UNITED TECHNOLOGIES RESEARCH CENTER

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 20, 2021

2021001646 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 20, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/517,025 04/05/2017 Wenping Zhao 75723US01 (U400011US) 8896
23413 7590 09/20/2021
CANTOR COLBURN LLP
20 Church Street
22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
THOMAS, KAREEN KAY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3736
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/20/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte WENPING ZHAO,
ELLEN Y. SUN, JOHN P. WESSON,
PAUL F. CROTEAU, and
ANDRZEJ ERNEST KUCZEK

Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before EDWARD A. BROWN, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and
BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21–25, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. See Appeal Br. 3. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Carrier
Corporation.” Appeal Br. 1 (Title page).
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The disclosed subject matter relates “to [a] pressure vessel to be used
for transport, storage, or utilization of a pressurized fluid, including gas or
liquid.” Spec. ¶ 2. Apparatus claim 21 is the sole independent claim. Claim
21 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and is reproduced below.
21. A composite pressure vessel assembly comprising:
a plurality of lobes, each of the lobes having at least one
interior wall and at least one curved wall, the plurality of lobes
being positioned in a side by side arrangement and extending in
a longitudinal direction from a first end to a second end; and
a plurality of end caps disposed at the ends of the lobes;
wherein the plurality of lobes and end caps are formed of
at least one fiber-reinforced polymer.
EVIDENCE
Name Reference Date
Blair et al. (“Blair”) US 6,095,367 Aug. 1, 2000
REJECTION
Claims 21–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated
by Blair.
ANALYSIS
Appellant presents separate arguments for claims 21, 22, and 23. See
Appeal Br. 4–5. We address these three claims separately below. Regarding
claims 24 and 25, they each depend directly from claim 21 and are not
separately argued. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019),
claims 24 and 25 stand or fall with claim 21.
Appellant initially contends that claim 21 “is directed to a fiber-
reinforced polymer end cap[]” and that Blair items 16, 18, and 20 are not
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

3
end caps. Appeal Br. 4. The Examiner identifies items 16, 18, 20 and 62 as
being end caps. See Final Act. 3; Ans. 4. Items 16, 18, and 20 are described
by Blair as forming “cells 12.” See Blair 5:57–59 (“three cells 12 [are]
secured within a web [and] cells 12 include a left end cell 16, a right end cell
18, and one interior cell 20”). Blair further specifically identifies item 62 as
“a cap” on “each end of each cell 12.” See Blair 7:26. Thus, while items 16,
18, and 20 are more properly identified by Blair as being a series of cells,
item 62 is clearly identified as being an end cap on these cells. Thus,
Appellant’s focus solely on items 16, 18, and 20 is not persuasive that Blair
fails to disclose the recited “end caps.”
Appellant also contends that “[o]nly the mid sections of each cell in
Blair is covered with a fiber-reinforced polymer.” Appeal Br. 4. This
statement is inconsistent with the clear teachings of Blair. First, as
expressed above, Blair teaches that “each end of each cell 12 [is configured]
with a cap 62.” Blair 7:26. Thus a cell includes end caps. Blair further
teaches that in one manufacturing embodiment,
the materials used to form the cells 12 include preimpregnated
graphite tow which is wound with a combination of hoop and
helical windings to provide sufficient strength to resist a
standard operating pressure within the pressure vessel of about
3,600 p.s.i. and a burst strength of about two to three times that
pressure.
Blair 8:50–56. Blair also teaches use of a liner 28 that “is overwrapped by
composite material using filament winding.” Blair 8:64–66; see also Blair
4:56–58. Because Blair’s cell includes end caps, Appellant does not explain
how Blair’s teachings avoid any wrapping of the end caps, and, instead,
“[o]nly the mid sections” are wrapped as asserted. Appeal Br. 4. Further,
Appellant does not explain how such unwrapped end caps would be able to
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

4
maintain the desired pressure without bursting in Blair. Appellant’s
contention is not persuasive that only Blair’s mid-section is covered by such
material2, and not also the cell’s end caps.
Appellant next contends that, in Blair, “only the elongated lobes are
wrapped with the web (14) and not the end caps (62)” and also that “liner
(28) is not made of a fiber-reinforce polymer.” Appeal Br. 4; see also id. at
5 (“it is the web that is made of fiber-reinforced polymers”). Neither
contention is persuasive. First, the Examiner is addressing the construction
of the individual cells 12 themselves, and not the outer web 14 wrapped
around multiple cells to bind them into a single package. See Final Act. 3;
Blair 9:8–9 (“Then the cells 12 are overwrapped by the composite web
14.”), Fig. 3. Regarding the liner, Appellant’s contention is not addressing
the Examiner’s rejection which does not address the liner but, instead,
focuses on outer wall 26. See Final Act. 3 (referencing Blair 6:37–43).
Further, Appellant does not explain how the outer wall 26 wrapped around
liner 28 (not the liner itself) fails to be “a fiber-reinforced polymer” as noted
above. See Blair 6:37–41.
Appellant also contends that Blair does not “affirmatively” make it
known that the end caps 62 are “made of a fiber-reinforced polymer”
because “Blair is silent as to the composition of the end caps.” Appeal Br. 4.
We disagree for the reasons expressed above, i.e., Blair teaches that each
cell 12 has an end cap on each end (see Blair 7:26) and Blair further teaches

2 Blair states that such material forming the outer wall surrounding the liner
“is preferably made of a composite material, such as carbon, glass, graphite,
aramid, or other known fibers bound in a thermoplastic or thermoset resin
such as epoxy.” Blair 6:37–41.
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

5
that cell 18 (along with the “other cells 12 of the pressure vessel”) is made of
a composite material. Blair 6:37–47; see also Ans. 5 (“[m]ember 62 is part
of end cap member 18 and member 18 is covered with a fiber-reinforced
polymer”). Thus, it is not understood how Blair fails to “affirmatively”
make it known that the end caps are constructed of the recited material.
Appellant further contends that “end caps (62) are a separate
component from the liner (28) and/or cell (12).” Appeal Br. 5. Appellant
does not make clear how, whether end caps 62 are a separate component or
not, is material (or even recited) when Blair’s end caps 62 form a part of
each cell the same as Appellant’s end caps 100 form a part of each lobe (25,
30, 35). See Spec. Fig. 1. Thus, even if Blair’s end caps are separate,
Appellant does not explain how they are separate in a manner different from
Appellant’s end caps.
Addressing now claim 22 (which depends from claim 21), this claim
additionally recites “wherein the plurality of lobes is entirely formed of at
least one fiber-reinforced polymer.” Italics added. Appellant contends that
because each cell in Blair employs a liner, this limitation is not met because
“the liner (28) of the lobes is not formed of a fiber-reinforce[d] polymer.”
Appeal Br. 5.
As understood, Appellant is reading the “entirely formed” claim
language as a negative claim limitation (i.e., the lobe/cell is only formed of
such material to the exclusion of all others, such as Blair’s liner). MPEP
§ 2173.05(i) states that there must be a basis in the original disclosure for
such exclusion. See also In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52 (CCPA 1976) (“it
is necessary and proper to determine whether [the] specification reasonably
supports a construction” that would exclude or include particular
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

6
ingredients). Further, we are instructed that “negative claim limitations are
adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude
the relevant limitation.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In other words, a specification that is silent on this
point does not provide sufficient support for such a claim construction.
Here, Appellant’s Specification is silent as to why such construction
must solely be single-walled and also made only of a particular material, and
no other.3 See Spec. ¶¶ 7, 49. Appellant’s assertion of exclusivity is further
undermined by Appellant’s usage of the transitional term “comprising”
rather than the more restrictive “consisting of” or even “consisting
essentially of.” We also note that claim 22 recites “entirely formed of at
least one fiber-reinforced polymer” (italics added) indicating that its
construction might include multiple layers of fiber-reinforced polymers.
As noted above, Blair’s outer wall 26 is made of the recited material.
Blair further teaches that liner 28 “may be made of . . . a synthetic polymer
film.” Blair 6:41–43; see also Blair 4:54–55. Appellant does not address
the composition of Blair’s “synthetic polymer film,” only stating that it is
lacking in fibers. See Appeal Br. 5. Appellant provides no basis for this
conclusion when seeking to rebut the Examiner’s rejection. See In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); ACCO Brands Corp. v.
Fellowes, Inc., 813 F.3d 1361, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Furthermore, we
have been instructed that “attorney argument [is] not the kind of factual
evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.” In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

3 We note that Appellant’s Figure 2 discloses a single-walled device not
unlike Blair’s Figure 2 labeled “Prior Art.”
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

7
In view of the above, although Blair may teach more than just outer
wall 26, we are not persuaded that Blair fails to teach cells 12 made of the
recited material. See Final Act. 3; Ans. 5. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of Examiner error on this point.
Claim 23 also depends directly from claim 21, and additionally recites
that the lobes and end caps “are formed as a single, integrally formed
composite structure.” Appellant contends, “FIG. 3 does not show the lobes
and end caps (62) being formed as a single integrally formed composite
structure” and refers to the “argument presented for claim 21 above” because
“[t]he end caps are separate.”
The matter of the separateness of the end caps has been discussed
above and is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appellant also contends that
“being ‘connected’ is not ‘integrally formed.’” Appeal Br. 5. However,
Appellant does not explain how Blair’s Figure 3, illustrating various cells
bound together via web 14, fails to disclose a single integral unit.4 In other
words, Appellant does not explain how items secured or “overwrapped
together” are not also said to be “integral.” Ans. 5. Nor does Appellant’s
Specification provide any clear distinction between the two terms (i.e.,
“connected” and “integrally formed”). See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 48 (“an end cap 100
is joined to, or integrally formed with, the plurality of lobes”). Accordingly,
we are not persuaded the Examiner erred on this point.

4 The term “integral” has been interpreted to cover more than a unitary, one-
piece, construction. See, e.g., In re Kohno, 391 F.2d 959, 960 n.4 (CCPA
1968); In re Dike, 394 F.2d 584, 590 n.5, (CCPA 1968); In re Larson, 340
F.2d 965, 967–968 (CCPA 1965); and In re Clark, 214 F.2d 148, 150
(CCPA 1954).
Appeal 2021-001646
Application 15/517,025

8
In summation, and based on the record presented, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–25 as being obvious in
view of Blair. We sustain their rejection.
CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21–25 102 Blair 21–25
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED