Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 10, 1975

221 N.L.R.B. 464 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., Beau Products
Division' and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC 2 and. Local 210, Warehouse and
Production ` Employees Union, a/w Office and
Professional Employees' International Union,
AFL,-CIO , ,CLC3, Party to the Contract . Case 1-
CA-9359
November 10, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING,' JENKINS, AND PENELLO
On April 25 and November 29, 1974, respectively,
Administrative Law Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn
issued the attached Decision and Supplemental
Decision in this , proceeding. The General Counsel
has filed exceptions to both Decisions, together with
briefs in support thereof. Respondent filed briefs in
opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decisions in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified herein.
The record reveals the following sequence of
events:
This case concerns Respondent's Laconia, New
Hampshire, plant. Its parent company owns
two other plants, located elsewhere, both of which
are under contract to Local 210. On September 7,
1973,4 Respondent's president was informed by his
corporate headquarters in New York that two
representatives of Local 210 would be in Laconia on
September 10 to organize the plant and was told to
treat them courteously.
On September 10, Respondent's supervisors were
told to, and did, assemble their employees, by
departments, for meetings with the union organizers.
When queried about this by employees, one supervi-
sor told them that whatever they did about the
Union was all right with the Employer, while another
replied affirmatively when asked if the Employer
wanted Local 210.
The series of organization meetings lasted the
entire day, employees were directed to attend them,
and all were paid for the time involved. At the
meetings , one of the Local 210 representatives told
employees: (1) his union represented employees at
Vernitron's other plants, (2) if they signed up, the
Union would get them a 25-cent-per-hour raise and
other benefits, and (3) Local 210 would obtain a
union-security clause under which they would have
to join Local 210 30 days after a contract was signed,
regardless of whether they executed union cards that
day or not.5 Supervisors, including Respondent's
general foreman, were present for all or part of each
meeting. None of them spoke, but all were in a
position to observe the employees while the latter
were executing their authorization cards. By' the end
of the meetings, Local 210 had secured authoriza-
tions from 101 of Respondent's 125 employees and
Respondent-after inspecting the cards-granted
recognition the very same day.
On September 11, Respondent's president met with
employees, informed them that he had recognized
Local 210, and opined that Local 210 was the least
unacceptable of three unions which had been, or
might be, interested in organizing them.6 He then
told employees it was their responsibility to select
representatives for a bargaining committee to work
with Local 210 in negotiations. He also cautioned
that they should choose nonradicals for the commit-
tee and named two particular employees as being
examples of the type of radicals who should not be
selected. Thereafter, the employees elected a negotia-
tions committee.7
On September 13 and 20, the employee committee
met with Respondent to negotiate a contract. On the
morning of September 20, the Steelworkers sent
Respondent a telegram in which it claimed a
substantial interest in representing the employees,
stated an intent to file a representation petition, and
warned Vernitron against violating Section 8(a)(2).
The Administrative Law Judge found that, in accord
with its custom, Respondent refused to take the
telegram over the telephone; had it delivered,
instead, over its TWX; and no Respondent official
saw the telegram until September 21. During the
afternoon of September 20, Respondent and Local
210 reached agreement on a contract calling for a 25-
cent-per-hour wage raise, other improved benefits
which had been mentioned by the union representa-
tives at the September 10 meetings, and a union-
security clause requiring all employees to become
union members 8 and providing for the checkoff of
union dues.
1 Hereinafter called Vermtron, the Employer, or Respondent.
3 Hereinafter called the Steelworkers.
3 Hereinafter called Local 210 or the Union.
4 All dates hereinafter are in 1973, unless otherwise indicated
5 Local 210 organizers also told some employee groups that they might
dust as well sign the authorization cards because more than half the persons
in the bargaining unit had already done so At the time it was uttered, the
statement was untrue.
6 One of those unions-the Steelworkers , the Charging Party heremn-
221 NLRB No. 74
had lost an election at the plant in 1966 . However, as of September 10, no
union other than Local 210 was engaged in any organizing efforts The
Steelworkers began organizing I or 2 days later.
I None of the statements attributed to Respondent in this paragraph was
alleged to be violative of the Act.
8 The clause requires all employees to become and remain union
members in good standing after the completion of 30 days' probationary
employment or, for current employees, 31 days after the execution of the
collective-bargaining agreement
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 465
On September 26, the Steelworkers requested
recognition, offering to submit to a neutral party
authorization cards signed by a majority of employ-
ees. A representation petition was also filed.
The complaint herein alleges, inter alia, that
Respondent gave unlawful assistance to Local 210,
violative of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act, by
arranging for that Union's representatives to address
employees and solicit authorization cards on compa-
ny time and property and in the presence of
Respondent's supervisors; and by-on the basis of
the cards so secured-granting Local 210 recognition
and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement
with it. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed
these allegations, relying for such disposition entirely
upon the authority of the Board's decision in
Longchamps, Inc. and its Wholly Owned Subsidiary, S
& B Restaurant of Huntington, d/b/a Steak and Brew
of Huntington, 205 NLRB 1025 (1973)-a case he
found to be factually almost identical with the case
herein. In his exceptions, the General Counsel
contends that the two cases are clearly distinguish-
able. We agree.
In Longchamps, a few days after the opening of its
restaurant, the employer called a meeting to intro-
duce the newly hired employees to ; the supervisory
staff and explain the employer's policies. At the end
of the employer's presentation, an employer official
introduced union representatives, turned the meeting
over to them, and-together with other` supervisors-
left the room. The union representatives , then
explained union benefits and distributed authoriza-
tion cards, 10 of which were immediately signed and
returned to the representatives. Later the same day,
four employees were directed by, a supervisor to leave
their work stations and report to a room where the
union representatives successfully solicited their
authorization-card signatures. About 2-1/2 weeks
later, after a card check by a local governmental
agency had affirmed the union's card majority, the
employer recognized it as the employees' representa-
tive and 2 weeks thereafter executed a collective-
bargaining agreement.
Here, as in Longchamps, there were no employer
threats or promises, and no other labor organization
was involved as of the date of Local 210's organiza-
tional meetings. But, supervisors were present and
observed - the solicitation and execution of the
Union's authorization cards, and no neutral source
was brought in to verify the card majority. Further,
the , instant recognition granted by Respondent
prevented employees who might have felt pressured
by the presence of their supervisors from having the
opportunity to take subsequent action to either
19 Petition for review dismissed sub nom. Mary Kimbrell, et at. v. N.L.R B,
290 F.2d 799 (C A. 4, 1961).
revoke their authorizations or bring another union
into the organizational campaign. In Longchamps, by
contrast, there was a 2-1/2 week hiatus between the
date the authorizations were solicited and the date
recognition was granted.
Respondent's brief herein, while echoing the
Administrative Law Judge's reliance on Longchamps,
also cites as governing authority our decisions in
Jolog Sportswear, Inc., and Jonathan Logan, Inc., 128
NLRB 886 (1960),9 and Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc.,
150 NLRB 579 (1964), wherein similar 8(a)(2)
allegations were dismissed. However, we note that in
Jolog no supervisors or other management personnel
were present when the authorization cards used in
seeking recognition were executed; a card check was
conducted by the representative of a governmental
agency; recognition was not granted until 1 month
after the union's meeting on company premises; and,
during the interim, the employer issued statements
assuring employees of their free choice and its
neutrality. In Coamo, . attendance at the union
meeting was not compulsory; all but 5 of 170
employees at the meeting were on nonwork, nonpaid
time; and no supervisor or other employer official
was in a position to view the, employees executing the
authorizations.
Here, unlike the cases cited by Respondent and the
Administrative Law Judge, there is present a set of
factors which, in combination, constitute what we
conclude to be unlawful assistance on the part of
Respondent. First, considerable indirect pressure was
placed upon employees by their being directed, and
paid, by their, Employer to attend union meetings
during worktime. Then came the direct pressure of
being solicited to' designate the' Union as their
representative while supervisors, including the gener-
al foreman, were clearly in a position to watch them
execute or refuse to execute the Union's authoriza-
tion cards. Finally, Respondent extended recognition
within a few hours and without any attempt being
made to obtain verification by a neutral party of the
Union's alleged majority status.
In our view, the above-noted combination of
Employer-applied pressures, both direct and indirect,
with the instantaneous and unverified grant of
recognition to the Union, reasonably tends to coerce
employees in the exercise of their' free choice in
selecting a bargaining representative. Accordingly,
we, find that Respondent provided unlawful assist-
ance to Local 21,0 in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and
(1) of the Act.
466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Local 210 and the Steelworkers are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.'
3. By unlawfully assisting Local 210 in obtaining
union designation cards from its employees;, by
recognizing and executing a collective-bargaining
agreement with Local 210 when said Union did not
represent an uncoerced majority of the employees in
the unit covered by the agreement ; and by incorpo-
rating in said agreement a union-security clause
requiring employees to become or remain members
of an illegally assisted union as a condition of
continued employment , Respondent has interfered
with, 'restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights in violation of
Section 8(a)(2) and ( 1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the purposes and
policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent has interfered with,
restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise
of their right to freely select their own bargaining
representative by according unlawful assistance and
support to Local 210 in violation of Section 8(a)(2)
and (1) of the Act, we shall order it to withdraw and
withhold all recognition from Local 210 and to cease
giving effect to the collective-bargaining agreement
with that Union dated September 20, 1974, or to any
renewal , modification , or extention thereof, until
such time as Local 210 shall have been certified by
the Board as the exclusive representative of the
employees in question . However, nothing in our
Order shall authorize or require the withdrawal or
elimination of any wage increase or other benefits,
terms, and conditions of employment which may
have been established pursuant to the performance
of that agreement . We shall further order Respon-
dent to reimburse all present and former employees
for all initiation fees , dues , and other moneys which
may have been exacted from them by, or in behalf of,
Local 210 pursuant to' the union-security and dues-
checkoff provisions of the aforementioned collective-
bargaining contract , together with interest thereon at
6 percent per annum.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., Beau Prod-
ucts Division , Laconia, New Hampshire , its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Assisting or contributing support to Local 210
by recognizing or bargaining with such labor
organization as the exclusive representative of its
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
unless and until Local 210 is certified by the Board as
the collective -bargaining representative of said em-
ployees pursuant to Section 9(c) of the Act.
(b) Maintaining or giving any force or effect to the
collective-bargaining agreement between Respon-
dent and Local 210 dated September 20, 1974, or any
extention or modification thereof; provided , howev-
er, that nothing ^ in this Order shall authorize or
require the withdrawal or elimination of any wage
increase or other benefits, terms, and `conditions of
employment which may have been established
pursuant to the performance of said contract.
(c) Withholding from the pay of any of its
employees union dues or other union fees or
assessments which 'have ' been deducted on account of
any obligation of membership in Local 210, and
paying to Local 210 any dues, fees, or assessments
which have been deducted from the pay of its
employees.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the purposes and policies of, the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from
Local 210 as the collective-bargaining representative
of its employees unless and until said labor organiza-
tion has been , duly certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the exclusive representative of
such employees.
(b) Reimburse all former and present employees
for all initiation fees , dues, assessments and other
moneys , if any, paid by or withheld from them in the
manner provided in "The Remedy" section of this
Decision.
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to
the Board or its agents , for examination and copying,
all payroll records , social security payment records,
timecards , personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, INC.
(d) Post at its Laconia, New Hampshire, plant
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly
signed by a representative of Respondent, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof and shall be -maintained by it -for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to its employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps it has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint herein be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act
not specifically found.
10 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the, United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found,
after a hearing at which all parties were represented,
that we violated certain provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL, NOT 'assist or contribute support to
Local 210, Warehouse and Production Employees
Union, affiliated with Office and Professional
Employees' International Union, AFL-CIO,
CLC, by recognizing or contracting with such
labor organization as the bargaining representa-
tive of our employees unless and until it has been
certified as such representative by the National
Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT give effect to our September 20,
1974, contract with Local, 210 or to any renewal,
extension, modification, or supplement thereof,
but we are not authorized or required to withdraw
or eliminate any wage rates or other benefits,
terms, and conditions of employment which we
have given to our employees under said contract.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
467
in the exercise of -their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recogni-
tion from Local 210. as the collective-bargaining
representative of our employees.
WE WILL reimburse all our employees, former
and present, for dues and other moneys unlawful-
ly exacted from them under our contract with
Local 210.
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS, INC., BEAU
PRODUCTS DIVISION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge:
The charge in this case was filed on October 3, 1973.1 The
complaint was issued on November 21. The hearing was
held on February 20 and 21, 1974, in Laconia, New
Hampshire.
The principal issue litigated was whether Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, by recognizing Local 210 as
the collective-bargaining representative of its warehouse
and production employees on September 10 and by
entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with Local
210 on September 20. As set forth in detail in section II, A,
below, I granted Respondent's motion to dismiss those
allegations of the complaint • at the conclusion of the
General Counsel's case in chief on the ground that the
General Counsel had failed to make out a prima facie case
under the precedent established by the Board in Long-
champs, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidary, S & B Restaurant
of Huntington, d/b/a Steak and Brew of Huntington, 205
NLRB 1025 (1973).
Upon the entire record and after due consideration, most
of it during the hearing, of oral argument and a brief filed
by Respondent relating to that allegation of the complaint
which was not dismissed from the bench, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a New York corporation, is engaged at
Laconia, New Hampshire, in the manufacture of electrical
connectors and barrier terminal spreads. Respondent,
annually receives goods valued in excess of $503000 directly
from suppliers located outside the State of New Hampshire
and ships products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
customers located outside the State of New Hampshire.
1 Dates are 1973 unless otherwise indicated.
468, DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Longchamps Issue
1. Facts
The following findings of fact ' are based solely on
evidence, presented by the General Counsel in, his case in
chief. They are, in most respects, undisputed. However,
many findings, for example, what Supervisor Bradley
Wallace, Jr., said to employees Amanda Darin and Wanda
Lee Atkinson as they walked to a meeting with Local 210's
organizers on the morning of September 10 and the fact
that Ralph,'Lenmer (misspelled Limmer throughout the
transcript), -one of Local 210's organizers, told employees
at meetings held that day that he already had authorization
cards executed by a majority of unit employees when he, in
fact, did not, are not admitted by Respondent. The latter is
an inference drawn from the testimony of General
Counsel's witnesses under the rule that motions for
dismissal prior to introduction of any, evidence for the
defense must be considered in light of the most favorable
view which can be taken of evidence presented by the
prosecution.
Vernitron"has two plants, in addition to the one in
Laconia involved in this case, which are under contract
with Local 210. Those contracts contain valid union-
security clauses. On the Thursday of Friday prior to
September 10, .Walter Eshelman, president of Respondent
received a 'telephone call from Vernitron's corporate
headquarters hi New` York. He was informed that
representatives of Local 210 would be in Laconia on
September 10 for the'purpose of attempting to organize his
plant. He was requested to treat them courteously.
On Monday morning, September 10, Eshelman assem-
bled his supervisors. He informed, them that Local 210's
organizers would be in the plant that day and, instructed
them to assemble the employees- by -departments on
company time so,that the organizers could talk to them. He
told the supervisors to refrain from doing anything that
could be construed as being either for or against Local 210.
He told them he wanted to get the, drive over with as little
disruption as,possible., -
Ralph. Lenmer,,.secretary-treasurer of Local 210, and
Dominick Formisano, a business agent, arrived at the plant
on schedule. They conducted a series of meetings with
employees in the cafeterias of each of the two buildings
which comprise the Laconia plant. The meetings began in
the morning and ended in the late afternoon. Lenmer, who
acted as spokesman, talked to all first- and second-shift
employees who were at work that day. Employees were
paid for the time they spent with Local 210's organizers.
Foremen were in the room with the employees from their
departments as Lenmer made his presentation to each
group. John Mont, general ' foreman, was in the room for
part or all of each of the meetings. Mont and the other-
foremen attended after one or more of the supervisors, at
the time of the first employee meeting, asked Eshelman
whether it would be all right for them to do so and were
told yes, so long as they did nothing while they were there.
Neither Mont nor the foremen spoke during any -of the
meetings . By the end of the day, Lenmer and Formisano
had obtained valid authorization cards from 101 - of
Respondent's, approximately 125 warehouse and pro-
duction employees. They then met with Eshelman. They
showed him the authorization cards they had obtained,,
After inspecting the cards, Eshelman recognized Local 210
as the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's
employees.
The following events took place when foremen'instructed
the employees under them to go-to, the cafeteria or as"they
walked with employees to the cafeteria: `William Roberts,
first-shift foreman in final assembly, when asked by'one of
his employees whether they - had to go to the meeting,
answered yes, told, them he could not influence their
decision, and, in a joking manner, wished them good luck;
Howard Cole, second-shift foreman in final assembly, said
the-decision whether to join Local 210 was up to the
employees, whatever they did was all right with the
Company; an employee- asked Brad Wallace, first-shift
foreman in the barriers department, if the Company
wanted this Union and Wallace replied yes. Wallace's
answer was heard both by Amanda Darin,- the' employee
who put the question to him, and by Wanda Lee Atkinson,
another employee who was walking with them to the
cafeteria.
Lenmer's talk was roughly the same at each meeting.' He
told the employees his purpose in meeting with them. He
explained that Local 210 represented employees at other
Vernitron plants. He told the employees that, if they signed
up, Local 210 would obtain a 25-cent-an-hour raise for
them and other benefits. He told them Local 210 would
obtain a union-security clause under which, they would
have to join the Union 30 days after a contract went into
effect regardless of'whether they signed up at that moment
or not. Sometime during the day before he actually had
cards -in hand from more than '50 percent of unit
employees, he began saying that the'employees might`as
well sign up because' he already had cards from more than
half their colleagues. At one meeting during the afternoon,
he got into a loud argument with a recalcitrant employee.
Ray Zelakowski, Respondent's comptroller,' and Richard
Jorgenson, head of the engineering department, overheard
the noise coming from the cafeteria 'and reported it to
Eshelman. Eshelman told Formisano to tell Lenmer to cool
it or he would -throw them both out of the plant. Lenmer
cooled it.
Eshelman met with the employees on September 11. He
told them that he had recognized Local 210. He instructed
them to select representatives from among themselves to
work with Local 210 in negotiations. He suggested that
they pick nonradicals ' who had some, service with the
Company. He told diem-that, in Respondent's opinion,
Local 210 was the least unacceptable of the three unions
which had been or might, in the future, be interested in
organizing them. The other two unions to which he alluded
in this remark were the Automobile Workers and the
Steelworkers. Neither had been engaged in a campaign to
organize Respondent just prior to or on September' 10. The
Steelworkers had lost an election at the plant in 1966. It
learned that Respondent had recognized Local 210 almost
as soon as recognition was granted. It began attempting to
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 469
sign up Respondent's employees within a day or two after
September 10.
Employees, voting by departments, elected seven persons
to a negotiating committee. The committee,, Lenmer, and
Formisano met with Respondent's representatives on
September 13. A second negotiating session was held on
September 20. The Steelworkers sent a telegram to
Respondent on the morning of September 20 in which it
claimed "a substantial interest in representing .. .
[Respondent's] production and maintenance employees
... and intends to file a petition with the National Labor
Relations Board requesting a secret ballot election be
conducted among your employees as soon as possible."
The telegram went on to call Respondent's attention to
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. As is its custom, Respondent
refused to take the message over the telephone and had the
telegram delivered to it over TWX. No official of
Respondent saw the telegram until September 21. In the
meantime, on, the afternoon of September 20, Respondent
and Local 210 had reached agreement on a contract. It
provided for a raise of 25 cents an hour for all employees,
an additional holiday, and other of the improved benefits
which Lenmer had mentioned to the employees when he
solicited their signatures to authorization cards on Septem-
ber 10. It contained valid union-security and checkoff
provisions.
The Steelworkers did, in fact, file a petition for an
election among Respondent's employees. It is pending in
the Boston Regional Office of the Board, blocked by this
proceeding.
before recognition was granted. The General Counsel does
not rely on the latter point in attempting to distinguish this
case from Longchamps.
The General Counsel contends that this case is not
controlled by the Board's decision in Longchamps because
supervisors were in the room when Lenmer and Formisano
signed up Respondent's employees on September 10 and
because Lenmer misled the employees by telling them
Local 210 had a majority before it, in fact, did. Longchamps
provides no direct guidance on the latter argument. It
implies a rule of law which places on Respondent an
affirmative duty to act to protect its employees when a
labor organization makes a material misrepresentation to
them in the course of an organizing campaign. During the
oral argument which preceded my ruling on Respondent's
motion to dismiss, the General Counsel was at first
uncertain as to whether he was asserting that such a rule of
law exists and then unable to cite any cases in support of
that position. I am aware of no such rule or case. More
importantly, Chairman Miller's dissenting opinion in
Longchamps demonstrates that both of the arguments
advanced by the General Counsel are distinctions without
a difference.
Chairman Miller predicated his disagreement with the
majority on a point not discussed in Administrative Law
Judge Corbley's Decision. For Chairman Miller, the key
element in the Longchamps situation was the fact that the
company was recruiting its initial complement of employ-
ees when it permitted a union to sign them up on company
time and property. He said:
2. Analysis and conclusions
I dismissed this, the major portion of the complaint, at
the hearing at the conclusion of the General Counsel's case
in chief on the, authority of the Board's recent decision in
Longchamps, supra. The Board dismissed the complaint in
Longchamps, a case factually almost identical with this one,
by a vote of two to one. Chairman Miller dissented.
Longchamps is a consolidated proceeding, involving
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) charges against the allegedly assisted
union, as well as charges against the company involved.
The majority discussed only Administrative Law Judge
John F. Corbley's dismissal of 8(b) violations in the course
of dismissing the consolidated complaint in its entirety,
thus affirming without comment his finding that the
company had not violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1). (There
was also an 8(a)(3) allegation in Longchamps that is not
present here. Administrative Law Judge Corbley also
dismissed as to that allegation and the Board affirmed
him.) As pointed out in said Decision, the Longchamps
decision turned on four factual elements. This case is
distinguishable as to two of them. The two which are
indistinguishable are the fact that supervisors did not urge
employees to join the allegedly assisted union or attempt to
coerce them into doing so by employing threats or
promises and the fact that there was no other, labor
organization on the scene at the time voluntary recognition
was granted . The two which are distinguishable are the fact
that supervisors were in the room, albeit silent, when the
organizers signed up employees and the fact that no formal
card check was conducted by an impartial third person
indeed, the very purpose of the employees' presence
on this day was one of introduction to the Employer's
staff and to its policies. The virtually simultaneous
introduction to a union obviously approved of and
favored by the Employer, and the immediate solicita-
tion by that Union of authorization cards on company
time and property, seem to me to be inimical to the
kind of free choice which this Act is supposed to
guarantee to employees. The employees here were in no
significantly different position than if the Employer
himself had actively engaged in the solicitation of
employee signatures on the authorization cards, and
when cards thus solicited were then usedas a basis for
recognition of the Union, the odor of unlawful
assistance and support is too strong for at least my
nostrils to tolerate.
Here, Respondent's plant has been in operation for years.
Its employees are an established corps. Therefore, even
under Chairman Miller's approach to Respondent's con-
duct in this case, no,violation of the Act results. Since there
is nothing in the Longchamps decision which indicates that
it turned on the fact no supervisors were in the room when
organizers met with employees and since there is no duty
on an employer to speak up when a union makes a
misrepresentation of fact to employees during the course of
an organizing campaign, I affirm my ruling on Respon-
dent's motion to dismiss that Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) by permitting Local 210 to solicit
authorization cards from its employees on September 10 at
mass meetings, which it arranged on its time and property
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for Local 210's benefit and which were attended by its
supervisors, by recognizing Local 210 that day on the basis
of authorization cards obtained in that manner, and by
thereafter, on September 20, entering into a collective-
bargaining agreement with Local 210 which contains
union-security and checkoff provisions.
B. The Other Issue
1. Credibility
The one allegation of the complaint as to which I denied
Respondent's motion to dismiss is that Respondent
violated Section- 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act on or about
September 12 when Supervisor Steven White "distributed a
Local 210 authorization card to an employee on Respon-
dent's premises." The employee involved in this incident is
B. J. Wanger, the mother of, Wanda Lee Atkinson. The
General Counsel relies on the testimony of Mrs. Wanger.
White, called as a witness by Respondent, denied that the
incident ever took place. I credit Mrs. Wanger over White,
as well as two other witnesses called,by Respondent to
support White's denial for the following reason:
Briefly, Mrs. Wanger's story is that she signed a card
given to her by White on September. 12 and then, when the
30-day deadline imposed by the union-security clause in
the Respondent-Local 210 contract neared in October, had
to sign another one in order to protect her job because the
first one had "disappeared." During the first day of the
hearing, when a question arose, as to the whereabouts of
Local 210's authorization cards, Respondent's counsel
indicated that Respondent had in its possession photoco-
pies of them. On the second day of the hearing, despite the
fact that no party had made an effort to produce any'card
bearing Mrs. Wanger's name, Respondent's counsel
frankly stated, just before the hearing closed, that he had
looked at the copies in Respondent's possession the
evening before and discovered to his surprise that the card
which bears Mrs. Wanger' s name is dated September 12.
The gravamen of this part of the complaint is what
transpired between Mrs. Wanger and White on September
12. Since there is an authorization card signed by Mrs.
Wanger which ' bears that date and no evidence in the
record on which to base a finding that Mrs. Wanger
deliberately misdated a card in order to bolster the General
Counsel's case; I can only conclude that the card came into
existence under the circumstances described by her.
2. Facts
As indicated above, Lenmer and Formisano made no
effort on September 10 to contact the approximately seven
employees who were on the third shift. Mrs. Wanger was
one of those third-shift employees. She worked in the
molding department. She learned about Lenmer's' and
Formisano's visit to the plant when her daughter, Mrs.
Atkinson, telephoned her at home that evening. Early on
the morning of September 11, near the end of her shift, she
learned that Respondent had recognized Local 210. She
holds strong opinions, one of which is that unions have no
place in small plants, a category to which she assigns
Respondent, and does not hesitate to express them.
Consequently, she visited the plant on her own time on the
afternoon of September 12.
Mrs. Wanger went into an office in the production area
of the plant where White, first-shift molding department
foreman, was sitting at his desk. She perched on the desk
and started a conversation about the union situation. She
told White that the third shift had been "shysted" (her
word; a synonym, I assume, for "shafted") so much she
had come in to find out what was going on. She asked him
to tell her, off the record, whether a'union was coming into
the plant. White told her one was. In the discussion which
followed, Mrs. Wanger expressed her disapproval of what
had happened and White suggested that she sign an
authorization card since the time would come soon when
she would have to sign one in order to keep her-job: He
took a blank Local 210 card out of the' desk drawer and
handed it to her. She reached across the desk, plucked a
pencil (or pen, the record is unclear) from White's shirt
pocket, used it to fill out 'and sign the card, and then
returned card and pencil to White. White returned the card
to the drawer. The card was one of a number which had
been left in the office by a prounion employee on one shift
to be picked up by a prounion employee on another shift.
Some of them had been executed. Others were blank.
The third shift was abolished early in October., Mrs
Wanger transferred to the second shift at that time. On
October 19, Respondent posted a notice reminding its
employees that the grace period for joining Local 210
provided in the contract which Respondent had agreed to
on September 20 expired on October 20. Apparently there
was some confusion at that time about whether Local 210
had a card signed by Mrs. Wanger which would keep it
from requesting her discharge for failure to comply with
the union-security clause. Clearly, Mrs. Wanger under-
stood that the card she had signed on September 12 had
vanished in some unexplained way. Consequently, she
executed a second card on October '20. In her view, she
signed on both occasions "under protest."
3. Analysis and conclusions
Mrs. Wanger was a belligerent witness whose demean-
or, absent the admission of Respondent's counsel during
oral argument about this issue at the conclusion of the
hearing that her card was dated September 12, might have
caused me to discredit her. On direct examination, she
said, "Mr. White passed me, a card and suggested that I do
sign it because I know that without signing it I don't have a
job and he knows at present 'I'm interested in what is
happening at Vernitron." On'cross-examination came this
exchange:
Q. He didn't say, "You must join the Union now,"
did he?
A. He said there will come a time if you've not
signed that you will not have a job. Right, sir.
Q. And he was talking about when the labor
contract was signed. Is that right?
MR. COHEN: Objection.
JUDGE BLACKBURN: Overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Reich) Did he tell you when the time
would come?
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 471
A. He told me that it was already in the contract.
Q. Didn't he say, "There would come a time?"
That if you didn't join the Union you wouldn't have a
job?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the time, "come a time," was speaking of
some time in the future, is that correct?
A. If you wish to interpret it that way?
Q. Well, wasn't that your interpretation of the term
"come a time?"
A. No, sir, because he had already told me the
Union was in.
Q. Did he use the term, "there would come a time
when you would have to join the union?"
A. I answered you yes, sir.
Q. He used those very words?
A. Yes, sir.
Despite Mrs. Wanger's bold statement that White "told
me that [union security] was already in the contract," it is
clear that he said, no such thing. The most that can be
taken from her testimony is that White made an accurate
prediction on September 12 that the negotiations between
Respondent and Local 210 which began an September 13
and ended on September 20 would result in union security.
Given the prior relationship between Local 210 and
Respondent's parent at other plants and the courtesies
extended to Local 210's organizers at Respondent's plant
on September 10, it was a prediction that required no great
insight on the part of White. The General Counsel's
position is based on this fact.
The General Counsel's, argument is twofold. First, he
contends that, the demonstrated accuracy of White's
prediction notwithstanding, White's statement was inher-
ently ;coercive because there was no certainty, prior to
negotiations , that they would result in a contract with a
union-security clause in it. Second, he contends that
White's statement was inherently coercive because it
deprived Mrs. Wanger of the 30-day grace period to which
she would have been entitled if she had elected to give up
her job rather than join Local 210 or stay out until the last
moment she could legally do so. Both arguments are
without merit. As to the first, the imminence on September
12 of a union-security clause covering Respondent's
employees was as certain as anything can be in this world,
short'of death and taxes . As to the second, the fact that
Mrs. Wanger signed two cards demonstrates she had no
intention of giving up her job rather than join Local 210,
and there is no evidence in the record of when Respondent
began checking off her dues.
The most significant point, I think, is the fact that what
happened between Mrs. Wanger and White on September
12 resulted from Mrs. Wanger's initiative. She went to the
plant on her own time to find out about the situation. She
raised the subject of Local 210, not White. White sensibly
suggested that she might as well sign a card because the
time was coming when not to have signed one would cost
her her job. He gave her a blank card which was at hand
through circumstances which in no way suggest an effort
on Respondent's part to force its employees to join Local
210 before the law required them to do so.2 Mrs. Wanger
sensibly took his advice and signed. The fact that she, on
more mature consideration of the impulsive step she had
taken, felt that she had been coerced into signing, is
immaterial. The test at law is whether White's conduct`was
objectively coercive when considered under a reasonable
man standard. There was nothing coercive about what
took place between Mrs. Wanger and White under the
circumstances which existed in Respondent's plant on
September 12. Under those circumstances,' White's hand-
ing to Mrs. Wanger a Local 210 authorization card which
happened to be at hand does not rise to the level of illegal
assistance to a labor organization. I find, therefore, that
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the
Act on September 12 when Steven White handed a Local
210 authorization card to B. J. Wanger.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., Beau Prod-
ucts Division, is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC,
and Local 210, Warehouse and Production Employees
Union, a/w Office and Professional Employees' Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act have not
been sustained.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi-
cation.]
2 While I have discredited White as to his denial that he gave Mrs.
Wanger a card on September 12, I have not discredited ham generally My
finding that cards were left in the office by one employee to be picked up by
another is based on has testimony. The fact that other cards in the drawer
had already been executed , as testified to by Mrs. Wanger, has no
significance . There is no evidence that anyone other than Mrs. Wanger ever
received a card from White or any other supervisor. A likely explanation for
the cards being in the office at that particular moment is that they had been
left there for the use of third-shift employees since they had not been
contacted by Lenmer and Formisano on September 10 In any event, the
point is unimportant.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge:
The charge in this case was filed on October 3, 1973.1 The
complaint was issued on November 21. The original
hearing was held on February 20 and 21, 1974, in Laconia,
New Hampshire.
I issued my Decision on April 25, 1974. On September
13, 1974, the Board issued its order reopening record and
remanding proceeding to Regional Director for further
hearing in which it ordered that a further hearing be held
before me "for the purposes of: (1) receiving evidence from
the Respondent relating to the allegations of paragraph 10,
subparagraphs A, B, C, E and F of the complaint [the
Longchamps issued below], and (2) reconsideration of his
findings relating to paragraph 10, subparagraph D of the
1 Dates are 1973 unless otherwise indicated.
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complaint [the other issue below], in light of Joint Exhibit
I and the stipulation between Respondent and General
Counsel dated May 24, 1974." Further hearing was held on
October 24, 1974, in Laconia, New Hampshire.
The principal issue litigated was whether Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, by recognizing Local 210 as
the collective-bargaining representative of its warehouse
and production employees on September 10 and by
entering into ,a collective-bargaining, agreement with Local
210 on September 20. For the .reasons. set forth in detail in
section II A, below, I find no merit to those allegations of
the complaint (par. 10, subpar. A, B, C, E, and F) under
the precedent established by the Board in Longchamps,
Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, S & B Restaurant of
Huntington, d/b/a Steak and Brew of Huntington, 205
NLRB 1025 (1973).
Upon the entire record and after due consideration of
oral argument and briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a New York corporation, is engaged at
Laconia, New Hampshire, in the manufacture of electrical
connectors and barrier terminal spreads. Respondent
annually receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from suppliers located outside the State of New Hampshire
and ships products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
customers located outside the State of New Hampshire.
R. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Longchamps Issue
1. Facts
Vernitron has two plants, in addition to the one in
Laconia involved in this case, which are under contract
with Local 210. Those contracts contain valid -union-
security clauses. On the Thursday or Friday prior to
September 10, Walter Eshelman, general manager of
Respondent , received a telephone call from Vernitron's
corporate headquarters in New York. He was informed
that representatives of Local 210 would be in Laconia on
September 10 for the purpose of attempting to organize his
plant. He was requested to treat them courteously.
On Monday morning, September 10, Eshelman assem-
bled his supervisors. He informed them that Local 210's
organizers would be in the plant that day and instructed
them to assemble the employees by departments on
company time so that the organizers could talk to them. He
told the supervisors to refrain from doing anything that
could be construed as being either for or against Local 210.
He told them he wanted to get the drive over with as little
disruption as possible.
Ralph Limmer, secretary-treasurer of Local 210, and
Dominick Formisano , a business agent, arrived at the plant
on schedule . They conducted a series of meetings with
employees in the cafeterias of each of the two buildings
which comprise the Laconia plant. The meetings began in
the morning and ended in the late afternoon . Limmer, who
acted as spokesman , talked to all first- and second-shift
employees who were at work that day. Employees were
paid for the time they spent with Local 210's organizers.
Foremen were in the room with the employees from their
departments as Limmer made his presentation to each
group . John Mont, general foreman , was in the room for
part or all of each of the meetings . Mont and the other
foremen attended after one or more of the supervisors, at
the time of the first employee meeting , asked Eshelman
whether it would be all right for them to do so and were
told yes,, so long as they did nothing while they were there.
Neither Mont nor the foremen spoke during any of the
meetings . They did not intend, by their actions or presence,
to attempt to influence the employees under their supervi-
sion in the employees ' exercise of their own judgment as to
whether they wanted to be represented by Local 210. By
the end of the day, Limmer and Formisano had obtained
authorization cards from 101 of Respondent 's approxi-
mately 125 warehouse and production employees. They
then met with Eshelman . They showed him the authoriza-
tion cards they had obtained . After inspecting the cards,
Eshelman recognized Local 210 as the collective-bargain-
ing representative of Respondent 's employees.
The following events took place when the foremen
instructed the employees under them to go to the cafeteria
or as they walked with employees to the cafeteria: William
Roberts, first-shift foreman in final assembly , when asked
by one of his employees whether they had to go to' the
meeting, answered yes, told them he could not influence
their decision, and, in a joking manner , wished them good
luck; Howard Cole, second-shift foreman in final assem-'
bly, said the decision whether to join Local 210 was up to
the employees , whatever they did ''was all right with the
Company; an employee asked Brad Wallace, first-shift
foreman in the barriers department, if the Company
wanted this Union and Wallace replied yes. Wallace's
answer was heard both by Amanda Darin, the employee
who put the question to him, and by Wanda Lee Atkinson,
another employee who was walking with them, to the
cafeteria . Larry Cox, foreman in secondary operations,
said to Virginia Moody, " There 's a 'meeting in the
cafeteria. I'd like you to go down .'? Steven White, foreman
in the molding room, told Josephine Hamel' there was a
meeting upstairs in the cafeteria.
Both Mrs. Moody and Miss Hamel refused to sign
authorization cards for Local 210 that day. Each expressed
her opposition to a union during the meeting she attended.
Mrs. Moody stayed only a few minutes. Once she had said
"I'm not interested in a union ," she turned to a supervisor
named Paul Graf who was standing in the hallway by the
door and said , "May I be excused?" Graf said yes. Both
Mrs. Moody and Miss Hamel joined Local 210 when,
under the union-security provisions of Local 210's contract
with Respondent, it became necessary for them to do so in
order to keep their jobs.
Limmer's talk was roughly the same at each meeting. He
told the employees his purpose in meeting with them. He
explained that Local 210 represented employees at other
Vernitron plants . He told the employees that , if they signed
up, Local 210 would obtain a 25-cent-an-hour raise for
them and other benefits . He told them Local 210 would
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, INC.- 473
obtain a union-security clause under which they would
have to join the Union 30 days after a contract went into
effect regardless of whether they signed up at that moment
or not. Sometime during the day- before he actually had
cards in hand from more than 50 percent of unit
employees, he began saying that the employees might as
well sign up because he already had cards from more than
half their colleagues, a fact of which Eshelman was
unaware when he recognized Local 210 that afternoon. At
one meeting during the afternoon, Limmer got into a loud
argument with Joanne Paul. Mrs. Paul, who' also worked
under Larry Cox, already knew from another employee
that union representatives were' in the plant when Cox
came to her and other employees after lunch and told them
to go to the cafeteria for a meeting. When the employees
tried to ask him questions about the Union, Cox said, "I'm
not answering any questions. I'm not making any com-
ments one ,way or the other." At the meeting, Mrs. Paul
took exception to Limmer's presentation to the point where
they both raised their voices: Mrs. Paul became so angry
that she walked out-of the meeting, went back-upstairs to
her work station, changed her mind, and went back to the
meeting in order to , tell Limmer in no uncertain terms that
she was not going, to, sign an authorization card for Local
210. Limmer said, "Either sign your card or you're all
done.'' She replied that she had been at Vernitron before
him and she was going to be there after he left, tore up the
blank card he had given her, handed hun the pieces, and
walked out a second time. Ray Zelakowski, Respondent's
comptroller, and Richard Jorgenson,'head of the engineer-
ing department, overheard the noise coming from the
cafeteria and reported it to Eshelman. Eshelman told
Formisano to tell Limmer to cool it or he would throw
them both out of the plant. Limmer cooled it.
Eshelman met with the employees on September 11. He
told them that he had recognized Local 210. He instructed
them to select representatives from among themselves to
work ' with Local 210, in negotiations. He suggested that
they pick 'nonradicals who had some service with the
Company. He named Joanne Paul as one of the radicals
they should not pick. He told them that, in Respondent's
opinion, Local 210 was the least unacceptable of the three
unions which had been or might, in' the future,' be
interested in organizing them. The other two unions to
which he alluded in this remark were the Automobile
Workers and the Steelworkers. Neither had been engaged
in a campaign to organize Respondent just prior to or on
September 10. The Steelworkers had lost an election at the
plant in 1966. It learned that Respondent had recognized
Local 210 almost as soon as recognition was ,granted. It
began attempting to, sign up Respondent's employees
within a day or two after September 10.
Employees, ,voting by departments, elected seven persons
to,a negotiating committee. The committee, Limmer, and
Formisano met with Respondent 's representatives on
September 13. A second negotiating session was held on
September 20. The Steelworkers sent a telegram to
Respondent on the morning of September 20 in which it
claimed "a substantial interest in representing .. .
[Respondent's] production and maintenance employees
... and intends to file a petition with the National Labor
Relations Board requesting a secret ballot election be
conducted among your employees , as soon as possible."
The telegram went on to call Respondent's attention to
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. As is its custom, Respondent
refused to take the message over the telephone and had- the
telegram delivered to it over teletypewriter exchange: No'
official of Respondent saw the telegram until September
21. In the meantime, on the afternoon of September 20,
Respondent and Local 210 had reached agreement on' a
contract. It provided for a raise of 25 cents an hour for all
employees, an additional holiday, and, other of the
improved benefits which Limmer had mentioned to the
employees when he solicited their signatures to authoriza-
tion cards on September 10. It contained. valid union-
security and checkoff provisions.
Joanne Paul's coworkers elected her a shop steward
around October 10. Like other employees who had refused
to sign authorization cards for Local 210 on September 10,
she did not join Local 210 until later in-October at the last
possible moment she could do so and retain her job under
the contract.
The Steelworkers did, in fact, - file a petition -for an
election among Respondent's employees. It is pending in
the Boston Regional Office of the Board, blocked by this
proceeding.
2. Analysis and conclusions
I dismissed this, the major portion of the complaint, at
the original hearing at the conclusion of the General
Counsel's case in chief on -the authority of the Board's
decision in Longchamps, supra. The Board dismissed the
complaint in Longchamps, a case factually almost identical
with this one, by a vote of two to one. Chairman Miller
dissented. -
Longchamps is a consolidated proceeding, involving
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) charges against the allegedly assisted
union, as well as charges against the company involved.
The majority discussed only Administrative Law Judge
John F. Corbley's dismissal of 8(b) violations in the course
of dismissing the consolidated complaint in its entirety,
thus affirming without comment his finding that the
company had not violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1). (There
was also an 8(a)(3) allegation in Longchamps that is not
present here. Administrative Law Judge Corbley also
dismissed as to that allegation and the Board affirmed'
him.) As pointed out in Administrative Law Judge
Corbley's Decision, the Longchamps decision turned on
four factual elements. This case is distinguishable as to two
of them. The two which are indistinguishable are the fact
that supervisors did not urge employees to join the
allegedly assisted union or attempt to coerce them into
doing so by employing threats or promises and the fact that
there was no other ' labor organization on the scene at the,
time voluntary recognition was granted. The two which Fare'
distinguishable are the fact that supervisors were in. the
room, albeit silent, when the organizers signed up employ-
ees and the fact that -no formal card check`was conducted
by an impartial third ^ person before recognition was
granted. The General Counsel does not rely on the latter
point in attempting to distinguish this case from Long-
champs.
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General -Counsel -contends that this case is not
controlled by the Board's decision in Longchamps because
supervisors were in the room when Limmer and Formisano
signed up Respondent's employees on September 10 and
because Limmer misled the employees by telling them
Local 210 had a majority before it, in fact, did. Longchamps
provides no direct guidance on the latter argument. It
implies a rule of law which places on Respondent an
affirmative duty to act to protect its employees when a
labor organization makes a material misrepresentation to
them in the course of an organizing campaign. During the
oral argument which preceded my ruling on Respondent's`
motion to dismiss , the General Counsel was at first
uncertain as to whether he was asserting that such a rule of
law exists and then unable to cite any cases in support of
that position . I am aware of no such rule or case. More
importantly, Chairman Miller's dissenting' opinion in
Longchamps demonstrates that both of the arguments
advanced by the General'Counsel'are distinctions without
a difference.
Chairman Miller predicated his disagreement with the
majority on a' point not discussed in Judge Corbley's
decision . For Chairman Miller, the key element in the
Longchamps situation was the fact'that the company was
recruiting its initial complement of employees when it
permitted a union to sign them up on company time and
property. He said:
Indeed the very purpose of the employees' presence on
this day was one of introduction to the Employer's staff
and to its policies. The virtually simultaneous introduc-
tion to a union obviously approved of and favored by
the Employer, and the immediate solicitation by that
Union of authorization cards on company time and
property, seem to me to be inimical to the kind of free
choice which this Act is supposed to guarantee to
employees : The employees here were in no significantly
'different position than if the Employer himself ' had
actively engaged in the solicitation of employee
signatures on the `authorization cards; and when cards
thus solicited were then used as a basis for recognition
of the Union, the odor of unlawful assistance and
support is too strong for at least my nostrils to tolerate:
{
Here, Respondent 's plant has been in operation for years.
Its employees are an established corps. Therefore, even
under Chairman . Miller's approach to Respondent's con-
duct in this case , no violation of the Act results. Since there
is nothing in the Longchamps decision which indicates that
it turned on the fact no supervisors were in the room when
organizers met with employees and since there is no duty
on an employer to speak up when a' union makes a
misrepresentation of fact to employees during the course of
an organizing campaign, I find Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a)(2),and (1) by permitting Local, 210 to solicit
authorization cards from its employees on September 10 at
mass meetings , which ,it arranged on its time and property
for Local, 210's benefit (subpar. A) and which were
attended by its supervisors (subpar. B); by recognizing
Local 210 that', day on- the basis of authorization cards
obtained in that manner -(subpar. C), andby thereafter, on.
September 20, entering into a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Local 210 which contains, union-security and
checkoff provisions (subpars. E and F).
B., The Other Issue
Paragraph 10, subparagraph D, of the complaint reads,
"On or about September 12, 1973, Respondent, through its
supervisor, Steven White, distributed a Local 210 authori-
zation card to an employee on Respondent's premises."
The General Counsel, relies on the testimony of B. J.
Wanger, the mother of Wanda Lee Atkinson. White, called
as a witness by Respondent, denied that the incident ever
took 'place. In my original Decision, I said, in a section
devoted to this credibility conflict:
I credit Mrs. Wanger over White, as well as two other
witnesses called by Respondent to support White's
denial, for the following reason:
Briefly, Mrs. Wanger's story is that she signed a card
given to her by White on September 12 and then; when
the 30-day deadline imposed by the union-security
clause in the Respondent-Local 210 contract neared in
October,,had to, sign another one in order to protect her
job because the first one had "disappeared." During
the first day of the hearing, when a question arose as to
the whereabouts of Local 210's authorization cards,
Respondent's counsel indicated that Respondent ,had
in its possession photocopies of them. On the second
day of the hearing, despite the fact that no party had
made an effort to produce any card bearing Mrs.
Wagner's name, Respondent's counsel frankly stated,
just before the hearing closed, that he had looked at the
copies in Respondent's possession the evening before
and discovered to his surprise that the card which bears
Mrs. Wanger's name is dated September 12. The
gravamen of this part of the complaint is what
transpired between Mrs.- Wanger and White on
September 12. Since there is an authorization, card
signed by Mrs. Wanger which bears that date and no
evidence in, the record on which, to base a finding that
Mrs. Wanger deliberately misdated a card in ,order to
bolster the General Counsel' s case, I can only conclude
that the card came into existence under the circum-
stances described by her.
At the beginning of the section devoted to my analysis and
conclusions with respect to this issue, ,l said: ,
Mrs. ' Wanger was a 'belligerent witness whose
demeanor, absent the admission of Respondent's
- counsel during 'oral argument about this issue at the
conclusion of the hearing that her card was dated
September 12, might have caused me to discredit her.
Some weeks after I issued my Decision on April 25, 1974,
I received a motion from counsel for Respondent and the
General Counsel that I reopen. the record for the limited
purpose of receiving into evidence a Local 210 authoriza-
tion card signed by Mrs. Wanger and dated September 12,
1973, and a stipulation with respect thereto. I denied the
motion , on the ground that, having issued my Decision, I
had, no authority to do anything with respect to this case.
At the further hearing on October 24, 1974, pursuant to the
VERNITRON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, INC. 475
second part of the Board's order set forth in the section
entitled "Statement of the Case" above, I received card
and stipulation into evidence.
The card is the one referred to by counsel for Respon-
dent in his oral argument . As indicated in the two portions
of my Decision set forth above, I relied on an assumption
that the card Respondent's counsel had in his possession
had actually been signed by Mrs. Wanger on-September 12
to credit her over Respondent 's witnesses . The card and
the stipulation with respect to it disprove that assumption.
The back of the card contains a statement in Mrs.
Wanger's handwriting and bearing her initials that this is
the second card she signed . The stipulation is that the card
was executed by Mrs. Wanger sometime subsequent to the
date which appears on its-face.
But for counsel 's statement that the card in his
possession was dated and thus, presumably , had been
signed by Mrs. Wanger on September 12, I would not have
credited her in my Decision. After reconsideration of the
record as a whole , especially the authorization card and
stipulation with respect thereto which became a part of the
record only after issuance of that Decision, I credit the
testimony of Steven White that the incident relied on by
the General Counsel as supporting paragraph 10, subpara-
graph D, of the complaint never occurred. I find, therefore,
the General Counsel has not established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Respondent, on or about
September 12, 1973 , "through its supervisor Steven White,
distributed a Local 210 authorization card to an employee
on Respondent's premises."
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire
record in this case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., Beau Prod-
ucts Division, is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6),and (7) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC,
and Local 210 , Warehouse and Production Employees
Union, a/w Office and Professional Employees ' Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The, allegations of the complaint that Respondent
has violated Section 8 (a)(2) and (1) of the Act have not
been sustained.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi-
cation.]