0120100503
05-26-2011
Trena R. Price, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.
Trena R. Price,
Complainant,
v.
John M. McHugh,
Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120100503
Agency No. ARRAD08AUG03196
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a decision by the Agency dated September 11, 2009, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of an April 16, 2009 settlement agreement. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
BACKGROUND
During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Painting Worker at the Agency's Red River Army Depot facility in Texarkana, Texas. Believing that the Agency subjected her to unlawful discrimination, Complainant contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO complaint process.
On April 16, 2009, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement agreement (SA) to resolve the matter. The (SA) provided, in pertinent part, that the Agency agreed to:
(1) Place the Complainant on a time limited appointment as a Material Expediter . . . or Heavy Mobile Equipment Mechanic Helper . . . . Placement will be dependent upon where the workload dictates an overallocated space is needed. The Directorate for Maintenance will submit appropriate paperwork, to include a Request for Personnel Action (RPA) to the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) which will be processed within 60 days of the date all parties sign this agreement.
(2) Restore sick leave and annual leave from 20 August 2008 to effective date of appointment reflected in paragraph 3a. The agency will submit documentation for restoration of leave within 30 days of Complainant's appointment.
By letter to the Agency dated August 8, 2009, Complainant alleged breach, and requested that the Agency implement its terms. Specifically, Complainant alleged that the Agency did not restore her Service Computation Date "as was verbally agreed upon in the 16 Apr 09 meeting by" the Agency's attorney. Complainant argued that the subject settlement agreement did not contain this provision due to an oversight by all parties involved. Further, Complainant argued she was under significant mental and duress when she signed the agreement.
In its September 11, 2009 FAD, the Agency concluded it complied with all the terms of the SA. The Agency investigated Complainant's allegation, and the Agency's attorney denied he orally agreed to restore her Service Computation Date. Further, paragraph 5 of the SA provided that it was "the full and complete settlement of any and all issues arising from" the formal complaint, and paragraph 6 allowed Complainant seven (7) days from receipt of the agreement to review and consult with an attorney. Because Complainant provided no evidence other than her statement and that of her representative, the Agency found that Complainant was not under duress when she signed the SA.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Complainant reiterates her account of the events leading up to the execution of the SA, and argues that her word, and that of her representative, should have as much credence as that of the Agency's attorney. Complainant maintains that she was rushed into signing the SA, and she signed the SA under duress. Complainant argues she was told that "if an agreement wasn't reached we would continue to the Formal FFC."
In response, the Agency argues that Complainant's allegations are unfounded, and attaches a declaration provided by the EEO investigator involved in the settlement negotiations. The investigator said both Complainant and the Agency's attorney were engaged in heated debate, and the investigator had to tell both parties to calm down. Additionally, both Complainant and her representative read the agreement before signing and neither requested the SA address Complainant's service computation date. The Agency further emphasized that both Complainant and her representative were aware the SA provided it was the full and complete agreement and that Complainant had seven days to review the agreement, either independently or with an attorney.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
Because the Commission favors the voluntary resolution of discrimination complaints, settlement agreements are not lightly set aside. However, if coercion, misrepresentation, misinterpretation, or mistake occurs during the formation of the contract, assent to the agreement is impossible, and the Commission will find the contract void. This Commission examines coercion claims with much scrutiny. The party raising the defense of coercion must show that there was an improper threat of sufficient gravity to induce assent to the agreement and that the assent was in fact induced by the threat. Such a threat may be expressed, implied or inferred from words or conduct, and must convey an intention to cause harm or loss. A complainant's bare assertions will not justify a finding of coercion. Cannella v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01995444 (December 5, 2000).
In the instant case, Complainant does not provide any evidence, beyond her own assertions, that she was coerced into signing the SA without properly reviewing it. The affidavit of Complainant's representative makes no mention that Complainant was subject to any improper threat. Instead, Complainant admits that the failure to include a provision regarding her service computation date was an "oversight" and that she rushed into signing the agreement. Moreover, the record and arguments on appeal provide no evidence of any improper threats. The Agency did not engage in improper conduct by saying that a formal fact finding conference would commence in the absence of a signed agreement. In fact, the Agency is obligated to continue processing Complainant's formal complaint unless the claims are withdrawn or settled.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the Agency's final decision finding no breach of the subject SA.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 26, 2011
__________________
Date
2
0120100503
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120100503