Uber Technologies, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 20, 2022

2020005944 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 20, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/436,575 02/17/2017 Michael O'Herlihy UP-259 3215 110654 7590 01/20/2022 Mahamedi IP Law LLP (Uber) 910 Campisi Way, Suite 1E Campbell, CA 95008 EXAMINER BOOK, PHYLLIS A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2454 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/20/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@m-iplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MICHAEL O’HERLIHY and KIMBERLY SIEGEL ____________ Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and MINN CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, and 20-22. Claims 6, 16, and 19 are canceled. See Claims Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Uber Technologies, Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 2 The present invention relates generally to detecting and responding to the occurrence of safety events during the provisioning of the requested service. See Spec. ¶ 11. Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the appealed claims: 1. A network system comprising: one or more processors; and one or more memory resources storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the network system to: in response to receiving, from a requesting user device of a requesting user, a service request for a transport service, identify a service provider to fulfill the service request, the service provider operating a vehicle and being associated with a provider device; during a duration of time subsequent to a first determination of a start event for the transport service provided by the service provider for the requesting user and before a second determination of an end event for the transport service provided by the service provider for the requesting user, cause a first one of the provider device or the requesting user device to monitor an environment of the vehicle operated by the service provider; receive, over a network, a first event indication from the first one of the provider device or the requesting user device, the first event indication including audio data captured by a microphone of the first one of the provider device or the requesting user device in the environment of the vehicle operated by the service provider; and selectively transmit, based on analyzing the first event indication received from the first one of the provider device or the requesting user device, a set of safety notification data over the network to at least one device of the provider device or the requesting user device to cause the at least one device to display an interactive safety notification. Appellant appeals the following rejections: R1. Claims 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, and 20-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent- Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 3 ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 3-13. R2. Claims 1-5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, and 20-222 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schultz (US 2013/0222133 A1, Aug. 29, 2013) and Childress (US 2018/0018718 A1, Jan. 18, 2018). Non-Final Act. 14-29. R3. Claims 9, 13, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schultz, Childress, and deCharms (US 2016/0192166 A1, June 30, 2016). Non-Final Act. 29-36. R4. Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schultz, Childress, and Beaurepaire (US 2013/0226926 A1, Aug. 29, 2013). Non-Final Act. 36-38. We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). ANALYSIS Rejection under § 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 2 Although the heading for this rejection indicates claims 1-8, 10-12, and 15-20 are rejected (see Non-Final Act. 14), we view this as a typographical error given that claims 6, 16, and 19 are canceled and the body of the rejection discusses claims 21 and 22, but does not discuss claim 12. See Non-Final Act. 14-29. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 4 ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with the framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). For example, concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). The USPTO published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_ update.pdf) (jointly referred to as “Revised Guidance”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the October update). Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 5 Under the Revised Guidance “Step 2A,” the office first looks to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52, 55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then (pursuant to the Revised Guidance “Step 2B”) look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Step 2A, Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?) With respect to independent system claim 1, and similarly, method claim 18 and non-transitory computer readable medium claim 15, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to “an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion” (Non-Final Act. 9) (emphasis omitted), which we conclude are mental processes, which is a type of abstract idea. We also determine that the claims are directed to managing personal behavior or interactions between people, which we conclude is certain methods of organizing human activity, which is another type of abstract Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 6 idea. For at least the following reasons, we are persuaded that representative claim 1 recites plural abstract ideas. Illustrating these plural abstract ideas, Appellant’s Specification discloses: According to embodiments, the network system and remote devices can detect and respond to the occurrence of safety events during the provisioning of the requested service by the service provider for the requesting user. As used herein, safety events can include actual or potential interpersonal conflicts (e.g., argument, disagreement, etc.) between the service provider and the user, between users, or between the user (or the service provider) and a third party. Safety events can also include . . . traffic-related incidents (e.g., collision, impact, accident, etc.) involving a vehicle associated with the service provider and/or the user. In addition, safety events can include events (e.g., gunshots, explosions, other accidents, etc.) that are external to the monitored environment but may affect or impact the safety of the service provider and/or the user, or others in the general public. Spec. ¶ 11. In other words, Appellant’s Specification illuminates that the character of the present invention looks both at interactions between people and observations made by people. See also Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he specification may be helpful in illuminating what a claim is directed to [but it] must always yield to the claim language when identifying the ‘true focus of a claim.”’) (citation and some internal quotations omitted). Claim 18 recites at least the following limitations: (1) “identifying a service provider to fulfill the service request,” (2) “monitor an environment of the vehicle,” (3) “receiving . . . a first event indication,” and (4) “transmitting . . . a set of safety notification data.” These limitations, under Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 7 their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite both certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes. For example, as the Office explains, certain methods of organizing human activity encompass both activity of a single person (for example, a person following a set of instructions or a person signing a contract online) and activity that involves multiple people (such as a commercial interaction), and thus, certain activity between a person and a computer (for example a method of anonymous loan shopping that a person conducts using a mobile phone) may fall within the “certain methods of organizing human activity” grouping. The number of people involved in the activity is not dispositive as to whether a claim limitation falls within this grouping. Instead, the determination should be based on whether the activity itself falls within one of the subgroupings [e.g., managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people]. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 5. Additionally, a claim recites a mental process when the claim encompasses acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372- 73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental process). This is true even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 8 performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”) (emphasis omitted). The aforementioned limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, encompass acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper because people can perform the “identify” and “monitor” steps by simply making observations while the service is being performed and evaluating the service provider and the particular environment of the provider. People can also perform the “receive” step by simply listening to audio data and can perform the “transmit” a safety notification step by merely passing a piece of paper to one another based on a judgment and opinion on what is happening in the service provider’s environment. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the claimed limitations include “an observation . . . an evaluation . . . a judgement and opinion.” See Non-Final Act. 10 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 11 - Table I. Thus contrary to Appellant’s argument that “[t]he Examiner’s analysis merely identifies the alleged judicial exception and cites the Revised Guidance without any accompanying explanation” (see Appeal Br. 15), the Examiner provides sufficient explanation why claim limitations encompass acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper. Additionally, as noted supra, we determine that the claims recite managing interactions between people, e.g., monitor an environment of the vehicle and display an interactive safety notification. Therefore, for at least the aforementioned reasons, we determine that representative claim 18 recites plural abstract ideas, which we conclude are “mental processes” and “certain methods of organizing human activity.” Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 9 Step 2A-Prong 2 (integration into Practical Application) 3 Under the Revised Guidance, we now must determine if additional elements in the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)). Here, we consider the claim as a whole, i.e., “the limitations containing the judicial exception as well as the additional elements in the claim besides the judicial exception . . . evaluated together to determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application.” October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, at 12. Beyond the abstract ideas noted above in the Prong-1 analysis, method claim 18 also recites several additional elements: “a requesting user device,” “a requesting user,” “a service provider,” “a vehicle,” “a provider device,” “a network,” “a first event indication,” “a microphone,” “[a] safety notification,” and “[a] display.” In addition to the components recited in claim 18, claim 1 further recites “one or more processors,” and “one or more memory.” However, these additional elements do not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the 3 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2, properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office revised guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office revised guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27-32. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 10 claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). In other words, the aforementioned additional element (or combination of elements) recited in at least Appellant’s representative claims 1 and 18 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55 (“Prong 2”). Appellant contends “claim [18] recites a process that is rooted in technology to enable monitoring, by a remote device . . . of an environment of a service provider and a requesting user.” Appeal Br. 16. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Specification indicates that “the remote devices can be configured to monitor certain characteristics of the monitored environment only while a requested service is being provisioned. . . . In this manner, the monitoring can be selectively performed based on a status of the requested service.” Id. at 18 (citing Spec. ¶ 13) (emphasis omitted). Appellant contends “that these are tangible technical improvements to the operation of the mobile devices and the system as a whole.” Id. Specifically, Appellant’s Specification indicates that “the remote devices can be configured to monitor certain characteristics of the monitored environment only while a requested service is being provisioned.” Spec. ¶ 13; see also id. ¶ 35. In other words, the claimed invention focuses on monitoring the service provider’s passenger cabin of their vehicle while the service provider is providing the requested service. Thus, the alleged improvement is the selective timing of the monitoring of the environment, e.g., a time duration between the start event and the end event, as opposed to improving the monitoring functionality itself. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 11 Here, the “safety events can include actual or potential interpersonal conflicts (e.g., argument, disagreement, etc.) between the service provider and the user . . . can also include . . . traffic-related incidents (e.g., collision, impact, accident, etc.).” Spec. ¶ 11. For example, “[t]he remote device(s) can include one or more microphones for detecting changes in audio volume or pitch, capturing audio, and/or detecting changes in air pressure of the monitored environment.” Id. ¶ 12. In other words, the claimed system uses a typical microphone to monitor for arguments happening within the vehicle and/or traffic accidents occurring with the vehicle. If any of these events happen, the claimed system transmits a set of safety notification data to the display of one of the devices. The Examiner determines, and we agree, that the recited “monitor an environment” and “receive . . . a first event indication” steps amount to “mere data gathering” which is “insignificant extra-solution activity.” See Non-Final Act. 12. The claimed invention receives, processes, and displays data -- this is merely conventional data gathering and analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As such, based on the record before us, we determine that these steps do not integrate the claimed invention into a practical application. Regarding Appellant’s aforementioned contention that the claimed process “is rooted in technology to enable monitoring” (see Appeal Br. 16), we find Appellant’s computer-implemented method (claim 18) does not provide a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 12 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, in DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259, the subject claim was held patent-eligible because it encompassed “an inventive concept” for resolving a “particular Internet-centric problem.” Here, we find all claims on appeal merely use a generic computer or processor or microphone as a tool which is used in the way these components normally function. Thus, we conclude the claims fail to impart any discernible improvement upon the computer or processor or microphone, nor do Appellant’s claims solve “a challenge particular to the Internet” as considered by the court in DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256-57. Thus, we conclude none of Appellant’s claims are like the claims held patent-eligible by the court in DDR, in which the claimed invention was directed to the “challenge of retaining control over the attention of the customer in the context of the Internet,” such that: Instead of the computer network operating in its normal, expected manner by sending the website visitor to the third-party website that appears to be connected with the clicked advertisement, the claimed system generates and directs the visitor to the above-described hybrid web page that presents product information from the third-party and visual “look and feel” elements from the host website. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258-59. Therefore, we find unavailing Appellant’s arguments that the claims are “rooted in technology” (Appeal Br. 16), given that no convincing “inventive concept” for resolving a “particular Internet- centric problem” is identified by Appellant. Here, we determine that the alleged improvement to the technical field appears to address the abstract idea itself. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 13 For these reasons, we determine the additional recitations of claims 1 and 18 do not integrate the recited patent-ineligible subject matter into a practical application. For at least the reason noted supra, we determine that claim 18 (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application. Thus, representative claim 18 is directed to the aforementioned abstract idea. Alice/Mayo-Step 2 (Inventive Concept) Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, we now look to whether claim 1 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As recognized by the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 can be evaluated based on whether an additional element or combination of elements: (1) [a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present; or (2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see MPEP § 2106.05(d). Appellant contends that the Examiner “fails to provide the factual determinations required under Berkheimer to support the conclusion that these additional limitations are well-understood, routine, and conventional.” Appeal Br. 20. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 14 Here, the Examiner determines that “the claims only recite generic computing elements - processors, memory, transmission over a network, and an audio device . . . [and] [t]he components are recited at a high-level of generality.” Non-Final Act. 13. Illustrative of the Examiner’s aforementioned determinations, we highlight that Appellant’s Specification discloses “the user device 500 can comprise a mobile computing device, such as a smartphone . . . the user device 500 can include typical telephony features such as a microphone 545 . . . using any number of wireless communication protocols.” Spec. ¶ 72; see also id. ¶¶ 79, 83. Thus, the Examiner provides a rational basis for the conclusions made, given that Appellant’s Specification described components used as “typical” and emphasize that any number of communication protocols can be used. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”). We find the Examiner’s noting of generic nature of the component parts recited in the claims provides sufficient evidence of a generic computer system used to implement the abstraction. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Significantly, the claims do not provide details as to any non-conventional software for enhancing the financing process.). See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[o]ur law demands more” than claim language that “provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it”). Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 15 Thus, we find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claim 1 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Appellant has not adequately explained how claim 18 is performed such that it is not a routine and conventional function of a generic computer. Because Appellant’s independent claim 18 is directed to a patent- ineligible abstract concept, does not include additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and does not add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, and conventional,” we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of the claims 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, and 20-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter in light of Alice, its’ progeny, and the Revised Guidance. Rejection under § 103(a) Issue 1: Appellant contends that “claim 1 makes clear, the claimed service provider is identified to fulfill a service request for a transport service and further operates a vehicle . . . [i]n contrast, Childress[] ‘service providers’ are hotels or restaurants that are to receive the user’s information as the user approaches the ‘service provider’ location.” Appeal Br. 5. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that “Childress specifically discloses ‘vehicle parking services’ in [0015] . . . which do relate to transport services.” Ans. 4. Additionally, the Examiner also finds, and we agree, that the claimed “transport service” reads on Schultz’s police and Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 16 ambulatory services given that such services do engage in transporting individuals. See Non-Final Act. 16. As such, we find unavailing Appellant’s aforementioned argument given that both Childress and Schultz disclose a “transport service.” Issue 2: Appellant also contends that in Childress the service provider “is already known and selected . . . before what the Examiner alleges to be the ‘service request’ is transmitted.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant emphasizes that “the claim language recites that the service provider is identified ‘in response to receiving . . .’ however, the Examiner ignores this language and points to a function in Childress . . . that is not performed ‘in response to’ the other function identified in Childress.” Id. We disagree with Appellant. Claim 1 recites, in response to receiving . . . a service request for a transport service, identifying a service provider. See claim 1. Similarly, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “the Office Action clearly explains that [in Childress] when information is ‘manually entered by the user for specific requested service,’ the linked profiles are then sent to the service provider . . . . This explanation clearly provides that actions are taken by the system ‘in response to . . . .’” Ans. 5. Specifically, Childress discloses “[t]he application may provide the user information, user requested services, and/or other information to the service provider computing system based on which the service provider computing system may generate a service list for the user.” Childress ¶ 64. Childress further discloses that “[w]hen a user who needs assistance arrives at a target location, a notification may be sent to all nearby available Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 17 individual service providers announcing the user’s location and the type of assistance needed . . . acceptance of a task can be communicated (e.g., via an ‘Accept’ button).” Id. ¶ 66. As such, we find that Childress’ “Accept” button is activated by a service provider in response to receiving a service request. Issue 3: Appellant further contends that “[t]he goal of Schultz is to notify other parties, such as emergency services . . . . In the claimed invention, the set of notification data is transmitted to either the provider device or the requesting user device.” Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis omitted). In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “Schultz discloses the generation of ‘targeted communications to select one or more contacts related to a particular device user.’” Ans. 6; see also Schultz ¶¶ 18, 54. In other words, Schultz’s system generates and sends targeted communications to contacts related to a particular device user, not only emergency services as proffered by Appellant. Therefore, we find unavailing Appellant’s aforementioned arguments given Schultz’s additional teachings. Issue 4: Appellant also contends that “the monitoring in Schultz has no relationship to any determinations of start events or end events of a transport service.” Appeal Br. 8. For example, claim 1 recites, inter alia, “during a duration of time subsequent to a first determination of a start event for the transport service . . . and before . . . an end event for the transport service . . . cause . . . to monitor an environment of the vehicle.” See claim 1. Regarding the aforementioned limitation, the Examiner directs our attention to the “hostage scenario” event in Schultz. See Ans. 7-8. Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 18 Specifically, Schultz describes “a hostage situation unfolding in a shopping mall” (Schultz ¶ 17), whereby multiple different users capture the event on video. The Examiner further tries to tie this event to a “transport service,” i.e., police or ambulatory services. See Ans. 7-8; see also Non-Final Act. 16-17. We disagree with the Examiner’s interpretation. Although we find that Schultz’s hostage scenario can be seen as a “monitored event,” claim 1 requires monitoring an environment of a vehicle, during a transport event, whereas we construe a transport event as entailing using a vehicle to transport something or someone. At best, the Examiner has drawn our attention to monitoring an external hostage event that may end with transporting individuals to a hospital or prison, as opposed to monitoring an environment of the vehicle (of the police or ambulance) during the actual transport event itself. Therefore, although, as outlined above, we agree with many of the Examiner’s findings, we disagree with at least one of the Examiner’s findings, i.e., monitoring an environment of the vehicle during a duration, as recited in each of the independent claims 1, 15, and 18. The Examiner has not found that any of the other references of record teach this specific feature. Since we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments, e.g., non-analogous art argument, hindsight argument, and improper claim interpretation argument. See Appeal Br. 10-14. Accordingly, because of at least issue 4 outlined above, we will not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, and 20-22. CONCLUSION Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 19 Appellant has demonstrated that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, and 20-22 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. However, the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, and 20-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, 20-22 101 Eligibility 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, 20-22 1-5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20-22 103 Schultz, Childress 1-5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20-22 9, 13, 14 103 Schultz, Childress, deCharms 9, 13, 14 12 103 Schultz, Childress, Beaurepaire 12 Overall Outcome 1-5, 7-15, 17, 18, 20-22 Because at least one rejection encompassing all claims on appeal is affirmed, the decision of the Examiner is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). Appeal 2020-005944 Application 15/436,575 20 No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED