Vernard Evans, Complainant,v.Michael O Leavitt, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 21, 2008
0120063847r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 21, 2008)

0120063847r

03-21-2008

Vernard Evans, Complainant, v. Michael O Leavitt, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Agency.


Vernard Evans,

Complainant,

v.

Michael O Leavitt,

Secretary,

Department of Health and Human Services,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120063847

Hearing No. 100-2003-08280X

Agency No. ACF-009-02

DECISION

On June 16, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's May

15, 2006, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a GS-13 Developmental Disabilities Specialist in the Administration

for Children and Families (ACF) and Administration for Developmental

Disabilities (ADD). In April 2001, complainant applied for a promotion

to one of the newly created Lead Development Program Specialist (LDPS)

positions. Complainant was deemed qualified for the position, was

interviewed, and was notified that she was tentatively selected for

the position in October 2001. In addition to complainant, the agency

tentatively selected a Black male and a White female for the position.

However, according to the agency, complainant and the other selectees were

not placed into the position because of a hiring and promotion freeze.

Agency officials testified that the hiring freeze was relaxed in November

2001, but all promotions to the GS-13 level and above had to be approved

by the Assistant Secretary for Children and Families. None of the three

selectees for the LDPS positions were placed into the position.

Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated

against on the bases of race (African-American) and age1 (born September

27, 1946) when she was selected for a GS-15 LDPS position but was not

placed into the position because of hiring controls; and in October 2001,

a GS-14 Special Assistant to a Commissioner position was made available

to the Commissioner's White female friend, whereas complainant was not

made aware of this position or given a chance to compete for it.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing, and the AJ held a hearing on March 8 and 9, 2006 and

issued a decision on April 17, 2006, finding no discrimination. The AJ

found that complainant failed to prove that the agency's articulated

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were pretext for

unlawful discrimination. The agency subsequently issued a final order

adopting the AJ's findings.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant argues that the AJ erred when he found no

discrimination. Complainant contends that the agency failed to give a

consistent reason why it failed to place her in the LDPS position; the

agency failed to properly designate the LDPS position as a non-bargaining

unit position; the Commissioner selected a White female to a GS-15

position despite the hiring freeze; and the Commissioner detailed

an African-American Division Director out of the ADD days after the

Commissioner testified at the hearing.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case claiming

discrimination is a three-step process as set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), and its progeny. See

Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,

425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976)

(applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases). For complainant to

prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a

factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden

then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is

pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

(2000).

In this case, we find that the agency provided legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, agency

management testified that complainant was not placed into the LDPS

position because a hiring freeze/control was placed on the position and

all positions at the GS-13 level and above. Regarding the GS-14 Special

Assistant to a Commissioner position, agency management testified that as

a political appointee, the Commissioner was entitled to select an agency

employee for an Executive Assistant position. The agency stated that

the Commissioner initially selected a 55-year old White female as her

Executive Assistant in a GS-14 detail capacity, but later promoted her

to the position permanently at the GS-15 level pursuant to a publicized

vacancy announcement. The Commissioner testified that her Executive

Assistant was selected based upon her experience in developmental

disabilities, many years of experience with the agency, and a personal

relationship with the Commissioner.

Complainant argues that the agency failed to give a consistent reason

why it failed to place her in the LDPS position. A review of the record

reveals that indeed agency officials appeared to be unsure of the extent

of the hiring control and the authority of agency officials to make

exceptions to the control. However, we find that the inconsistencies

in management's testimony were good faith attempts of agency officials

to recall confusing and changing agency directives on hiring, not an

attempt to cover discriminatory motives. Complainant also argues that the

agency's articulated reasons are pretextual because the agency failed to

properly designate the LDPS position as a non-bargaining unit position.

However, the record reflects that the agency's Human Resources office

designated the position as a non-bargaining unit position before the

relevant vacancies were announced, and there is no indication that

Human Resources' decision was based upon unlawful discrimination.

Complainant also contends that the agency's explanation is pretextual

because the Commissioner selected a White female co-worker to a GS-15

position despite the hiring freeze. We note that the Executive Assistant

position was a unique position that was exempted from the hiring control

and involved consultation and interaction with a political appointee,

and as such, was not similar to the LDPS position.

Complainant further argues that the agency's articulated reasons

are pretextual because the Commissioner detailed an African-American

Division Director out of the ADD because the Director raised concerns

about discrimination to the Commissioner. Complainant contends that the

AJ erred when he denied complainant's post-hearing motion to "reopen the

hearing" because the reassignment of the Director constituted new evidence

that was relevant to her complaint. However, we conclude that complainant

has failed to demonstrate how the Commissioner's alleged reprisal against

the Director in 2006 was related to her non-selection in 2001 and 2002;

therefore, we determine that the AJ acted within his discretion when

he denied complainant's request to allow testimony on the Director's

reassignment. Consequently, we find that substantial evidence supports

the AJ's conclusion that complainant failed to prove that the agency's

reasons for its actions were pretext for unlawful discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the agency's

final order finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_March 21, 2008_________________

Date

1 We note that on appeal, complainant states that he is not pursuing

her age discrimination claim.

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0120063847

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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