Vaibhav Goel et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 28, 2019

14300302 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/300,302 06/10/2014 Vaibhav Goel 3080.B71US1 5464
45839 7590 08/28/2019
Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner / LinkedIn/Microsoft
PO BOX 2938
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
NOVAK, REBECCA R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/28/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@slwip.com
slw@blackhillsip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte VAIBHAV GOEL, SUMAN SUNDARESH, and
SATPREET HARCHARAN SINGH1
___________

Appeal 2018-006100
Application 14/300,302
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, MARC S. HOFF, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–24, which constitute all the claims pending in
this application. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 The real party in interest is Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. App.
Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to “a system and method for
analyzing companies and business organizations using online profile data.”
Spec. ¶ 2.

Exemplary Claim
1. A memory device, the memory device
communicatively coupled to a processor and comprising
instructions which, when performed on the processor, cause the
processor to:

maintain member profiles and job profiles on an online
social networking server;

[L1] identify a first business organization on the online
social networking server by using one or more of the member
profiles and the job profiles;

[L2] identify a job title or a job function at the first
business organization by using one or more of the member
profiles and the job profiles; and

[L3] create a job profile for the job title or job function at
the first business organization using the member profiles and the
job profiles.
App. Br. 24 (Claims Appendix) (Emphasis added regarding the contested
limitations L1, L2, and L3).

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Nov. 22, 2017 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed Jan. 26, 2018 (“App. Br.”); Examiner’s Answer,
mailed Mar. 28, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief, filed May 24, 2018
(“Reply Br.”).
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Rejections
A. Claims 1–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed
to a judicial exception, without significantly more. Final Act. 2.
B. Claims 1, 2, 5–10, 13–18, and 21–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of
Patwa et al. (US 2013/0046704 A1; published Feb. 21, 2013; (hereinafter
“Patwa”)), and Schneiderman et al. (US 2010/0153289 A1; published June
17, 2010; (hereinafter “Schneiderman”)). Final Act. 7.
C. Claims 3, 4, 11, 12, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Patwa,
Schneiderman, and Baig et al. (US 2015/0287051 A1; published Oct. 8,
2015; (hereinafter “Baig”)). Final Act. 12.

Issues on Appeal
1. Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more?
2. Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
as being obvious over the cited combination of prior art references?

ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and any evidence
presented. To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). In our analysis below, we highlight
and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis.

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Rejection A of Claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Issue: Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, did the Examiner err by rejecting
claims 1–24, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly
more?
Principles of Law — 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas’ are not patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18
(2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that
framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding of rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68
(1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane
v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
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patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.

Subject Matter Eligibility — 2019 Revised Guidance
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). This
new guidance is applied in this Opinion. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance,
we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes,
or certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people);3 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).4, 5
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.

3 Referred to as “Step 2A, Prong One” in the Revised Guidance (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 1”).
4 Referred to as “Step 2A, Prong Two” in the Revised Guidance (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 2”).

5 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so
integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id.
Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
6
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Because there is no single definition of an “abstract idea” under Alice
step 1, the PTO has recently synthesized, for purposes of clarity,
predictability, and consistency, key concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas to explain that the “abstract idea” exception includes the
following three groupings:

6 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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1. Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical
calculations;
2. Mental processes— concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion);
and
3. Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
According to the 2019 Revised Guidance, “[c]laims that do not recite
[subject] matter that falls within these enumerated groupings of abstract
ideas should not be treated as reciting abstract ideas,” except in rare
circumstances. Even if the claims recite any one of these three groupings of
abstract ideas, these claims are still not “directed to” a judicial exception
(abstract idea), and thus are patent eligible, if “the claim as a whole
integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that
exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
For example, limitations that are indicative of integration into a
practical application include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any
other technology or technical field — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a
particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
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3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular
article to a different state or thing — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological
environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception
— see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a
practical application include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the
judicial exception, or merely include instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses
a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see
MPEP § 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use
— see MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One 7
The Judicial Exception
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we begin our analysis by first
considering whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas, in particular: (a) mathematical concepts,
(b) mental steps, and (c) certain methods of organizing human activities.

7 Throughout this Opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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The Examiner concludes claims 1–24 recite an abstract idea of
“creating job profiles by identifying and analyzing information[,] . . . [a]s
such, the claims fall under at least the categories of an idea of itself.” Final
Act. 4 (emphasis omitted). In support, the Examiner concludes the claims
are similar to the subject claims considered by the Federal Circuit in:
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Cyberfone Systems, LLC v. CNN Interactive Group, Inc., 558
Fed.Appx. 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (non precedential), and Electric Power
Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Final
Act. 4.
Turning to the claims, we conclude representative independent
claim 1 recites the following identified types or categories of abstract ideas,
as mapped below in TABLE ONE:
TABLE ONE
Independent Claim 1 Revised 2019 Guidance
[a] A memory device, the memory
device communicatively coupled to
a processor and comprising
instructions which, when performed
on the processor, cause the
processor to:

A memory device is a machine,
which is a statutory subject matter
class. See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(“Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this
title.”).

[b] maintain member profiles
and job profiles on an online
social networking server;
Adding insignificant extra-solution
activity to the judicial exception
— see MPEP § 2106.05(g); i.e., data
gathering and storage. See 2019
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Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
55, n.31.

[c] identify a first business
organization on the online social
networking server by using one or
more of the member profiles and the
job profiles;

Abstract idea, i.e., identifying a first
business organization can be
performed alternatively as a mental
process. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Moreover, business organizations
and job profiles fall into the category
of a fundamental economic practice,
in particular, the subcategory of
business relations. Id.
[d] identify a job title or a job
function at the first business
organization by using one or more
of the member profiles and the job
profiles; and

Abstract idea, i.e., identifying a job
title or a job function can be
performed alternatively as a mental
process. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Moreover, business organizations,
including job titles and job profiles,
fall into the category of a
fundamental economic practice, in
particular, the subcategory of
business relations. Id.
[e] create a job profile for the job
title or job function at the first
business organization using the
member profiles and the job
profiles.

Abstract idea, i.e., creating a job
profile or job function can be
performed alternatively as a mental
process. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Business organizations which
include job profiles, job titles, and
job functions, fall into the category
of a fundamental economic practice,
in particular, the subcategory of
business relations. Id.
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To the extent the created job profiles
are intended for human perception,
they are also Non-Functional
Descriptive Material (NFDM).

“[W]here the claim as a whole is
directed to conveying a message or
meaning to a human reader
independent of the intended
computer system, and/or the
computer-readable medium merely
serves as a support for information
or data, no functional relationship
exists.” MPEP § 2111.05 (III.). See
also Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d
1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008)
(precedential) (“[T]he nature of the
information being manipulated does
not lend patentability to an otherwise
unpatentable computer-implemented
product or process.”).

Considering the language of representative claim 1 as a whole, we
conclude the claim limitations pertaining to business organizations and job
profiles fall into the category of a fundamental economic practice, and more
particularly, into the subcategory of business relations. Moreover, we
conclude that the recited functions of identifying and creating (emphasized
in italics above in Table One), could be performed alternatively as mental
processes under the Revised Guidance. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52.
If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a human
using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract idea and is not patent eligible
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under § 101. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011); “That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.” CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375. See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
We note the additional non-abstract generic computer components
recited in claim 1: “[a] memory device,” “a processor,” and “an online
social networking server.” Independent process (method) claim 9 recites “an
online social networking server.” Similarly, independent system claim 17
recites: “[a] computer processor.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
We emphasize the supporting description of generic computer and
network components in the Specification, for example:
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system 100 including user
devices 102 and a social network server 104. In an
embodiment, a particular type of social network server can be
referred to as a business network server. User devices 102
can be a personal computer, netbook, electronic notebook,
smartphone, or any electronic device known in the art that is
configured to display web pages. The user devices 102 can
include a network interface 106 that is communicatively
coupled to a network 108, such as the Internet.
Spec. ¶ 17.
Given this context in the Specification (id.), McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games America Inc. (837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) provides
applicable guidance: “[t]he abstract idea exception prevents patenting a
result where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery the result is
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accomplished.’” 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62,
113 (1854)) (emphasis added).
We note that remaining independent claims 9 and 17 recite similar
steps, acts, or functions of commensurate scope which also fall into the same
abstract idea categories mapped above in Table One for independent system
claim 1.
Because we conclude that all claims on appeal recite an abstract idea,
as identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Step 2A,
Prong Two.

2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance, we consider whether there
are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54–55. We have identified supra the additional non-abstract
elements recited in independent claim 1, e.g., “[a] memory device,” “a
processor,” and “an online social networking server.”
Under MPEP § 2106.05(a) (“Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field”), Appellants
contend the claims amount to significantly more than an abstract idea:
like in McRO, what was previously performed by humans is
now performed by a specialized online social networking
system.[] Consequently, since Appellants’ claims are the flip
side of the claims in DDR Holdings in that the claims
implement a process that was not known prior to the creation of
the Internet, Appellants respectfully submit that their claims
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recite patent eligible subject matter, and Appellants respectfully
seek the reversal of the rejection of their claims.
App. Br. 16.
We find Appellants’ argument based on McRO (id.), unavailing
because we conclude Appellants’ memory device claim 1 is unlike the
subject claim considered by the court in McRO.8
The patent at issue in McRO describes that prior character animation
and lip synchronization were accomplished by human animators, with the
assistance of a computer, which involved the use of a so-called “keyframe”
approach in which animators set appropriate parameters, i.e., morph weights,
at certain important times, i.e., in order to produce accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1305.
Animators knew what phoneme a character pronounced at a given time from
a time-aligned phonetic transcription (a “timed transcript”). Id.
In accordance with the prior technique, animators, using a computer,
thus, manually determined the appropriate morph weight sets for each
keyframe based on the phoneme timings in the timed transcript. Id. See
also SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing McRO):
The claims in McRO were directed to the creation of something
physical—namely, the display of “lip synchronization and
facial expressions” of animated characters on screens for
viewing by human eyes. Id. at 1313. The claimed improvement
was to how the physical display operated (to produce better
quality images), unlike (what is present here) a claimed
improvement in a mathematical technique with no improved
display mechanism. The claims in McRO thus were not abstract

8 Appellants are referring to McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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in the sense that is dispositive here. And those claims also
avoided being “abstract” in another sense reflected repeatedly
in our cases (based on a contrast not with “physical” but with
“concrete”): they had the specificity required to transform a
claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of
achieving it.
SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis added).
In contrast to the claimed invention in McRO that improved how a
physical display operated to produce better quality images (id.), claim 1
merely uses a “memory device” and a generic “processor” and “networking
server” to perform the recited functions. See, e.g., claim 1 (“[a] memory
device,” “a processor,” and “an online social networking server.”).
Thus, Appellants’ claims on appeal do not improve the operation of a
physical display, as was the case in McRO, nor the operation of any other
computer component, such as the “memory device” or “processor” recited in
the preamble of claim 1. See SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167. Moreover, we
conclude Appellants’ generic processor implementation in claim 1 performs
functions that can be performed alternatively as mental processes, as
discussed above.
Nor is this a case involving eligible subject matter as in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.Com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See
App. Br. 16. In DDR, instead of a computer network operating in its normal,
expected manner by sending a website visitor to a third-party website via a
clicked advertisement, the claimed invention in DDR generated and directed
the visitor to a hybrid page that presented: (1) product information from the
third party, and (2) the visual “look and feel” elements from the host
website, thus retaining the visitor at the original website. DDR, 773 F.3d at
1258–59. Given this particular Internet-based solution, the court held that
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the claimed invention did not merely use the Internet to perform a business
practice known from the pre-Internet world, but rather was necessarily
rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in
computer networks. Id. at 1257.
That is not the case here. Appellants’ claimed invention results in the
creation of “a job profile for the job title or job function at the first business
organization,” which does not improve the “memory device” recited in the
preamble of claim 1. Thus, we find Appellants’ argument unavailing that “it
is a new concept to create a job profile for a particular job title or job
function at the business organization using member and job profiles stored
on the online social networking system.” App. Br. 18. We note an
improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90
(holding that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea
is, nonetheless patent-ineligible).
The claimed invention here is not rooted in computer technology in
the sense contemplated by DDR, where the claimed invention solved a
challenge particular to the Internet. Although Appellants’ invention uses
various generic computer and networking components noted above, the
claimed invention does not solve a challenge particular to the computing and
networking components used to implement the created “job profile for the
job title or job function at the first business organization.” Claim 1.
Nor do we find persuasive Appellants’ arguments that analogize the
claims on appeal to the subject claims considered by the court in Amdocs
(Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (2016). App. Br.
18–19. In particular, Appellants note “[t]he Federal Circuit held that the
claims in Amdocs were subject matter eligible because the enhanced
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accounting records were dependent on the invention’s distributed
architecture.[] That is, the invention’s distributed data gathering, filtering
and enhancements performed in the system enabled load distribution.” App.
Br. 18.
Appellants urge:
In a similar manner, Appellants’ claimed subject matter
enhances job profiles. Specifically, Appellants’ claimed subject
matter uses member profiles and job profiles in an online social
network to “borrow” data from those online sources and
enhance the job profiles of a particular business organization.
Because of this, the business organization does not have to
maintain as much job profile data, and rather can use such
data in the distributed online environment.
App. Br. 18–19.
In Amdocs, the Federal Circuit held that claim 1 of the patent at issue
is also like the claims in BASCOM because even though the
system in the ’065 patent relies upon some arguably generic
limitations, when all limitations are considered individually and
as an ordered combination, they provide an inventive concept
through the use of distributed architecture. This is similar to the
design in BASCOM which permitted the invention to have a
filtering tool with the benefits of a filter on a local computer
and the benefits of a filter on an ISP server. The benefits in
BASCOM were possible because of customizable filtering
features at specific locations remote from the user. Similarly,
the benefits of the ’065 patent’s claim 1 are possible because of
the distributed, remote enhancement that produced an
unconventional result—reduced data flows and the possibility
of smaller databases. This arrangement is not so broadly
described to cause preemption concerns. Instead, it is narrowly
circumscribed to the particular system outlined. As in
BASCOM, this is a technical improvement over prior art
technologies and served to improve the performance of the
system itself.
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1302.
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We are not persuaded by Appellants’ reliance upon Amdocs, because
there is nothing in Appellants’ claims that provides benefits based upon a
“distributed, remote enhancement that produce[s] an unconventional
result—reduced data flows and the possibility of smaller databases,” as was
found by the court in Amdocs. Id. We note that Appellants’ claims are
silent regarding any mention of a database, much less any indication that
claim 1 provides unconventional results produced by a distributed, remote
enhancement that reduces data flows and allows for the possibility of smaller
databases, as was the case in Amdocs.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that “each and every step can
be performed mentally and with pen and paper. A computer is not necessary
to identify, gather, associate, store and present data.” Final Act. 5.
Accordingly, we conclude that independent representative claim 1
does not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)).
Although claims 9–16 are method claims, Appellants advance no
arguments that might be analyzed under either MPEP § 2106.05(b), as a
method being tied to a particular machine, or under MPEP § 2106.05(c), as a
method that transforms physical subject matter to a different state or thing.
Appellants point to paragraph 44 of the Specification and argue:
unlike the pre-Internet days of a business organization having
someone in its human resources department create job profiles,
the claimed subject matter takes advantage of the member
profiles and job profiles on an online social networking site,
and greatly expands the ability of the business organization to
create meaningful and extensive job profiles.
App. Br. 16.

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However, we conclude that the creation of a more “meaningful” job
profile is merely an improved abstract idea. Independent system claim 1 has
no other argued meaningful limitations. See MPEP § 2106.05(e). Instead,
the memory device of claim 1 merely stores instructions that, when executed
on the recited generic “processor,” merely cause the processor to perform
the recited functions of identifying and creating. See MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
The Supreme Court guides: “the prohibition against patenting abstract
ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post
solution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–611 (2010),
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)).
Here, we conclude the recited function of “maintain[ing] member
profiles and job profiles on an online social networking server” (claim 1),
is merely extra-solution data gathering activity that does not meaningfully
limit the claim. See Final Act. 5. Such extra-solution activity is insufficient
to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible
application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55, 55, n.31.
Further, to the extent the created job profile is intended for human
perception, such data is Non-Functional Descriptive Material (NFDM)
intended for human perception, as mapped above in Table One. See Claim
1.
Moreover, we conclude the claims on appeal are silent regarding
specific limitations directed to an improved “memory device,” “processor,”
and “online social networking server.” Thus, we agree with the Examiner
that there is not any combination of the “additional elements that amounts to
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more than the sum of the parts.” Final Act. 6. The additional elements of
claim 1 do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they
would be generic computer functions. Final Act. 11.
Therefore, we find Appellants’ claimed invention does not provide a
solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a
problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” as
considered by the court in DDR Holdings (773 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis
added)).
Nor do claims 1–24 on appeal present any other issues as set forth in
the 2019 Revised Guidance regarding a determination of whether the
additional generic elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and
(e)–(h)), we conclude claims 1–24 do not integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application. Therefore, we proceed to Step 2B, The
Inventive Concept.
The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

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Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
We note Berkheimer was decided by the Federal Circuit on February
8, 2018. On April 19, 2018, the PTO issued the Memorandum titled:
“Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)”
(hereinafter “Berkheimer Memorandum”).9 Because Appellants filed the
Reply Brief on May 24, 2018, Appellants had the benefit of both the
Berkheimer Federal Circuit decision and the USPTO Berkheimer
Memorandum.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants note:
On page 6 of the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner
contends that it has long been known to perform the well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities of creating a
job profile for a job title or job function at a business
organization using the member profiles and job profiles on an
online social networking system.
Reply Br. 2.
Appellants disagree, and contend:
the Examiner has not supported this contention by a citation to
an express statement in the specification, a citation to one or
more court decisions discussed in the MPEP at §2106.05(d)(II),
a citation to a publication, or taking judicial notice thereof as
required by the Berkheimer v. HP case and/or the April 19,
2018 PTO Berkheimer memorandum. Appellants therefore
respectfully submit that the rejection of the claims under
Section 101 cannot be sustained, and Appellants respectfully
request the reversal of the rejection.
Reply Br. 3.

9 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-
berkheimer-20180419.PDF.
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We note the Berkheimer Memorandum provided specific
requirements for an Examiner to support with evidence any finding that
claim elements (or a combination of elements) are well-understood, routine,
or conventional. In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or
combination of elements) is not well-understood, routine, or conventional
unless the Examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a
rejection in writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s). . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of
the additional element(s). . . .
See Berkheimer Memorandum 3–4.
Here, we find the Examiner provides evidence under Berkheimer type
1 (id.), in relying upon paragraph 17 of Appellants’ Specification:
The Examiner finds that the individual elements of the claims
are performing their intended roles and functions. Further,
Paragraph 0017 of the specification details user devices can be
a personal computer, netbook, electronic notebook,
smartphone, or any electronic device known in the art that is
configured to display web pages. These are basic computer
elements applied merely to carry out data processing such as, as
discussed above, identifying, receiving, transmitting,
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associating, analyzing, categorizing, storing and displaying
data, which fall under well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions of generic computers. Therefore, the
claimed interactions of the various generically recited devices
lack[] an unconventional step that confines the claim to a
particular useful application in the sense that the result is
equivalent to purely mental activity, e.g., data comparison and
output.
Final Act. 6 (emphasis added).
Because Appellants fail to traverse the Examiner’s specific factual
findings regarding paragraph 17 of the Specification (Final Act. 6), on this
record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Arguments not made are
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Further regarding the use of the recited generic “memory device,”
“processor,” and “networking server” (independent claim 1), the Supreme
Court has held “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573
U.S. at 223. Our reviewing court provides additional guidance: See
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or
user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (claims reciting, inter alia, sending
messages over a network, gathering statistics, using a computerized system
to automatically determine an estimated outcome, and presenting offers to
potential customers found to merely recite “‘well-understood, routine
conventional activit[ies],’ either by requiring conventional computer
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activities or routine data-gathering steps” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
This reasoning is applicable here. Therefore, on the record before us,
Appellants have not shown that the claims on appeal add a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellants’ claims 1–24, considered as a whole, is
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a
practical application, and does not include an inventive concept.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1–24.10

Rejection B of Representative Independent Claim 1 under § 103
Issue: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, did the Examiner err by finding Patwa
and Schneiderman collectively teach or suggest the following disputed
limitations L1, L2, and L3:
[L1] identify a first business organization on the online
social networking server by using one or more of the member
profiles and the job profiles;

10 To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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[L2] identify a job title or a job function at the first
business organization by using one or more of the member
profiles and the job profiles; and

[L3] create a job profile for the job title or job function at
the first business organization using the member profiles and the
job profiles[,]
within the meaning of representative independent claim 1?11 (Emphasis
added). We note the aforementioned limitations L1, L2, and L3 of claim 1
are recited in similar form having commensurate scope in remaining
independent claims 9 and 17.

Limitation L1 of Claim 1 under § 103 Rejection B
Regarding limitation L1 (“identify a first business organization on the
online social networking server by using one or more of the member profiles
and the job profiles”), Appellants focus their arguments on the “business
organization” term recited in claim 1. Id. (emphasis added).
Specifically, Appellants contend:
Paragraph [0101] of Patwa only relates to “feedback received
by a screener [of job candidates] from an employer with
reference to the screened candidates.” Appellants respectfully
submit that there is no disclosure in paragraph [0101] of
identifying a business organization using member profiles
or job profiles. Providing feedback to a screener
and identifying a business organization are two separate and
distinct actions.
On page 23 of the Final Office Action, the Examiner

11 See supra, n.7. We give the contested claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See
Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054.
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contends that in considering paragraph [0101] and FIG. 4N of
Patwa, a screener can view a member’s information
and identify a business organization using a member profile.
Appellants respectfully disagree with this analysis. As
indicated in paragraph [0101], the information on the screen
shot of FIG. 4N is “received by a screener from an employer,”
it is not from a member profile.
App. Br. 20–21 (emphasis added).
The Examiner’s Answer
The Examiner disagrees. In response, the Examiner further explains
the basis for the rejection:
The Examiner respectively disagrees, as the Appellants claims
are very broad. Patwa, Figure 4N and Paragraph 0101, teaches
a job title and an employer/business organization in a
member profile. As written, Appellant[s’] claims are very
broad, and a member’s profile may be the Screener, the
Candidate or the Employer’s profile, as depicted in Figure 4N
of Patwa, and therefore teaches the limitation.
Ans. 10 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Examiner refers to the mapping of the claimed “business
organization” to an employer profile found in Patwa, as set forth in the Final
Office Action pages 7–9. See Ans. 10. The Examiner addresses Appellants’
arguments (App. Br. 20–21), based upon the claimed two different types of
business organization data derived from a “member profile” or “job profile.”
See Ans. 10. See claim 1.
As a matter of claim construction, the Examiner concludes that the
claim term “business organization” is a broad term with a plain meaning.
Claim 1. See Ans. 10. As noted above, the Examiner finds “Patwa, Figure
4N and Paragraph 0101, teaches a job title and an employer/business
organization in a member profile.” See Ans. 10.
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We begin our analysis with claim construction.12 Claim 1 recites:
“identify a first business organization on the online social networking server
by using one or more of the member profiles and the job profiles” (emphasis
added).
We turn to the Specification for context regarding the claimed
business organization:
Referring now to FIGS. 6A and 6B, as noted, a system
and process are illustrated for creating a job profile for a
particular job title or job function at a business organization
using member profiles and job profiles. Specifically, at
605, member profiles and job profiles are maintained on a
social networking service. At 610, a business organization is
identified using one or more of the member profiles and the job
profiles. At 615, a job title or a job function is identified at the
business organization using one or more of the member profiles
and the job profiles. And at 620, a job profile is created for the
job title or job function at the business organization using the
member profiles and the job profiles.
Spec. ¶ 41 (emphases added).
Given this supporting description of business organization (id.), we
turn to the evidence relied upon by the Examiner (Final Act. 8; Ans. 10).

12 Claim construction is an important step in a patentability determination.
“Both anticipation under § 102 and obviousness under § 103 are two-step
inquiries. The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the
claims. . . . The second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the
properly construed claim to the prior art.” See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo,
S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted)). Under
the second step, the Board must compare the construed claim to one or more
prior art references and make factual findings regarding the limitations
contested by Appellants. See In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2004).

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The Examiner finds limitation L1 of claim 1 is disclosed by Patwa, at
paragraphs 37, 101 and Figure 4N. Final Act. 8.
We reproduce the pertinent cited portions of Patwa below:
FIG. 1 illustrates a computer implemented method for
managing recruitment interactions among multiple users
associated with multiple roles. … The recruiter or employer
may be an organization, an individual, etc., that intends to
recruit a candidate, or search for possible eligible candidates for
jobs, research, internships, etc. … In an embodiment, the
recruitment interaction management platform is implemented
as a website hosted, for example, on an online server or a
network of servers. The recruitment interaction management
platform may be implemented internally within an organization
for managing internal recruitment interactions, or as a consumer
facing website for managing internal and external recruitment
interactions.
Patwa ¶ 37 (emphasis added).
FIG. 4N exemplarily illustrates a screenshot of a web
page indicating the feedback received by a screener from an
employer with reference to the screened candidates. Based on
the feedback, the recruitment interaction management platform
assigns a rating, for example, between 1 and 100 to the
screener. In this example, the screener Robert Johnson receives
an overall rating of 84 based on feedback from employers STU
and VWX for screening Jane Doe and Dan Smith respectively.
Patwa ¶ 101 (emphasis added).

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Shown below, Patwa’s Figure 4N depicts a Screenshot of
Employer, Candidate, and Job Title

Figure 4N of Patwa, shown above, illustrates an example employer
organization, as described in paragraph 101.

As noted above, claim 1, limitation L1 recites: “identify a first
business organization on the online social networking server by using
one or more of the member profiles and the job profiles” (emphasis added).
Regarding the use of alternative “or” language, when a claim covers several
alternatives, the claim may be unpatentable if any of the alternatives within
the scope of the claim are taught by the prior art. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d
1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
In reviewing the record, we find that Patwa teaches or suggests the
following claim 1, limitation L1 language, emphasized and mapped to the
reference(s) as follows:
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identify a first business organization (see Patwa ¶ 37: “The recruiter
or employer may be an organization, an individual, etc.” and Patwa ¶ 101:
“FIG. 4N exemplarily illustrates . . . a screener from an employer with
reference to the screened candidates. … In this example, the screener Robert
Johnson receives an overall rating of 84 based on feedback from employers
STU and VWX for screening Jane Doe and Dan Smith respectively.”
(emphasis added)),
on the online social networking (Patwa ¶ 21: “social network sources
comprising, for example, professional networking sources such as
Linkedin® . . . [and] social media sources such as Facebook® of Facebook,
Inc., etc. (emphasis added)),
server (see Patwa ¶ 37: “an online server or a network of servers.”)
by using one or more of the member profiles (Patwa ¶ 25: “candidate
profiles” and Patwa Fig. 4N: “member profiles (candidate or employer)”)
and the job profiles (see Patwa ¶ 53: “job profiles” and Patwa Fig. 4N:
“job title ”) (emphasis added)). See Final Act. 7–9.

Thus, we find Patwa teaches or suggests disputed limitation L1:
“identify a first business organization on the online social networking server
by using one or more of the member profiles and the job profiles” as
claimed. Claim 1 (emphasis added).
We note there is no requirement in an obviousness analysis for the
prior art to “contain a description of the subject matter of the appealed claim
in ipsissimis verbis.” In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090 (CCPA 1978)
(emphasis added). Moreover, “‘the question under 35 USC 103 is not
merely what the references expressly teach but what they would
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have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention
was made.’” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)
(emphasis added)); see also MPEP § 2123.
This reasoning is applicable here. Based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, and because Appellants fail to address the Examiner’s specific
findings regarding Patwa paragraph 37 (Final Act. 8), on this record, we are
not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s finding that the cited
combination of references, including Patwa, teaches or suggest disputed
limitation L1 of claim 1. See Final Act. 7–9.

Limitation L2 of Claim 1 under § 103 Rejection B
identify a job title or a job function at the first business
organization by using one or more of the member profiles and
the job profiles.
Claim 1 (emphasis added). See App. Br. 24.
The Examiner refers to the mapping of the claimed “identify a job title
or a job function at the first business organization by using one or more of
the member profiles and the job profiles” (emphasis added) to the profile
management module in Patwa paragraph 111, as set forth in the Final Office
Action page 8. See Ans. 10–11. The Examiner addresses Appellants’
arguments (App. Br. 21), based on the job title or job function. See Ans.
10–11. See Claim 1.
Turning to the evidence found by the Examiner, Patwa paragraph 111
describes the “job profile” limitation:
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The profile management module 603 creates one or more
candidate profiles for the candidates using the recruitment
advisory information and/or the acquired profile information.
The profile management module 603 creates candidate profiles
that are template driven, user generated, and structured. The
GUI 612 of the recruitment interaction management platform
601 further comprises a configurable taxonomization interface
612b for dynamically acquiring taxonomies from the users for
classifying the created candidate profiles of the candidates. The
profile management module 603 configures user adjustable
privacy settings for providing selective access of the acquired
profile information of each of the users to other users and for
maintaining anonymity during the recruitment interactions. The
profile management module 603, in communication with the
information acquisition module 602, utilizes the acquired
recruitment advisory information for creating development
programs and performance programs within an organization
and for performing internal recruitment interactions within the
organization.
Patwa ¶ 0111 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Patwa paragraph 53 also describes the “job profiles”
limitation:
In another embodiment, the recruitment interaction
management platform provides a configurable taxonomization
interface on the GUI for dynamically acquiring taxonomies
from one or more of the users for classifying the created
candidate profiles of the candidates. The recruitment
interaction management platform classifies the candidate
profiles for expediting the steps of retrieving candidate profiles
and matching the retrieved candidate profiles with the recruiting
requirement acquired from a particular recruiter or an employer.
… The recruitment interaction management platform provides a
starting set of common job profiles, for example, “Java
programmers”, and then allows the community to create their
own job profiles. … Therefore, the recruitment interaction
management platform enables the creation of new job
taxonomies.
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Patwa ¶ 0053 (emphasis added).
As reproduced above, claim 1, limitation L2 recites: “identify a job
title or a job function at the first business organization by using one or more
of the member profiles and the job profiles” (emphasis added).
In reviewing the record, we find Patwa teaches or suggests the
following claim 1, limitation L2 language, emphasized and mapped to the
reference(s) as follows:
identify a job title (Patwa Fig. 4N: “job title”) or
a job function (Patwa ¶ 53: “job profile” and Patwa ¶ 111 “The GUI
612 of the recruitment interaction management platform 601 further
comprises a configurable taxonomization interface 612b for dynamically
acquiring taxonomies from the users for classifying the created candidate
profiles of the candidates.” Here, the new job taxonomies include classifying
based on job titles or job functions.)
at the first business organization (Patwa ¶ 37: “The . . . employer may
be an organization” (emphasis added))
by using one or more of the member profiles (Patwa ¶ 111: “The
profile management module 603 creates candidate profiles…” (emphasis
added)) and the job profiles (Patwa ¶ 53: “job profiles” and Patwa Fig. 4N:
“job title (candidate)” (emphasis added)). See Final Act. 7–9.
Thus, we find Patwa describes the “identify a job title or a job
function at the first business organization by using one or more of the
member profiles and the job profiles” (emphasis added) as claimed. Given
this evidence (id.), on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding
the Examiner’s findings, as pertaining to contested limitation L2 of
representative claim 1.
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Limitation L3 of Claim 1 under 103 Rejection B
create a job profile for the job title or job function at the
first business organization using the member profiles and the job
profiles.
Claim 1. See App. Br. 24.
The Examiner refers to the mapping of the claimed “create a job
profile for the job title or job function at the first business organization
using the member profiles and the job profiles” (emphasis added) to
generating customized profiles in Schneiderman, Abstract, paragraphs 10,
38, and 54, as set forth in the Final Office Action pages 8–9 and Answer
page 11. The Examiner addresses Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 21–22),
based on generating job profiles. See Ans. 11. See claim 1.
Turning to the evidence found by the Examiner, Schneiderman
(Abstract) describes “creating job profile” limitation:
A system and method for dynamically generating a customized
profile for a company for a selected profile type, the customized
profile including a set of attribute types, each of the attribute
types having a customized attribute range. The system
comprises a receipt module for receiving a predefined profile
having predefined attribute types corresponding to the set of
attribute types. Each of the predefined attribute types has a
predefined attribute range representing a range of attribute
values for the selected profile type, and for receiving personal
assessments of individuals related to the company. Each of the
personal assessments has questions related to attributes. Each
of the questions has a value assigned by the respective related
individual.
Schneiderman Abstract (emphasis added).

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Referring to FIG. 1, shown is an employment
determination environment 10 for generating a plurality
of customized profiles 107 (e.g.
job/position/company/department benchmarks—see FIG. 2a)
for companies 104, based on a selected predefined profile 100
(e.g. industry job/position/company/department
benchmarks—see FIG. 2b) and employee information 105 that
contains answers to personal assessments 99 completed by
employees of the respective companies 104. For example, it is
recognised that the predefined profile 100 can be based on
industry wide employee profile(s). Further, the customized
profiles 107 for a company 104 are a result of selected personal
assessment 99 results and can include other employment
definition information 98 (e.g. desired work experience,
academic qualifications, etc). …
Schneiderman ¶ 38 (emphasis added).
Referring to FIG. 1, the customization engine 250
facilitates a turnkey/self-serve environment 10 for generation of
a customized profile 107 for a company 104, based on
assessment information 99 of company 104 employees and a
selected standard profile 100 (or profiles 100) by the company
104 from a profile 100 list provided by the framework 112. In
terms of customizing, each employer 104 gets their own unique
job profile 107, because each job profile 107 incorporates the
scores of their own top performer employees (which are unique
to only them, obviously), as well as potentially their
underperformers as well (e.g. a customized undesirable profile
107 can be generated as a tool for use in weeding out
undesirable employee candidates—where matches to the
customized undesirable profile 107 would result in
disqualification of the potential candidate 114 for any jobs at
the company 104). Otherwise, it is recognised that a
combination of both together, where both the high and low
performers results can be explicitly represented in the
customized profile 107 (e.g. desired attributes 150 and/or
undesired attributes 150 can be included with corresponding
ranges 152 in the profile 107).
Schneiderman ¶ 54 (emphasis added).
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Claim 1, limitation L3 recites: “create a job profile for the job title or
job function at the first business organization using the member profiles and
the job profiles” (emphasis added).
In reviewing the record, we find Patwa and Schneiderman teach or
suggest the following claim 1, limitation L3 language, emphasized and
mapped to the references as follows:
create a job profile (see Schneiderman Abstract: “A system and
method for dynamically generating a customized profile for a company for a
selected profile type, the customized profile including a set of attribute types,
each of the attribute types having a customized attribute range.”;
Schneiderman ¶ 38: “…generating a plurality of customized profiles 107
(e.g. job/position/company/department benchmarks—see FIG. 2a) for
companies 104, based on a selected predefined profile 100 (e.g. industry
job/position/company/department benchmarks—see FIG. 2b) … industry
wide employee profile(s). Further, the customized profiles 107 for a
company…” (emphasis added); and Schneiderman ¶ 54: “job profile”
(emphasis added)),
for the job title (see Patwa Fig. 4N: “JOB TITLE”) or
job function (Patwa ¶ 53: “job profile” (emphasis added)) at the first
business organization (Patwa ¶ 37: “The . . . employer may be an
organization” (emphasis added))
using the member profiles (Patwa ¶ 111: “The profile management
module 603 creates candidate profiles…” (emphasis added))
and the job profiles (Patwa ¶ 53: “job profiles” (emphasis added)).
See Final Act. 7–9.
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Thus, we find Patwa and Schneiderman teach or suggest limitation L3
of claim 1: “create a job profile for the job title or job function at the first
business organization using the member profiles and the job profile”
(emphasis added), as claimed.
Given the aforementioned evidence, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and
ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, as pertaining to the disputed
limitations L1, L2, and L3 of representative claim 1. Therefore, based upon
a preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred
regarding Rejection B of representative independent claim 1.
For similar reasons, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports
the Examiner’s legal conclusion of obviousness for Rejection B of
independent claims 9 and 17, which recite similar limitations of
commensurate scope to those contested by Appellants for claim 1. See Final
Act. 7–11. Therefore, grouped claims 2, 5–10, 13–18, and 21–24, also
rejected under Rejection B (and not argued separately) fall with
representative independent claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection B of
claims 1, 2, 5–10, 13–18, and 21–24.

Rejection C of Remaining Dependent Claims 3, 4, 11, 12, 19, and 20
Regarding all remaining dependent claims rejected under § 103
Rejection C, Appellants advance no separate, substantive arguments.
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
Rejection C of dependent claims 3, 4, 11, 12, 19, and 20.
Appeal 2018-006100
Application 14/300,302

39
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, as being obvious over the cited combinations of prior art.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–24 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–24 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED