TRW Automotive U.S. LLCv.Magna Electronics Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 1, 2014

13525763 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2014)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 19
Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: July 1, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.,
Patent Owner.
____________

Cases IPR2014-00293 and IPR2014-00294
Patent 8,314,689 B2
____________

Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, BART A. GERSTENBLITH, and
FRANCES L. IPPOLITO, Administrative Patent Judges.

IPPOLITO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108

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I. INTRODUCTION
In IPR2014-00293, TRW Automotive US LLC (“TRW”) filed a
corrected Petition (Paper 17, “-293 Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review
of claims 1–3, 5–10, 12, 15–25, and 27–31 of U.S. Patent No. 8,314,689 B2
(“the ’689 patent”). -293 Pet. 3–4. Patent Owner, Magna Electronics Inc.
(“Magna”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “-293 Prelim. Resp.”).
In IPR2014-00294, TRW filed a corrected Petition (Paper 17, “-294
Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review of claims 34, 39–48, and 50–54 of
the ’689 patent. -294 Pet. 3. Magna filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8,
“-294 Prelim. Resp.”).
IPR2014-00293 and IPR2014-00294 involve the same patent and
parties, and there is overlap in the asserted prior art and additional evidence
submitted by TRW.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314. The standard for
instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a):
THRESHOLD – The Director may not authorize an inter partes
review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
information presented in the petition filed under section 311
and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.
Inter partes review is instituted only if the petition supporting the ground
demonstrates “that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the
claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
On this record, we find that TRW does not establish a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim of the
’689 patent. Accordingly, we deny TRW’s petitions and decline to institute
an inter partes review of the ’689 patent.
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A. Related Proceedings
TRW indicates that the ’689 patent is the subject of federal district
court proceedings in Magna Electronics Inc. v. TRW Automotive Holdings
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00654-PLM (W.D. Mich.). -294 Pet. 5-6.
B. The ’689 Patent (Ex. 1102)
The ’689 patent, titled “Vehicular Vision System,” describes a vehicle
vision system with “a CMOS [complementary metal oxide semiconductor]
photosensor array including a plurality of photosensor elements.” Ex. 1102,
Abstract. The ’689 patent discloses that the CMOS photosensor array is
disposed at an interior portion of a vehicle with a forward field of view to
the exterior of the vehicle through a windshield of the vehicle. Id. In the
disclosed integrated headlight control system, “logic and control circuit 34
processes the photosensor array signals corresponding to the forward field of
view to determine an appropriate vehicle lighting configuration depending
on the light information in the forward field of view.” Id. at 33:25–29. The
’689 patent adds that the system may be used to recognize “veiling glare
caused by scattered light that may be caused by fog, snow, rain or other
adverse conditions. . . . This information may then be used to select the
appropriate vehicle lighting. . . .” Id. at 36:39–50.
C. Illustrative Claims
The challenged claims encompass independent claims 1, 22, 29, 34,
39, and 50. Claims 1 and 50 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter,
and are reproduced below.
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1. A vehicular vision system, said vehicular vision system
comprising:
a CMOS photosensor array comprising a plurality of
photosensor elements;
wherein said photosensor array is disposed at an interior
portion of a vehicle equipped with said vehicular vision system
and wherein said photosensor array has a forward field of view
to an exterior of the equipped vehicle through a windshield of
the equipped vehicle at a windshield area that is swept by a
windshield wiper;
said photosensor array having a field of view forward of
the equipped vehicle that is generally in line with the equipped
vehicle’s primary direction of forward travel;
a control comprising an image processor, said image
processor processing image data captured by said photosensor
array; and
wherein said control analyzes image data captured by
photosensor elements where an object exterior of the equipped
vehicle is determined to be present more than said control
analyzes image data captured by other photosensor elements
where the determined object is not present.
50. A vehicular vision system, said vehicular vision system
comprising:
a CMOS photosensor array comprising a plurality of
photosensor elements;
wherein said photosensor array is disposed at an interior
portion of a vehicle equipped with said vehicular vision system
and wherein said photosensor array has a forward field of view
to an exterior of the equipped vehicle through a windshield of
the equipped vehicle at a windshield area that is swept by a
windshield wiper;
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said photosensor array having a field of view forward of
the equipped vehicle that is generally in line with the equipped
vehicle’s primary direction of forward travel;
a control comprising an image processor, said image
processor processing image data captured by said photosensor
array;
wherein said control processes image data to determine
the presence of an object in said forward field of view of said
photosensor array;
wherein the determined object comprises one of (a) a
vehicle, (b) a headlight of an approaching vehicle and (c) a
taillight of a leading vehicle;
wherein, responsive to an output of said control, said
vehicular vision system is operable to automatically control an
exterior light of the equipped vehicle to limit debilitation of a
driver of another vehicle forward of the equipped vehicle; and
wherein at least one of (i) said control analyzes image
data captured by photosensor elements where a determined
object exterior of the equipped vehicle is present more than said
control analyzes image data captured by other photosensor
elements where the determined object is not present, (ii) said
control, responsive to an output of said photosensor array,
determines an ambient light level present at the equipped
vehicle, (iii) said photosensor array is operated at a plurality of
exposure periods, and (iv) at least said photosensor array is
disposed in a module and wherein said module releasably
attaches to a mounting element that is attached to the
windshield of the equipped vehicle.

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D. The Prior Art1
TRW relies on the following prior art references:
U.S. Patent No. 5,166,681, issued November 24, 1992
(“Bottesch”) (Ex. 1104).
Japanese Unexamined Patent Publication No. S62-131837,
published June 15, 1987 (“Yanagawa”) (Ex. 1105).
Vellacott, CMOS in camera, IEEE Review, May 1994, 111-14
(“Vellacott”) (Ex. 1106).
Yong-Jian Zheng, Werner Ritter & Reinhard Janssen, An
Adaptive System for Traffic Sign Recognition, IEE
Proceedings of the Intelligent Vehicles ’94 Symposium 165
(Oct. 1994) (“Zheng”) (Ex. 1107).
U.S. Patent No. 4,645,975, issued February 24, 1987
(“Meitzler”) (Ex. 1108).
Venturello, European Patent Application, Publication
No. 0353200 A2, published January 31, 1990 (“Venturello”)
(Ex. 1109).
Japanese Patent Application Publication No. H04-127280,
published April 28, 1992 (“Tadashi”) (Ex. 1110).
2

U.S. Patent No. 4,254,931, issued March 10, 1981 (“Aikens”)
(Ex. 1111).
U.S. Patent No. 5,096,287, issued March 17, 1992
(“Kakinami”) (Ex. 1112).

1
For the purposes of this decision, we refer to the exhibit numbers provided
in Case IPR2014-00294 unless otherwise indicated.
2
We refer to “Tadashi” and “Yanagawa” as the English translations of the
original references. TRW provided affidavits attesting to the accuracy of the
translations. Exs. 1105, 1110; 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b).

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E. The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability3
In the -293 and -294 petitions, TRW challenges claims 1–3, 5–10, 12,
15–25, 27–31, 34, 39–48, and 50–54 of the ’689 patent on the following
grounds:
References Basis Claims challenged
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and
Zheng
§ 103(a) 1–3, 5–10, 12, 20–22, 24, and
28–31
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, and Meitzler
§ 103(a) 15–17 and 23
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, Meitzler, and Venturello
§ 103(a) 18 and 19
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, Meitzler, and Tadashi
§ 103(a) 25 and 27
Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott § 103(a) 39, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, and 53
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Aikens, and Kakinami
§ 103(a) 34 and 41
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and
Zheng
§ 103(a) 40
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and
Meitzler
§ 103(a) 43
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and
Venturello
§ 103(a) 45 and 54
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Aikens, Kakinami, and Zheng
§ 103(a) 52
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Meitzler, and Tadashi
§ 103(a) 46 and 47

3
TRW supports its challenge with declarations executed by Jeffrey A.
Miller, Ph.D. on December 23, 2013 (“Miller Declaration”). -293 Pet.,
Ex. 1012; -294 Pet., Ex. 1114.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Interpretation
Consistent with the statute and legislative history of the America
Invents Act, the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the
“broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in
which [they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Office Patent Trial
Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012). Claim terms
are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by
a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the
context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d
1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We apply this standard to the claims of the
’689 patent.
The following claim construction applies.
1. “said control analyzes image data captured by photosensor
elements where an object exterior of the equipped vehicle is
determined to be present more than said control analyzes image
data captured by other photosensor elements where the determined
object is not present” (claims 1 and 40),
and
“said control analyzes image data captured by photosensor
elements where a determined object exterior of the equipped
vehicle is present more than said control analyzes image data
captured by other photosensor elements where the determined
object is not present” (claim 50)
TRW does not propose a construction for these phrases. Magna
submits that the phrase recited in claims 1 and 40 includes a “time/sequence
element,” requiring
that first, an object is determined to be present and then, after,
the object is determined to be present, the control analyzes
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image data captured by the photosensor elements where the
object is determined to be present more than the control
analyzes image data captured by other photosensor elements
where the determined object is not present.

-293 Prelim. Resp. 32; see also -294 Prelim. Resp. 36–39 (proposed claim
construction for this limitation recited in claim 40). Magna does not propose
a construction for the similar phrase recited in claim 50. Given the
similarity of the phrases in claims 1, 40, and 50, we construe both as
follows.
We agree with Magna that the ordinary and customary meaning of the
claim language requires that the recited object first is “determined” to be
present, and then the control analyzes image data as claimed. This
construction is consistent with the claim language as a whole as well as the
Specification, which explains that
[a] significant advantage of the photosensor array 32 over other
sensing technologies is its ability to provide selected image
information so that the logic circuit 46 need only process RS(t)
when, for example, the relevant sub-array S(X) and
corresponding sub-array RS(t) contain all the image information
necessary to a particular application. For example, in the
automatic rearview mirror and vehicle intrusion detection
system described herein, a selected sub-array S(X) of
photosensor elements 32a may provide image information as
shown in FIGS. 3A and 3B, which may be used by logic circuit
46 to provide information regarding the location and intensity
of the headlights of following vehicles. To the extent that other
areas of the photosensor array 32 do not provide such image
information, they may be ignored.
Ex. 1102, 28:23–36 (emphasis added).
Thus, on the record before us, consistent with the ordinary and
customary meaning and the Specification, we construe “said control
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analyzes image data captured by photosensor elements where an object
exterior of the equipped vehicle is determined to be present more than said
control analyzes image data captured by other photosensor elements where
the determined object is not present” in claims 1 and 40, and “said control
analyzes image data captured by photosensor elements where a determined
object exterior of the equipped vehicle is present more than said control
analyzes image data captured by other photosensor elements where the
determined object is not present” in claim 50, to require that the control
perform the recited analysis after an object exterior of the equipped vehicle
is determined to be present.
B. Claims 1–3, 5–10, 12, 20–22, 24, and 28–31 – Obviousness over
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng
TRW contends that claims 1–3, 5–10, 12, 20–22, 24, and 28–31
would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng. -293 Pet. 14–44. For the
reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded that TRW has demonstrated
a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this assertion.
1. Bottesch (Ex. 1104)
Bottesch is directed to vehicle presence detection systems that detect
“the presence of any object capable of varying light rays emanating
therefrom in contrast to the ambient light conditions.” Ex. 1104, 1:6–12.
Bottesch discloses “[m]onitoring the field of surveillance” by “using a single
photosensitive device or an array of such devices within tube structures
arranged to be directed at one or more areas of surveillance.” Id. at 2:40–43.
Bottesch monitors the arrays “for voltage or current fluctuations,” which
“are interpreted as indicating the presence of an object such as a vehicle.”
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Id. at 2:45–48. Bottesch explains:
The variation in reading from sensor tubes 15a, 15b, will
usually be gradual, however, when an object such as a vehicle
enters the field of vision or area of surveillance of sensor 15a,
as in FIG. 2, there will be registered an abrupt change in the
voltage which the microcomputer will interpret as the presence
of an object.
Id. at 5:31–37; see also id. at 5:59–6:15 (further explaining this process).
2. Yanagawa (Ex. 1105)
Yanagawa is directed to “a recognition device for a traveling vehicle
which recognizes the presence of taillights of a vehicle traveling ahead and
headlights of an oncoming vehicle[,] . . . calculates and displays the
interrelationship with the vehicle ahead, and is capable of controlling the
device vehicle’s headlights automatically.” Ex. 1105, 1. Yanagawa
explains that the traveling vehicle recognition device
has an imaging apparatus such as a color television camera . . .
for imaging . . . the forward direction of a traveling vehicle,
extracts color features of headlights and taillights to form a
feature extracted color image signal . . . recognizes the
headlights and taillights of a vehicle ahead, and controls the
headlight beams based on this . . . result.
Id. at 2.
3. Vellacott (Ex. 1106)
Vellacott discloses that a CMOS image sensor (imputer) was used in a
field trial to develop “electro-chromic rearview mirrors, which automatically
reduce headlamp glare from behind.” Ex. 1106, 4. Vellacott describes that
an imputer programmed to analyze an image to recognize when and where
headlamps are present in the field of view and to dim the rear-view and wing
mirrors automatically to reduce glare to the driver. Id. Vellacott also
disclosed an “edge-detection algorithm” that “samples a number of pixels
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around the centre of the imputer sensor to check whether the probe has
crossed an edge.” Id.
4. Zheng (Ex. 1107)
Zheng discloses a traffic sign recognition system. Ex. 1107, 10 (title).
Zheng teaches that “[t]he system . . . has two main modules of detection and
recognition.” Id. During the detection process, each color image taken with
a CCD [charge coupled device] camera is first segmented into some regions
according to the color-values of each pixel.” Id. Zheng classifies each
region by color and if a region “satisfies certain constraints on its size and
color combinations with neighbor regions . . . the region can be marked as a
region of interest (ROI) for the following recognition process.” Id. The
recognition process verifies if a given ROI is really a traffic sign and
identifies the pictographic symbol of the ROI. Id.
5. Analysis
a. Claims 1–3, 5–10, 12, 20, and 21
TRW asserts that independent claim 1 and its dependent claims 2, 3,
5–10, 12, 20, and 21 are unpatentable over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
and Zheng. -293 Pet. 14. Upon review of TRW’s Petition and supporting
evidence, we are not persuaded that TRW has shown sufficiently how the
alleged teachings in the applied references are combined to meet the
limitations recited in the challenged claims. Below we discuss independent
claim 1 that is illustrative of the other claims 2, 3, 5–10, 20, and 21
challenged in this ground.
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i. TRW’s Asserted Combination of References for the
CMOS Photosensor Array and Control Recited in
Claim 1
TRW’s Petition fails to explain sufficiently the specific combination
of references it relies upon to teach the photosensor array and control
limitations recited in claim 1.
For claim 1, TRW asserts that Bottesch is the “primary” reference and
that the discussion “set forth below shows that Bottesch, alone or in
combination with the other applied references” renders the challenged
claims obvious. -293 Pet. 15. From this statement, we understand TRW’s
position to be that it would have been obvious to modify Bottesch’s
disclosure (as the “primary” reference) with the teachings described in
Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng.
Claim 1 recites “a CMOS photosensor array comprising a plurality of
photosensor elements.” TRW asserts that Vellacott teaches a CMOS image
sensor, which can be substituted for any of the CCD cameras taught by
Bottesch or Zheng, or the television camera in Yanagawa. -293 Pet. 20–22,
28. Based on these statements, TRW’s argument appears to be that any one
of Bottesch, Yanagawa, or Zheng may be combined with Vellacott to teach
the recited CMOS photosensor array.
Claim 1 also recites other limitations pertaining to the photosensor
array. Claim 1 recites
wherein said photosensor array is disposed at an interior portion
of a vehicle equipped with said vehicular vision system and
wherein said photosensor array has a forward field of view to
an exterior of the equipped vehicle through a windshield of the
equipped vehicle at a windshield area that is swept by a
windshield wiper; [and]
said photosensor array having a field of view forward of the
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equipped vehicle that is generally in line with the vehicle’s
primary direction of forward travel.
For the first of the above limitations, TRW asserts that “[a]ll of Bottesch,
Yanagawa, and Zheng are directed toward forward facing vehicular vision
systems,” but Vellacott “does not expressly state an example where its
image sensor has a field of view forward of the vehicle’s primary direction
of travel.” -293 Pet. 22. TRW adds that Zheng describes “one example of a
successful and predictable solution,” Bottesch teaches “a view through an
area of the windshield swept by the windshield wiper,” and Yanagawa
discloses how “[t]he television camera for imaging in the forward direction
may be mounted at any location from which the forward direction of the
vehicle can be imaged.” Id. at 22–23. For the second of the limitations
above, TRW argues that “all of Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Zheng expressly
disclose cameras and photosensor arrays generally in line with the
equipped vehicle’s primary direction of forward travel (forward field of
view).” Id. at 24.
Even assuming that the references provide the teachings alleged, we
are not persuaded that TRW has explained sufficiently the exact
combination of teachings, out of the numerous possible combinations of the
four references, that it is relying upon as rendering claim 1 unpatentable. As
discussed above, TRW asserts that Vellacott’s CMOS image sensor can be
substituted for the cameras taught in Yanagawa, Bottesch, or Zheng. -293
Pet. 20–22, 28. However, because TRW has not specified which references
and the exact combination it relies upon for its arguments, we are left to
initially speculate as to TRW’s asserted combination for the first “CMOS
photosensor array” limitation. We would then be required to speculate on
how such a combination would have been modified by some or all of the
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alleged disclosures in Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Zheng to meet the additional
limitations required for the “said photosensor array.” In this instance, we
decline to speculate as to how four references teaching different systems
could apply to all three photosensor array limitations recited in claim 1.
Claim 1 also recites “a control comprising an image processor, said
image processor processing image data captured by said photosensor array,”
and “said control analyzes image data captured by photosensor elements
where an object exterior of the equipped vehicle is determined to be present
more than said control analyzes image data captured by other photosensor
elements where the determined object is not present.”
Similarly, TRW asserts that Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and
Zheng “all . . . disclose a control having an image processor for analyzing
image data captured by a photosensor array, or a camera utilized for a
purpose identical to a vehicular photosensor array.” -293 Pet. 25. TRW
further argues that Bottesch, Vellacott, and Zheng teach the “more than”
limitation, while at the same time acknowledging that the references teach
“different configuration[s]” and “alternative embodiments.” Id. at 25–28.
Once more, TRW does not provide sufficient explanation for how it believes
a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the different
systems disclosed in the cited references. We decline to engage in
speculation as to how some or all of the references could render these
limitations obvious.
A petition must identify with particularity each claim challenged, the
grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that
supports the grounds for the challenge. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). Under 37
C.F.R. § 42.22(a), a petition must include a statement of the precise relief
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requested and a full statement of the reasons for the relief requested,
including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including
material facts, the governing law, rules, and precedent. Additionally, in
accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), the petitioner must establish
“[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” by specifying “where each
element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications
relied upon.” Based on the current record, TRW’s arguments regarding the
“photosensor array” and “control” limitations recited in claim 1 have not
satisfied these requirements.
ii. TRW’s Reasons for Combining the References
TRW has not provided a sufficient reason for why a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have combined the alleged teachings of the
references.
TRW’s analysis is silent on any reason for a combination of the
references teaching a “control comprising an image processor, said image
processor processing image data captured by said photosensor array,” or a
combination of the references teaching “said control analyzes image data
captured by photosensor elements where an object exterior of the equipped
vehicle is determined to be present more than said control analyzes image
data captured by other photosensor elements where the determined object is
not present.” TRW’s general assertion of equivalent substitution also is not
persuasive. Specifically, TRW asserts that it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art,
at the time of the invention, to combine these references
together as desired, according to the particular vehicle system
for which control is desired, by merely substituting individual
components of their common general structure (camera/image
processor/control structure), where such substitutions were well
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known equivalents at the time of the invention for their same
intended purposes.
-293 Pet. 19.
4
However, an analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is objective
and includes an explicit analysis requiring more than “mere conclusory
statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). TRW’s assertion of equivalent substitution
amounts to no more than a conclusory statement without sufficient
explanation as to why one of ordinary skill would have been prompted to
perform the substitution.
Additionally, TRW’s arguments as to why a person of ordinary skill
in the art would change Vellacott’s CMOS image sensor to be forward
facing are not persuasive. TRW asserts that “simply turn[ing] around
Vellacott’s camera to perform the same as the camera did facing rearward
constitutes no more than choosing from a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success.”
-293 Pet. 22. To support this argument, TRW relies on the Specification of
the ’689 patent and contends that the Patent Owner has “admitted that its
method of operating the forward-facing image sensor (a known device) is at
least ‘generally the same’ as its method for operating the rearward-facing
image sensor (a known method).” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). This
argument is not persuasive because TRW has not explained sufficiently how
the methods disclosed in the ’689 patent establish that a different system,
e.g., Vellacott’s imputer, would perform the same either rearward facing or

4
TRW’s declarant, Dr. Jeffrey A. Miller, also repeats this statement without
further explanation. -293 Pet., Ex. 1012 ¶ 21.
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forward facing. Vellacott states that the imputer was used to “develop rear-
view mirrors, which automatically reduce headlamp glare from behind.”
Ex. 1006, 4. In order to perform this function, the imputer “was housed
inside a rear-view mirror and positioned to look out the rear and sides of the
car in a 90
o
arc.” Id. TRW has not shown sufficiently how a forward facing
Vellacott imputer would perform “the same as the camera did facing
rearward” to reduce headlamp glare from behind.
Furthermore, we also are not persuaded by TRW’s conclusory
statement that Zheng describes “one example of a successful and predictable
solution.” -293 Pet. 22. Specifically, TRW has not pointed to what aspect
of Zheng indicates that Vellacott’s imputer could be “turned around” to
perform the same.
Finally, we are not persuaded by TRW’s assertion that
[a]ccording to the applied art, the particular location of the
photosensor array, and/or its field of view, was an obvious
matter of design choice to a person of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention.
-293 Pet. 23 (emphasis added). Forward facing and rearward facing sensors
can be used for different functions, as illustrated by Vellacott. Further, as
discussed above, TRW has not explained sufficiently how Vellacott’s
imputer would perform the same if turned forward facing. See In re Gal,
980 F.2d 717, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a different structure to
achieve a different purpose was not an obvious design choice).
iii. TRW’s Arguments Regarding the “More Than”
Limitation Recited in Claim 1
Claim 1 requires that the recited control “analyzes image data
captured by photosensor elements where an object exterior of the equipped
vehicle is determined to be present more than said control analyzes image
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data captured by other photosensor elements where the determined object is
not present.” (emphasis added).
As explained above, TRW asserts that Bottesch, Vellacott, and Zheng
each disclose this limitation. -293 Pet. 25–26. For Bottesch, TRW asserts
that Bottesch’s microcomputer “may actively monitor one of the groups of
photocells 17, 35, 36 more than [photocells] corresponding to particular
areas of surveillance 37, 38, 39.” Id. at 25. TRW also asserts Bottesch
discloses, in Figures 20 and 21, “the system computer analyzing photosensor
elements directed toward particular areas of surveillance where an exterior
object would be present (e.g., area 43), more so than the computer would
analyze the elements directed toward a different area where the object would
not be present (e.g., area 45).” Id. at 25–26. TRW additionally argues that
Bottesch shows analysis of data from particular photocells (darkened areas)
more than data from other photocells (non-darkened areas). Id. (citing Figs.
11–12d). For Vellacott, TRW argues that Vellacott’s disclosure of an edge-
detection algorithm for its imputer satisfies this limitation. Id. at 26. For
Zheng, TRW argues that Zheng’s description of alternative algorithms to
segment a color image from a forward facing vehicle CCD camera into some
regions also meets this limitation. Id.
We are not persuaded by TRW’s assertions. Even assuming TRW
had explained properly the particular combination relied upon for its
arguments here, we are not persuaded that the alleged disclosure in the
references meet the claim limitation. As discussed, we construe this phrase
to require that the control analyzes the recited image data after an object is
determined to be present. See supra Section II.A.1. TRW has not explained
sufficiently how Bottesch’s alleged disclosure of monitoring photocells 17
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and 35–39 differently teaches a control that performs the recited analysis of
claim 1 after first determining the presence of an object. Likewise, we are
not persuaded by TRW’s assertion that Bottesch’s Figures 20 and 21
disclose analyzing “areas of surveillance where an exterior object would be
present,” (-293 Pet. 25–26 (emphasis added)), because TRW has not
explained sufficiently how this alleged disclose teaches “an object . . . is
determined to be present” (emphasis added). Additionally, TRW’s reliance
on Figures 11–12d also is unpersuasive because TRW cites the figures but
does not explain how Bottesch’s alleged darkened and non-darkened areas
describe the claimed analysis.
We also are not persuaded by TRW’s assertions that Vellacott’s edge-
detection algorithm or Zheng’s algorithms meet this claim limitation. As
Magna states, “[i]n both Vellacott and Zheng, the processing described is
limited to determining whether or not an object is present in the field of view
of the imager.” -293 Prelim. Resp. 33. Vellacott’s edge-detection algorithm
is described as sampling a number of pixels around the center of the imputer
sensor to “check whether the probe has crossed an edge.” Ex. 1106, 4
(emphasis added). Similarly, Zheng discloses that segmentation of a color
image is carried out during “the detection process.” Ex. 1107, 10.
Thus, based on the current record, we are not persuaded that TRW has
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the assertion that
claim 1 is unpatentable over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng.
TRW relies upon the same arguments to show that these references teach the
same limitations recited in claims 2, 3, 5–10, 12, 20, and 21, which depend
from claim 1. -293 Pet. 28–36.
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b. Claims 22, 24, and 28–31
TRW argues that claims 22, 24, and 28–31 would have been obvious
over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng. -293 Pet. 36–45. Claims
24 and 28 depend from independent claim 22, and claims 30 and 31 depend
from independent claim 29.
Independent claims 22 and 29 recite many of the same limitations
recited in claim 1. These limitations include:
a CMOS photosensor array comprising a plurality of
photosensor elements;
wherein said photosensor array is disposed at an interior
portion of a vehicle equipped with said vehicular vision system
and wherein said photosensor array has a forward field of view
to an exterior of the equipped vehicle through a windshield of
the equipped vehicle at a windshield area that is swept by a
windshield wiper; [and]
said photosensor array having a field of view forward of
the equipped vehicle that is generally in line with the equipped
vehicle's primary direction of forward travel.
For the same limitations recited in claims 1, 22, and 29, TRW relies
on its arguments for claim 1 to assert the same ground of unpatentability
against claims 22 and 29. -293 Pet. 37–39, 41–44. For the same reasons
discussed above for claim 1, we are not persuaded that TRW has identified
and explained sufficiently the specific combination of references it relies
upon to satisfy these limitations. Moreover, for the same reasons, we also
are not persuaded that TRW has articulated a sufficient reason for why a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the alleged
teachings of the references.
For claim 22, TRW further asserts that Bottesch teaches a control
“responsive to an output of said photosensor array, [that] determines an
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ambient light level present at the equipped vehicle,” as recited in the claim.
-293 Pet. 38–39. For claim 29, TRW argues that Vellacott discloses
operating a photosensor array “at a plurality of exposure periods,” as recited
in the claim. Id. at 43.
These statements do not clarify the ambiguities created by TRW’s
arguments discussed above. With respect to claim 22, TRW relies on all
four references—Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng—as teaching
the “control” recited in the claim (id. at 38), but does not explain sufficiently
how it believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the
different systems described in Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng with
Bottesch’s ambient light sensors 15c. For claim 29, we understand TRW’s
assertion to be that Vellacott teaches a CMOS image sensor that is operated
at a plurality of exposure periods. Again, however, TRW has not explained
sufficiently the exact combination of the four references—Bottesch,
Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng—that it relies upon for the claim as a
whole. Rather, TRW’s analysis requires us to speculate on the references,
combination, and modification applicable for each of the four photosensor
array limitations recited in claim 29. We decline to do so.
Thus, based on the current record, we are not persuaded that TRW has
shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claims 22
and 29 and their dependent claims 24, 28, 30, and 31 are unpatentable over
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng.
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C. Claims 15–17 and 23 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, and Meitzler
TRW contends that claims 15–17 and 23 would have been obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Bottesch, Yanagawa,
Vellacott, Zheng, and Meitzler. -293 Pet. 45–49. Based on the current
record, we are not persuaded that TRW has demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on this ground based on Bottesch, Yanagawa,
Vellacott, Zheng, and Meitzler.
1. Meitzler (Ex. 1108)
Meitzler is directed to a composite light pickup device for use in a
vehicle “to collect light from both the ambient surroundings and from
oncoming vehicles.” Ex. 1108, Abstract. Meitzler discloses that the
composite light pickup device includes an ambient light element and a lens.
Id. at 2:30–38. Meitzler indicates that the light pickup device is installed in
a vehicle so that the lens element is directed forward of the vehicle to pick
up light radiated from oncoming vehicle headlamps, and the ambient light
element is oriented in an upward direction to pick up ambient light. Id. at
3:16–21. Meitzler also discloses a control circuit to provide “automatic
headlamp-on control and automatic dimming of the high beam headlamps.”
Id. at 3:35–37.
2. Analysis
Claims 15–17 depend from claim 1. Claim 23 depends from claim 22.
For the limitations recited in independent claims 1 and 22 that are required
in dependent claims 15–17 and 23, TRW relies on the same arguments
discussed for claims 1 and 22. -293 Pet. 45–46. Thus, for the reasons
discussed above for claims 1 and 22, we also are not persuaded that TRW
has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that claims 15–17 and 23 are
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unpatentable over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, Zheng, and Meitzler.
Additionally, TRW’s reliance on Meitzler for “certain details of the control
output controlling a vehicular lighting switch” does not persuade us
otherwise. Id. at 46.
D. Claims 18 and 19 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, Meitzler, and Venturello
TRW contends that claims 18 and 19 would have been obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, Meitzler, and Venturello. -293 Pet. 49–53. Based on the current
record, we are not persuaded that TRW has demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on this ground.
1. Venturello (Ex. 1109)
Venturello is directed to “the display of scenes in conditions of low
visibility,” and more particularly, to its “use for facilitating the driving of
motor vehicles in conditions of poor visibility, for example in fog.”
Ex. 1109, 2. Venturello discloses a method for detecting images of an
object employing the following steps: “sending a train of light pulses
towards the object,” “observing the object illuminated by the pulses in
respective time windows,” “reconstructing images of the object from the
observation in the respect[ive] time windows,” and “displaying the image
thus reconstructed.” Id.
2. Analysis
Claims 18 and 19 depend from claims 1 and 17. TRW relies upon the
same arguments for claims 1 and 17 as it presented with respect to claims 1
and 17. -293 Pet. 45, 49–50 (applying TRW’s claim 1 analysis to claim 17
and TRW’s claim 17 analysis to claims 18 and 19). For the reasons
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discussed above for claims 1 and 17, we are not persuaded that TRW has
shown sufficiently that the limitations recited in independent claim 1, and
required in dependent claims 18 and 19, are met by the alleged teachings in
Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng. Additionally, TRW’s reliance
on Venturello for “certain details of the imaged light on the photosensor
array” (id. at 50) does not persuade us otherwise.
E. Claims 25 and 27 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, Meitzler, and Tadashi
TRW contends that claims 25 and 27 would have been obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Zheng, Meitzler, and Tadashi. -293 Pet. 53–57. Based on the current
record, we are not persuaded that TRW has demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on this ground.
1. Tadashi (Ex. 1110)
Tadashi is directed to tunnel-detection apparatuses that apply to auto-
light control devices. Ex. 1110, 6. The disclosed tunnel-detection apparatus
comprises a one-dimensional imaging device, binarizing means for
“binarizing” a one-dimensional video signal output from the one-
dimensional imaging device (i.e., creating a video signal with two possible
values for each pixel), and a tunnel-judgment means for judging a tunnel by
processing the binarized signal. Id. at 7.
2. Analysis
Claims 25 and 27 depend from claim 22. TRW relies upon the same
arguments as it presented with respect to claim 22. -293 Pet. 53. TRW
relies on Tadashi solely to describe the “determination of a daytime
condition” recited in claims 25 and 27. Id. at 54. For the reasons discussed
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above for claim 22, we also are not persuaded that TRW has shown
sufficiently that the limitations of 25 and 27 are met by the alleged teachings
in Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, Zheng, Meitzler, and Tadashi.
F. Claims 39, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, and 53 – Obviousness over Bottesch,
Yanagawa, and Vellacott
TRW asserts that claims 39, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, and 53 are
unpatentable over Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 13. Upon
review of TRW’s Petition and supporting evidence, we are not persuaded
that TRW has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its
assertion that claims 39, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, and 53 are unpatentable.
1. Claims 39, 42, 44, and 48
TRW asserts that claims 39, 42, 44, and 48 are unpatentable over
Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 13–28. However, similar to
TRW’s treatment of claims 1, 22, and 29 discussed above, TRW has not
explained sufficiently how the alleged teachings from each prior art
reference are combined to teach the limitations recited in claims 39, 42, 44,
and 48. Below we discuss independent claim 39 that is illustrative of claims
42, 44, and 48, which depend from independent claim 39.
For this ground, TRW also states that Bottesch is the “primary”
reference and that the discussion “set forth below shows that Bottesch, alone
or combination with the other applied references,” renders the challenged
claims obvious. -294 Pet. 15. Again, TRW’s position appears to be that it
would have been obvious to modify Bottesch’s alleged teaching (as the
primary reference) with the teachings described in Yanagawa and Vellacott.
Like claims 1, 22, and 29, claim 39 also recites “a CMOS photosensor
array comprising a plurality of photosensor elements.” Here, TRW first
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asserts that Vellacott “directs a person of ordinary skill in the art [to] replace
a camera” such as that taught by Yanagawa or Bottesch with Vellacott’s
CMOS image sensor. -294 Pet. 19–20. Then, under its analysis of this
limitation, TRW asserts that “Vellacott . . . expressly directs a reader to
substitute a CMOS image sensor for a CCD camera such as that taught by
Bottesch.” Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Subsequently, TRW asserts that
In summary, claim 39 of the ‘689 Patent does not claim
anything inventive over the known forward facing vehicular
vision systems taught by Bottesch and Yanagawa, each of
which can be properly modified to utilize the CMOS image
sensor taught by Vellacott, as a known equivalent substitution
for television or CCD cameras.
Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).
Claim 39 also recites
wherein said photosensor array is disposed at an interior
portion of a vehicle equipped with said vehicular vision system
and wherein said photosensor array has a forward field of view
to an exterior of the equipped vehicle through a windshield of
the equipped vehicle at a windshield area that is swept by a
windshield wiper;
said photosensor array having a field of view forward of
the equipped vehicle that is generally in line with the equipped
vehicle’s primary direction of forward travel; [and]
wherein said photosensor array is operated at a plurality
of exposure periods.
For these limitations, TRW asserts that Bottesch and Yanagawa are directed
to forward facing vehicular vision systems and Vellacott’s CMOS image
sensor is operated at a plurality of exposure periods. -294 Pet. 21–22, 25.
For similar reasons discussed above for claims 1, 22, and 29, we are not
persuaded that TRW has shown sufficiently how the alleged forward facing
teachings in Bottesch and Yanagawa would apply to an unspecified
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combination of Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. Thus, we decline to
speculate as to TRW’s specific proposed combination of references for the
photosensor array limitations.
Claim 39 also requires “a control comprising an image processor, said
image processor processing image data captured by said photosensor array”
and “said control, responsive to an output of said photosensor array,
determines an ambient light level present at the equipped vehicle.”
Although TRW asserts “all of the applied references disclose a control
having an image processor for analyzing image data captured by a
photosensor array, or a camera utilized for a purpose identical to a vehicular
photosensor array,” TRW does not indicate which particular reference(s) it is
relying upon as teaching the “control” limitations of the claim. -294 Pet.
23–24. TRW then asserts that Bottesch discloses ambient light sensors 15c,
(id. at 24–25), but does not explain sufficiently how Bottesch’s teaching
applies to the three references (including Bottesch) cited to teach the recited
“control.” In sum, based on the current record, TRW’s Petition does not
specify sufficiently how the alleged teachings from Bottesch, Yanagawa,
and Vellacott would have been combined to satisfy each and every
photosensor array and control limitation recited in claim 39.
Further, to the extent that TRW relies on a combination of the
references, TRW has not provided a sufficient reason as to why one of
ordinary skill in the art would have combined the applied references. As
discussed above, we are not persuaded by TRW’s assertion that it would
have been a predictable solution or an obvious design choice “to simply turn
Vellacott’s camera to perform the same as the camera did facing rearward.”
-294 Pet. 21–22. TRW’s reliance on “equivalent substitution” (id. at 26)
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also is not persuasive, as this is a conclusory statement without proper
explanation as to why one of ordinary skill would have been prompted to
perform the substitution.
Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that TRW has
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that
claim 39 is unpatentable over Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott.
Additionally, for the same reasons, we also are not persuaded that TRW has
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the same ground
against claims 42, 44, and 48, which depend from claim 39.
2. Claims 50, 51, and 53
TRW asserts that claims 50, 51, and 53 are unpatentable over
Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 28–35. Claims 51 and 53
depend from independent claim 50. Initially, we note that TRW presents
many of the same arguments discussed above for claims 39, 42, 44, and 48.
See -294 Pet. 28–29 (relying on arguments made under the same ground for
claim 39). For the same reasons discussed above, we also are not persuaded
that TRW has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this
ground challenging claims 50, 51, and 53.
Additionally, TRW has not explained sufficiently how the applied
references teach claim 50’s limitations requiring
said control processes image data to determine the presence of
an object in said forward field of view of said photosensor
array; wherein the determined object comprises one of (a) a
vehicle, (b) a headlight of an approaching vehicle and (c) a
taillight of a leading vehicle; [and]

wherein, responsive to an output of said control, said vehicular
vision system is operable to automatically control an exterior
light of the equipped vehicle to limit debilitation of a driver of
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another vehicle forward of the equipped vehicle.
TRW argues that Yanagawa “expressly discloses that the determined object
may comprise both a headlight of an approaching vehicle and a taillight of a
leading vehicle” and “automatically controlling headlight beams to high and
low beams according to the state of whether there is a vehicle ahead.” -294
Pet. 31–32. However, TRW’s analysis is silent on a reason as to why one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to combine Yanagawa’s
alleged teaching with Bottesch or Vellacott. Id. Moreover, we are not
persuaded by TRW’s general assertion that Yanagawa’s system “may be
substituted for portions of Bottesch’s POS computer . . . as an equivalent
substitution.” Id. at 18. This statement is conclusory and does not explain
sufficiently why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the
substitution.
Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that TRW has
established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the ground that
independent claim 50, and its dependent claims 51 and 53, would have been
obvious over Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott.
G. Claims 34 and 41 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Aikens, and Kakinami
TRW asserts that claims 34 and 41 are unpatentable over Bottesch,
Yanagawa, Vellacott, Aikens, and Kakinami. -294 Pet. 35. Upon review of
TRW’s Petition and supporting evidence, we are not persuaded that TRW
has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that
claims 34 and 41 are unpatentable over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Aikens, and Kakinami.
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1. Aikens (Ex. 1111)
Aikens is directed to a “rear view mirror for mounting on the interior
surface of an automobile windshield . . . [that] will automatically snap loose
and drop out of the way without causing serious injury to the occupant.”
Ex. 1111, Abstract.
2. Kakinami (Ex. 1112)
Kakinami discloses “a video camera for an automobile.” Ex. 1112,
Abstract. Kakinami’s Figure 2a is reproduced below.

Figure 2a is a cross-sectional view of the automobile and the video camera
mounted to it. Id. at col. 2:6–7. Kakinami discloses that video camera 20 is
mounted on arm 11, which supports rearview mirror 1. Id. at 2:15–21.
Kakinami discloses positioning video camera 20 “to shoot scenes through
the front glass windshield 3 through an area covered by the wipers 23. The
wipers 23 clean the front glass windshield 3 when it rains or the front glass
is dirty so the video camera 20 is provided with good visibility through the
front glass windshield 3.” Id. at 2:64–3:2.
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3. Analysis
For claims 34 and 41, TRW presents many of the same arguments
discussed above for claim 39. -294 Pet. 36–40. For the same reasons
discussed above, we also are not persuaded that TRW has demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this ground against claims 34 and 41.
Moreover, TRW’s arguments that Aikens and Kakinami teach structural
details of the module in which the array is disposed (id. at 36) do not
persuade us otherwise.
H. Claim 40 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and Zheng
Claim 40 depends from independent claim 39. TRW relies on the
same arguments for claim 40 that were asserted for claim 39 based on
Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 40–41. For the same reasons
discussed above, we are not persuaded by these arguments.
Additionally, claim 40 recites
said control, analyzes image data captured by photosensor
elements where an object exterior of the equipped vehicle is
determined to be present more than said control analyzes image
data captured by other photosensor elements where the
determined object is not present.
For this limitation, TRW reiterates the arguments discussed above for
claim 1. Specifically, TRW argues that Bottesch, Vellacott, and Zheng each
discloses this limitation. -294 Pet. 42–43; -293 Pet. 25–27. For the same
reasons discussed above for claim 1, we are not persuaded that TRW has
shown sufficiently that the applied references teach a controller that
performs the recited analysis after an object is determined to be present.
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I. Claim 43 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, and
Meitzler
Claim 43 depends from independent claim 39. TRW relies on the
same arguments for claim 43 that were made for claim 39 based on
Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 44. For the same reasons
discussed above, we are not persuaded by these arguments.
J. Claims 45 and 54 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
and Venturello
Claim 45 depends from claims 39 and 44, and claim 54 depends from
claim 50. TRW relies on the same arguments for claims 45 and 54 that were
asserted for respective independent claims 39 and 50 based on Bottesch,
Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 47. For the same reasons discussed
above for claims 39, 44, and 50, TRW has not demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on this ground.
K. Claim 52 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott, Aikens,
Kakinami, and Zheng
Claim 52 depends from independent claim 50. TRW relies on the
same arguments for claim 52 that were asserted against claim 50 based on
Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 51. For the same reasons
discussed above, we are not persuaded by these arguments.
L. Claims 46 and 47 – Obviousness over Bottesch, Yanagawa, Vellacott,
Meitzler, and Tadashi
Claims 46 and 47 depend directly or indirectly from claim 39. TRW
relies on the same arguments for claims 46 and 47 that were asserted for
claim 39 based on Bottesch, Yanagawa, and Vellacott. -294 Pet. 54. For the
same reasons discussed above for claim 39, TRW has not demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this ground.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, TRW has not demonstrated that there is a
reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of
at least one claim of the ’689 patent.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons given, it is
ORDERED that the Petitions in IPR2014-00293 and IPR2014-00294
challenging the patentability of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,314,689 B2
are denied; and
FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Decision be entered into
the file of both of the instant proceedings.

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PETITIONER:

Josh Snider
Timothy Sendek
A. Justin Poplin
LATHROP & GAGE LLP
patent@lathropgage.com
tsendek@lathropgage.com
jpoplin@lathropgage.com

PATENT OWNER:

Timothy A. Flory
Terence J. Linn
GARDNER, LINN, BURKHART & FLORY, LLP
Flory@glbf.com
linn@glbf.com

David K.S. Cornwell
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX PLLC
Davidc-PTAB@skgf.com