Vivian A. Reese, Complainant,v.Department of Education Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 28, 2002
01A03264 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 28, 2002)

01A03264

08-28-2002

Vivian A. Reese, Complainant, v. Department of Education Agency.


Vivian A. Reese v. Department of Education

01A03264

August 28, 2002

.

Vivian A. Reese,

Complainant,

v.

Department of Education

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A03264

Agency No. ED-97-14060

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaints of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1>

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as an Office Automation Assistant, GS-326-05, at the agency's

Office of Management, Washington, D.C. Complainant sought EEO counseling

and subsequently filed formal complaints on November 22, 1996, and on

October 29, 1997, alleging that she was discriminated against on the

bases of race (African-American), disability (sarcoidosis-respiratory),

and reprisal (prior EEO activity) as to:

(1) The assignment and non-assignment of work to her since August

17, 1995;

The denial of her request for sick leave on October 25, 1996;

The �minimally satisfactory� rating she received on July 31, 1996,

for the March 6, 1996, to July 6, 1996 (120-day) rating period.<2>

Complainant alleged that White workers received more favorable assignments

of work; that any meaningful duties she had been performing were

reassigned; and that her work assignment consisted of general clerical

duties that fell extremely short of what she should have been doing.

Complainant also alleged that she had requested as an accommodation for

her disability that she not have to make deliveries outside of the office

during extremely hot or cold weather.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

initially requested a hearing, but withdrew the request and requested

that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant did not establish a

prima facie case of discrimination as to any of her allegations. The FAD

also found that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, and that complainant was unable to show that

the articulated reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant did not file any contentions on appeal. The agency submitted

an Agency's Opposition to Appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging

discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see, Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976),

aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to

retaliation cases). This order of analysis in discrimination cases,

in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence

of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the

agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

actions at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

the complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Service

Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983).

For purposes of analysis, we will assume, arguendo, that complainant

has established a prima facie case of race, disability and reprisal

discrimination. Therefore, we consider whether the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. If we find

that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons,

then the burden returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's

reasons were a pretext for discrimination, that is, that the agency's

reasons were not true and that the agency was more likely motivated by

discriminatory reasons.

Claim 1 -Assignment and non-assignment of duties. Complainant's

supervisor (S1), a GS-15 Supervisory Management Analyst, who became

complainant's supervisor in November, 1995, stated that when he first

became complainant's supervisor, complainant was primarily scanning

documents. However, after the development of a Performance Agreement,

complainant performed a variety of duties. S1 stated that employee

assignments were based on position description, grade, series, and

Performance Agreements. Further, that an employee's assignments

were primarily based on organizational functions, and workload

requirements. S1 stated that complainant's assignments were consistent

with other individual employees in similar job titles and grades. They

included administrative support, consisting of: optical scanning, word

processing and typing, filing, assisting in mailings; redacting Freedom

of Information Act requests; on-line time and attendance record keeping;

delivering packages to the Office of Management and Budget and/or Federal

Register; and other assignments as appropriate. The Commission finds

that the agency has articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons

for its assignment of duties to complainant.

Therefore, the burden returns to complainant to demonstrate that the

agency's reasons were a pretext for discrimination, that is, that the

agency's reasons were not true and that the agency was more likely

motivated by discriminatory reasons. Complainant alleged that she was

not given meaningful work. However, complainant did not identify how

this was discriminatory, and further did not identify what would have

been meaningful work. While complainant advised management concerning

her assignments, all of her duties were in line with her position

description. Complainant's position description provided, in part,

that the employee serves as an office assistant with responsibility for

providing administrative and secretarial support services; performs a

variety of routine clerical tasks; receives visitors and telephone calls;

uses a computer to type, process forms and documents; and maintain files

and records. We find that complainant was working within her position

description. Complainant has not provided sufficient evidence to persuade

us that the agency's reasons for its assignments and non-assignment were

a pretext for discrimination.

Concerning complainant's assignment, on occasion, to make deliveries

outside of her office, she claimed that her disability was not

accommodated. Assuming, arguendo, that she is an individual with a

disability, the agency is obligated to make reasonable accommodations

for the known physical and mental limitations of an individual with a

disability. See Sellers v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal

No. 01964003 (Oct. 3, 2000). The record reflects that the agency's

medical review officer had determined that additional information was

needed before a final determination could be made on whether complainant's

condition prevented her from making deliveries. S1 stated that although

complainant did not provide the requested medical information concerning

her medical request, when the weather was not the best and/or complainant

indicated that she was not feeling well, someone else made the delivery.

A co-worker testified that she could not recall any time that complainant

was made to go on a delivery when complainant said that she could not go.

The co-worker stated that she would go on the delivery when complainant

could not go. We find that complainant's request for accommodation

was granted.

Claim 2 - Sick Leave. Concerning complainant's request for advanced

sick leave, S1 stated that complainant submitted two requests, each

for nine hours, for advanced sick leave. Complainant, at that time,

had eight hours of sick leave available. S1 stated that he approved

the available sick leave, but denied complainant ten hours of advanced

sick leave because complainant's medical documentation did not indicate

that her requests were for a serious illness involving an exigency.<3>

The agency's policy, as set forth in the Personnel Manual Instruction,

states that the minimum time period covered by an advance is normally

five consecutive days, unless the criterion of �a serious illness

involving an exigency� is met. The denial of complainant's request for

advanced sick leave was based on the failure to provide adequate medical

documentation and agency policy. This is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the agency's action. Subsequently, complainant requested

annual leave for the same amount of time, which was approved by S1.

Complainant appealed the denial for advanced sick leave decision to a

higher official, who also denied the request, but advised complainant

that she could submit a revised medical statement for reconsideration

of the denial. Thereafter, the sick leave was granted. As to pretext,

complainant averred, but did not prove, that White employees do not have

their leave requests denied. Complainant has not provided sufficient

evidence to persuade us that the agency's reasons for its denial of

advanced sick leave was a pretext for discrimination.

Claim 3 -Performance rating. Concerning complainant's �minimally

satisfactory� rating, S1 stated that he used the General Performance

Appraisal System (GPAS) which specifies criteria for rating complainant.

The appraisal was done for a 120-day period because when S1 first became

complainant's supervisor he learned that complainant did not have a

GPAS performance plan. Therefore a plan was develop by S1, and after

waiting the minimum 120 days, an appraisal was prepared. S1 stated

that he fully documented complainant's rating, and that complainant had

received an interim appraisal that identified some problem areas with her

performance, some of which continued and were documented in her appraisal.

The approving official reviewed the appraisal, reviewed S1's written

ratings, obtained S1's verbal input, and was satisfied that the rating

was accurate. For the subsequent rating period, the rating system was

changed to a �pass/fail� methodology, and the complainant received a

�pass� rating.

The Commission finds that the agency has articulated legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for its performance rating of complainant.

Complainant has not provided sufficient evidence that would persuade

us that the agency's reasons for its rating was a pretext for reprisal

discrimination. The complainant has not met her burden in this regard.

CONCLUSION

We find that the complainant has not shown by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination

or reprisal. Therefore, after a careful review of the record, the

agency's Opposition to Appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 28, 2002

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 As to this allegation, complainant only claimed reprisal as a basis.

3 Complainant's medical documentation stated: �Please excuse

[complainant] from work .... She was seen [by the doctor] and now may

return to work.�