UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 29, 2020

14894567 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/894,567 11/30/2015 John R. Otto 73399US02;
67097-2541PUS1
3130
54549 7590 09/29/2020
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
Birmingham, MI 48009
EXAMINER
SUTHERLAND, STEVEN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3741
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN R. OTTO
Appeal 2020-000508
Application 14/894,567
Technology Center 3700
Before EDWARD A. BROWN, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
BRETT C. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12, 14–17, and 19. See Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as United Technologies
Corporation, assignee of the present invention. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2020-000508
Application 14/894,567
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to over speed monitoring using a fan drive
gear system. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method of controlling a turbofan engine, the turbofan
engine including a rotating shaft coupling a turbine to a
compressor and driving a fan through a geared architecture, the
method comprising:
measuring a first speed of the rotating shaft at a first
location aft of the geared architecture;
measuring a second speed of a fan drive shaft driven by
the geared architecture and rotating at a speed different than the
rotating shaft;
calculating an expected difference in speed of the rotating
shaft and the fan drive shaft based on a gear ratio of the geared
architecture;
determining that one of the rotating shaft and the fan drive
shaft are outside predefined deformation limits responsive to a
difference between an actual difference between the first and the
second speed and the calculated expected difference; and
initiating a remedial action to protect the gas turbine
engine responsive to a determination that one of the rotating shaft
and the fan drive shaft are outside the predefined deformation
limits.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Cunliffe US 752,009 July 4, 1956
Witte US 5,067,355 Nov. 26, 1991
Hayess US 6,494,046 B1 Dec. 17, 2002
McVey US 2010/0011740 A1 Jan. 21, 2010
Drnevich US 5,802,875 Sept. 8, 1998

Appeal 2020-000508
Application 14/894,567
3
REJECTIONS
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
2, 12, 17 112(a) Written Description
1–7, 9–12, 15–17 103 Hayess, McVey,
Cunliffe
8, 14, 19 103 Hayess, McVey,
Cunliffe, Drnevich
Witte

OPINION
Written Description
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 12, and 17 as lacking proper written
description because the claimed gear ratios have no upper bounds. As
Appellant points out, “numerical ranges ‘must be considered in the context
in which is being applied,’ here within a gas turbine engine.” Reply Br. 2
(citing Ex parte Fulner, Appeal No. 2013-010469 at pp. 8–9). We agree
with Appellant that “[o]ne skilled in the art would recognize that there is an
inherent upper limit to the gear ratio applicable to a gas turbine engine” and
that the lack of a claimed upper bound does not render the claims as lacking
proper written description. Reply Br. 3. Accordingly, we do not sustain this
rejection.
Obviousness
Appellant argues claims 1–7, 9–12, and 15–17 as a group. We select
claim 1 as representative and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1.
Appellant argues that “[t]he proposed combination is not supported by a
rational reason and therefore the references are not properly combinable.”
Reply Br. 3. In general, Appellant argues that there is no reason to combine
the various features of Hayess, McVey, and Cunliffe and that doing so
Appeal 2020-000508
Application 14/894,567
4
“would require a complete redesign and change of the intended operation of
Hayess.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant asserts an understanding “that bodily
incorporation is not necessary to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness,” but then makes arguments that essentially amount to
deficiencies in the bodily incorporation of the various features of the
references at issue. Reply Br. 4.
Taking a step back from the physical device resultant from the
Examiner’s combination, it is helpful to understand both what the claims
require at a conceptual level and what the prior art also teaches at a
conceptual level. Claim 1 requires a turbofan engine with a fan coupled via
geared architecture. The claim also requires sensors both fore and aft of the
geared architecture to measure rotational speeds of the shafts and utilizing
those speeds to determine whether one of the shafts is outside of the
deformational limits.
Hayess is a turbofan engine similar to the recited turbofan engine, but
lacks the geared architecture. Hayess teaches a very similar sensing system
that detects rotations speeds at either end of the direct-drive shaft to
determine if a potential failure might occur, similar to the claimed invention.
Hayess teaches a delta in the two rotational speeds indicative of a potential
failure, but because it is a direct drive shaft, the speeds are expected to be the
same and so essentially any delta that is detected would indicate the
potential for a failure. Therefore, what is lacking from Hayess is an
understanding of how such a sensing system would operate if the two ends
of the shaft were already operating at differing speeds due to the presence of
a geared architecture between the drive shaft and the fan.
The Examiner thus points to McVey for teaching a turbofan more
similar to the claimed turbofan in that it has a geared architecture, but is
Appeal 2020-000508
Application 14/894,567
5
silent regarding any sensing system. Essentially, the Examiner just uses
McVey to point out that geared turbofans were known in the art and could
operate in a similar fashion to Hayess turbofan engine with a direct-drive
architecture. In our view, the Examiner could have satisfactorily rejected the
claims with these two references alone. Hayess teaches all of the key
sensing features in that it senses rotational speeds at two ends of a rotating
shaft and utilizes the difference therebetween in order to determine if a
failure event is imminent. Simply applying the logic of Hayess to McVey
would convey to one of skill in the art that in a geared architecture,
accomplishing the same sensing would simply require sensing at both ends
of the shaft mechanism such that sensors are fore and aft of the geared
architecture and then accounting for the fact that the shafts in a geared
architecture already rotate at differing speeds. As such, the important thing
to sense is a change in the delta, not just the delta itself as is done in Hayess.
The Examiner, however, went a step further and included teachings of
the Cunliffe reference into the rejection to show that it was known that in a
similar structure, those skilled in the art were already aware of the need to
sense and compare the differing rotational speeds involved in a geared
architecture between a drive shaft and fan shaft rotating at differing speeds.
Appellant protests that “Cunliffe does not disclose sensors, but devices that
act like sensors” because Cunliffe teaches, in the Examiner’s interpretation,
“a three phase alternator 21 as a first sensor and a three-phase induction
machine 23 as another sensor.” Reply Br. 5.
We first note that Appellant admits supra that Cunliffe teaches
devices that act like sensors. We do not ascribe such a narrow meaning to
the term sensor such that it could not include devices such as the alternator
and induction machine taught in Cunliffe. The important teaching in
Appeal 2020-000508
Application 14/894,567
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Cunliffe is that in a geared architecture, as found in the claims and in
McVey, one of skill in the art already knew that it was desirable to sense the
speeds of the shafts on either side of the gear mechanism to then compare
the speeds and determine if a failure is imminent. Even though we consider
Cunliffe to teach sensors according to the broadest reasonable interpretation
of the term, this teaching is cumulative because Hayess already teaches
sensors more in line with Appellant’s disclosure, it just does not teach their
use in a geared architecture.
Again, from a conceptual standpoint, the Examiner has clearly shown
that sensing either end of a shaft to detect potential failure was known as
disclosed in Hayess. The Examiner then showed that geared turbofan
engines were known as disclosed in McVey and the Examiner also showed
that in a similar architecture as disclosed in McVey and found in the claims,
Cunliffe teaches that it was known to sense speeds of two shafts rotating at
different speeds and separated by a geared architecture with sensors (or even
sensor-like devices) located as claimed. Combining all of those teachings
together, the Examiner’s combination meets all of the claimed features.
Although Appellant asserts an understanding that bodily incorporation
is not necessary, its arguments amount to faulting the Examiner for just such
a bodily incorporation without looking at the higher-level of teachings found
in the prior art. Given that all of the claimed features are present and that the
combination naturally flows from a conceptual standpoint, we are not
apprised of error in the Examiner’s combination.
Regarding claims 8, 14, and 19, Appellant merely relies on their
dependency from other independent claims subject to the group above
represented by claim 1. Having found Appellant’s arguments with regard to
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Application 14/894,567
7
claim 1 as not persuasive, we likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 8, 14, and 19.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is AFFIRMED.
More specifically,
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
2, 12, 17 112(a) Written
Description
2, 12, 17
1–7, 9–12,
15–17
103 Hayess, McVey,
Cunliffe
1–7, 9–12,
15–17

8, 14, 19 103 Hayess, McVey,
Cunliffe, Drnevich,
Witte
8, 14, 19
Overall
Outcome
1–12, 14–
17, 19

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED