Van der Vleuten, Renatus Josephus. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 1, 2020

2019000260 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/345,826 03/19/2014 Renatus Josephus Van der Vleuten 2011P01990WOUS 7724
24737 7590 06/01/2020
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
SHAH, PRIYANK J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RENATUS JOSEPHUS VAN DER VLEUTEN and
CHARLES LEONARDUS CORNELIUS MARIA KNIBBELER
____________

Appeal 2019-000260
Application 14/345,826
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JAMES W. DEJMEK, SCOTT E. BAIN, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 3–13, 15–17, 19–24, and 29–31. See Appeal Br. 8–25. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies the
real party in interest as Koninklijke Philips N.V. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
Appellant’s invention relates generally to “dynamic range transforms
for images, and in particular, but not exclusively to image processing to
generate High Dynamic Range images from Low Dynamic Range images or
to generate Low Dynamic Range images from High Dynamic Range
images.” Spec. 1.
An exemplary embodiment of Appellant’s invention is shown in
Figure 17, reproduced below.

Figure 17 shows elements of an image processing
apparatus according to Appellant’s invention.
Spec. 10; Fig. 17.
The image processing apparatus shown in Figure 17 comprises
(a) receiver 201 for receiving an image signal having an encoded image;
(b) another receiver 1701 for receiving a data signal from display 107 (not
shown), where the data signal includes a data field having a display dynamic
range indication of at least one luminance specification for display 107;
(c) dynamic range processor 203 for generating an output image by applying
a dynamic range transform to the encoded image in response to the display
dynamic range indication; and (d) output 205 for outputting an output image
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signal including the output image to display 107. Spec. 11, 15–16, 46–47;
Figs. 1, 2, 17. According to the Specification, the dynamic range transform
may additionally be performed in response to a target display reference
indicative of a dynamic range of display for which the encoded image is
encoded, where the target display reference may be included in the received
image signal. See Spec. 16–17 (“The content provider apparatus 101 is thus
arranged to generate an image signal which not only includes the encoded
image itself but also a target display reference which represents the dynamic
range of the display for which the encoded signal has been generated.”).
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal:
1. An image processing apparatus, comprising:
a first receiver for receiving an image signal, the image
signal comprising at least an encoded image, the first receiver
being further configured to receive a target display reference
indicative of a dynamic range of a target display for which the
encoded image is encoded;
a second receiver for receiving a data signal from a
display, the data signal comprising a display dynamic range
indication of the display;
a dynamic range processor configured to generate an
output image by applying a dynamic range transform to the
encoded image in response to the received display dynamic range
indication and the target display reference; and
an output for outputting an output image signal comprising
the output image to the display.
Appeal Br. 27 (Claims App.).
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The Applied References
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability of the claims on appeal:
Glen US 2008/0055228 A1 Mar. 6, 2008
Hussain US 2011/0242142 A1 Oct. 6, 2011
Messmer US 2012/0038782 A1 Feb. 16, 2012
Seetzen US 2013/0038790 A1 Feb. 14, 2013
Wilson US 2013/0120656 A1 May 16, 2013
Muijs WO 2010/100609 A1 Sept. 10, 2010
The Examiner’s Rejections
The Examiner made the following rejections of the claims on appeal:
Claim 31 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, for failing to comply with the definiteness requirement. Final
Act. 2–3.
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9–13, 15–17, and 24 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Wilson. Final Act. 3–8.
Claim 5 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Wilson and Hussain. Final Act. 9.
Claim 8 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Wilson and Glen. Final Act. 10–11.
Claims 19 and 21 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Wilson and Messmer. Final Act. 11–
14.
Claim 20 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Wilson, Messmer, and Seetzen. Final
Act. 14.
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Claims 22, 23, and 29 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Wilson, Messmer, and
Glen. Final Act. 15–18.
Claims 30 and 31 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Wilson and Muijs. Final Act. 18–20.

ANALYSIS2
Indefiniteness
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s finding that the dependent claim 31
limitation, “the dynamic range processor is configured to apply the dynamic
range transform to the image signal being a high dynamic range image
signal corresponding with a target display absolute maximum luminance
above 500 nit,” is “unclear” (Final Act. 2–3). Appeal Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 2–
3.
The Examiner finds:
Claim 31 and its parent [dependent] claim 30 recite additional
features that render claim 31 indefinite. Claim 31 outlines the
image signal being a high dynamic range signal of luminance
above 500 nit(s), while claim 30 outlines “the high dynamic
range display” onto which the “image signal” of claim 31 is
applied has a “luminance value of 1000 nits”. However, the
maximum luminance value between 500 nits and 1000 nits
(e.g. 500< maximum luminance value< 1000) for a high dynamic
range image cited in claim 31 contradicts with the high dynamic

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered Appellant’s Appeal Brief
filed April 13, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Appellant’s Reply Brief filed October 9,
2018 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed August 9, 2018
(“Ans.”); the Final Office Action mailed November 15, 2017 (“Final Act.”);
and Appellant’s Specification filed March 19, 2014 (“Spec.”).
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range display having a luminance value of 1000 nits or above as
cited in claim 30.
Ans. 2; see also Final Act. 2–3 (“It is unclear how an HDR image signal
corresponding to a target display has a maximum luminance only over
500 nits, while the parent claim states that the HDR display has a luminance
at 1000 nits or above.”).
Appellant argues (and we agree):
Put simply, claim 30 is directed to whether “the display is a high
dynamic range display having a white point luminance value of
1000 nits, or above,” while claim 31 is directed to “the image
signal being a high dynamic range image signal corresponding
with a target display absolute maximum luminance above
500 nit.” Said otherwise, the 1000 nits of claim 30 apply to the
display, while the 500 nit of claim 31 apply to the image signal.
The display and image signal are two separate features that can
have different numerical values associated with them. There is
no confusion or indefiniteness here.
Appeal Br. 10; see Reply Br. 2–3. During prosecution, “if a claim is
amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is
justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and
bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki,
89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211–1212 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). Here, we find
the Examiner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
skilled artisan could reasonably interpret the limitation at issue to have at
least two plausible and distinct constructions. As argued by Appellant (see
supra), the high dynamic range value in claim 31 is directed to the image
signal, and the high dynamic range value in claim 30 is directed to the
display—two separate and distinct features each being further defined.
As such, we find Appellant’s argument persuasive of Examiner error.
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Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 31
as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Anticipation
Appellant disputes, inter alia, the Examiner’s findings that Wilson
anticipates claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9–13, 15–17, and 24, including independent
claims 1 and 24. Appeal Br. 10–17; Reply Br. 3–9.
Wilson relates generally to “the creation, processing, distribution
and/or viewing of digital images, including video images” and “functional
units that perform one or more of tone mapping and gamut mapping.”
Wilson ¶ 2. An exemplary embodiment of Wilson’s display management
unit 10 is shown in Figure 1, reproduced below.
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Figure 1 shows “a block diagram illustrating some
possible inputs for a display management unit.”
Wilson ¶ 30; Fig. 1. Display management unit 10 includes input 12 for
receiving video signal 13 and output 14 for providing modified video
signal 15 to a display (not shown). Id. ¶ 43. Display management unit 10
generates modified video signal 15 by mapping tone and/or color of input
video signal 13 according to tone map 17 and color map 18 respectively.
Id. ¶ 44. Display management unit 10 also includes “one or more additional
inputs 22A–22E (collectively, inputs 22) capable of receiving signals that
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may be used to control the mapping of tone and/or color in display
management unit 10.” Id. ¶ 45. For example, inputs 22 may include
(a) second video signal input 22A for receiving a second video signal;
(b) “metadata input 22C for receiving metadata characterizing one or more
aspects of a creative intent that affect how the video content ought to be
displayed (e.g., the subject-matter of the content embodied in a video signal,
such as, for example, ‘sports’, ‘movie’, or the like);” and (c) “display
input 22E for receiving information from the display regarding the
capabilities and/or current status of the display on which the video content is
to be displayed.” Id. ¶¶ 47, 49, 51.
Wilson also discloses that the display management system may
include an optional “version creation block,” which includes a content
version generator for receiving one or more input video signals from a video
content provider and generating a plurality of versions of video content,
where each version is configured to be provided to one of a plurality of
different classes of display. See Wilson ¶¶ 130–132; Fig. 8.
To serve as an anticipatory reference, “the reference must disclose
each and every element of the claimed invention, whether it does so
explicitly or inherently.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). The Examiner finds Wilson anticipates independent
claim 1, and as relevant here, the limitation of “a first receiver for receiving
an image signal, the image signal comprising at least an encoded image, the
first receiver being further configured to receive a target display reference
indicative of a dynamic range of a target display for which the encoded
image is encoded” (emphasis added). Ans. 3–6; Final Act. 3–4, 20–24.
The “Examiner submits, in order for the display management unit 50 to
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change the dynamic range of the input video signal 13 to meet the capability
of the display parameters based on display info 22E, the display
management unit 50 knows the dynamic range of the input video signal 13
so it can be modified to suit the display capability.” Final Act. 21 (emphasis
in italics added); see Ans. 4–5 (finding, inter alia, “the first input video
signal received at the input node 12 of the display management unit 10 is
optimized/encoded so that it reflects the dynamic range of a target device;”
“to ‘receive a target display reference indicative of the dynamic range’ is
being equated as receiving a ‘first video signal’ that is constructed for a
‘target device having capability A;’” and “the input video signal is
‘optimized for use with a target device having a capability A’ so that it
reflects the ‘dynamic range’ of the target device” (original emphases
omitted; emphases in italics added)); see also Advisory Action at 2 (mailed
Jan. 29, 2018) (“In Wilson, acquiring the dynamic range from the input
image is equivalent to receiving a ‘target display reference indicative of
dynamic range,’ as claimed.” (emphasis added)).
Appellant argues the Examiner “does not point to any element of
Wilson which discloses a receiver configured to receive: 1) an image signal;
and 2) a target display reference [indicative of a dynamic range of a target
display for which the encoded image is encoded],” and to the contrary,
“merely provides a conclusory statement” that display management unit 50
“knows” the dynamic range of input video signal 13 so it can be modified to
suit the display capability. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant continues: “the
Examiner’s statement is conclusory because there is no explanation of how
knowing a dynamic range of an input video signal is the same as receiving a
target display reference indicative of a dynamic range of a target display for
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which the encoded image is encoded.” Appeal Br. 13–14 (emphases added);
see Reply Br. 7 (“Every signal has capabilities and metes and bounds for a
given use. This does not mean that the receiver receives this capability
information though. . . . Said otherwise, the fact that an encoded image has a
capability does not mean that: 1) the capability is communicated to the
receiver; or 2) the encoded image was encoded with the given capability in
mind.”; “An input signal may have a certain dynamic range, but this range
may be unknown to the receiver. This range may only be apparent when the
input signal is attempted to be displayed.”). Appellant submits “[t]here is no
explanation of whether this [asserted] equivalency is based on the
Examiner’s personal knowledge, inherency, some other reference[,] or
knowledge of one ordinarily skilled in the art.” Appeal Br. 14; see Reply
Br. 4–5.
We find Appellant’s argument persuasive, and agree that the
Examiner has not provided sufficient evidence or technical reasoning to
show how Wilson explicitly or inherently discloses the limitation at issue
(recited above). For example, although the Examiner finds display
management unit 50 “knows” the dynamic range of input video signal 13 so
it can be modified to suit the display capability (Final Act. 21), the Examiner
does not sufficiently explain how “knowing” or being capable of
determining that dynamic range upon or after receiving an image signal
translates to Wilson explicitly or inherently disclosing a receiver configured
to receive a target display reference indicative of a dynamic range of a
target display for which the encoded image is encoded. Moreover, the
Examiner also does not sufficiently address whether Wilson would need to
first receive and/or process a video signal for an entire movie, for example,
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even to “know” the dynamic range of the video signal itself. Indeed,
although the Examiner maintains the subject anticipation rejection based on
Wilson “know[ing]” or “reflect[ing]” certain dynamic range data, the
Examiner has not made any express finding that the limitation at issue is
inherently disclosed in Wilson. See Final Act. 21; Ans. 4–5; Appeal Br. 14
(“Examiner fails to state whether reliance is being made on inherency.”).
Because we find this issue dispositive here, we do not address Appellant’s
other arguments.
Accordingly, constrained by the present record, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) of independent claim 1. For
similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) of independent claim 24, which recites commensurate limitations.
We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) of
claims 3, 4, 6, 7, 9–13, and 15–17, which depend therefrom.
In addition, because the Examiner has not persuasively shown how
the other cited art, namely Hussain, Glen, Messmer, and Muijs, remedies the
deficiency in the rejection based upon Wilson (see Final Act. 9–11, 15–20;
Ans. 9–11, 13–18), we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 5, 8, and 29–31, which variously depend from
independent claims 1 and 24.
Further, because the Examiner has not persuasively shown how the
other cited art, namely Messmer, Seetzen, and Glen, remedies the deficiency
in the rejection based upon Wilson of independent claims 1 and 24 (see Final
Act. 11–13; Ans. 7–9), we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103 of independent claim 19, which in relevant part recites
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commensurate limitations with independent claims 1 and 24, and claims 20,
22, and 23, which depend from independent claim 19.
However, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish
to consider whether Wilson inherently discloses or renders obvious (alone or
in combination with other art), inter alia, the limitation at issue (recited
above). Indeed, Appellant practically invites the Examiner to do so. See
Appeal Br. 12 (“Applicant contested this equivalency as basis for
anticipation, and instead suggested that an obviousness rationale should’ve
been applied.” (quoting Advisory Action at 2 (mailed Jan. 29, 2018))),
14 (“Examiner fails to state whether reliance is being made on inherency.”);
Reply Br. 5. For example, the Examiner may wish to consider whether
Wilson’s Figure 8 and associated description impacts patentability of the
pending claims. See, e.g., Wilson ¶¶ 130–132. Although the Board is
authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should
be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See MPEP § 1213.02.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §
(pre-AIA)
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
31 112, second
paragraph

Indefiniteness 31
1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
9–13, 15–17,
24
102 Wilson 1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
9–13, 15–17,
24
5 103 Wilson, Hussain 5
8 103 Wilson, Glen 8
19, 21 103 Wilson, Messmer 19, 21
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §
(pre-AIA)
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
20 103 Wilson, Messmer,
Seetzen
20
22, 23, 29 103 Wilson, Messmer,
Glen
22, 23, 29
30, 31 103 Wilson, Muijs 30, 31
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–13, 15–
17, 19–24,
29–31

REVERSED