Vera J. Robinson, Complainant,v.Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 15, 2002
01A12908 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 15, 2002)

01A12908

08-15-2002

Vera J. Robinson, Complainant, v. Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.


Vera J. Robinson v. Department of the Treasury

01A12908

August 15, 2002

.

Vera J. Robinson,

Complainant,

v.

Paul H. O'Neill,

Secretary,

Department of the Treasury,

(Internal Revenue Service),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12908

Agency No. 99-2291

Hearing No. 330-A0-8114X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's final order in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant alleged that she was discriminated against on the bases of

her race (African-American) and sex (female) in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the agency's final order.

Many of the facts which precipitated the filing of the instant complaint

are not in dispute. Complainant was employed by the agency as a Bankruptcy

Specialist in the Collection Division of the Special Procedures Branch

at the agency's Houston, Texas District Office. On April 21, 1998,

complainant and a coworker (coworker: White, female) attended hearings

before the United States Senate Finance Committee. When coworker returned

to Houston, the agency issued her an �Opportunity Letter� notifying her to

improve her performance or risk removal. Believing that the letter was

sent in reprisal for her testimony before the Senate Finance Committee,

coworker sought and received the intervention of the Commissioner.

The Commissioner ordered the agency's Deputy Commissioner to Houston

to investigate.

Upon returning to Houston, complainant received a Notice of Proposed

Adverse Action (30-day suspension). Through the grievance process, the

proposed suspension was reduced to a Letter of Reprimand. Believing that

the agency issued the Notice of Proposed Adverse Action in reprisal

for her appearance at the hearing before the Senate Finance Committee,

complainant sought the personal involvement of the executive head of the

agency, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Commissioner).

The Commissioner did not become personally involved. On June 9, 1999,

complainant filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the agency

alleging that the Commissioner failed to adequately respond to her

allegation of reprisal because she is African-American and female.

Specifically, complainant alleged that:

On April 15, 1999, [coworker] was retaliated against by her managers in

the Houston District IRS. As a result, the Commissioner . . . immediately

sent the second in command . . . to Houston to review the case. The same

actions . . . were taken against me (Black Female) on April 21, 1998,

when my picture appeared in the Washington Post during the Senate Finance

Committee Hearings, however, the response to my retaliation was totally

different and to this date has not been resolved.

Individual Complaint of Employment Discrimination, Investigative Report

Page 5.

After an investigation, complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge. Before the hearing, complainant withdrew sex

as a basis of her complaint. After the hearing, the Administrative

Judge issued findings, ultimately concluding that complainant failed to

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was discriminated

against on the basis of her race. The agency issued a final order on

March 26, 2001, fully implementing the Administrative Judge's decision.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding

regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual

finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

An Administrative Judge's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo

standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

In this case, the agency has articulated legitimate non-discriminatory

reasons for its actions. The agency states that, unlike complainant,

coworker testified in an open session before Congress on the topic

of abuse by the agency of employees and taxpayers. The Chair of the

Senate Finance Committee specifically instructed the agency not to

retaliate against coworker on the basis of her testimony whereupon the

Commissioner instructed local management in Houston that they were not to

take retaliatory action against coworker. In the event that discipline

was necessary, the Commissioner was to approve that discipline himself.

When the agency's Houston District Office sent the Opportunity Letter to

coworker without the Commissioner's approval, the Commissioner responded

by sending the Deputy Commissioner to Houston to ascertain why his

instructions were not followed. The Commissioner testified that he

was involved in coworker's retaliation allegations only because of the

interest expressed by the Congress and because of the Houston office's

failure to comply with his specific instructions, not because of race.

At the hearing complainant produced witnesses who testified that they

believe that discrimination generally exists at the agency's Houston

District Office. However, complainant has failed to produce evidence that

the explanations given at the hearing by the Commissioner are actually

pretexts for race discrimination. The Administrative Judge found that

while complainant's discontentment with the agency was well known in the

District, it did not have the national attention coworker's testimony had

caused and complainant was not treated the same because the Commissioner

had not been instructed by the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee to

ensure that she was not retaliated against. The Administrative Judge

found the Commissioner's testimony reliable and complainant has failed

to establish that the Administrative Judge's factual findings are against

the substantial weight of the evidence.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to affirm the final agency order because

the Administrative Judge's ultimate finding, that unlawful employment

discrimination was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, is

supported by the record.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 15, 2002

__________________

Date