Viacom International Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 23, 20202019002907 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/438,339 02/21/2017 Gregg William RIEDEL 40205/04004(MTV-040CON) 4738 30636 7590 12/23/2020 FAY KAPLUN & MARCIN, LLP 150 BROADWAY, SUITE 702 NEW YORK, NY 10038 EXAMINER HE, YINGCHUN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2613 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/23/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mmarcin@fkmiplaw.com okaplun@fkmiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte GREGG WILLIAM RIEDEL, JEFF HESS, and SCOTT DANAHY ____________ Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CAROLYN D. THOMAS, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 22–41. Claims 1–21 are canceled. See Claims App. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Viacom International Inc. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 2 According to Appellant, the claimed subject matter relates generally to displaying, repositioning, and/or formatting graphics on a display. See Spec., Abst. Claims 22 and 41 are illustrative: 22. A method, executed by one or more computer processors in communication with one or more displays, for displaying graphics on the one or more displays comprising: receiving, by the one or more computer processors, a graphics stream in a first playout format, the first playout format comprising a first display resolution and a first display layout; determining, by the one or more computer processors, a second playout format, the second playout format comprising a second display resolution and a second display layout; identifying, by the one or more computer processors, an area of importance within the first display layout given the first display layout, the second display resolution, and the second display layout; identifying, within the second display format, cut portions of the graphics stream that will not be displayed in the second display layout; identifying, within the second display format, a viewing area comprising a portion of the second display layout within which the entire graphics stream will be displayed; determining, by the one or more computer processors, a preferred position within the second display layout for the area of importance, wherein the preferred position is a user-selected location; converting, by the one or more computer processors, the graphics stream from the first playout format into the second playout format using the area of importance and the preferred position; and displaying, by the one or more computer processors on the one or more displays, the converted graphics stream in the second playout format. Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 3 41. A method, executed by one or more computer processors in communication with one or more displays, for displaying graphics on the one or more displays comprising: receiving, by the one or more computer processors, a graphics stream in a first playout format, the first playout format comprising a first display resolution and a first display layout; determining, by the one or more computer processors, a second playout format, the second playout format comprising a second display resolution and a second display layout; determining, by the one or more computer processors, an area of importance within the first display layout given the first display layout, the second display resolution, and the second display layout; determining, by the one or more computer processors, a preferred position within the second display layout, wherein the preferred position is a location in the second display layout that is in a relatively similar location as the area of importance in the first display layout; converting, by the one or more computer processors, the graphics stream from the first playout format into the second playout format using both the area of importance and the preferred position concurrently; and displaying, by the one or more computer processors on the one or more displays, the converted graphics stream in the second playout format. Appellant appeals the following rejections: R1. Claims 22–32, 35, 38, and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Terry (US 5,546,131, Aug. 13, 1996) and Mountain (US 2003/0025833 A1, Feb. 6, 2003). Final Act. 6–13. R2. Claims 33, 34, and 39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Terry, Mountain and Rodriguez (US 2005/0160468 A1, July 21, 2005). Final Act. 13–16. R3. Claims 36 and 37 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 4 unpatentable over Terry, Mountain and Matsuo (US 2011/0032979 A1, Feb. 10, 2011). Final Act. 16–17. R4. Claim 41 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over DeHaan (US 2012/0075526 A1, Mar. 29, 2012) and Kondo (US 2008/0084503 A1, Apr. 10, 2008). Final Act. 18–21. We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). ANALYSIS Rejection under § 103(a) Claims 22–40 Appellant highlights that “the converting step of claim 22 recites that, in the process of changing the formats, the area of importance and preferred position are used.” Appeal Br. 7. With that in mind, Appellant contends that “neither Terry nor Mountain either discloses or suggests ‘converting . . . using the area of importance and the preferred position,’ as recited in claim 22.” Appeal Br. 5. Appellant further contends that “Terry never relies on any area of interest or on any desired position . . . in performing the format conversion . . . [instead] [t]he area of interest is always dealt with only after the format conversion has been completed.” Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis added). Appellant also contends that “[l]ike Terry, Mountain uses the already converted transmission as a basis for determining the manner in which the teletext is to be inserted.” Id. We agree with Appellant. Here, the Examiner finds that in Terry “there exist two graphics streams: one is the transmitted picture in the 4:3 format, and the other is a graphics stream displayed on the 16:9 format display without losing the Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 5 subtitles.” Ans. 4. The Examiner further finds that in Terry “[t]he area of importance is the area where the subtitles are and the preferred position is the position where the subtitles are visible.” Ans. 4–5. In other words, the Examiner finds that in Terry the first playout format is the 4:3 format, the second playout format is the displayed 16:9 format display without losing the subtitles, whereby there is no need to shift the subtitles to another position on the display area, i.e., you already have your preferred position because the subtitles are still visible. First, we note that the Examiner’s proffered converted 16:9 format, without losing visible subtitles, is not explicitly disclosed in Terry because Terry assumes that at least some portion of the subtitles are lost due to the expansion to the wide aspect ratio and Terry’s invention is based thereon. Second, as noted by Appellant, the distinction between the claimed subject matter and Terry’s process “is with regard to the converting operation and how this converting operation is performed – not necessarily the final displayed output.” See Reply Br. 5. Stated differently, Appellant emphasizes, and we agree, that it is the “converting process” of the claimed subject matter that is distinguishable from Terry’s converting process, not the final displayed output. For example, the claimed subject matter requires converting . . . using the area of importance and the preferred position (see claim 22), whereas Terry merely converts from the 4:3 format to the expanded 16:9 format, without providing any discussion about using the area of importance (e.g. the subtitles) and the preferred position (e.g., the visible part of the display) during the converting process. Instead, as identified by Appellant, Terry only uses the area of importance and the preferred position after the Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 6 conversion from the 4:3 to the expanded 16:9 format has occurred, i.e., “detecting the presence of subtitles within the undisplayed part [of the 16:9 format] and means for shifting any such subtitles so detected to a displayed part of the received picture.” Terry 2:51–53. Similarly, the Examiner incorrectly finds that Mountain teaches the aforementioned argued limitation because Mountain discloses “shifting subtitles or text data either automatically . . . by a user selection and therefore only the text is moved with respect to the video display and prior to the display being generated on screen.” Ans. 5 (citations omitted). However, claim 22 requires converting using the area of importance and the preferred position, not merely using these criteria prior to or during display on the screen, i.e., not displaying using. We find that Mountain, like Terry, merely teaches moving text after conversion (i.e., after the 4:3 format is zoomed), but prior to displaying on screen. As such, the Examiner fails to illustrate that Mountain teaches the claimed conversion process. Thus, we disagree with the Examiner’s finding that Terry and Mountain, either alone or in combination, teach the aforementioned limitations, as recited in each of independent claims 22 and 40. The Examiner has not found any of the other references of record that teach this feature. Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by Appellant, we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s remaining arguments regarding claim 22. Accordingly, we will not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 22–40. Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 7 Claim 41 Appellant contends that “the ticker of Kondo is dealt with only after format conversion has been completed and neither the ticker nor its desired position is not used in any way in the conversion itself.” Appeal Br. 10–11. As such, Appellant contends that “in a manner substantially similar to that of Terry and Mountain described above . . . Kondo [also] does not disclose or suggest performing a conversion by considering the area of importance and the preferred position. Rather, these are addressed only after the format conversion in Kondo has been completed.” Id. at 11. We agree with Appellant. Although the Examiner illustrates that Kondo teaches “the converted image [is] provided to the display 26 . . . [and] an updated display ratio with the ticker viewable” (see Ans. 7–8), we find the Examiner is conflating a “displaying” function with a “converting” function. While the results of the conversion is ultimately displayed on the screen in Kondo, the conversion step itself must include using both the area of importance and the preferred position, concurrently. The Examiner has not shown that Kondo teaches such a claimed conversion step. Instead, Kondo merely discloses that “the image converter 24 starts the size conversion process based on the information representing the conversion factor K supplied in step S13 from the image format detector 22.” Kondo ¶ 173. The Examiner fails to demonstrate that Kondo concurrently uses information pertaining to the area of importance and the preferred position, when performing such a conversion process. Thus, we disagree with the Examiner’s finding that Kondo, either alone or in combination with DaHaan, teach the aforementioned limitations, Appeal 2019-002907 Application 15/438,339 8 as recited in independent claim 41. Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by Appellant, we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments with respect to claim 41. Accordingly, we will not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 41. CONCLUSION Appellant has demonstrated that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 22–41 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 22–32, 35, 38, 40 103 Terry, Mountain 22–32, 35, 38, 40 33, 34, 39 103 Terry, Mountain, Rodriguez 33, 34, 39 36, 37 103 Terry, Mountain, Matsuo 36, 37 41 103 DeHaan, Kondo 41 Overall Outcome 22–41 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation