Victor M. Guilamo, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 1, 2005
01a55033_r (E.E.O.C. Dec. 1, 2005)

01a55033_r

12-01-2005

Victor M. Guilamo, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Victor M. Guilamo v. United States Postal Service

01A55033

December 1, 2005

.

Victor M. Guilamo,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A55033

Agency No. 4G-700-0137-04

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning his formal EEO complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

Complainant was hired as a Part-Time Flexible (PTF) at the agency's

Ferriday Post Office in Ferriday, Louisiana, subject to a 90-day

probationary period.

On December 30, 2004, complainant filed a formal complaint. Therein,

complainant claimed that he was discriminated against on the bases of

race (Hispanic) and national origin (Puerto Rican) when:

(1) on June 15, 2004, his employment was terminated; and

(2) on an unspecified date, he was harassed when the Postmaster

physically put her arms around him, and was threatening in her demeanor.

On February 10, 2005, the agency issued a document identified as �Partial

Acceptance/Partial Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint.� Therein, the

agency accepted claim (1) for investigation. The agency, however,

dismissed claim (2) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1), for failure

to state a claim

At the conclusion of the investigation of claim (1), complainant was

informed of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency.<1>

When complainant did not respond within the time period specified in 29

C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

In its July 11, 2005 FAD, the agency found that complainant failed to

establish a prima facie case of race, color or sex discrimination because

he did not identify any similarly situated employee, outside his protected

classes, who was treated more favorably under similar circumstances.

The agency concluded, however, that even assuming complainant established

a prima facie case on all alleged bases, it nonetheless articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant

failed to show was pretextual. Further, the agency found that in its

February 10, 2005 partial dismissal, it properly dismissed claim (2)

for failure to state a claim.

Claim (1)

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

The evidence supports a determination that he agency articulated

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its action. Complainant was

issued a Notice of Separation during his probationary period, for failure

to meet the performance requirements of his position. The record contains

an affidavit from the Postmaster. Therein, the Postmaster stated that

complainant was terminated because of his unsatisfactory work performance

and failure to follow instructions. The Postmaster further stated that

the agency's actions were prompted by complainant's poor work performance;

and not because of his race, national origin or sex. Specifically, the

Postmaster stated that complainant was counseled on the following dates

"5/03, 5/04, 5/18, 5/25 (30-day evaluation), 5/28, 5/29, 6/02, 6/04, 6/07,

6/08, 6/10, and 6/14 for performance deficiencies of missed deliveries,

customer complaints, failure to follow instructions, and failure to

perform the route within the authorized times." The Postmaster stated

that in addition to the initial training from April 19, 2004 through

April 26, 2004, complainant was "reinstructed on the above deficiencies

and he was given additional training on 4/27, 4/28, 4/29, 5/27, 6/03,

6/04, 6/05, and 6/08." The Postmaster stated that the agency uses a

model to compute the average time a carrier should use to deliver mail

on a specific day, and that complainant "never came within the average."

The Postmaster stated that by his sixtieth day in the probationary

period, complainant did not perform his duties as instructed and did not

demonstrate the capacity or willingness to improve. The Postmaster stated

that complainant's removal during his probationary period was required

for the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency. Furthermore,

the Postmaster stated that she did not discriminate against complainant

based on his race, national origin or sex.

Complainant has not demonstrated that the agency's articulated reasons

were a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination regarding

the matter raised in claim (1) is AFFIRMED.

Claim (2)

Complainant claimed that on an unspecified date, he was harassed when

the Postmaster physically put her arms around him and was threatening

in her demeanor. In a partial dismissal dated February 10, 2005,

the agency dismissed claim (2) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1),

for failure to state a claim.

The Commission finds that claim (2) fails to state a claim under the EEOC

regulations because complainant failed to show that he suffered harm

or loss with respect to a term, condition or privilege of employment

for which there is a remedy. See Diaz v. Department of the Air Force,

EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994). Moreover, a review of the

record reflects that the matter in question is insufficient to support

a claim of harassment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC

Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997).

Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of claim (2) is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 1, 2005

__________________

Date

1During the investigation, complainant requested that the complaint be

amended to include sex as a basis, which the agency accepted.