United States Postal Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1981

258 N.L.R.B. 1414 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United States Postal Service and Boston Local,
America Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
Case 1-CA-17057(P)
September 30, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On March 2, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Sidney J. Barban issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
and Respondent filed exceptions and supporting
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order to the
extent consistent herewith.
The General Counsel excepts, inter alia, to the
failure of the Administrative Law Judge to find
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by Superintendent Coombs' threatening Union Ste-
ward Dumont with discipline if he refused to go to
Coombs' office and, as steward, represent employ-
ee Marino. We find merit in this exception.
According to the evidence credited by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, employee Marino was to
be presented with his notice of suspension per
agreement between Respondent and the Union. On
December 18, 1979, Coombs approached Dumont
while the latter was working and told Dumont to
get Marino and meet Coombs in the front office.
Dumont asked why Coombs wanted him there and
Coombs answered, "I'll tell you when you get
there." Dumont told Coombs that he would like to
know why he was being called there before he
went. Coombs again answered, "I'll tell you when
you get there." Dumont stated to Coombs that "if
he didn't tell [Dumont] beforehand, [Dumont]
wasn't going down." Coombs then said, "I'm
giving you a direct order. You're a steward; I want
you there to represent Mr. Marino. If you don't go
down, I'll give you a suspension."
The Administrative Law Judge based his dis-
missal of the 8(a)(1) allegation on the obligation of
the Union, in this instance the steward, Dumont, to
fairly represent all employees, and found that, even
though management refused to tell Dumont the
reason for the meeting, the obligation of the ste-
ward remained. Dumont did in fact represent
258 NLRB No. 193
Marino, but was threatened only for refusing to
attend the meeting unless he was informed in ad-
vance of its purpose. We disagree with the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's conclusion that Coombs'
action did not violate the Act.
The issue posed here concerns neither the obliga-
tion of an employer to afford an employee an op-
portunity to have a union representative present
when management is meeting with the employee to
impose discipline, nor the obligation of a union ste-
ward to represent an employee upon the employ-
ee's request in such circumstances. It is clear in this
case that Marino was not aware of the imminent
meeting with management, and had not requested
the assistance of a steward. Nor do we find any
provision in the collective-bargaining agreement
which obligates a steward to represent an employ-
ee at the request of the Employer at a meeting
such as planned here. Thus, unlike the Administra-
tive Law Judge, we find that there is no issue pres-
ent here as to the obligation of the Union to fairly
represent all employees. The only issue is whether
the Respondent interfered with Dumont's Section 7
rights by ordering him, under threat of suspension,
to represent Marino at the upcoming meeting.
Involved here is not a question concerning the
right of an employer to order an employee to
attend a meeting, or its right to discipline an em-
ployee for insubordination for refusing to attend
such a meeting. It is clear that Coombs' conversa-
tion with Dumont was not vis-a-vis the supervisor-
employee relationship which existed between them.
It had nothing to do with Dumont's work perform-
ance or his status as an employee. Coombs was ad-
dressing Dumont as a union steward and was issu-
ing orders to Dumont concerning Dumont's func-
tioning in that capacity.
While unions do have a statutory obligation to
represent all employees fairly, and a cause of action
under Section 8(b) may arise for failure to fulfill
this obligation, it is not within the purview of the
authority of an employer to dictate the manner in
which a union carries out its duties, as Coombs did
in this case. Thus, despite what Coombs may have
perceived was Dumont's obligation as a steward,
by his threatening Dumont's employment status in
connection with his performance as a union ste-
ward, he coerced Dumont and interfered with his
Section 7 rights to engage or not engage in union
activities as a steward. Coombs' action was thus
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by both threaten-
ing to restrict, and restricting, the movement of
Shop Steward Swankowski. However, in his Con-
clusion of Law 3, he did not list the threat to re-
1414
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
strict. Conclusion of Law 3 is thus amended to in-
clude the threat.
The General Counsel also excepts to the failure
of the Administrative Law Judge to note in his rec-
ommended Order and notice that Respondent's
unfair labor practices were directed at union stew-
ards. We will amend the recommended Order and
notice to reflect this fact. We shall also order Re-
spondent to refrain from interfering with employ-
ees' Section 7 rights in any like or related manner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
United States Postal Service, Boston, Massachu-
settes, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to restrict, or restricting, the
movement of employees for performing functions
as shop stewards for the Union within its facility at
Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, or other-
wise engaging in acts of reprisal against employees
at that facility because such employees engage in
activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Threatening employees with discipline in
connection with their performance as shop stew-
ards for the Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its operations at Logan Airport,
Boston, Massachusetts, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
1n the evenl that this Order is enforced bh a Judgmentc of a Unlted
States Court of Appeals, the words ill the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the Natiotnal Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals E-;nforcing an
Order of he Na onal I-abor Relations Board
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of
the complaint not specifically found herein to be
violations of the Act be, and they hereby arc, dis-
missed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to restrict, or re-
strict, the movement of employees for per-
forming functions as shop stewards for the
Union within our facility at Logan Airport,
Boston, Massachusetts, or otherwise engage in
acts of reprisal against employees at that facili-
ty because such employees engage in activities
which are protected by Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with dis-
cipline in connection with their performance
as shop stewards for the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the Act.
UNITED STATES PosrAL SERVICE
DECISION
STATF.MENT OF THI CASIE
SIINI. J. BARBAN, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard in Boston, Massachusetts. on August
20, 1980, on a complaint issued on February 29. 1980, as
amended at the hearing, based on a charge filed on Janu-
arv 16, 1980, and an amended charge filed on February
27, 1980, by the above-named Charging Party (herein the
Union). The complaint alleges that the above-named Re-
1415
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act), by (1)
threatening an employee union steward with discipline if
that steward did not represent another employee; (2)
threatening an employee union steward with discipline
because that steward filed grievances and engaged in
other union activity; (3) discriminatorily restricting the
movement of an employee union steward within the
work facility because of the steward's union activity; and
(4) threatening an employee union steward and another
employee with suspension if the steward and/or the
other employee left a disciplinary meeting. The answer
admits that the Board has jurisdiction over Respondent
by virtue of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C.
§101, et seq., and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act, but denies the commis-
sion of the unfair labor practices alleged.
Upon the entire record' in this case, from my observa-
tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, and after due
consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel
and Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CONTENTIONS
1. The General Counsel contends that on December
18, 1979, Respondent's superintendent, Thomas Coombs,
approached Union Steward Robert Dumont at work and
ordered Dumont under threat of discipline to come to
Coombs' office, to bring employee William Marino with
him, and to represent Marino at a meeting in Coombs'
office, notwithstanding Coombs' refusal to tell Dumont
at the time what the purpose of the meeting was; and,
further, that at this point Marino was unaware of the
meeting or its purpose, and had not requested Dumont's
assistance. The General Counsel argues that Respond-
cnt's action interfered with Dumont's right under the
Act to refuse to engage in union activity; i.e., to refuse
to represent Marino in the circumstances.
Respondent contends that Coombs told Marino to
come to his office (though not the purpose therefor), that
Marino asked to be represented by Dumont, and that
Coombs told Dumont of this and asked him (but did not
threaten him with discipline) to come to the office for
that purpose. Respondent further argues that even if
Coombs had ordered Dumont under threat of discipline
to come to his office this would not violate the Act.
2. At one point in the meeting in Coombs' office,
Dumont suggested to Marino that they both leave the
meeting. The General Counsel contends that Coombs
then threatened Dumont with discipline, in violation of
the Act, if he left the meeting.
Respondent denies that Coombs threatened Dumont
on this occasion, but asserts that Coombs did threaten
Marino with serious consequence if he left.
3. On January 10, 1980, Coombs interrupted Union
Steward Dennis Swankowski while he was discussing a
grievance with an employee and ordered Swankowski
and the employee to return to work. On his way to his
'The General Counsel. in fn 3 of his brief. requests Ihe folloring cor-
reclionls in the transcript. which I have hereby noted and granted
work station, Swankoswki answered a ringing phone,
which happened to involve a call for Coombs from Re-
spondent's labor relations specialist, Edward Segelman,
who on prior occasions, Coombs thought, had interfered
with Coombs' conduct in operating the facility. Errone-
ously believing that Swankowski had called Segelman to
interfere with Coombs' direction that Swankowski cut
short his grievance meeting and get back to work, and
that Swankowski was deliberately refusing to return to
work as ordered, Coombs threatened Swankowski with
discipline. The General Counsel argues that if Swan-
kowski had actually called Segelman to protest Coombs'
interference with his processing a grievance, this would
have been protected union activity,2 and therefore the
threat to discipline Swankowski for such conduct violat-
ed the Act.
Respondent contends that the facts, in context, show
that Coombs threatened Swankowski with discipline not
for calling Segelman about grievances, but for refusing
to go back to work when ordered.
4. Swankowski testified that after he informed
Coombs, on January 11, 1980, that he was going to file a
grievance against Coombs, he saw the latter talking to
Swankowski's supervisor, Edward Furness, and thereaf-
ter, when Swankowski sought to go to the office for
work-related reasons, Furness told him that Furness had
orders that Swankowski was "not to be allowed to leave
the platform." The past practice had been to permit em-
ployees to leave their work station on union business
with the permission of the immediate supervisor and to
leave for work-related reasons or for legitimate personal
reasons on advising the supervisor of the reason for leav-
ing. The General Counsel contends that Swankowski
was restricted to his work station because of his protect-
ed union activity, in violation of the Act.
Respondent asserts that Swankowski was not restricted
to his work area, and points to the fact that Swankowski
received permission from Furness to be absent from his
work station several times that day (Swankowski states
that on each of these occasions he observed Furness go
over and talk to Coombs before giving him permission to
leave).
II. THE. Al.EGi:D UNFAIR l.ABOR PRACTICES
A. Dumont and Marino
The Facts
According to Union Steward Dumont, while he was
at work on December 18, 1979, Superintendent Coombs
came to him and told him to get employee Marino and
meet Coombs in the front office, at which Dumont said,
"I asked Mr. Coombs why he wanted me there. And he
said, 'll tell you when you get there.' I told him that I
Segelmlan, arllong other labor relations fulctlions. stas apparently the
Posilil;astr's designee to) process and adjust griesallces a the second step
of the grics ance procedure S:lankosski had dealt ,ith him at that level
in the past There seerns to be some dispule a Ito shether Segelman is a
supervisor or other agenlt of Respondent Since, on this record. he ap-
pears to hasve the authority to adjust emphlo.ee griesvances siaig inde-
pendelt udgment. he is clearl. ai superssor %it hin the meaning of Sec
2(5) of lhe Act
1416
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
would like to know why I was being called down there
before I went down. Again he told me 'I'll tell you when
you get there.' I finally told Mr. Coombs that [if] he
didn't tell me before hand, I wasn't going down. At this
point, Mr. Coombs said, 'I'm giving you a direct order.'
He says, '[Y]ou're a steward; I want you there to repre-
sent Mr. Marino. If you don't go down, I'll give you a
suspension."'" 3
Dumont testified that he attended the meeting because
of the threat of suspension, that Marino had not previ-
ously asked him to attend the meeting nor had anyone,
including Coombs, advised him that Marino had made
such a request, and that he was unaware of the purpose
of the meeting prior to attending.
Marino confirmed that he had not asked Dumont to
represent him, stating that he was not aware that there
was to be a meeting until Dumont came and advised
him, and that he did not know what the purpose of the
meeting was prior to its inception.
Coombs, on the other hand, testified that he first went
to Marino and told him to go to the office, that Marino
objected to going to the office unless advised of the
reason, and that Coombs told Marino that he would
learn the purpose at the meeting and ordered him to
attend. When Marino said he would not go without Ste-
ward Dumont, Coombs said that he then went to
Dumont and asked him to come to the office, and that,
when Dumont asked the reason, Coombs advised
Dumont that Marino had requested that he be present.
Coombs denied ordering Dumont to attend the meeting.
For reasons discussed hereinafter, I do not believe that
a violation of the Act is made out, whichever version is
accepted. For the purpose of this Decision, however,
and, on the entire record, I believe Dumont should be
credited in this instance. His version is circumstantially
supported by Marino. Coombs admits that "it was the
practice in the past to have a Union Steward present
when [Coombs] was serving a suspension letter." There
is a substantial likelihood that he went to Dumont first,
therefore, to advise him to come to the office and bring
Marino, rather than going to each in turn. When
Dumont demurred, in the absence of being advised of
the reason for the request, I am sure Coombs made it
plain that the request was, in fact, a command.
The events which followed in Coombs' office are even
more confusing. Coombs had requested another supervi-
sor, Phil Panarese, to attend the meeting to act as a wit-
ness to Coombs advising Marino of his suspension, which
seems to have been normal prior practice. Dumont, not
informed of the purpose of the meeting, but aware that
settled procedure called for only one supervisor at a
step-one grievance discussion, objected to Panarese's at-
tending this meeting. The indications are, however, that
Dumont probably did not clearly articulate the reason
for his protest. Coombs replied that he wanted Panarese
present as a witness and he would remain. At some point
Coombs gave Marino a letter stating the terms of his sus-
' The meeting. in fact. was for the purposec of formally presenting
Marino Aith notice of his suspensiotn hbecaue of ai prior issilit onl
Coombs, and to give Marino an opportunity to apologize for hi, conduct.
in accordance with an agreement between the lUnion alnd Respondent al
to the discipline to he meted out o Maritno for thrat assault
pension and stating that Marino was to apologize to
Coombs. Dumont then objected to Marino's being re-
quired to apologize "in front of an audience"-i.e., Pan-
arese-asserting that Marino was being humiliated.
Coombs rejected this request also.
Sometime during this rather turbulent meeting,
Dumont advised Marino that the two of them should
leave the meeting. Dumont testified that Coombs re-
sponded that, if they left, he would suspend both of
them. Marino, who was apparently somewhat bewildered
by the arguments swirling around him, supported Du-
mont's testimony. Coombs admitted telling Marino that
he would incur further discipline if he left, but denied
threatening Dumont. Indeed, Coombs denied that "[he]
said anything to Mr. Dumont" at that point.4 There is
also a dispute as to whether Marino and Dumont left the
room for a short time, which issue is unnecessary to re-
solve for the purpose of this Decision.
With respect to this in-office confrontation, I believe
Dumont and Marino are mistaken in their belief that
Coombs threatened them both with discipline if they left
the office. The physical situation-Coombs was on one
side of a counter looking at Dumont and Marino stand-
ing together on the opposite side of the counter-would
tend to lead to the impression that Coombs' threatening
command that one not leave was meant for both. The
likelihood is that Coombs was not too clear in his state-
ment. Logically-if logic may be employed in analyzing
management-union relationships at this installation-there
was no reason for Coombs to care whether Dumont left
at this point. Coombs had clearly fulfilled any obligation
he may have felt to provide Marino with union represen-
tation. Dumont was obviously a thorn in his side.
Coombs may well have welcomed his departure. It is
therefore found that Coombs did not threaten Dumont
with discipline if he left the office at this point.
Analysis and Conclusions
It has been found that Coombs threatened Union Ste-
ward Dumont with discipline if he persisted in his refusal
to come to Coombs' office. During this conversation
Dumont became aware that Coombs' purpose was to
have Dumont represent employee Marino in a meeting in
the office, although Coombs would not tell Dumont the
reason for the meeting. The General Counsel takes the
position that the threat violated Dumont's alleged right,
under Section 7 of the Act, to refuse to "engage in union
and/or protected concerted activity, i.e., representing
Marino at the meeting in the office" (G.C. br., p. 9), and
thus violated Section 8(a)(1).
The General Counsel cites no precedent for the propo-
sition that a union-in this instance the steward is acting
on behalf of the Union-has the right to refuse to repre-
sent a unit member, without a valid reason, and I know
of none. Such a principle would not only be destructive
of the purposes of the Act, but such conduct would also
' ;anarcse, hwever. asserts that Coomhs aid to I)umnont. "I could
care ,less hcther ou sta r go." Marino deied on rebhuttal. Ihat
Coomnlhs used lllangiag to this effectl Dunoll's tstinlot l. as ulted. %as
to the coltntrar (Coombs l,titilcd thai hlc di(I ot, i fac. care 'o he her
)Duniuln1 left
1417
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
violate a union's obligation to fairly represent all union
employees. Nor do I find in the circumstances of this
case that management's refusal to tell the steward in ad-
vance the purpose of the meeting would justify the stew-
ard's refusal to represent a unit member.5
Indeed, close analysis of the testimony is convincing
that Dumont did not refuse to represent the unit employ-
ee, and, in fact, was threatened with discipline only for
refusing to attend the meeting unless he was informed in
advance as to its purpose.
For the reasons stated, I shall recommend that this al-
legation of the complaint be dismissed.
As I have found that Coombs did not order Dumont
to remain in the disciplinary meeting, I shall recommend
that the allegation in the complaint that such action vio-
lated the Act be dismissed.
B. Swankowski
The Facts
I. On January 10, 1980, in accordance with established
practice, Union Steward Dennis Swankowski obtained
permission from his supervisor, Edward Furness, to
process a grievance for employee Rita Powers, who was
stationed in the front office. Swankowski and Powers
were talking in an adjacent office when Coombs inter-
rupted their discussion, advising Powers that her phone
in the front office was ringing, with no one there to
answer it, and that the two of them should get back to
their work. Powers suggested that Swankowski and she
could finish their discussion at her desk. The three of
them continued talking as they walked toward Powers'
desk. Swankowski protested that Coombs did not have
tlie right to terminate the grievance discussion in this
manner, since Swankowski had secured permission from
his immediate supervisor to leave his work for this pur-
pose. Coombs ordered Swankowski to get back to his as-
signment, saying that he (Coombs) was "sick of talking
to [Swankowski]." Swankowski thereupon left. On his
way back to his work position, Swankowski stopped by
the timekeeper's unit, following normal practice, so that
the timekeeper could record that he was no longer on
union business, but back at his assigned task. The time-
keeper was not there, but his phone was ringing. Swan-
kowski answered the phone involving a call from Labor
Relations Specialist Segelman, who stated that he wanted
to talk to Coombs.6 Swankowski paged Coombs. When
told that Segelman wanted to talk to him, Coombs
became angry, accused Swankowski of calling Segelman,
asserted that "I don't want to talk to him. I won't talk to
him. He's not going to interfere, and I'm not talking to
him." Coombs thereupon walked away.
I Cf Climax Molybdenum Company. a Division of .4nma. Inc., 227
NLRB 1189, concerning the right of a union and employee Io consulta-
lion before an investigatory interview.
' Coombs asserted that no one except the timekeeper or a supervisor
was supposed to answer that phone without permission. Swankowski tes-
tifted that he was unaware of such a rule, and that it was a normal prac-
tice for employees in the area to answer the phone. It is unnecessary to
consider this issue. S far as this record shows. Swankowski was not
criticized or disciplined for answering the telephone. as such, on this oc-
calsion.
In the past, when Swankowski had disputes with
Coombs, as the latter knew, Swankowski had called Se-
gelman (with whom Swankowski had numerous contacts
in the course of processing grievances), or the Union had
requested Segelman's intercession in resolving disputes
with Coombs. On these occasions, this had led Segelman
to call Coombs about such matters.
When Swankowski reported that Coombs had refused
to talk to Segelman on the phone, Segelman directed
Swankowski to go get Coombs. Coombs, when again ap-
proached by Swankowski to talk to Segelman, according
to the credited testimony of Swankowski, reacted as fol-
lows: "Mr. Coombs got very upset, very mad, and he
started raising his voice, saying, you know, 'I know you
called him. You called him. I'm giving you a direct
order, get back to your job, or I'll give you a letter of
warning."' When Swankowski said he had to answer Se-
gelman, Coombs repeated his threat of a letter of warn-
ing if Swankowski did not return to his job. Swankowski
indicated a lack of concern whether he got a letter of
warning or not. Coombs thereupon told him that he
could "consider it done."
When Swankowski reported this to Segelman, the
latter said he did not believe what was occurring, and
asked Swankowski to get a supervisor to the phone.
However, when Swankowski found his supervisor, Fur-
ness was standing by Coombs. Coombs then strode to
the phone and took the call. Swankowski left for his job.
Later in the day, according to Coombs, he humorously
indicated to Swankowski that he (Coombs) had been in
error. So far as appears Swankowski received no disci-
pline as a result of this incident.
2. The following day, Swankowski informed Coombs
that he intended to file a grievance against Coombs for
interfering with the processing of Powers' grievance the
day before. Coombs countered that he had "had it with
[Swankowski], walking around the building," that he
"was going to act like every employee in the building."
Swankowski protested that he was like every employee
in the building. Thereafter Swankowski saw Coombs in a
vigorous conversation with Furness. 7 Later, when Swan-
kowski told Furness, in accordance with past practice,
that he was going to the office to get a list of new truck-
drivers which was needed in his work, Furness said that
Swankowski could not go, that Furness "had his orders.
And [Swankowski] wasn't allowed to leave the plat-
form."' Swankowski then requested permission to use
the telephone to call the union office before 4:45 p.m.
Furness said he would let Swankowski know. Swan-
kowski observed Furness go over and engage Coombs in
conversation. When Furness returned, he told Swan-
kowski that he could use the telephone. However, when
7 Coombs recalled hasing a conversation with Furness concerning
whether Swankowski had permissiotn to talk to employee Pl'wers n that
day, January I , Coombs asserting that he had seen them ik:'ig. l(Swan-
kowski stated thal he recalled rno such convrersatiotn that day.) Wh:l Fur-
ness said he had not given such permission. Ciombs says that he lecllred
Furness on the nlecessity of knowing where his employees were at all
times.
' Furnes, testified that he des not recall ordering Swanlkowski, (.n
January I I. "l, slay at his work stalion" 'ro the extenl that thi, ma'
corflnicl with Sankowski' Icstiluin', I credit the latter
1418
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Swankowski went to the telephone, Furness walked
along nearby, which was not a normal occurrence.
During the day, Furness gave Swankowski permission,
apparently after talking to Coombs, to go to his locker
for medication, and later that evening to take time off to
write up a grievance.
In the past, Swankowski had secured permission from
Furness three to four times a day to engage in union
business, without complaint. Furness had never before
said he had orders not to let Swankowski leave his work
station.9 Since January 11, Furness has not forbidden
Swankowski from leaving his work station.
Analysis and Conclusions
1. The incidents of January 10: On two occasions, Su-
perintendent Coombs, believing that Union Steward
Swankowski was unduly prolonging the processing of a
grievance and interfering with the other employee's
work, directed Swankowski to return to his assigned sta-
tion. Instead of doing so, Swankowski became involved
in a series of activities designed to get Coombs to come
to the telephone to take a call from Respondent's labor
relations specialist, Segelman. This annoyed Coombs,
who thought (erroneously) that Swankowski, on this oc-
casion, as he had in the past, had called Segelman to "in-
terfere" in Coombs' dealings with Swankowski. Coombs
ordered Swankowski to return to his work station under
threat of discipline if he did not do so.
The General Counsel asserts that Coombs thus threat-
ened Swankowski with discipline because he had en-
gaged in a protected activity under the Act, i.e., because
Swankowski, as Coombs thought, had protested to Re-
spondent's management Coombs' interference with griev-
ance processing. It is not necessary for me to consider
whether such activity on Swankowski's part would have
been protected, if it had occurred, or whether Coombs'
action would have violated the Act in such a case, for I
find that the facts do not support the General Counsel's
theory. No matter how much Coombs became annoyed
with Swankowski for supposedly calling Segelman, as
Coombs thought, the facts show that Coombs threatened
Swankowski for not returning to his work station, and for
The General Counsel made an offer, by question and answer, that in
March 1980 Coombs had previously threatened to restrict Sankovski to
his work station, asserting that I should accept the evidence a, back-
ground to this ase. Respondent objected on the ground that the incident
involved had been the subject of a prior complaint issued by the General
Counsel. which had been withdrawn pursulant to a non-Board settlement.
After consideration. I have decided that both the General Counsel's
offer, and Respondent's Iestinilon in response should be rejected ind
have disregarded them.
that alone. When the matter was fully unraveled, Swan-
kowski received no discipline. I shall recommend that
this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
2. The incidents of January 11: On this date Supervisor
Furness, after a discussion with Coombs, advised Swan-
kowski that he would be restricted to his work area and
would not be given permission to leave for any reason.
Swankowski was, in fact, hindered in his movements that
day. This was not the normal policy. It was not strictly
enforced on that day, and apparently was ignored there-
after. The record is convincing that the order restricting
Swankowski to his work station, and the actual hin-
drance of his movements, was generated by Coombs in
retaliation for Swankowski's protected activities as a
shop steward. By such order and conduct, Respondent
clearly violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Nor is this di-
minished by the fact that management found the restric-
tion to be imprudent and rather quickly abandoned it
Such action against a steward because he is acting as a
steward tends to be destructive of the purposes of the
Act to provide a peaceful and orderly mechanism for the
resolution of labor-management disputes, and may not be
condoned.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Secton 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by restricting the movement of an em-
ployee shop steward within the work facility because of
the shop steward's activities protected by the Act, en-
gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent did not engage in other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint in this matter.
THi REMEFDY
It having been found that Respondent United States
Postal Service has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act,
it will be recommended that said Respondent cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
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