the log files generated within large, distributed computing
systems, the recited steps could not be performed without the use of a
computer. Appeal Br. 7 (quoting Spec. ¶ 55). Appellant asserts, “manual
analysis and interpretation of log files is an increasingly daunting, if not
impossible, challenge, for the reasons detailed in the above-quoted
paragraph [55 of the Specification].” Id. at 8.
Nevertheless, claim 4 is not limited to any volume of data, and we do
not read limitations from the Specification into the claims. See Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(‘‘[W]ith the exception of generic computer implemented steps, there is
nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed
by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.’’) Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (‘‘Courts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
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underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.’’). Consequently, we are persuaded claim 4, as well
as claim 12, recites an abstract idea falling within this “mental processes”
grouping.
In addition, the evaluation performed in claim 4 is merely a
mathematical calculation, which falls within the abstract idea grouping of
“Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas or equations, mathematical calculations.” 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. As the Office
explains,
A mathematical calculation is a mathematical operation (such as
multiplication) or an act of calculating using mathematical
methods to determine a variable or number, e.g., performing an
arithmetic operation such as exponentiation. There is no
particular word or set of words that indicates a claim recites a
mathematical calculation. That is, a claim does not have to recite
the word “calculating” in order to be considered a mathematical
calculation. For example, a step of “determining” a variable or
number using mathematical methods or “performing” a
mathematical operation may also be considered mathematical
calculations when the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claim in light of the specification encompasses a mathematical
calculation.
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 4.
Claim 4 recites “generating . . . a probability distribution of all or a
subset of the event types in the one or more log files for a time interval to
represent the state of a monitored computer system for the time interval” and
storing that generated probability distribution. We find this claim recites a
mathematical calculation. See SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to a ‘‘series of
mathematical calculations based on selected information’’ are directed to
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abstract ideas); Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350 (holding that claims to a
‘‘process of organizing information through mathematical correlations’’ are
directed to an abstract idea). The step of storing the results of the calculation
adds nothing to the abstract idea. See TDE Petroleum Data Solutions, Inc. v
AKM Enterprise, Inc., 657 Fed. Appx. 991, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S.Ct. 1230 (2017) (The Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court’s “finding that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of ‘storing
data, receiving data, and using mathematics or a computer to organize that
data and generate additional information’”); cf. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Here, the claims are not
simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are
specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.”).
Consequently, we are persuaded claim 4, as well as claim 12, also recites an
abstract idea falling within this “mathematical concepts” grouping. Ans. 4.
Appellant contends, “the Examiner’s statement of rejection does not
clearly lay out any type of abstract-idea judicial exception, but consists
merely of conclusory assertions.” Appeal Br. 12. Nevertheless, we identify
the abstract idea groupings into which the rejected claims fall and the
limitations that place the claims within those groupings. We determine that
claim 4, as well as claim 12, recites mental processes and mathematical
concepts, which are abstract ideas. See October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility at 2 (“Other claims may recite multiple abstract ideas,
which may fall in the same or different groupings, or multiple laws of
nature. In these cases, examiners should not parse the claim. For example,
in a claim that includes a series of steps that recite mental steps as well as a
mathematical calculation, an examiner should identify the claim as reciting
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both a mental process and a mathematical concept for Step 2A Prong One to
make the analysis clear on the record.”).
2. Step 2A, Prong Two – Abstract Ideas Not Integrated Into Practical
Application
Under the Office’s guidance, having determined that the claims recite
abstract ideas, we now determine if additional elements in the claims
integrate the identified abstract ideas into a practical application. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Thus, we look to see whether the “additional
elements” impose a meaningful limit on the identified abstract ideas.
Ans. 3–4; see October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 11.
Claim 4 expressly recites
[a] log-file analysis subsystem within a computer system having
one or more processors, one or more memories, and computer
instructions, stored in one or more of the one or more memories
that, when executed by one or more of the one or more
processors, control the log-file analysis system to monitor a state
of the computer system by repeatedly [generating probability
distributions and storing them].
Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.). In addition to the components recited in
claim 4, claim 12 further recites “a distributed computer system that includes
multiple, network interconnected discrete computer systems, each having
one or more processors, one or more memories, and one or more data-
storage devices.” Id. at 31.
The Specification discloses that the various computer components in
Appellant’s claimed subsystems and methods are generic computer
components for performing generic computer functions. Spec. ¶¶ 30, 32, 43,
63, 76, 80. For example, “Figure 4 illustrates generalized hardware and
software components of a general purpose computer system, such as a
general-purpose computer system having an architecture similar to [the
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general architectural diagram for various types of computers] shown in
Figure 1.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 8; see id. ¶¶ 30 (“Figure 1 provides a general
architectural diagram for various types of computers. Computers that
receive, process, and store event messages may be described by the general
architectural diagram shown in Figure 1, for example.”), 36 (“Figure 4
illustrates generalized hardware and software components of a general-
purpose computer system, such as a general-purpose computer system
having an architecture similar to that shown in Figure 1.”). Thus, considered
individually and as an ordered combination, we are persuaded that these
components do not recite a particular machine. Final Act. 4 (“There is no
indication that the elements either: . . . applies the judicial exception with, or
by user of a particular machine”); see MPEP § 2106.05(b); 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.27.
Further, applying the second part of the Alice/Mayo framework,9 the
Examiner finds the claims use of the computer components as a tool, as
opposed to reciting an improvement to the computer components
themselves. Final Act. 5 (“The claims simply recite generic computers
performing the generic computer functions”); MPEP § 2106.05(f); 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.30.
Appellant acknowledges that the claims recite the automation of a manual
process. In particular, Appellant states, “[t]he current claims are directed to

9 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two,
properly may be evaluated under the second part of the Alice/Mayo
framework (Step 2B of the Office guidance). See Final Act. 4–5. For
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
those considerations under the first part of the Alice/Mayo framework
(Step 2A of the Office guidance). See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 nn.25, 27–32.
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automated log-file analysis systems that clearly address the above-discussed
deficiencies in manual log-file analysis and interpretation.” Appeal Br. 8
(emphases added, citing Spec. ¶ 62); see id. (“Thus, the current application
is directed to automated log-file analysis incorporated within automated
monitoring subsystems that represent significant improvements over current
approaches to log-file analysis and interpretation.” (emphases added)). As
our reviewing court explains, “[o]ur prior cases have made clear that mere
automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute
a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance
Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
In addition, the Examiner finds, “[t]he processor, memory, computer
instructions, log-file and associated analysis system do not, for example,
include other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an
abstract idea to a particular technological environment and generic, routine
computer systems.” Final Act. 5. As the Specification makes clear, neither
the hardware nor the software elements of the claimed methods effect an
improvement in computer technology. See Spec. ¶¶ 5, 8, 30, 32, 36, 43, 63,
76, 80; Figs. 1–4. Instead, considered individually or as an ordered
combination, these additional elements do no more than their known
functions in the claimed subsystems and methods. See id. Here, the claimed
subsystems and methods process gathered data in a particular way; that does
not demonstrate an improvement in computer technology. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a); 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25.
Appellant disagrees and contends, “Appellants pointed out, in the
amendment filed on March 4, 2017, that the specification includes a great
deal of information indicating that the claims are, in fact, directed to a log-
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file analysis system and a method that represent significant improvements
over currently available log-file-analysis systems and log-file-analysis
methods.” Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, although we
interpret the claim recitations in light of the Specification, we do not read
limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re Morris, 127
F.3d 1048, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We are not persuaded that the type of
data considered or its possible volume or complexity is sufficient here to
demonstrate an improvement to the functioning of the recited components or
to the technology employed or the technical field. Instead, this argument
merely describes an improvement to the identified abstract ideas themselves,
not to a technology or a technical field. See October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility at 13 (“However, it is important to keep in mind that an
improvement in the judicial exception itself (e.g., a recited fundamental
economic concept) is not an improvement in technology.”).
Despite disclosures in the Specification, Appellant fails to show where
the claims recite limitations to achieving improvement to the technical field
or to computer technology, as opposed to merely automating a manual
process. See Appeal Br. 9 (“[T]he currently claimed methods and systems
involve a very specific activity within distributed computing systems,
namely using event-type probability distributions to compare sets of log-file
entries during the analysis and interpretation of terabytes of data residing in
log files, and thus correspond to a very particular and specialized activity.”);
Spec. ¶ 55 (“There are a number of reasons why event messages, particularly
when accumulated and stored by the millions in event-log files or when
continuously received at very high rates during daily operations of a
computer system, are difficult to automatically interpret and use.”). Thus,
we are not persuaded that the additional elements in the claimed subsystems
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18

and methods reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to another technology or technical field. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a).
Finally, Appellant contends the additional elements in the systems, as
recited in claim 1, and computer-readable devices, as recited in claim 20,
effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state
or thing. Id. at 9; but see Final Act. 4. Claim 1 recites “when the numeric
divergence metric is greater than a threshold value, generat[ing] one of a
displayed indication, alarm, event, or other physical-state transformation to
indicate that the first and second sets of log-file entries exhibit more than a
threshold level of difference.” Appeal Br. 28 (Claim App.) (emphasis
added). However, neither claim 4 nor claim 12 recites this limitation.
Appeal Br. 28–29, 31 (Claims App.). Moreover, like the “storing” limitation
recited in claims 4 and 12, “generat[ing]” a display indication or an alarm in
claim 1 and 20 is insignificant extra-solution activity. See Appeal Br. 29, 32
(Claims App.) (claim 6 and 16); MPEP § 2106.05(g) (“The term ‘extra-
solution activity’ can be understood as activities incidental to the primary
process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the
claim.”).
In view of Appellant’s claim recitations and the Specification’s
disclosure, and consistent with the Examiner’s findings, we are persuaded
the rejected claims do not recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
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use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h); see Final Act. 4–5. Thus, we are
persuaded the additional elements of the rejected claims do not integrate the
identified abstract ideas into a practical application, and independent
claims 4 and 12 are directed to the recited abstract ideas.
3. Step 2B – Not Significantly More Than the Abstract Ideas
Because we determine that the claims recite abstract ideas and do not
integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application, we now
consider whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the
claims amount to significantly more than the abstract ideas. Applying the
second part of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds,
the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than
the above identified abstract idea. There is no indication that the
elements . . . add[] a specific limitation other than what is well-
understood, routine and conventional in the field, or adding
unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful
application.
Final Act. 4.
Further, the Specification evidences that the additional limitations are
well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan, as required
by our reviewing court in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018). Spec. ¶¶ 5, 8, 30, 32, 36, 43, 63, 76, 80; Figs. 1–4; see USPTO
Memorandum of April 19, 2018, “Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” 3–4 (Apr. 19, 2018).10 Here, for the

10 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-
berkheimer-20180419.PDF.
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reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that the Specification adequately
demonstrates that the components of the claimed subsystems and methods
are well-understood, conventional, and routine.
Appellant contests the Examiner’s findings with respect to the second
part of the Alice/Mayo framework, i.e., Step 2B of the Office’s guidance.
Specifically, Appellant contends, “[c]laim 1 of the current application
contains a great many elements that are not mentioned and do not occur in
hypothetical claim X or in the building block of human ingenuity
‘calculating a difference and indicating is the difference exceeds a threshold’
that is proposed without evidence or reasoned argument.” Appeal Br. 11.
Nevertheless, claim X is a strawman set up by Appellant to contrast with
independent claims 1 and 20, not independent claim 4 or 12. Id. at 10.
Appellant does not identify an additional limitations of claim 4 or 12 that
amount to significantly more than the abstract ideas.
Appellant also contends, “[i]mprovements to log-file analysis and
interpretation does not result in any type of preemption or monopolization of
fundamental building blocks of human ingenuity over all of the technical
and scientific fields.” Appeal Br. 9. As our reviewing court has explained,
“[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the
basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason,
questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354); see Final Act. 12.
Consequently, on this record, we agree with the Examiner that
independent claim 4, as well as independent claim 12, is directed to abstract
ideas and fails to recite “significantly more” than the identified abstract
ideas. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Examiner errs in determining that
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independent claims are patent-ineligible, and we sustain this rejection of
claims 4 and 12.
E. Dependent Claims
As noted above, each of claims 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 depends
directly or indirectly from independent claim 4 or 12. As also noted above,
Appellant does not challenge the patent eligibility rejection of these
dependent claims separately from the challenges to the rejection of their base
claims. Because we are not persuaded the Examiner errs with respect to the
patent eligibility rejection of claim 4 or 12, we also are not persuaded the
Examiner errs with respect to the rejection of claims 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13.
However, claims 15, 17, and 19 depend directly from claims 14, 16,
and 18, respectively, from which the Examiner has withdrawn the patent
eligibility rejections. Ans. 3; but see id. at 3–4. Consequently, we are
persuaded the Examiner errs with respect to this rejection of claims 15, 17,
and 19.
Thus, we sustain the patent eligibility rejection of claims 5, 7, 9, 11,
and 13, but we do not sustain the patent eligibility rejection of claims 15, 17,
and 19.
Anticipation by Tonouchi
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12–14, and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Tonouchi. Final Act. 5–9. “A
claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is
found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this
is not an ipsissimis verbis test. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir.
Appeal 2019-004067
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1990). Moreover, “it is proper to take into account not only specific
teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art
would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d
825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
The Examiner finds that Tonouchi discloses each and every element
of the rejected claims. For the reasons given below, we sustain the
anticipation rejection of claims 4, 5, 12, and 13, but not of claims 1, 2, 6, 14,
and 20.
Referring to independent claims 1 and 20, the Examiner finds that
Tonouchi discloses the steps of generating a first and a second probability
distribution. Final Act. 6 (citing Tonouchi ¶¶ 30–33); see Appeal Br. 28
(Claims App.). Tonouchi discloses, “[t]he monitor unit 10, which monitors
the state of a system to be managed 90, generates various logs, for instance,
a learning event log L1, a learning [Service Level Agreement (SLA)] log L2,
an inspection object event log L3 and an inspection object SLA log L4.”
Tonouchi ¶ 30 (emphasis added). Further, Tonouchi discloses, “[t]he
learning event log L1 and the learning SLA log L2 are logs for analysis and
learning that are used for generating beforehand a probability distribution
table L6 and an SLA probability distribution table L9 to be referred to upon
prediction of the occurrence of an SLA breach.” Id. ¶ 33 (emphasis added);
see also id. ¶ 6 (“a probability density calculation unit that refers to the
measured value information, and calculates a probability density of the
measured value that applies to the service level agreement breach during a
period of time from event occurrence until a predefined time has elapsed”).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Tonouchi discloses generating
probability distributions from some or all data stored in event logs, and
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Tonouchi’s distributions may be over time intervals. See Final Act. 6
(claim 1), 7 (claim 4); Ans. 4–8; Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.).
The Examiner further finds Tonouchi discloses “generat[ing] a
numeric divergence metric from the first and second probability
distributions” and “when the numeric divergence metric is greater than a
threshold value, generat[ing]” a display or an alarm, as recited in
independent claim 1. Final Act. 6 (citing Tonouchi ¶¶ 41–43, 79–81); see
Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.) (claim 1). Although independent claim 20 also
recites these elements, independent claims 4 and 12 do not. Appeal Br. 28–
29, 31, 33 (Claims App.); but see id. at 29, 31 (claims 6 and 14 reciting
elements corresponding to those of claims 1 and 20).
Tonouchi discloses:
The probability calculation unit 22 illustrated in FIG. 1 refers to
the probability distribution table L6 and the SLA list L7,
calculates, for each event, a probability that applies to an SLA
breach and a probability that does not apply to an SLA breach,
and stores the results in a breach probability table L8.
Tonouchi ¶ 41 (emphases added). In addition, Tonouchi discloses, “[t]he
breach probability table L8 stores, mapped to each other, a probability Pr(O)
that does not apply to an SLA breach, and a probability Pr(x) that applies to
an SLA breach, for the entire system.” Id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added). Although
Tonouchi does not disclose “a numeric divergence metric” verbatim, the
Examiner appears to rely on Tonouchi’s disclosed mapping of probabilities
to disclose this element. See Final Act. 6; Ans. 8.
The Examiner also suggests that claims 1 and 20 do not recite “the
numeric divergence metric [is] between the first and second probability
distributions.” Ans. 8. Given the use of the word “divergence” in the claims
and the Specification’s description of Kullbach-Leibler divergence, we
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interpret the “numeric divergence metric” as between the first and second
probability distributions. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 71 (“Thus, the Kullbach-Leibler
divergence values for pairs of probability distributions of log-file entries
provides a numeric indication of the dissimilarity between two probability
distributions.” (emphasis added)).
With respect to claims 1 and 20, the Examiner further finds Tonouchi
discloses:
In a case where, for instance, the SLA states that the response
time of the service should not exceed 8 seconds, then 8 seconds,
which is the agreement threshold value, is stored in the SLA list
L7 mapped to information that identifies the response time,
which is the SLA service item.
Tonouchi ¶ 42 (emphasis added). Thus, the Examiner finds Tonouchi
discloses determining “when the numeric divergence metric is greater than a
threshold” and triggering an alarm when the threshold is exceeded. See id.
¶¶ 79–81.
Appellant contends the Examiner errs for the following three reasons.
Appeal Br. 19–21; see Reply Br. 19–23. We are persuaded by Appellant’s
reasons with respect to claims 1 and 20, but not with respect to claims 4
and 12.
First, Appellant contends the Examiner fails to show that Tonouchi
discloses a “probability distribution,” as recited in the independent claims.
In particular, Appellant contends, “‘a first probability distribution of all or a
subset of the event types in the first set of log-file entries’ means exactly
what it states, namely that the probability distribution is a probability
distribution of event types.” Appeal Br. 19. Nevertheless, independent
claims 1 and 20 recite that the first and second probability distributions may
be a subset, i.e., one, all, or less than all, of the event entries in the first or
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second set of log-file entries. See Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.). Tonouchi
discloses a specific embodiment of a probability distribution, in which “[t]he
probability distribution table L6 stores, for each event, a mean value and an
unbiased variance that define a normal distribution.” Tonouchi ¶ 37; see id.
¶ 35.
Appellant also contends that the recited “probability distributions” of
claims 1 and 20 would not involve a mean or a variance. Appeal Br. 19–20;
see Spec. ¶ 65. Nevertheless, we determine that Tonouchi’s disclosure of
“probability distributions” is not limited to the example of its Figure 7. See
Tonouchi ¶ 6. Moreover, even if we were persuaded that claims 1 and 20
recite a probability distribution based solely on event entries (see Spec. ¶ 65,
Figs. 16A–B) and Tonouchi does not disclose such distributions, claims 4
and 12 are not so limited and recite “probability distributions” based on log-
files of event entries “for a time interval” (e.g., Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims
App.); see Spec. ¶ 66, Figs. 17A–B). Thus, we are persuaded that Tonouchi
discloses generating probability distribution as recited in independent
claims 1, 4, 12, and 20. Ans. 4–6.
Second, Appellant contends:
The phrase “divergence metric” is quite well-known in statistical
analysis, as demonstrated by the use of the very same
terminology in the Carmel reference as used in the current
application. Tonouchi does not teach, disclose, mention, or
suggest a “divergence metric.” Probabilities of SLA breaches,
like any other probabilities, are probabilities associated with
classes of events, and have absolutely nothing at all to do with
the divergence between two probability distributions.
Appeal Br. 20.
The Examiner finds that the Specification discloses Kullbach-Leibler
divergence (Spec. ¶ 70) and Carmel discloses Jensen-Shannon divergence
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(Carmel ¶ 89). Nevertheless, the Examiner rejects claims 1, 4, 12, and 20 as
anticipated by Tonouchi, and the Examiner does not rely on Carmel’s
teachings or that numeric divergence metrics are well-known to supply this
element. The Examiner also does not read either of these divergences into
Tonouchi, but, instead, reads Tonouchi broadly enough to disclose the
recited “numeric divergence metric.” Ans. 8–9. We find the Examiner’s
broad reading of Tonouchi’s disclosure unsupported by sufficient evidence.
Id. Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner shows that Tonouchi discloses
this element of claim 1 or 20.
However, “a numeric divergence metric” is not recited in claim 4 or
12. Appeal Br. 28–29, 31 (Claims App.); but see id. at 29, 31 (claims 6 and
14 reciting “computing a divergence metric”). Thus, this element does not
distinguish the subsystems of claim 4 or the methods of claim 12 over
Tonouchi.
Third, Appellant contends:
Had the Examiner read and understood this final element of
claim 1, the Examiner would have discovered that the claim
element is directed to generating a displayed indication, alarm,
or event when a divergence metric, which provides an indication
of the difference between two event-type of probability
distributions, indicates that the log-file entries in two different
sets of log files exhibit more than a threshold level of difference.
Appeal Br. 20–21 (emphasis added). The Examiner does not respond to this
contention. See Ans. 4–9.
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner relies on the threshold
disclosed in Tonouchi’s paragraph 42 to disclose this element. Final Act. 6.
However, as Appellant correctly notes, Tonouchi’s disclosed threshold is for
the SLA, not a threshold against which a divergence metric between a first
and second probability distribution may be compared, as recited in claims 1
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and 20. See Final Act. 6 (citing Tonouchi ¶¶ 42, 79–81); see also Appeal
Br. 29, 31 (Claims App.) (claims 6 and 14 reciting corresponding
limitations). Nevertheless, we note again that this element is not recited in
claim 4 or 12.
For the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded the Examiner errs
in determining that Tonouchi anticipates the systems and computer-readable
devices recited in claims 1 and 20 and in claim 2 that depends directly from
claim 1. The elements, which we determined Tonouchi does not disclose,
are not recited in claims 4 and 12, or in claims 5 and 13, which depend
directly from claims 4 and 12, respectively. Nevertheless, elements that we
determined Tonouchi does not disclose are recited in claims 6 and 14.
Consequently, we are persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 1, 2,
6, 14, and 20 as anticipated by Tonouchi, but we are not persuaded the
Examiner errs in rejecting claims 4, 5, 12, and 13 as anticipated by
Tonouchi. Therefore, we sustain the anticipation rejection of claims 4, 5, 12,
and 13, but not of claims 1, 2, 6, 14, and 20.
Obviousness Over Tonouchi and Carmel
The Examiner rejects claims 3, 7–11, and 15–19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Tonouchi and Carmel.
Final Act. 9–11. Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of these dependent claims separately from its challenge to the
anticipation rejection of their base claims. Appeal Br. 26. Given that we do
not sustain the anticipation rejection of independent claim 1 or dependent
claim 14, we are persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 3 and 15,
which depend directly from claim 1 or 14, respectively. Appeal Br. 28, 32
(Claims App.). Similarly, given that we sustain the anticipation rejection of
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independent claim 4, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting
claim 7, 9, and 11, which depend directly therefrom. Id. at 29–30.
With respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 8, 10, and 16–19,
each of claims 8, 10, 16, and 18 recite limitations that, as we determine
above, are not disclosed by Tonouchi. Appeal Br. 30, 32 (Claims App.)
(claim 16 recites “computing a divergence metric” and “when the
divergence metric is greater than a threshold value, raising an alarm,” and
claim 18 recites “computing a divergence metric,” “computing a measure of
the variance of the divergence metrics,” and “selecting . . . a subset of the
event types having the greatest computed variance”); see id. at 30 (claim 8
and 10 recite limitations corresponding to those of claims 16 and 18,
respectively). Because the Examiner relies solely on Tonouchi to teach
these missing limitations, we are persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting
claims 8, 10, 16, and 18, and of claims 17 and 19, which depend from
claims 16 and 18, respectively, as obvious over the combined teachings of
Tonouchi and Carmel.
Consequently, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 7, 9, and
11, but we do not sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 3, 8, 10, and
15–19. See supra note 6.
DECISION
1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 1–3 and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.
2. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 4, 5, 7, 9, and 11–13
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
without significantly more, but the Examiner errs in rejecting claims
15, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent-ineligible
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subject matter without significantly more.
3. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 4, 5, 12, and 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Tonouchi, but the Examiner
errs in rejecting claims 1, 2, 6, 14, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as anticipated by Tonouchi.
4. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 7, 9, and 11 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Tonouchi
and Carmel, but the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 3, 8, 10, and
15–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings
of Tonouchi and Carmel.
5. Thus, on this record, claims 1–5, 7, 9, 11–13, and 20 are unpatentable,
but claims 6, 8, 10, and 14–19 are not unpatentable.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1–5, 7, 9, 11–13, and 20, but we do not sustain the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 6, 8, 10, and 14–19.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis
/Reference(s)
Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 20 112(b) Indefiniteness 1–3, 20
4, 5, 7, 9,
11–13, 15,
17, 19
101 Eligibility 4, 5, 7, 9, 11–
13
15, 17, 19
1, 2, 4–6,
12–14, 20
102(a)(1) Tonouchi 4, 5, 12, 13 1, 2, 6, 14,
20
3, 7–11,
15–19
103 Tonouchi,
Carmel
7, 9, 11 3, 8, 10,
15–19
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7, 9, 11–
13, 20
6, 8, 10,
14–19
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No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be
extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge, concurring.
I agree with the Majority’s factual findings and legal conclusions. I
write separately because I would exercise the Board’s discretionary authority
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) to reinstate the withdrawn rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1–3, 6, 8, 10, and 14–20.11
The Examiner states, without further explanation, that these claims
“recite additional elements that integrate the identified judicial exception
into a practical application.” Ans. 3. Admittedly, I do not have the benefit
of the Examiner’s reasoning for reaching this conclusion, but, nonetheless, I
do not see any additional language in these claims that reasonably can be
said to integrate the abstract ideas (mathematical concepts or mental
processes) into practical applications.
Presumably, the Examiner determines that claim 1 recites language
that integrates the abstract ideas into a practical application because, in
contrast to independent claim 4, for example, claim 1 recites the final
limitation, “when the numeric divergence metric is greater than a threshold
value, generate one of a displayed indication, alarm, event, or other physical-
state transformation to indicate that the first and second sets of log-file
entries exhibit more than a threshold level of difference.” But generating a
displayed indication or alarm subsequent to performing a mathematical
analysis, as claimed, merely constitutes insignificant post-solution activity
that is insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.

11 Because claims 15, 17, and 19 respectively depend from claims 14, 16,
and 18, I presume the Examiner intended to withdraw the § 101 rejection of
claims 15, 17, and 19, as well.
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In Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), the Court considered the
patent eligibility of claims that were directed to a method that used a novel
mathematical formula for calculating alarm limits in a known chemical
process, coupled with a final step of adjusting the alarm limits. Id. at 594–
96. In spite of the claims including the post-solution step of adjusting the
alarm limits, the Court found the claims to be directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Court found “the notion that alarm limit values must be
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for ‘automatic
monitoring-alarming’” to be well known. Id. at 594. The Court reasoned
that the claims as a whole contained no inventive concept in the application
of the mathematical formula. Id. at 594–95; see also Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)
(“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”).
In the present case, Appellant does not provide persuasive argument
or evidence that generating an alarm or displaying an indication entails
anything other than conventional activity or otherwise practically applies the
recited abstract ideas. Rather, like the claims in Flook, Appellant’s
improvement relates only to the abstract idea—in this case, generating
probability distributions and a numeric divergence metric.
For this reason, I would reject independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea without reciting
significantly more. I, likewise, would reject claims 2, 3, 6, 8, 14–17, and 20,
which similarly recite generating an indication or an alarm.
Regarding claims 10 and 18, the Examiner presumably withdrew the
patent-ineligibility rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the last
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limitation of both of these claims recites “selecting, as a basis for a
monitoring fingerprint, a subset of the event types having the greatest
computed variance.” Appeal Br. 30, 32. However, the act of selecting an
event type merely constitutes making a judgment or formulating an opinion.
The claims do not recite that any action is actually taken in response to
making the claimed judgment.
Making judgments and formulating opinions based on gathered data
constitute mental processes that can be performed in the human mind. The
2019 Guidance recognizes such mental processes as constituting patent-
ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7, 2019).
Because this additional limitation of claims 10 and 18 constitutes an
abstract idea, the limitation, viewed either alone or in conjunction with the
rest of the respective claims, as a whole, does not constitute an additional
element that can add significantly more to the patent-ineligible subject
matter of independent claims 4 and 12. Therefore, I also would reject
claims 10, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract idea without reciting significantly more.