Vaughan & Sons, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1986

281 N.L.R.B. 1082 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Vaughan & Sons, Inc. and Sheet Metal Workers
Local Union No. 54, AFL-CIO. Case 23-CA-
10132
30 September 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND BABSON
On 9 June 1986 Administrative Law Judge
Philip P. McLeod issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel and the Charging Party
filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions' and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Vaughan &
Sons, Inc., Houston, Texas, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order.
1 Member Babson agrees with the judge's conclusion that the Re-
spondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status
based on objective considerations sufficient to justify its withdrawal of
recognition In so doing, Member Babson considers it unnecessary to rely
on the judge's finding that the General Counsel affirmatively proved that
the Union in fact enjoyed majority status See Bartenders Hotel & Restau-
rant Assn. of Pocatello, Idaho, 213 NLRB 651 (1974), and particularly fn
21 of that decision
John A. Ferguson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Tom Davis, Esq. (Cooke, Davis & McFall), of Houston,
Texas, for the Respondent.
Patrick M. Flynn, Esq., of Houston, Texas, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PHILIP P . McLEOD, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case on 10 November 1985 in Houston, Texas.
The charge that gave rise to this case was filed on 9
August 1985 . On 20 September 1985 a complaint and
notice of hearing issued that alleges, inter alia, that
Vaughan & Sons, Inc. (Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, by
failing and refusing to meet with Sheet Metal Workers
Local Union No. 54, AFL-CIO (the Union), for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining concerning the terms of a
new agreement to cover the appropriate bargaining unit
represented by the Union and by failing and refusing to
281 NLRB No. 144
discuss with the Union a grievance filed by a discharged
employee.
In its answer to the complaint, Respondent admitted
numerous allegations, including the filing and serving of
the charge, its status as an employer within the meaning
of the Act, the status of the Union as a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of the Act, the appropriateness
of the bargaining unit, the history of successive collec-
tive-bargaining agreements between it and the Union,
and the fact that it and the Union met on several occa-
sions in an attempt to negotiate a new collective-bargain-
ing agreement covering that same unit. Respondent ad-
mitted that the Union filed a written grievance on behalf
of a discharged employee Allan Lavalais and that in
August 1985 the Union requested Respondent to sched-
ule further contract negotiations. Further, Respondent
admitted that it both failed and refused to discuss and at-
tempt to resolve the grievance and failed and refused to
meet with the Union for the purpose of further negotia-
tions. In its answer, Respondent asserted the affirmative
defense that it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's ma-
jority status as the exclusive bargaining representative of
employees in the appropriate unit and that Respondent
therefore has no duty to engage in collective bargaining
with the Union. Respondent denied having engaged in
any conduct that would constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of the Act.
At the trial all parties were represented and afforded
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-exam-
ine witnesses, and to introduce evidence. Following the
close of the trial, the General Counsel, the Union, and
Respondent all filed timely briefs, which have been duly
considered. 1
On the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent engages in distribution of wholesale
lumber and building materials in Houston, Texas. Re-
spondent annually purchases and receives at its Houston
facility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points located outside the State of
Texas. Respondent is, and has been at all times material,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 54, AFL-CIO
is, and has been at all times material , a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 In its posttrial brief, the Union moved that p. 143, LL 8 and 9 of the
transcript be corrected to read, "I withheld sending them that informa-
tion that they had requested." This motion is unopposed, and the pro-
posed change comports with my memory of the testimony. Accordingly,
the Union's motion is granted.
VAUGHAN & SONS 1083
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Union and Respondent have been parties to suc-
cessive collective-bargaining agreements for several
years. The most recent agreement was to expire by its
term on 30 November 1984. On 19 September 1984 the
Union gave timely notice to Respondent of its desire to
terminate that agreement and to negotiate a new agree-
ment.
On 26 November 1984 Respondent and the Union
commenced negotiations. At that meeting, the Union
presented its proposal, for a new collective-bargaining
agreement . The parties, met again on 29 November at
which time Respondent presented its first proposal. At
this meeting, the parties agreed to extend the terms of
their then-current contract beyond the 30 November ex-
piration date. By letter of 30 November from Respond-
ent's counsel, Tom Davis, this agreement was confirmed
in writing.
Subsequent bargaining sessions were held on 5 and 11
December 1984, at which time further proposals were
exchanged between the parties. On 13 December the
Union"s counsel, Patrick Flynn, sent a letter to Davis
confirming the parties' agreement to extend the terms of
the contract until 15 January 1985 and to resume bar-
gaining on 7 January. The parties held bargaining meet-
ings on 7 and 10 January and 6 February 1985.
It is undisputed that, at the 6 February meeting, the
parties reached impasse. Respondent gave 48 hours'
notice of its intent to terminate the contract. On 8 Febru-
ary the Union held a meeting with members of the bar-
gaining unit and a vote was taken not to strike Respond-
ent. On 11 February Respondent implemented the terms
of its last offer to the Union.
On 15 March Respondent notified its employees that it
was no longer withholding union dues from' their pay-
checks. On 25 March the Union held another meeting
with members of the bargaining unit. Approximately- 18
employees from the bargaining unit attended this meet-
ing. At that meeting, employees decided to send the
Union's representatives back to the bargaining table to
attempt to obtain the best contract possible. The Union
then contacted a representative of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service and advised him of the Union's
desire to resolve the impasse and return to the bargaining
table.
On 26 March the parties resumed negotiations under
the auspices of a Federal mediator. The parties discussed
various contract proposals, which were still unresolved.
No significant progress was made. The parties met again
on 3 April, at which time Respondent presented specific
proposals on various provisions previously -unresolved.
Also at this meeting, Respondent proposed that when a
new contract was reached, the Union obtain new dues-
checkoff authorization cards from members of the' bar-
gaining unit. Again, little progress was made toward an
agreement.
The' parties met for the last time on 9 April. At that
meeting , the Union orally requested information from
Respondent concerning insurance coverage provided to
employees. The session ended with the parties agreeing
to meet again on 17 April after Respondent provided the
requested information.
About 14 April-Union Representative Albert Douglas
telephoned Respondent's general manager, Steve Sims,
and offered to pick up the requested information. Sims
told Douglas that the information was not yet available
and that if it was not available by 17 April the meeting
scheduled for that day would have to be canceled.
Douglas telephoned Union Counsel Flynn. Flynn then
telephoned Respondent Counsel Davis and advised
Davis that the Union would be making a written request
for the insurance information. Flynn also stated it ap-
peared that the 17 April meeting should be canceled.
By letter dated 18 April, Flynn requested specific in-
formation concerning insurance coverage provided by
Respondent to employees. The letter concluded, "please
provide us with this, information and we will be able to
set up another meeting next week."
On at least one occasion after 18 April, Flynn tele-
phoned Davis to point out that he had not yet received
the information and to renew the request for that infor-
mation. By letter dated 30 May 1985 and received by
Flynn on 3 June, Respondent furnished the requested in-
formation. Flynn then forwarded the information to
Douglas.
During June and July 1985 the Union made no contact
with Respondent. On 5 August Respondent discharged
employee Allan Lavalais. Lavalais contacted Union Rep-
resentative Guy Rogers, who filed a written grievance
with Respondent on 7 August on behalf of Lavalais.
Thereafter, Union Counsel l Flynn received a telephone
call from Union Representative `Holzworth who advised
Flynn that Respondent was refusing to entertain the La-
valais grievance. On 7 August Flynn then telephoned
Respondent's counsel, Davis. This conversation between
Flynn and Davis is the only element of this case about
which there is any substantive dispute. Flynn and Davis
agree that Flynn asked Davis as Respondent's counsel to
process and discuss the Lavalais grievance, and Davis re-
fused. Davis testified, "I told Pat, Mr. Flynn, that we do
not have a contract, and therefore there is no way that
we can entertain this grievance." Flynn and Davis also
both agree that in -thi conversation Flynn asked Davis if
Respondent was withdrawing recognition from the
Union. Flynn testified that Davis responded, "not at this
time," or words to that effect. Davis, however, admits
the following:
[Flynn] then asked me something to the effect, am I
saying, that Vaughan Company no longer has a duty
to bargain with the Union? I told him that I
thought that was correct, and I believe that... .
He then asked me something about future meetings
between Vaughan and the Union, and I said, in
view of what I said that I don't see any further
need for us to meet anymore.
The discrepancy in testimony between Flynn and Davis
does not require prolonged consideration or discussion.
In spite of Flynn's testimony, Davis admits that in this
conversation he withdrew recognition from the Union
and refused to conduct further negotiating sessions be-
tween Respondent and the Union. Respondent's answer
to the complaint also admits that Respondent withdrew
1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL'LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
recognition from the Union. I find that Respondent did
so on 7 August in the telephone conversation between
Flynn and Davis.
,On 14 August Union Representative Al Mayfield tele-
phoned Respondent's general manager, Sims, and asked
Sims to meet with the Union "for the purpose of con-
tinuing negotiations ." Sims replied that he would have to
turn over Mayfield's request to Davis. Mayfield never
heard from either Sims or Davis.
Analysis and Conclusions
While the collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent and the Union remained in effect, the Union
enjoyed an irrebuttal presumption of majority status
among employees. On expiration of that agreement, a re-
buttal presumption of the Union's majority status contin-
ued. The burden of rebutting such a presumption rests on
Respondent. "Clear, cogent, and convincing proof is re-
quired to rebut that presumption." To meet its burden of
proof, Respondent must establish either that the Union in
fact no longer enjoyed majority status at the time Re-
spondent withdrew recognition from the Union or that
its withdrawal of recognition was predicated on a good-
faith and reasonably founded doubt of the Union's con-
tinued majority status. Such a good-faith doubt- must be
based on objective considerations. Flex Plastics, 262
^NLRB 651, 656 (1982); Bartenders Assn. of Pocatello, 213
NLRB 651 (1974); Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480,
1480-1481 (1969), enfd. 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970).
In the case at hand, Respondent does not contend that
the Union had in fact lost its majority status among em-
ployees, and no evidence was introduced from which
such a finding could be made.
In its answer to the complaint, Respondent specifically
asserted as an affirmative defense that it had a good-faith
doubt of the Union's majority status. Its position at the
trial was consistent, with that defense. In its posttrial
brief, however, Respondent argued as its primary posi-
tion that the Union disclaimed interest in representing
employees and thereby relieved Respondent of any obli-
gation thereafter to recognize and bargain with the
Union. Respondent asserted the good-faith doubt of the
Union's continued majority status only as a secondary
position. I have considered both of Respondent 's argu-
ments and find them to be without merit.
Frank Ahr, one of Respondent's first-line supervisors,
testified that in late March or early April 1985, Union
Business Agent Al Mayfield paid him a visit at Respond-
ent's facility. Mayfield was the business agent whose job
it had been to administer the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Respondent and the Union. Mayfield's
visit was brief. Ahr testified Mayfield said he "had just
come by to tell me that he enjoyed working with me,
and he probably wouldn't see me again. He said we were
pulling out." Mayfield was not called to deny Ahr's testi-
mony, which stands uncontradicted. I credit Ahr. Ahr
notified Respondent's general manager Sims of May-
field's visit and statement. There is no evidence that Sims
did anything to attempt to confirm Mayfield's statement
or its meaning insofar as the Union was concerned. In its
brief, Respondent argues that Mayfield's statement was
made shortly after the final bargaining session on 9 April
and that it had the legal effect of the Union disclaiming
further interest in representing employees. In fact, Ahr
could ' not pinpoint the timing of Mayfield's statement
with such precision that it can be determined with any
accuracy to have occurred after the 9 April bargaining
session . On 15 March Respondent notified its employees
that it was no longer withholding union dues from their
paychecks. Ahr placed the statement by Mayfield about
2 or 3 weeks after that notice. Whether the statement oc-
curred before or after the 9 April meeting, however, is a
matter of pure speculation. Further, I note that the 9
April bargaining meeting ended with an agreement that
the parties would meet again on 17 April. Respondent
had been requested to supply the Union with certain in-
formation regarding medical coverage provided to em-
ployees, and the parties were to meet again after Re-
spondent provided that information to the Union.
In its brief, Respondent argues that after 9 April the
Union's actions were consistent with a disclaimer. Such
an argument is patently absurd. Davis testified that he
withheld sending the Union the information it had re-
quested because he thought "the Union had gone away."
On at least one occasion, however, Union Counsel Flynn
telephoned Respondent Counsel Davis to remind him
that the requested information had` not yet been received.
By letter dated 30 May, Respondent supplied the Union
with the requested information. If Respondent had in
fact thought that the Union was disclaiming any further
interest in representing employees it would have been
easy for ' Davis to confirm that position with Flynn.
There is no indication whatsoever that Davis attempted
to do so. By 30 May it was perfectly clear to Respond-
ent that the Union was not in fact disclaiming interest in
representing employees or Respondent would have had
no reason and no need to finally supply the requested in-
formation. A disclaimer of interest under circumstances
such as are present here would in fact be a waiver of the
Union's right to represent Respondent's employees. The
Board has long held that such a waiver of statutory
rights must be clear and unequivocal. Mayfield's state-
ment made to a first-line supervisor, particularly when
considered in the light of other events that were then
taking, place between Respondent and the Union, falls far
short of being clear and unequivocal. I find that the
Union did not disclaim or waive its right to bargain on
behalf of unit employees.
Respondent's argument that it entertained a good-faith
doubt of the Union's majority status based on objective
considerations is equally unconvincing. In support, of that
argument, Respondent attempted to establish that there
was a decided lack of activity by the Union on behalf of
bargaining unit employees in recent years. Respondent
notes , for example, that the Union did not serve notice to
reopen the collective-bargaining agreement with Re-
spondent prior to its expiration date in 1983. As a result,
that contract was extended for another year until No-
vember 1984. Respondent argues that the Union walked
away from negotiations after the 6 February meeting.
According to Respondent, it then ignored its member-
ship's instruction to get the best deal possible. According
to Respondent, after the 9 April meeting, the Union took
VAUGHAN & SONS 1085
no action whatsoever that was inconsistent with a dis-
claimer in representing employees for a period of 4
months (i.e., from 9 April to 7 August). Respondent's as-
serted objective considerations were offered through
Davis. Davis testified that Respondent 's good-faith doubt
of the Union's majority status was based on inactivity by
the Union. More specifically, Davis testified that the
Union failed to terminate the collective-bargaining agree-
ment in 1983 as previously indicated ; the Union delayed
filing grievances on behalf of discharged employees in
1984; the Union did not proceed to arbitration on these
grievances; that during contract negotiations , after im-
passe was reached in February 1985 the Union did not
contact Respondent until 26 March when the parties re-
sumed negotiations ; the union membership voted not to
strike; and the Union took no action in response to Re-
spondent's rescinding dues checkoff on 15 March. Davis
testified he became aware of Mayfield's statement to Ahr
and that he "really thought . . . the Union had gone
away." As indicated, Respondent argues that for 4
months the Union did nothing consistent with having
"gone away ." For reasons previously expressed, I find
that argument patently absurd in view of the fact that on
30 May Respondent finally supplied the Union with in-
formation it had requested on at least two occasions
starting on 9 April.
It is also significant to note that Davis' asserted objec-
tive considerations were based entirely on alleged inac-
tivity by the Union. The relevant factual considerations
for an employer 's good-faith doubt of continuing majori-
ty status involves a lack of support resulting from inac-
tion between employees and the Union and is not evi-
denced by inaction between the Union and the employer.
Pioneer Inn , 228 NLRB 1263, 1265 (1977), enfd . 578 F.2d
835 (9th Cir. 1978).
Respondent offered no evidence that any employees of
Respondent no longer wished to be represented by the
Union . On cross-examination of Union Representatives
Mayfield and Douglas, Respondent attempted to show
that a minority of union members actually attended meet-
ings and that the Union' s bargaining committee did not
hold any meetings among themselves after June 1985. A
lack of attendance at union meetings and even employ-
ees' disinterest in further participation in negotiations
does not alone establish disinterest in union representa-
tion.
Finally, the General Counsel affirmatively proved that
the Union in fact had a majority status among employ-
ees. There were approximately 70 employees in the bar-
gaining unit . The General Counsel proved that approxi-
mately 49 of these employees were members of the
Union during the significant period.
In conclusion , Respondent has failed to establish that it
had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status at
the time it withdrew recognition from the Union. Re-
spondent was therefore not privileged to withdraw rec-
ognition , and I find that by doing so Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
The absence of a collective-bargaining agreement is
not a defense to Respondent's failure to accept and dis-
cuss the Union's grievance filed on behalf of discharged
employee Lavalais . On the expiration of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement , either party is relieved of its duty to
honor the binding arbitration clause of the expired col-
lective-bargaining agreement with regard to debates aris-
ing after the expiration of that agreement . Neither party,
however, is relieved of its duty to accept, consider, dis-
cuss, and otherwise meet and negotiate in an attempt to
resolve grievances , including disciplinary actions taken
against employees , which are mandatory subjects of col-
lective bargaining . The parties are required to discuss
and process such grievances in a sincere effort to reach a
resolution . Storall Mfg. Co., 275 NLRB 220 (1985), and
cases cited therein . Accordingly, I find that by refusing
to accept, consider , and discuss the grievance filed by
the Union on 7 August on behalf of employee Lavalais,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Vaughan & Sons , Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 54, AFL-
CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees , includ-
ing truckdrivers and shipping and receiving department
employees employed by Vaughan & Sons , Inc., at its
Houston , Texas facility, excluding all sales employees,
office clerical employees, professional employees , drafts-
men, guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
4. At all times material , Sheet Metal Workers Local
Union No . 54, AFL-CIO, has been , and is now, the ex-
clusive representative of the employees in the unit de-
scribed above for purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
5. Commencing about 7 August 1985, and continuing
to date, Respondent withdrew recognition from the
Union and thereafter has failed and refused to meet with
the Union for purposes of collective bargaining , and Re-
spondent has thereby engaged in, and is engaging in,
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. Commencing about 7 August 1985 , and continuing
to date, Respondent has failed and refused, and continues
to fail and refuse , to accept, process, discuss, and attempt
to resolve a grievance filed by the Union concerning the
discharge of employee Allan Lavalais, and Respondent
has thereby engaged in , and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act , I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. At-
tached to the brief of the General Counsel was a copy of
1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
what has become a form brief filed by the General
Counsel in every case asking that as a part of the remedy
a visitatorial clause be included, giving the General
Counsel certain specific discovery powers during the
compliance stage of this proceeding. In recent cases, the
Board has granted such a request only on a case-by-case
basis when it has felt such a clause is warranted. In this
case, the General Counsel points to no specific facts and
no special circumstances that would warrant such a
clause. This case does not involve the computation of
backpay, the location of unknown discriminatees, or
other special circumstances that in my view might war-
rant such a clause. The General Counsel's request is
therefore denied.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed2
ORDER
(c) Post at its Houston, Texas facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
23, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
The Respondent, Vaughan & Sons, Inc., Houston,
Texas, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the Union and fail-
ing and refusing to meet with the Union for purposes of
collective bargaining.
(b) Failing and refusing to accept , process, discuss, and
attempt to resolve grievances filed by the Union con-
cerning the discharge of employees, including the dis-
charge of employee Allan Lavalais.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
(a) On request, recognize and bargain collectively in
good faith with Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No.
54, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective -bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees in the following appropriate
unit, concerning rates of pay , hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment and, if an agreement is
reached, embody such agreement in a written collective-
bargaining agreement:
All production and maintenance employees , includ-
ing truckdrivers and shipping and receiving depart-
ment employees employed by Vaughan & Sons,
Inc., at its Houston, Texas, facility, excluding all
sales employees , office clerical employees , profes-
sional employees, draftsmen , guards, watchmen, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Accept, process, discuss, and attempt to resolve
grievances filed by the Union concerning the discharge
of employees , including the discharge of employee Allan
Lavalais.
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from Sheet Metal
Workers Local Union No. 54, AFL-CIO,, and fail and
refuse to meet with the Union for purposes of collective
bargaining.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to accept, process, dis-
cuss, and. attempt to resolve grievances filed by the
Union concerning the discharge of employees, including
the discharge of employee Allan Lavalais.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, recognize and bargain collec-
tively in good faith with Sheet Metal Workers Local
Union No. 54, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees in the following
appropriate unit, concerning rates of pay, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an
agreement is reacheed, embody such an agreement in a
written collective-bargaining agreement:
VAUGHAN & SONS
All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing truckdrivers and shipping and receiving depart-
ment employees employed by us at our Houston,
Texas facility, excluding all sales employees, office
clerical employees, professional employees, drafts-
men, guards , watchmen, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
1087
WE WILL accept, process, discuss, and attempt to re-
solve grievances filed by the Union concerning the dis-
charge of employees, including the discharge of employ-
ee Allan Lavalais.
VAUGHAN & SONS, INC.