VIANT TECHNOLOGY LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 4, 2021

2020003840 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 4, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/743,034 06/18/2015 Timothy C. Vanderhook 257.88-US-U1 6137
105454 7590 01/04/2021
Gates & Cooper LLP - Viant
Howard Hughes Center
6060 Center Drive, Suite 830
Los Angeles, CA 90045
EXAMINER
BRANDENBURG, WILLIAM A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3600
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/04/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing-us@gates-cooper.com
gates-cooper@blackhillsip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte TIMOTHY C. VANDERHOOK, JASON J. A. KNAPP, and
BRIAN C. DEFRANCESCO
____________

Appeal 2020-003840
Application 14/743,034
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–18. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Viant Technology
LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 10 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A computer-implemented method for utilizing household
connections, comprising:
associating a device with a primary household of one or
more households, wherein the device comprises an internet
enabled electronic device, and wherein each of the one or more
households includes all persons that occupy a physical housing
unit;
connecting the primary household with one or more
additional households of the one or more households based on
attributes in common between one or more of the persons that
occupy the physical housing unit of the primary household and
one or more of the persons that occupy the physical housing
unit of the one or more additional households, wherein the one
or more additional households are different households from
the primary household, and wherein a minimum threshold of
common attributes is required before establishing a connection;
storing, within a primary household profile, identification
information for the one or more additional households that are
connected to the primary household; and
targeting media content to the primary household based
on data associated with the primary household and the one or
more connected additional households identified in the primary
household profile, wherein the data comprises the attributes in
common.

EVIDENCE
The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Gill US 2013/0080526 A1 Mar. 28, 2013
Shoshitaishvili US 2014/0136333 A1 May 15, 2014
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THE REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–9.
II. Claims 1–3, 6–12, and 15–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Shoshitaishvili. Id. at
10–13.
III. Claims 4, 5, 13, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Shoshitaishvili and Gill. Id. at 14–16.

OPINION
Rejection I – Subject Matter Eligibility
Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
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(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The USPTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Eligibility Guidance” or “Guidance”). Under
the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Eligibility Guidance.
Analysis
In contesting the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection, Appellant presents
arguments for independent claims 1 and 10 together (Appeal Br. 6–11), and
does not separately argue dependent claims 2–9 and 11–18 (id. at 11). We
select claim 1 as representative to decide the appeal of this rejection, and
claims 2–18 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(2019).
The Examiner finds that claim 1 is directed to “a concept of targeting
media content based on connected and associated household profile
information based on a threshold number of attributes in common between
household persons.” Final Act. 3 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner
determines that the “associating,” “connecting,” and “targeting” limitations
recited in claim 1 fall within the certain methods of organizing human
activity grouping of abstract ideas identified in the 2019 Eligibility
Guidance. Id. at 4. The Examiner explains that these steps are “related to
advertising, marketing and sales activities or behaviors, comprised within
commercial or legal interactions, a clear enumerated grouping of ‘Certain
Methods of Organizing Human Activity’ as per MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)II.B.”
Ans. 6 (emphasis omitted).
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The Examiner also finds that claim 1 “only recites the additional
technical element[] of ‘device’ (and similarly ‘an apparatus’, ‘computer
system’, ‘a computer’, ‘a processor’ and ‘a device’ of claim 10).” Final
Act. 4 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner explains that “[t]he additional
technical elements as recited are at a high-level of generality (i.e. as a
generic processor performing a generic computer function of
communicating, processing, storing and displaying) such that it amounts to
no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic
computer component.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. (explaining that
“the entirety of the claimed subject matter amounts to simply storing
relational data (which is compared to a threshold value) for targeted
advertising purposes”). The Examiner determines that the additional
element recited in claim 1 “do[es] not integrate the abstract idea/judicial
exception into a practical application because it does not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.” Id. at 5. The Examiner
also explains that “the additional element[] of the claim do[es] not add a
meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because [it] would be generic
computer functions in any computer implementation. Thus, taken alone, the
additional element[] do[es] not amount to significantly more than the above-
identified judicial exception (the abstract idea).” Id. at 6–7.
Step 1: Does Claim 1 Fall within a Statutory Category of § 101?
We examine whether claim 1 recites one of the enumerated statutory
classes of subject matter, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 1 refers to “[a] computer-implemented method for utilizing household
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connections” (Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1)) which recites one of the statutory
classes (i.e., a process) under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Step 2A, Prong One: Does Claim 1 Recite a Judicial Exception?
Appellant argues that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea that falls
within the certain methods of organizing human activity grouping of abstract
ideas identified in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance. Appeal Br. 7–9. Appellant
asserts that
the claimed steps of actually associating devices with
households, connecting households (based on specific
attributes/conditions/thresholds), storing information about
connected households (in a specific location – i.e., within the
primary household), and then targeting content based on data
for households identified in the stored data, are not even
remotely in the same category of rules for playing a dice game,
voting, assigning hair designs, or how to hedge risk.
Id. at 8–9; see also id. at 8 (asserting that “[s]uch activities are not risk
hedging, a fundamental economic practice, creating contractual relation, or
resolving a legal dispute”). According to Appellant,
the targeting step[] is a step that targets media content based on
a prior identification in the claim of household profile
information and a series of other attributes. Such a step is not
organizing human activity, nor is it similar to the particular
categories of human activity described in the subject matter
guidance published by the USPTO.
Reply Br. 2. This argument is unpersuasive.
Claim 1 recites a method of using household connections for targeting
media content. Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1). The process includes steps of
associating an internet enabled device with a primary household, connecting
the primary household with additional households based on a minimum
threshold of attributes in common, storing additional household
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identification information in a profile of the primary household, and
targeting media content to the primary household based on attributes in
common with the additional households. Id. In other words, the process
provides targeted advertising to a primary household based on connections
between the primary household and additional households having attributes
in common. This limitation amounts to what the 2019 Eligibility Guidance
calls “advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors,” which is a type
of judicially excepted abstract idea—specifically, “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity.” 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52;
see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d
1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tailoring information presented to a user based
on particular information is an abstract idea); Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (customizing a user
interface to provide targeted advertising based on user information is an
abstract idea); Bridge and Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F.
App’x 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (non-precedential) (“Targeted marketing is
a form of ‘tailoring information based on [provided] data,’ which we have
previously held is an abstract idea.”). Thus, the Examiner correctly
determines that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, namely, an abstract idea.
See Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 6. In our view, the Examiner has properly
identified the specific limitations that recite an abstract idea and properly
determined that the specific limitations fall within one of the subject matter
groupings in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong Two: Is There Integration into a Practical Application?
Having found that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, namely, an
abstract idea, we are instructed by the 2019 Eligibility Guidance to
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determine whether each claim recites “additional elements that integrate the
exception into a practical application.” See 2019 Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). This
evaluation requires us to determine whether an additional element or a
combination of additional elements in a claim applies, relies on, or uses the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the exception. If the recited judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application, the claim is not “directed to” the judicial
exception.
Here, the additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the judicial
exception are a “computer” and “an internet enabled electronic device.”
Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1). The Examiner finds that these additional
elements are recited “at a high-level of generality (i.e. as a generic processor
performing a generic computer function of communicating, processing,
storing and displaying).” Final Act. 4 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner
finds that the additional elements do not amount to more than mere
instructions to apply the abstract idea using generic computer components,
and do not impose meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea beyond
generically linking it to a computer environment. Id. at 4–5.
Appellant argues that “the recited steps improve the functioning of a
computer and further provide an improvement in the field of advertising and
allowing household attributes to influence the targeting and reporting of
another household (see [0006] of the originally filed specification).” Appeal
Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 4 (asserting that the claimed steps “improve the
technical field of household internet communications (in addition to the
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technical field of advertising)”). Appellant asserts that “the claims and steps
are an integral part of a computer as well as devices (i.e., an internet enabled
electronic device).” Appeal Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 4 (asserting that “the
claim limitations are integrated into a specific machine – the internet enabled
electronic devices”). This argument is unpersuasive. The computer and
internet enabled electronic device elements are described only generically in
the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 40–54. We find no indication in the
Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any evidence, that these
elements contribute significantly to the claimed process. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(b) (“Use of a machine that contributes only nominally or
insignificantly to the execution of the claimed method (e.g., in a data
gathering step . . .) would not integrate a judicial exception.”). Notably, the
“computer” is only recited in the preamble recitation of “[a] computer-
implemented method,” and it is unclear to what extent the computer is
involved in actually implementing any of the steps recited in the body of the
claim. The “internet enabled electronic device” appears to be merely subject
to the “associating” step, and the device does not appear to actually be
involved in executing any of the steps recited in the claim. Additionally, we
find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any
evidence, that the computer and electronic device are anything other than
generic computer components performing generic computer functions.
See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.”). According to the Federal Circuit, the relevant question is
whether the claim as a whole “focus[es] on a specific means or method that
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improves the relevant technology” or is “directed to a result or effect that
itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit also made clear in Two-
Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications that the improvement
must be a technical one. See Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reciting an
abstract idea performed on generic computer and network components that
operate according to their ordinary functions does not contain an inventive
concept). Here, Appellant’s claim does not recite a technical improvement
tied to a specific apparatus that solves a technical problem. Instead, the
claim, as a whole, relates to targeted advertising using connections between
households, and is focused on establishing the connections between different
households using attributes in common, not an improvement in technology.
See Spec. ¶ 6 (“The present invention relates generally to advertising, and in
particular, to a method, system, apparatus, and article of manufacture to
connect multiple households and allowing one household’s attributes to
influence the targeting and reporting of another household.”).
Appellant argues that “the device and information about the device are
transformed into a household connection that is then stored in a profile, and
that is then transformed into common attributes that are used to target media
content.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant asserts that
the concept of a connection based on attributes in common
between different persons of different households is
transformed into identification information for additional
households stored in a particular location which was not present
before. In another example, attributes in common and
transformed and used to target media content. In this regard,
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the connection itself is transformed into tangible data that is
stored and then used to target media content.
Id.; see also Reply Br. 4–5 (asserting that the claim limitations “transform[]
household information to attributes while actually determining how and
which households to target with media content based on such attributes”).
This argument is unpersuasive. Connecting households based on attributes
in common, creating identification information, and using the data to target
media content, amounts to manipulation and reorganization of data, not a
“transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing
constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong.”).
In short, the claims do not recite any additional elements that
(1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are
applied with any particular machine, (3) effect a transformation of a
particular article to a different state, and (4) are applied in any meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
For the above reasons, we determine that the additional elements
recited in independent claim 1 beyond the judicial exception, whether
considered alone or in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application.
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Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Recite an Inventive Concept?
Because we determine that claim 1 fails to recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, in
accordance with the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, we next consider whether the
claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or instead “simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.” See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant argues that, “given . . . the arguments . . . with respect to the
prior art, (i.e., the claims are novel and nonobvious from the prior art), it is
theoretically impossible for the claims to recite elements [th]at are well-
understood, routine, and convention[al].” Appeal Br. 10. This argument is
unpersuasive because neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness
determination automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject
matter is patent-eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice
framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not
an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citation omitted).
“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non-obvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any
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element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance
in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
For the reasons discussed above, we find no element or combination
of elements recited in claim 1 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds
anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-
eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 1, and of claims 2–18 falling therewith, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Rejection II – Anticipation by Shoshitaishvili
In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that
Shoshitaishvili discloses a method for using household connections that
includes, in relevant part, “associating a device with a primary household of
one or more households, wherein the device comprises an internet enabled
electronic device, and wherein each of the one or more households includes
all persons that occupy a physical housing unit.” Final Act. 10 (citing
Shoshitaishvili ¶¶ 16–17, 40–41). The Examiner also finds that
Shoshitaishvili discloses
connecting the primary household with one or more additional
households of the one or more households based on attributes in
common between one or more of the persons that occupy the
physical housing unit of the primary household and one or more
of the persons that occupy the physical housing unit of the one
or more additional households, wherein the one or more
additional households are different households from the
primary household.
Id. at 10–11 (citing Shoshitaishvili ¶¶ 16–17, 22, 40–46, 53–58, 66–78).
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Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because Shoshitaishvili does
not disclose “connecting a primary household (i.e., all persons that occupy a
physical housing unit) with an additional household (i.e., all persons that
occupy a different physical housing unit) based on common attributes.”
Appeal Br. 11. Appellant asserts that Shoshitaishvili “simply attempts to
connect two people into a family identity without any concept or definition
of a household as set forth explicitly in the claims.” Id. at 12. We agree
with Appellant that the Examiner’s findings as to the disclosure of
Shoshitaishvili are deficient.
Shoshitaishvili discloses “generat[ing] personal identities and
relat[ing] multiple personal identities together under a family identity.”
Shoshitaishvili ¶ 17; see also id. ¶ 41 (“As used herein, family just means a
group. No actual family is required. For example, family identity 1030
could relate personal identities associated with students that are roommates
at college.”). In other words, “[t]he family identity associates personal
identities that view content, or have the potential to view content, together
through a shared device. For example, a group of personal identities that all
view content through a game console or laptop may be associated as a
family identity.” Id. ¶ 40; see also id. ¶ 71 (“For example, if personal
identities are associated with the same IP address or device then the personal
identities may be related as a family.”). Shoshitaishvili discloses that
“advertising may be targeted based on a common interest associated with
each personal identity in the family.” Id. ¶ 40; see also id. ¶ 66 (“[A] family
identity allows advertisers to provide advertisements targeted to a set of
closely related people, such as a family household.”). The Examiner takes
the position that
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the family identi[t]y of Shosh[itaishvili] satisfies the
“connecting the primary household with one or more additional
households...” as currently written. This is particularly
reasonable in light of [0041] of Fig. 10 of Shosh[itaishvili], as
multiple personal identities are deemed to be related as a
“family” based on a temporary living condition (e.g. college
roommates) deemed related based on various conditions such as
shared IP addresses, etc. (see [0047] and [0066–68]). Thus, the
primary household (i.e. single person) is connected to at least
one other household (i.e. additional single person (e.g.
roommate)) based on . . . common attributes.
Final Act. 11. The Examiner also explains that paragraph 20 of Appellant’s
Specification describes that “one person living alone” may constitute a
household and, “[a]s such, while a household may have more than one
person occupying a housing unit, a household is not limited to such an
implementation.” Ans. 18–19. According to the Examiner,
under a [broadest reasonable interpretation] in light of
Appellant’s own specification, and contrary to Appellant’s
assertions, a single individual (i.e. one person living alone)
would properly be construed as a “household”, and when that
single individual is present in the company of one or more other
single individuals (i.e. “one or more additional households” as
claimed), these individuals or “households” are connected
and/or associated with each other (i.e. “connecting” as
claimed). This is precisely what Shosh[itaishvili] discloses.
Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted). However, Appellant persuasively asserts that
the Examiner “is in essence interpreting the claims such that multiple people
occupy a house and selecting one of those multiple people . . . to identify the
claimed ‘household’. Such an interpretation simply ignores the explicit
words in the claims and attempts to provide no meaning for such words.”
Appeal Br. 14; see also id. at 13 (noting that claim 1 recites “a specific
definition for a household - which applies to both the primary household as
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well as the additional household. A household ‘includes all persons that
occupy a physical housing unit’”). In other words, independent claim 1
expressly defines a household as including “all persons that occupy a
physical housing unit.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1). Claim 1 also recites
that “the one or more additional households are different households.” Id.
Given the definition for the term “household” set forth in claim 1, the
Examiner’s interpretation that that two single persons living in the same
physical housing unit (e.g., roommates) constitutes two different households
(see Final Act. 11; Ans. 18–20) is not commensurate with the scope of the
claim. Thus, the Examiner’s rejection based upon this claim construction is
in error.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant apprises us of error in the
Examiner’s determination that Shoshitaishvili anticipates claim 1.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, and
6–9 depending therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by
Shoshitaishvili.
Independent claim 10 contains similar limitations as claim 1, and the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 relies on the same deficient findings as to
the disclosure of Shoshitaishvili discussed above with respect to claim 1.
See Final Act. 10–12. Accordingly, for the same reasons as set forth above,
we do not sustain the rejection of claim 10, and its dependent claims 11, 12,
and 15–18, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Shoshitaishvili.

Rejection III – Obviousness based on Shoshitaishvili and Gill
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5, 13, and 14, which depend
from one of independent claims 1 and 10, relies on the same findings as to
Appeal 2020-003840
Application 14/743,034

19
the disclosure of Shoshitaishvili that we find deficient for the reasons
discussed above in connection with Rejection II. See Final Act. 14–16. The
Examiner relies on Gill for teaching additional features, but does not
articulate any findings or reasoning that would cure the aforementioned
deficiency in the Examiner’s findings as to the disclosure of Shoshitaishvili.
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the
rejection of claims 4, 5, 13, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Shoshitaishvili and Gill.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–18 101 Eligibility 1–18
1–3, 6–12,
15–18
102 Shoshitaishvili 1–3, 6–12,
15–18
4, 5, 13, 14 103 Shoshitaishvili, Gill 4, 5, 13, 14
Overall
Outcome
1–18
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED