United Technologies Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 20, 2021

2020004438 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/904,416 05/29/2013 Brian D. Merry 67097-1681PUS3;60253US03 4681
54549 7590 07/20/2021
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
Birmingham, MI 48009
EXAMINER
KIM, TAE JUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3799
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/20/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BRIAN D. MERRY and GABRIEL L. SUCIU
____________

Appeal 2020-004438
Application 13/904,416
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, and 21–33.2 We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Raytheon Technologies Corporation
as the real party in interest. Update to Real Party in Interest (Apr. 23, 2020),
1.
2 Claims 2, 3, 6–10, 13, and 15–20 are cancelled. Amendment (Aug. 8,
2019), 1–4.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 4 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A gas turbine engine comprising:
a core housing including an inlet case and an intermediate
case that respectively provide an inlet case flow path and an
intermediate case flow path, the inlet case includes an inlet case
portion defining the inlet case flow path;
a bearing support portion removably secured to the inlet
case portion;
a shaft supporting a compressor section that is arranged
axially between the inlet case flow path and the intermediate case
flow path, the shaft includes a main shaft, a flex shaft axially
forward of the main shaft, a hub removably secured to the main
shaft and splined to the flex shaft at a spline end of the flex shaft,
and the compressor section includes a rotor mounted to the hub;
a geared architecture coupled to the shaft, and a fan
coupled to and rotationally driven by the geared architecture,
wherein the geared architecture includes a sun gear, the sun gear
supported by and cantilevered on the shaft;
a first bearing supporting the shaft relative to the
intermediate case; and
a second bearing supporting the shaft relative to the inlet
case, and the second bearing is arranged radially outward from
the shaft and axially forward of the spline end of the flex shaft,
the second bearing mounted to the bearing support portion, the
hub supporting the second bearing.

EVIDENCE
The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Name Reference Date
Rosen US 3,747,343 July 24, 1973
Dennison US 4,704,862 Nov. 10, 1987
Hurwitz US 2010/0058735 A1 Mar. 11, 2010
Sheridan US 2010/0150702 A1 June 17, 2010

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THE REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 4–12, 14, and 21–33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. Final Act. 2–4.
II. Claims 1, 4, 5, 21–23, and 25–27 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sheridan and
Dennison. Id. at 4–10.
III. Claims 11 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Sheridan, Dennison, and Rosen. Id. at
10–11.
IV. Claims 14 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Sheridan, Dennison, Rosen, and Hurwitz. Id.
at 11.
V. Claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, and 21–29 stand rejected on the
ground of nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over
either U.S. Patent No. 8,511,061 or U.S. Patent No. 8,402,741
in view of Sheridan and Dennison. Id. at 13–19.
OPINION
Rejection I
First, the Examiner finds that because claims 1 and 4 recite a shaft that
includes a main shaft and a flex shaft, subsequent recitations to “the shaft”
are indefinite as they “could refer to any of the previously cited ‘shaft,’
‘main shaft, [and] ‘flex shaft.’” Final Act. 2–3. Appellant responds that
“[a]fter th[e] initial introduction of these features, the claims are consistent
in their use of ‘the shaft,’ ‘the main shaft,’ and ‘the flex shaft.’” Appeal
Br. 4. Appellant asserts that “[o]ne skilled in the art would understand the
claims when read in light of the [S]pecification.” Id. We agree with
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Appellant that consistent usage of “shaft,” “main shaft,” and “flex shaft” in
the claims reasonably apprises those of skill in the art of the scope of the
claimed invention. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s first basis
for rejecting claims 1, 4–12, 14, and 21–33 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite.
Second, the Examiner finds that the recitation in claims 22 and 26 that
“the shaft includes a main shaft supporting the hub is indefinite because ‘the
main shaft’ was already introduced into the independent claims and claim[s]
22, 26 would render it unclear whether the same main shaft is being referred
to or a different main shaft from that of the independent claims.” Final
Act. 4. Appellant states that Specification discusses the various shafts at
paragraphs 29–32, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand
what is claimed in light of the Specification. Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 2.
“[A] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose
meaning is unclear.” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(citing MPEP § 2173.05(e)); see also Ex parte McAward, Appeal 2015-
006416, 2017 WL 3669566 at *5 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential)
(adopting the approach for assessing indefiniteness approved by the Federal
Circuit in Packard). Appellant does not explain adequately how the claims
are clear as to whether the subsequent recitation of “a main shaft” in
dependent claims 22 and 26 refers to the same shaft introduced in the
independent claims from which claims 22 and 26 depend or instead refers to
a different and/or additional main shaft. Claims 22 and 26 are, thus, unclear
as to the meaning of “a main shaft.” Accordingly, we sustain this basis for
rejecting dependent claims 22 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite.
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Third, the Examiner finds that the recitation in claim 22 that “the shaft
is supported by the hub” is problematic because “the hub is already defined
as part of the shaft in claim 1 and it is indefinite to say the shaft, which
already includes a hub[] can be supported by the hub.” Final Act. 4.
Appellant argues that “the shaft and hub are described in the [S]pecification
at least at paragraphs [0029]–[0032]” and “[o]ne skilled in the art would
understand what is claimed in light of the [S]pecification.” Reply Br. 2.
Appellant does not explain adequately how “the shaft is supported by the
hub,” as claimed. As explained by the Examiner, “the shaft” includes “a
main shaft” “a flex shaft,” and “a hub.” Final Act. 4; Appeal Br. 8 (Claims
App.). We agree with the Examiner that it is unclear how “the shaft” is
supported by one of its constituent parts. To the extent that the claim intends
to mean that “the flex shaft” is supported by the hub (as recited in dependent
claim 26), Appellant has relied on consistent usage of the terms “the shaft,”
“the main shaft,” and “the flex shaft” to ensure clarity, so we do not
understand “the shaft” to refer to solely “the flex shaft.” In our view, one of
ordinary skill in the art is not reasonably apprised of the scope of dependent
claim 22 with respect to the shaft being supported by the hub. Accordingly,
we sustain this basis for rejecting dependent claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite.
Rejection II
Appellant argues claims 1, 4, 5, 21–23, and 25–27 as a group. Appeal
Br. 4–5. We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 4, 5,
21–23, and 25–27 stand or fall therewith. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Sheridan discloses many of the limitations of
independent claim 1 including, among other things, (i) a shaft including
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“main shaft 15, a flex shaft 24 axially forward of the main shaft, [and] a hub
. . . removably secured to the main shaft 15” and (ii) “support portion 12
removably secured to [an] inlet case portion.” Final Act. 5–6. The
Examiner acknowledges, however, that Sheridan does not teach “the hub . . .
splined to the flex shaft at a spline end of the flex shaft” or “a second
bearing mounted to that [bearing] support portion 12; and the second bearing
[being] arranged radially outward from the shaft and axially forward of the
spline end of the flex shaft.” Id. at 6.
The Examiner finds that Dennison teaches “a hub . . . removably
secured to [a] main shaft [25] and splined to [a] flex shaft 62 at a spline end
of the flex shaft.” Final Act. 7. The Examiner further explains that although
element “62 is described as the sun gear[, it] is the shaft connected to the sun
gear 76” and is “analogous to the flex shaft.” Id. The Examiner further
explains that element “74 are the splines between sun gear 62 and the hub”
which is “radially outside of 74.” Id.
The Examiner additionally finds that Dennison teaches “a bearing
support portion 70 removably secured to [an] inlet case portion [of inlet
case 72].” Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner further finds that Dennison
teaches “a second bearing 7[3] supporting the shaft relative to the inlet case
72, and the second bearing [73] is arranged radially outward from the shaft
25 and axially forward of the spline end . . . of the flex shaft [62], the second
bearing [73] mounted to the bearing support portion [70], the hub [radially
outside of 74] supporting the second bearing [73].” Id. at 7.
The Examiner concludes that:
[i]t would have been obvious to make the hub splined to the flex
shaft at an end of the flex shaft forming a splined end, as taught
by Dennison in order to employ a conventional connection
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technique used for connecting shafts / hubs [] in gas turbine
engines and which facilitates assembly, disassembly[,] and/or
interengagement.
Ans. 10. The Examiner also concludes that:
[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to
employ a second bearing supporting the shaft relative to the inlet
case, which is removably connected to the inlet case and
supported by the hub . . . and which is radially outward of the
shaft and axially forward of the spline end of the flex shaft, as
taught by Dennison, in order to reduce the load on the shaft
between multiple locations and thus enhance reliability and/or
longevity.
Final Act. 8; Ans. 9–10.
Appellant first argues that “[t]he Examiner points to end 74 of
Dennison, but does not cite to any part of Dennison that suggests this is a
spline end.” Appeal Br. 4. The Examiner responds that “[e]lement 74 is
clearly a splined end[] that connects two shafts.” Ans. 21 (citing Dennison
4:30–35) (“The sun gear 62 is splined at its rearward end 74 to the forward
end of the low turbine shaft 25.”). In our view, the Examiner’s finding as to
a spline end at element 74 is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Appellant next argues that, with respect to the claimed flex shaft,
“[t]he Examiner points to a component between elements 62 and 78,” but
“the Examiner does not cite to any part of Dennison that suggests this is a
flex shaft.” Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2 (“The Examiner appears to ignore
the ‘flex’ feature of the claim, which is not disclosed in Dennison.”).
Appellant continues that “[i]nstead, Dennison teaches a flexible component
88 radially outward of the blades to provide flexibility within the engine.”
Appeal Br. 5 (citing Dennison 5:27–31). The Examiner responds that
although element “62 may be called the sun gear, only the toothed portion
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76 of [element] 62 is actually the gear and the rest of the elongated member
62 corresponds with a shaft.” Ans. 22 n.2. The Examiner takes the position
that Dennison’s element “62 is analogous to Appellant’s flex shaft[] that has
the sun gear 76 at the front end 78 and splined connection 74 to the hub at
the splined end of [element] 62.” Id. at 22. The Examiner also states that “it
is noted that shaft 62, as it is elongated in nature, will inherently
accommodate at least some ‘flex’ during rotation.” Id. at 23. As to
Dennison’s inclusion of component 88, the Examiner states that component
“88 provides for flexibility within the outer portion of the engine where
blades 42 require flexibility of support whereas the claims are directed to the
inner portion of the engine where the shaft / hub / flex shaft are located.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). Moreover, the Examiner responds that Sheridan
“already employs the flex shaft 24, 110, 112,” and the Examiner is merely
modifying Sheridan’s flex shaft so as to include a “type of splined end
connection [as taught] by Dennison.” Id. (citing Sheridan ¶ 19).
Appellant has not addressed the Examiner’s position that Sheridan
already includes a flex shaft, and the Examiner’s proposed modification is
only the inclusion of a splined connection between a shaft and hub as taught
by Dennison, in light of the “highly analogous gear / shaft / hub
arrangement” of both Sheridan and Dennison. Ans. 23. In addition,
Appellant has not addressed the Examiner’s position that Dennison’s
shaft 62 will inherently accommodate some flex, and thus, constitutes a flex
shaft. Id. Moreover, Appellant’s arguments regarding Dennison’s failure to
specifically identify element 62 as a flex shaft and/or Dennison’s inclusion
of a different flexible component 88 do not persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s stated position that element 62 is a flex shaft.
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In the Appeal Brief, Appellant next argues that “the Examiner
provides no reasoning one would make any additional modifications, such as
modifying Sheridan to have ‘a hub removably secured to the main shaft and
splined to the flex shaft at a spline end of the flex shaft.’” Appeal Br. 5. In
light of the additional reasoning outlined in the Examiner’s Answer as to it
being “obvious to make the hub splined to the flex shaft at an end of the flex
shaft forming a splined end, as taught by Dennison, in order to employ a
conventional connection technique used for connecting shafts / hubs [] in gas
turbine engines and which facilitates assembly, disassembly[,] and/or
interengagement” (Ans. 10, 24), which has gone unrebutted by Appellant in
the Reply Brief, we are not persuaded of error by the Examiner in
articulating reasoning with rational underpinning for combining Sheridan
and Dennison so as to arrive at the claimed invention.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in
the Examiner’s determination that Sheridan and Dennison render obvious
the subject matter of independent claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 1, and claims 4, 5, 21–23, and 25–27 falling therewith,
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sheridan and Dennison.
Rejection III
Dependent claims 11 and 12 recite that “the gas turbine engine is a
high bypass geared aircraft engine having a bypass ratio of greater than six
(6).” Appeal Br. 9, 10 (Claims App.). The Examiner acknowledges that
Sheridan and Dennison do not teach this feature. Final Act. 10. The
Examiner finds that Rosen “teaches a bypass ratio of greater than six . . . [is
a] well known range[] in the art.” Id. The Examiner concludes that it would
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have been obvious “to employ the claimed range as an obvious matter of
using the workable ranges in the art.” Id. at 11.
Appellant argues that “Rosen does not teach a bypass ratio greater
than six,” instead merely “list[ing] an example engine having a 5:1 bypass
and another example engine having a 6:1 bypass.” Appeal Br. 6 (citing
Rosen 1:10–18). The Examiner takes the position in the Answer that “[i]t
would have been obvious . . . to employ the claimed range of greater than 6,
when the range of 6 is known, as an obvious matter of using the workable
ranges in the art and the technology to increase the bypass ratio has
advanced significantly since 1973.” Ans. 25. The Examiner states that
“[w]hen the area for flow B [going through the fan / bypass duct] is
increased relative to flow C [entering the core engine], the bypass ratio is
increased and a change from 6 to greater than 6 (e.g.[,] 6.01 and above)
would not make a materially different engine.” Id.
Even if the claimed bypass ratio (i.e., greater than six (6)) does not
overlap the bypass ratio disclosed in Rosen (i.e., exactly 6:1), “when the
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is the range or
value of a particular variable, then a prima facie rejection is properly
established when the difference in the range or value is minor.” Haynes
Int’l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1577 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Here,
as noted above, the Examiner finds that a change in bypass ratio from 6 to
greater than 6 “would not make a materially different engine” (Ans. 25), and
Appellant does not argue otherwise. As [the Federal Circuit] has explained,
“[o]ne way for a patent applicant to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness
is to make a showing of ‘unexpected results,’ i.e., to show that the claimed
invention exhibits some superior property or advantage that a person of
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ordinary skill in the relevant art would have found surprising or
unexpected.” In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed.Cir.1995); see also In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appellant, however, presents
no persuasive evidence of such unexpected results.
Appellant further argues that “the Examiner has not established that
one would modify Sheridan, Dennison, and Sheridan ‘674 with Rosen as
proposed” because “Sheridan and Dennison disclose different engine
architectures from Rosen.” Appeal Br. 6. More particularly, Appellant
argues that “Sheridan and Dennison both disclose geared engines, while
Rosen discloses a direct drive engine” and “[t]he Examiner has not provided
any factual basis in the cited references to suggest the ratios of Rosen would
work with the different engine architectures of Sheridan or Dennison.” Id.;
Reply Br. 2. Appellant further asserts that “[t]he gear permits the fan to
operate at different speeds from the turbine, which may impact the fan
pressure ratio and bypass ratio.” Reply Br. 2. The Examiner maintains the
position that “a geared turbofan merely adds a gear between the turbine / fan
shaft that drives the fan” and “[t]here is nothing on the record that indicates
the fan or turbine blade and their respective pressure ratios would be
materially affected or why one of ordinary skill in the art would not use
analogous blades that are already utilized in the art when incorporating a
gear into the engine.” Ans. 25
Although we agree with Appellant that “[t]he gear permits the fan to
operate at different speeds from the turbine” (Reply Br. 2), Appellant has
merely identified a difference between the two references, but the presence
of differences between two references does not necessarily undermine a case
of obviousness. See In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Appellant does not present technical reasoning or evidence that the inclusion
of a gear impacts fan pressure ratio and bypass ratio in such a way that will
render the parameters of Rosen’s direct drive engine architecture
inapplicable to the geared engine architectures of Sheridan and Dennison.
On the other hand, Dennison indicates that “[o]ne object of the present
invention is a ducted prop engine with a high bypass ratio” (Dennison 1:53–
54), and Rosen similarly indicates that its “invention relates to high bypass .
. . ducted propulsion fans” (Rosen 1:4–5). In addition, Appellant’s
Specification indicates that the “invention is applicable to other gas turbine
engines including direct drive turbofans.” Spec. ¶ 25.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in
the Examiner’s determination that Sheridan, Dennison, and Rosen render
obvious the subject matter of claims 11 and 12. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claims 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Sheridan, Dennison, and Rosen.
Rejection IV
Appellant relies on the same arguments and reasoning we found
unpersuasive in connection with independent claims 1 and 4 and dependent
claims 11 and 12 as the basis for seeking reversal of the rejection of
dependent claims 14 and 29. Appeal Br. 6. Accordingly, for the same
reasons discussed above in connection with Rejections II and III, we also
sustain the rejection of claims 14 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Sheridan, Dennison, Rosen, and Hurwitz.
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Rejection V
Appellant does not present any substantive arguments contesting the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, and 21–29 on the ground
of nonstatutory double patenting. Rather, Appellant merely submits that
“[w]ithout conceding to the merits of the double patenting rejection,
Appellant will file a terminal disclaimer after receiving an indication of
allowable subject matter.” Appeal Br. 4. Consequently, Appellant has
waived any argument of error, and we summarily sustain the rejection of
claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, and 21–29 on the ground of nonstatutory double
patenting. See, e.g., In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984–85 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that the Board did not err in sustaining a rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph, when the applicant failed to contest the rejection
on appeal).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 5, 11,
12, 14, 21–33

112, ¶ 2 Indefiniteness 22, 26 1, 4, 5, 11,
12, 14, 21,
23–25, 27–
33
1, 4, 5, 21–
23, 25–27
103(a) Sheridan,
Dennison
1, 4, 5, 21–
23, 25–27

11, 12 103(a) Sheridan,
Dennison, Rosen
11, 12
14, 29 103(a) Sheridan,
Dennison, Rosen,
Hurwitz
14, 29
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Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 5, 11,
12, 14, 21–29
Nonstatutory
Double Patenting
1, 4, 5, 11,
12, 14, 21–
29

Overall
Outcome
1, 4, 5, 11,
12, 14, 21–
29
30–33

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED