Tynisha H.,1 Complainant,v.Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary, Department of State, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 17, 20170120141395 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 2017) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Tynisha H.,1 Complainant, v. Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary, Department of State, Agency. Appeal No. 0120141395 Agency No. DOS-F-075-11 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 30, 2013, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. BACKGROUND Complainant worked as a Nurse Practitioner Supervisor at United States Consulate General in Jerusalem, Israel, where she was in charge of the Health Unit. Because Complainant possessed dual American-Israeli citizenship, she was able to be hired by the Agency as Locally Employed Staff (LES), rather than as a career U.S. Government employee. Investigative Report (IR) 2221. Consequently, she was covered by Israeli national health insurance and subject to Israeli law governing medical licensure and practice. On May 23, 2011, Complainant filed an EEO complaint in which she alleged that numerous Agency officials had subjected her to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment because of her national origin (Israeli), sex (female), religion (Jewish), disability (bilateral 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120141395 2 wrist tendonitis), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. She also alleged that the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation for her disability. She amended her complaint on February 8, 2012, June 8, 2012, and August 15, 2012. She identified the following individuals as being responsible for or otherwise involved in the various incidents that comprise her discrimination claims: • Management Counselor (MC); • Supervisory General Services Officer (SGSO); • Information Management Officer (IMO); • Regional Medical Officer (RMO); • Regional Security Officer (RSO); • Human Resources Officer from October 31, 2009, to July 1, 2011 (HRO1); • Human Resources Officer since September 9, 2011 (HRO2); • Deputy Principal Officer from August 2008 through August 2011 (DPO1); • Deputy Principal Officer since August 2011 (DPO2); and • Facilities Manager (FM). At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency notified Complainant of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). When Complainant did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Claims 1. Failure to reasonably accommodate Complainant’s disabilities. 2. Disparate treatment and harassment: a. Providing disability accommodations for Palestinian LES but not for Jewish LES; b. Anti-Semitic comment by HRO1; c. Providing religious accommodations for Muslim LES but not for Jewish LES; d. Editing of comments made in customer satisfaction survey in order to make Complainant look bad; e. Endangering Complainant’s security; f. Slander of Complainant by spouse of obstetrics patient; 0120141395 3 g. Investigation by IMO and RMO regarding Complainant’s use of government- owned vehicle; h. Slanderous comment by RMO; i. MC’s rejection of Complainant’s nominations of her staff for awards; j. Elimination of Complainant’s job duties; k. IMO counseling Complainant and using profanity during that session; and l. Denial of tuition reimbursement for a doctoral program. Disability Accommodation In October of 2010, Complainant was diagnosed with bilateral wrist tendonitis, characterized by atrophy of the wrists and fingers which, over time, would result in a 50% to 70% reduction in finger strength and pincer-grasp strength. IR 157-59. She averred that if left untreated, the condition would become permanent. IR 159-60. In February of 2012, Complainant’s physical therapist informed her that she would need long-term occupational therapy lasting for at least a year in order to attain significant improvement in her hands and pincer-grasp functions. IR 653. Complainant’s condition required that she wear wrist braces, which she had to remove when writing or typing. IR 159. She averred that she was substantially limited in the major life activities, among others, of caring for herself, performing manual tasks, pulling, pushing, lifting, concentrating, and working. IR 160-65. When asked by the investigator what accommodations, if any, she needed, Complainant replied that between September 2010 and October 2011 she asked the MC, the IMO and the FM for the following accommodations: • Personal digital assistant (PDA) touch-screen for her desktop and laptop computers; • Modified / ergonomic keyboard that she could use with her PDA device; • Voice-recognition software; • Ergonomic evaluation; • Flexible work schedule; • Minimization of use of hands at work; • Locks changed in the office; • Relief from performing some medical exams; • Use of a fob.2 2 A fob, also called a key fob, is a small security hardware device with a built-in authentication mechanism used to control and security access to network services and data. Vangie Beal, Key 0120141395 4 IR 165-66. Complainant averred that some, but not all of her accommodation requests were granted. In particular, she stated that the touch screen worked only 10% of the time and was not supported in Israel, and that when she asked for another, she was told that the device she had was the only one available. She also stated that the SGSO offered to provide her with some ergonomic equipment in October 2010 but that she did not receive that equipment. Additionally she stated that nothing was done regarding her request for an ergonomic evaluation. IR 166-67. When asked about the keyboard for her PDA, she attested to being told that the keyboard was not an approved device and that she did not have a security clearance to use a fob. IR 164. She maintained that those officials responsible for providing her with an accommodation for her disability did not explore all their options, such as the use of a stylus for touch screens. IR 168. Complainant’s supervisor, the MC, averred that Complainant informed her of wrist problems periodically during 2011, and that she did not receive medical documentation of Complainant’s condition until February of 2012, after she had returned to the Consulate following home leave. IR 850-51. The MC averred that the limitations she eventually saw in the documentation included writing and typing up to point of pain with 30 minutes of rest afterward, minimized repetitive movements, and utilization of PDA technology requiring a very light touch. IR 851-52. She also averred that the accommodations that Complainant requested were granted expeditiously, with the exception of the fob, and that there were problems with the operation of the PDA. IR 852-54. The IMO served as the Acting MC whenever the MC was away from the Consulate, and consequently, acted as Complainant’s supervisor on those occasions. He acknowledged being aware of Complainant’s medical condition but averred that he had not seen medical documentation. IR 1389-90. As to the fob, the IMO stated that beginning in December 2010 and during 2011, he had attempted to procure a fob for Complainant but was informed by the RSO that the Agency’s security regulations precluded LES from having fobs. Regarding the voice recognition software, the IMO averred that he sent Complainant’s accommodation request to the Agency’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. in September or October of 2011, and that the software was provided along with a training module. IR 1390. The Information Systems Officer (ISO) who worked under the IMO and who actually processed Complainant’s reasonable accommodation request stated that he had sent Complainant’s request for voice recognition software to Washington and that the software arrived in December 2011. IR 2164, 2197. The IMO emphasized that Complainant had been provided with all Agency-approved information technology items. Regarding the PDA, the IMO, ISO, and SGSO all averred that the device was not defective, but was not compatible with the local telecommunications network. IR 2166, 2222-23. The IMO also acknowledged that even after the problems had been resolved, the PDA could not Fob, Webopedia (visited March 2, 2017), http://www.webopedia.com/ TERM/K/key_fob.html. 0120141395 5 work at Complainant’s residence because of the surrounding terrain. IR 1391-92. The SGSO averred that Complainant had declined an offer from the Agency to install an antenna at her residence. IR 2223-24. Concerning the keyboard, the IMO and ISO averred that he had told Complainant that the external keyboard she had originally requested was not approved for use at the Agency because of security protocols that required the disabling of USB ports. IR 2122, 2164, 2167. The SGSO averred that she personally had searched for a keyboard that was compatible with Complainant’s PDA, but that the one model available from the local provider did not have a compatible keyboard. IR 2224. The IMO along with other officials stated that LES were not authorized to use fobs. IR 1392, 1618, 2224. HRO1 averred that Complainant had been given a touch-screen PDA but that her request for a keyboard could not be granted for security-related reasons. IR 1598-99. She also averred that many PDAs were not fully operational, and not just Complainant’s. IR 1599-1600. HRO2 averred that there was no need to change the locks in the office because the doorknobs were the lever type which did not require twisting of the hands to open them. IR 1617. As to the requested job modifications, minimized use of hands and relief from having to perform certain medical examinations, HRO2 averred that these were among the core functions of Complainant’s position as a Nurse Practitioner Supervisor, and that her inability to perform these functions could potentially lead to her medical certification being revoked. IR 1617. There are no indications in the record, however, that such a step was ever undertaken. Complainant did remain on an alternate work schedule which gave her Fridays off. IR 1617. Complainant averred that she was told that she could not be given a reasonable accommodation because of her status as a member of the LES. The MC, IMO, HRO1, HRO2, RMO, and ISO all denied having made such a statement to Complainant. IR 853, 1391-92, 1599, 1618, 2122, 2166. The SGSO averred that there was some general discussion regarding the level of support that headquarters would be able to provide to an LES member. IR 2223. Disparate Treatment and Harassment Complainant alleged in her complaint that incidents 2(a) through 2(l) constituted a pattern of harassment as well as separate acts of discrimination. Each incident is described in detail below. Incident 2(a) Complainant alleged that the Consulate’s management denied disability accommodations to Jewish LES but granted disability accommodations to Palestinian LES. Complainant identified a Palestinian LES member who had been employed at the Consulate prior to the tenure of the management team she identified in her complaint. She averred that this individual, who was similarly deployed to Complainant but, unlike Complainant, had no security clearance, was given a fob by her previous supervisor. IR 168-69. Complainant also identified a Jewish LES member who also possessed dual American-Israeli citizenship, stating that this individual’s request for a PDA had been denied. IR 169-70. The IMO, HRO2, ISO, 0120141395 6 SGSO, and DPO2 all denied being involved with any accommodation requests made by the Palestinian LES member, and in so doing, confirmed that the Palestinian LES member Complainant referenced was no longer with the Consulate. IR 1393, 1618, 2083, 2167. DPO2 averred that, to her knowledge, no LES at the Consulate had ever been given a fob. IR 2083. Regarding the Jewish LES member, the IMO averred that this individual’s request for a PDA as a reasonable accommodation was sent to headquarters in Washington, D.C. and processed in the same manner as Complainant’s. IR 1393. HRO2 averred that the Jewish LES member’s request concerned an unlocked PDA, and was initially denied due to the non- availability of a vendor in the region. IR 1619. The ISO averred that the Jewish LES member submitted a second request, this time for a touch-screen PDA, and that this request had been approved at the same time as Complainant’s request for a touch-screen PDA. IR 2167. Incident 2(b) Complainant alleged that on January 20, 2011, HRO1 made the comment, “People don’t want to wait in a waiting room full of Orthodox Jews,†which she characterized as anti-Semitic. IR 175. HRO1 averred that she made the comment while explaining to Complainant the Consulate’s need to retain an Arabic-speaking physician to complete medical certifications for Palestinian employees, which comprised 65% of the Consulate’s local workforce. HRO1 questioned Complainant’s insistence that all employees and new hires go only to Hebrew/English-speaking physicians, frequently primarily by Orthodox Jewish Jerusalemites. HRO1 further averred that Complainant’s interpretation of the Consulate’s policy forced Palestinian employees and new hires to go to physicians with whom they could not communicate, and that she, HRO1, had personally witnessed an incident in which a Palestinian employee, who had to visit a Jewish clinic was made to feel uncomfortable in the waiting room by the other patients, many of whom were, in fact, Orthodox Jews. HRO1 also pointed out that Israeli law required all Gaza-resident Palestinians working for the Consulate and having business inside Israel proper to be escorted by U.S. diplomatic personnel, which further taxed the Consulate’s resources. IR 1600-01. Incident 2(c) Complainant listed a number of incidents which she claimed showed that the Consulate’s management accommodated the religious observances of Muslim employees, but did not do so for Jewish employees. She initially averred that religious accommodations were granted only for Muslim fasting days, but did not provide any dates upon which those occurrences allegedly took place. IR 174, 210. She also averred that during the Fast of Gedalia in 2009 or 2010, which coincided with Ramadan, a Muslim employee was allowed to leave work early while she was not. The MC could not recall whether Complainant had asked for permission to leave work early due to the need to fast. IR 856. Policy posts from the MC dated September 24, 2009, indicated that the Consulate was closed on both Ramadan and the Jewish High Holidays. IR 1044, 1047, 1049-51. HRO2 disputed Complainant’s assertion, characterizing it as “totally false.†IR 1620. 0120141395 7 Complainant stated that on July 19, 2011, the Consulate scheduled a planned fire drill during a Jewish fast day, that the Consulate denied her request to have the fire drill rescheduled, and that an evacuation during very hot weather would be taxing for those who were fasting. IR 184. The RSO responded that the fire drill had been scheduled long in advance, that emergency drills and exercises were essential given the constant threat of terrorism in the region, and that the evacuation would only be for ten minutes and would not require any strenuous physical exertion. IR 2207-08. Complainant claimed that as of November 30, 2011, Jewish employees were no longer allowed to participate in Arabic language training courses, but Palestinian employees were still permitted to participate in Hebrew language training. IR 1621. DPO 2 disputed this version of the event. He stated that the Consulate’s language officer had observed that LES were taking Agency-sponsored language courses in violation of department policy, which allows only for U.S. Government employees to avail themselves of such courses, and that all LES participating in language courses were informed that they could no longer do so. IR 2087. Complainant averred that on December 20, 2011, the IMO, in his capacity as acting MC during MC’s home leave, denied her request to allow one of her staff members to leave early in celebration of Chanukah while allowing a Muslim employee to leave early in observance of Ramadan, and that this request led to her being counseled by the IMO on December 29, 2011. IR 181, 654, 659-60. The IMO responded that Complainant misrepresented the facts of the situation. He pointed out that comparing Ramadan and Chanukah was not appropriate because Ramadan required observance by fasting whereas Chanukah did not, and that his decision was consistent with the policy that identified local holidays for which employees were allowed to leave early. IR 314. Incident 2(d) Complainant alleged that comments made about her in an International Cooperative Administrative Services System (ICASS) survey in effect at the Consulate had been edited to make her look bad, and referred to those comments as “anti-Semitic†several times in her affidavit. IR 177-80, 211. The MC averred that the ICASS survey was conducted annually, and that when the survey was completed, she provided Complainant and the other section chiefs with the results. The MC denied that she or anyone had edited the comments, which she characterized as a mixture of positive and negative. She averred that she told the section chiefs not to take the negative comments personally, and that despite her admonition, Complainant characterized the outcome of the 2011 ICASS Survey as “cyber-bullying.†IR 860. According to the RMO, the ICASS survey results showed that for 2010, 2011, and 2012, the Jerusalem Health Unit had the lowest ratings in the entire region, and that as the leader of that unit, Complainant had yet to demonstrate an analysis of the situation or the implementation of a process to improve customer service. IR 2125. 0120141395 8 Incident 2(e) Complainant alleged that in October 2011, the Consulate’s management jeopardized her personal security when they forced the health unit to enter into a referral agreement with a clinic in East Jerusalem whose point-of-contact had been arrested by the Israeli police for being a member of a terrorist organization. IR 176, 211, 704. The IMO averred that the Consulate had been trying to secure a contract with this particular health clinic for four years, that Complainant had imposed various requirements and qualifications upon this clinic that were not required for other clinics used by the Consulate in Jewish areas, and that the clinic’s staff had become so frustrated with Complainant and her tactics that they refused to have any further discussions with the Consulate. IR 1388-89. The RMO reviewed the requirements that Complainant was attempting to impose on the clinic and ruled that they were not necessary. The RSO, DPO2, and RMO averred that they had looked into Complainant’s security concerns and found them unwarranted, noting that the RSO’s office had repeatedly determined that there were no security risks in connection with the clinic. IR 2083, 2122-23, 2130-35, 2230. Incident 2(f) Complainant alleged that on an unspecified date, the husband of an obstetrics patient became hostile and called her a racist when she tried to explain to them the medical and security risks they would have to face if they chose to have the baby in Nazareth or Bethelem, as the couple preferred. IR 183-84. The husband averred that he tried to explain to Complainant that he preferred that his daughter not be born in Jerusalem because of travel limitations, restrictions, or outright bans imposed by other countries in the region upon those whose passport declares Jerusalem as their place of birth. He further stated that he informed Complainant that he understood the security restrictions that would have to be imposed upon their movement within Nazareth or Bethlehem, and that Complainant told him and his wife that the Agency would not support them either medically or financially if they chose to have their baby in an Arab hospital. When he checked with the Agency’s Health Office in Washington, D.C., he was told that they could have their baby in any hospital they chose and would be completely supported, both medically and financially. IR 2275. He characterized Complainant’s recommendations for service providers as “biased,†as evidenced by the fact that when he mentioned the name of one of the most prominent OB-GYN physicians in Jerusalem, who worked in an Arab hospital, Complainant denied knowing that physician and said to them that they would only seek medical care at that hospital if they did not care about their baby. IR 2275-76. Incident 2(g) Complainant alleged that on July 20, 2011, the IMO and the RSO interrogated her over her use of a government-owned vehicle (GOV) in a harsh and mean-spirited manner, in effect treating her as though she were a criminal. IR 184-93, 243-44. The IMO averred that he had recently been named acting MC and that the investigation by the RSO had already been underway. He stated that he reviewed the policy regarding employee use of GOVs and that the RSO had conducted the interview. Both the IMO and the RSO averred that the RSO treated 0120141395 9 Complainant with utmost respect and professionalism. IR 1393-94, 2208-09. DPO1 averred that he authorized the investigation after receiving reports of what appeared to be excessive usage of the GOV, and that Complainant appeared to be offended by the RSO’s skepticism at her answers to his questions regarding her personal use of the GOV. IR 2048-49. DPO2 averred that she had concerns about why the Health Unit needed a dedicated GOV in the first place, noting along with the RMO that there was no precedent for providing health units with dedicated automobiles. IR 2084, 2123. She also averred that the privilege was rescinded on October 19, 2011, in order to bring the Consulate’s practice in line with that of other overseas missions. IR 2084-85. Incident 2(h) Complainant averred that after the RMO met with one of her medical contacts who was very complimentary of her, he made the comment, “I guess the check’s in the mail, huh?†Complainant interpreted this comment as an accusation from RMO that she was taking illegal kickbacks from her medical contact. IR 193. The RMO responded that he met with the doctor in question in September 2011, and that he was very impressed with his comments about Complainant’s skills and service. He stated that he did not recall making a comment about a check being in the mail. IR 2123. Incident 2(i) Complainant averred that the MC rejected all of her staff award nominations for the Spring of 2011. IR 195. The MC stated that Complainant’s nominations came through on facsimiles that were of poor quality, that parts of Complainant’s nominations were handwritten, and that she did not have enough time to spend working on sorting out the nominations that Complainant had submitted. IR 858-59. When asked whether she issued awards to members of other units, she replied that although she sometimes nominates employees for awards, she herself did not issue them. IR 858-59. Incident 2(j) Complainant alleged that the MC and other management officials took away some of her job duties.3 She averred that the Consulate’s management forced her to recommend Palestinian physicians to her patients and had taken away her authority to prescribe medications. IR 243- 43. She also alleged that on an unspecified date, the Consulate issued a new policy which eliminated her telecommuting privilege. IR 246-47. Thus, she also appears to be alleging that 3 This issue was not addressed in the Agency’s final decision. However, it was raised in an amendment to the complaint and investigated. There are no indications in the record that the incident was part of a dismissed claim. Accordingly, we will rule on Complainant’s claim as it pertains to this incident. 0120141395 10 in addition to her job duties, the Consulate’s management had also taken away an employment privilege that she had previously enjoyed. Regarding physician recommendations, the MC averred that she made the decision to instruct Complainant to give patients referrals to both Jewish and Palestinian physicians when she observed that Complainant had not been doing so. The MC explained that a large percentage of the LES were Palestinian and needed to be served by diverse physicians. IR 863. As to Complainant’s claimed authority to prescribe medication, the RMO averred that the State of Israel did not legally recognize mid-level practitioners such as Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants as independent medical providers with prescribing authority. He maintained that Israel’s pharmacy regulations authorize prescriptions to be written only by Israeli-licensed physicians. IR 2126. As to the rescission of Complainant’s telecommuting privileges, the MC averred that this had occurred while she was on home leave between October 6, 2011 and January 18, 2012. IR 863. During that time frame, the IMO was acting for the MC. He averred that the decision to terminate Complainant’s teleworking privilege had already been made and that Complainant was given a 30-day grace period to get her personal affairs in order. The IMO also stated that his priority was maintaining adequate coverage at the Health Unit. IR 1394-95. Both he and HRO2 averred that although Complainant had claimed that she had been allowed to telework under a previous Management Counselor, she had not been able to produce any documentation for that authorization. IR 1397, 1623. The RMO had questioned how a direct healthcare provider like Complainant could perform her job while telecommuting. IR 2125. Complainant was allowed to keep her flexible work schedule, pursuant to which she did not have to work on Fridays. IR 2148. Incident 2(k) Complainant alleged that the IMO, as acting MC, counseled Complainant on December 29, 2011, after she had tried to request a religious accommodation for her subordinate to leave work early in celebration of Chanukah. IR 654. Complainant averred that the IMO was suspicious of her when she complained about inadequate cell phone coverage, that he accused her of not cooperating with his request for an inspection of her laptop, and that he referred to the counseling as a “bitch session†in her presence, while she was being counseled. IR 655- 57, 663-66. The IMO admitted to making the comment out of frustration with the multiplicity of unsubstantiated accusations that Complainant had been making. In particular, he stated that he used the term “bitch session,†in order to ensure that Complainant clearly understood what he was talking about. IR 1395-99. Following the counseling, Complainant filed a grievance, which was ultimately resolved with an apology from the IMO to Complainant in February 2012. IR 675-78, 1401, 1622, 2087-88. 0120141395 11 Incident 2(l) Complainant alleged that after she was accepted into a doctoral nursing program at Yale University, the Consulate’s management rejected her request for tuition reimbursement. IR 742-44. She identified HRO2, the MC, DPO2, and the RMO as directly responsible for the decision. IR 747. HRO2 averred that as the Training Officer for the Consulate, he was responsible for processing Complainant’s funding request. IR 1938. He further stated that admission into an educational or training program does not guarantee funding, and that only those modules or subjects that are directly relevant to Complainant’s position description would be considered in determining eligibility for reimbursement, which was limited to fifty percent of the total cost. He also averred that when he reviewed Complainant’s application, he found that Complainant’s request was considered to be continuing education, as opposed to job- related training. IR 1939-40. DPO2 averred that the funding that Complainant would need to complete her doctoral program would substantially exceed the funding allotted in the Consulate’s training budget. IR 2071-73, 2076. RMO2 averred that he had reviewed the curriculum of the program and had determined that none of the courses comprising the program were relevant to Complainant’s duties as a Nurse Practitioner. IR 2115. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,†and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the lawâ€). Disability Accommodation The Agency is required to reasonably accommodate the known limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless it can show that doing so would cause an undue hardship to its operations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2 (o) and (p); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17. 2002); Barney G. v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120400 (December 3, 2015). A qualified individual with a disability is an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, 0120141395 12 can perform the essential functions of such position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The record in this case establishes that Complainant’s bilateral wrist tendonitis was a long-term condition that substantially limited her ability to use her hands, which affected her ability to type, write, and examine patients. The accommodations provided to Complainant included a PDA touch screen for her computers, voice-recognition software, and a flexible work schedule that gave her Fridays off. When the PDA arrived, it had to be adjusted so that it could work with the Agency’s local telecommunications network. This was eventually accomplished, although Complainant still had difficulty using the device at home due to the terrain surrounding her residence. With the accommodations she was given, Complainant was able to perform the essential functions of her position. We therefore find that Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability. While Complainant is entitled to an effective reasonable accommodation, she is not entitled to the accommodation of her choice. Lynette B. v. Dept. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720140010 (Dec. 3, 2015). Regarding the ergonomic keyboard that Complainant had requested, the SGSO and other officials had tried to find a keyboard that complied with the Agency’s extensive security protocols, but were unsuccessful in doing so. As to the fob, those devices were only given to U.S. government employees due to the strict security protocols that had to be observed throughout the region. Concerning the locks on the doors to and within the office, there was no need to change those locks because the shape of the door handles precluded the need to twist one’s hands in order to open the doors. Consequently, Complainant would not have to engage in any hand motions in opening and closing doors that would have aggravated her condition. Concerning the use of her hands, the PDA and the voice-recognition software had minimized her need to type and write. Finally, Complainant’s staff and colleagues provided assistance whenever she needed to conduct a medical examination that required her to use her hands extensively. Accordingly, we find that the Agency had satisfied its obligation to provide Complainant with a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Disparate Treatment & Harassment The Commission cannot second-guess an Agency’s decisions involving personnel unless there is evidence of a discriminatory motivation on the part of the officials responsible for making those decisions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that the Agency articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for every incident set forth in the instant complaint. Those reasons are briefly summarized below. Incident 2(a): The Palestinian LES member who Complainant alleges was granted disability accommodations that she was denied had been employed at the Consulate several years before and had left before any of the officials identified as being responsible for denying Complainant’s reasonable accommodation requests had come on board. As to the Jewish LES who Complainant alleges had been denied a reasonable accommodation because of her religion and national origin, this individual’s initial request for an unlocked PDA had been denied, but 0120141395 13 her subsequent request for a touch-screen PDA had been granted. She received her PDA at approximately the same time that Complainant had received hers. Incident 2(b): HRO1 admitted to making the remark about people not wanting to wait in a room full of Orthodox Jews. She maintained that she had done so in the course of trying to explain to Complainant why she should not continue to send Muslim and other Arabic-speaking employees who needed medical certifications to Jewish/Israeli medical providers. Moreover, HRO1’s comment was based upon her personal observation of an encounter between a Muslim employee who was forced to go to an Israeli provider and that provider’s Orthodox Jewish patients. HRO1 had repeatedly urged Complainant to refer Muslim employees to Arab providers in East Jerusalem, but for her own reasons, Complainant had resisted doing so. Incident 2(c): There are no indications in the record that any management official at the Consulate granted Muslim LES leave to observe their holy days but denied the same accommodations to Jewish LES. The MC had posted clearly written policy statements which explicitly stated that the Consulate would be closed for observance of the Jewish High Holidays and for Ramadan. As to the fire drill that took place on July 19, 2011, Complainant had not presented any evidence tending to show that anyone who participated in the fire drill was inconvenienced or adversely affected by the exercise in terms of their religious observance. Regarding the Arabic language education issue, the policy all along had been that only U.S. Government employees were allowed to partake of the Agency’s language training resources, and that this privilege had not been extended to LES. As soon as DPO2 became aware that LES were enrolled in language training courses, he issued an order that such enrollments by LES cease. Finally, on December 20, 2011, the IMO, while serving as Acting MC, allowed employees to leave early in observance of Ramadan but not for Chanukah which was consistent with the Consulate’s policy identifying local holidays for which employees were allowed to leave early. Chanukah was not among them. Incidents 2(d)-2(f): The ICASS survey results indicated that for three consecutive years, the Health Unit supervised by Complainant had the lowest customer satisfaction ratings in the region. This assessment was borne out by the Consulate’s inability to reach a service agreement with the clinic in East Jerusalem due to Complainant’s unsubstantiated accusations that the point of contact with that clinic was a terrorist. It was also confirmed by Complainant’s treatment of the couple that did not want their daughter to be born in Jerusalem because of the negative impact it would have on their ability to travel in the Middle East, and by Complainant’s blatantly false representations that the Agency would not provide medical or financial support to them if they decided to have their baby in an Arab hospital. Contrary to Complainant’s claims of “cyber-bullying,†the comments in the ICASS survey appear to be consistent with these and other observations of Complainant’s leadership of the Jerusalem Health Unit. She has not presented any documents or sworn statements tending to show that any management official had edited the comments in any of the ICASS surveys conducted during Complainant’s tenure. 0120141395 14 Incident 2(g): The investigation conducted by the IMO and the RSO on July 20, 2011 had two purposes. The first was to ascertain whether and to what extent the Jerusalem Health Unit needed a dedicated GOV in order to carry out its responsibilities. The second was to determine whether Complainant or any member of her staff had used the Health Unit’s GOV for personal purposes. In October 2011 the Consulate rescinded its practice of providing the Health Unit with a dedicated GOV. It did so based on the results of the RSO’s investigation and in order to bring its policy in line with that of other U.S. overseas missions. The RSO treated Complainant with courtesy and professionalism during the course of his interview with her, and while Complainant may have been offended by the RSO’s tone of skepticism, Complainant has not provided any evidence that he treated her rudely or with disrespect. Incidents 2(h) and 2(i): While Complainant claims that the RMO made a comment suggesting that she took illegal kickbacks and that the MC rejected her staff award nominations, she has not presented any evidence beyond her own assertions that these occurrences had actually taken place. Incident 2(j): Regarding the requirement imposed upon Complainant to refer patients to Arab providers as well as Jewish providers, the MC had found that while 65% of the LES were Palestinian, Complainant had been referring them exclusively to Jewish providers, and consequently, many Muslim patients were being sent to health care providers with whom they could not even communicate due to the presence of language barriers and long-simmering cultural hostility between Palestinians and Israelis. The MC explained that achieving diversity among outside health care providers was an extremely important priority and that Complainant had often been recalcitrant in doing so. As to Complainant’s claim that the RMO took away her authority to prescribe medication, she never had that privilege to begin with under Israeli law to which, as we previously noted, she was subject as a citizen of the State of Israel. Israeli pharmaceutical regulations mandated that medications be prescribed only by Israeli-licensed physicians. Concerning the rescission of Complainant’s telework privilege, the IMO, HRO2, and the RMO had determined that Complainant’s position as the Health Unit supervisor did not lend itself to teleworking, and her privilege was rescinded after she was unable to produce documentation from the previous management team allegedly authorizing her to telecommute. Incident 2(k): There is no question that the IMO referred to the counseling session with Complainant as a “bitch session.†He admitted that he had done so in a fit of anger at having to deal with what he regarded as her numerous complaints and issues, especially with regard to referring patients to Palestinian health care providers. The IMO was counseled by the MC upon her return to the Consulate and the matter was ultimately resolved in a grievance. Incident 2(l): According to DPO2, the MC, and the RMO, the doctoral program to which Complainant had been accepted was beyond the scope of on-the-job training programs for which tuition reimbursement was typically granted. The RMO had reviewed the proposed curriculum and had determined that none of the coursework was related to her duties as the Health Unit Supervisor, and that the program amounted to unreimbursable continuing education. 0120141395 15 To ultimately prevail on her claims of discrimination and discriminatory harassment, Complainant would have to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that despite their legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the officials named her complaint were nevertheless motivated by unlawful considerations of her gender, religion, national origin, disability, or previous EEO activity in connection with the various incidents that she described in her complaint. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). In circumstantial-evidence cases such as this, Complainant can establish motive by presenting evidence tending to show that the reasons articulated by those officials for their actions were pretexts, i.e., not the real reason but rather a cover for discrimination and reprisal. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). Pretext can be demonstrated by showing such weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the Agency’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. Opare-Addo v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120060802 (Nov. 20, 2007), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080211 (May 30, 2008). Indicators of pretext include discriminatory statements or past personal treatment attributable to those responsible for the personnel action that led to the filing of the complaint, comparative or statistical data revealing differences in treatment across various protected-group lines, unequal application of Agency policy, deviations from standard procedures without explanation or justification, or inadequately explained inconsistencies in the evidentiary record. Mellissa F. v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141697 (Nov.12, 2015). In an attempt to establish the existence of a discriminatory motive on the part of the IMO, Complainant presented on appeal the affidavit of an Information Technology Manager who had been the Information Programs Officer (IPO) at the Consulate. This affidavit came from the investigative report of Agency No. DOS-F-023-13, not the report in the instant case. The issues accepted for investigation in Agency No. DOS-F-023-13 were as follows: 1. Whether, because of her religion (Jewish), national origin (American-Israeli), disability and reprisal (prior EEO activity), Complainant was discriminated against when: a. In June 2012, she was not selected for a Registered Professional Nurse position at Embassy Tel Aviv; b. Her prescription-writing privileges were removed; c. She received a low rating on her annual employee performance report; and d. She was subjected to an ongoing hostile environment characterized by, but not limited to, inappropriate comments and management monitoring her computer use. 0120141395 16 2. Management improperly disclosed and/or discussed her medical information. 3. As an act of reprisal, Complainant was discriminated against when she was terminated from her position on November 21, 2012. IR - DOS-F-023-13, pp. 74-75. The IPO reported directly to the IMP. IR - DOS-F-023-13, p. 453. She averred that after Complainant had requested a reasonable accommodation, the IMO confided in her that, “Complainant was a royal pain in the ass and he wanted her gone.†IR - DOS-F-023-13, p. 455. She further averred that the IMO had become obsessed with having Complainant fired, and had been systematically and illegally accessing Complainant’s personnel file, emails, and voice communications, and in so doing, repeated his desire to terminate Complainant. IR - DOS-F-023-13, pp. 457-61. But when asked whether Complainant’s religion, national origin, or previous EEO complaint were factors in the way Complainant was treated, the IPO replied that she “had no idea.†IR - DOS-F-023-13, p. 462. The investigator in Complaint No. IR - DOS-F-023-13 also asked the IPO whether Complainant’s impairment accounted for how she was treated. The IPO replied that she observed that the IMO would immediately deny Complainant’s requests for services, including services related to her medical condition, and that the intensity of these denials heightened after Complainant had announced her medical issues and filed her EEO complaint. IR - DOS-F- 023-13, p. 462. We have a number of concerns that cause us to question the evidentiary value of this statement. First, it is inconsistent with the sworn statements made by the ISO, the SGSO, and HRO1 in the instant case that Complainant was provided with the accommodations that she needed. More problematical is that the IPO’s affidavit was taken in connection with a case that is currently awaiting a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge. In the absence of indications to the contrary, we must assume that the IPO’s statements concerned the IMO’s conduct in response to the allegations Complainant raised in Complaint No. DOS-F-023-13, not to those she raised in the complaint now before us. We therefore cannot accord any evidentiary weight to the IPO’s affidavit from Complaint No. DOS-F-023-13. The only other evidence provided by Complainant in support of her discrimination claims are her own assertions, which are set forth in her affidavit. When asked why she believed that she was denied accommodations because of her medical restrictions, she replied that the managers “did not care,†and that “my suffering was not important to them.†She also accused HRO1 of being an anti-Semite. IR 168-69, 176-77. As to the counseling session with the IMO that took place on December 29, 2011, the investigator had asked Complainant why she believed that her sex, religion and national origin were the reasons that the IMO had initiated the counseling and had made the “bitch session†comment. Complainant responded that she was the only section supervisor who was Israeli/American and Jewish, that the session occurred right after the IMO had denied Complainant’s request for a religious accommodation for one of her staff members, and that the comment itself was a “vicious and inappropriate†reference to women. IR 654, 657-60. When asked why she believed that her prior EEO activity was a factor in the 0120141395 17 Agency’s decision to deny her request for tuition reimbursement, she stated that the Consulate’s management, particularly the FM, the IMO and the MC had coerced one of her staff members to discuss her personal information with them. IR 747-50. In addition, Complainant reiterated that she was treated as a second-class citizen, that Palestinian employees were treated more favorably than Jewish employees at the Consulate, that her religious observances were the reason her performance was criticized, and that she was not afforded the same accommodations for her disability that were afforded to Palestinian employees. IR 216-29, 232-41. Apart from these assertions, Complainant has not provided any evidence of the indicators of pretext listed above. See Mellissa F, supra. She has not presented any affidavits, declarations, or sworn statements from witnesses other than herself, or documents that contradict the explanations provided by the MC, the IMO, the DPOs, the HROs, or any other management official for the various incidents enumerated in the instant complaint. She has likewise not submitted any evidence which would cause us to question the veracity of any of those management officials. Since Complainant failed to prove the existence of an unlawful motive in connection with the incidents described herein, no further inquiry is necessary as to whether those incidents rise to the level of harassment or constitute separate acts of discrimination under disparate treatment theory. Johnathon M. v. Dept. of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141100 (Jan. 12, 2017); Gregory F. v. Dept. of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141037 (Dec. 2, 2016); Celinda L. v. Dept. of Defense – Defense Logistics Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 0120143166 (Sept. 8, 2016); Alfonso T. v. Dept. of State, EEOC Appeal No. 0120142502 (August 3, 2016); Crysta T. v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 0120142957 (February 3, 2016); Nicki D. v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133247 (Oct. 15, 2015). We therefore agree with the Agency that Complainant has not established that she had been subjected to discrimination or discriminatory harassment in connection with any of the incidents described in her complaint as amended. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision finding that Complainant did not establish that she was discriminated against as alleged. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0416) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 0120141395 18 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency†or “department†means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the 0120141395 19 time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations March 17, 2017 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation